Nationalist Chinese Generals lost 1937-1945

[Mil-tech Bard]

How many Nationalist Chinese general officers were lost between 1937 and the surrender of Japan to the Allies in 1945?

How does one differ between warlord forces and those of the Nationalist Chinese Army?

[Steen Ammentorp]

So far I have registered 399 Chinese generals, who died between 1937 and 1945 in my database. I'm not able to give an overview of the causes of death, and they were multiple:

Killed in action either by the Japanese, Communists, classes between different fractions
Assassinated either by the Japanese, Communists, Nationalists, rival fractions
Executed either by the Japanese, Communists, Nationalists, rival fractions
Accidents & Diseases
Suicides

As I said there were numerous.

How to distinct between true nationalist generals and generals from other fractions is difficult because during the war they all accepted - on paper - the overall leadership of the Nationalist Government (Ching Kai-shek) and all units were incorporated in the OoB of the National Revolutionary Army – again on paper. This meant that even communist officers like Zhu De were considered generals in the National Revolutionary Army. I say considered because in the Chinese system officers were recognized as, addressed as and whore the insignias as generals without ever being official promoted to a generals rank by the national government – It may be considered a temporary or provisional rank, which often came as a result of the appointment the officer held. In example Zhong Yi were considered a Major-General since September 1929 and a Lieutenant-General since September 1938, when becoming commander of the 173rd Division, however he didn't receive any official rank until after his death by suicide on the 9th May 1940, when he posthumously was promoted to Lieutenant-General by the National Government on the 28th June 1940.

[L1E1]

How many Nationalist Chinese general officers were lost between 1937 and the surrender of Japan to the Allies in 1945?

How does one differ between warlord forces and those of the Nationalist Chinese Army?

It is hard to locate the number. Ho Ying-chin (何應欽) mentioned 206 which only included 2 generals from the Communists (18th Army Group and New 4th Army). Some reports showed 275-278 which counted the ones who were promoted to generals after their death, but still only 2 generals from the Communists.

Regarding the question “Warlord forces and those of the Nationalist Chinese Army?”. Warlord is the one who has his own force. To protect his own best of interests, he will not always listen to the central government. In this case the Cantonese is a leading example of a warlord. But the Cantonese also belongs to Chinese Nationalist because once you stepped in the Military Academy, you are a Chinese Nationalist.

In fact the officers of the National Revolutionary Army are all Nationalists with only one exception. This exception is also the sole example that a warlord who belongs to National Revolutionary Army is not a Nationalist. This warlord is the Chinese Communist........ Hand on, I understand the Communists don't think themselves are Warlords..... But it is a fact. The one who can read Chinese must understand the below.
《中共中央為公布國共合作宣言》，
四、取消紅軍名義及番號，改編為國民革命軍，受國民政府軍事委員會之統轄，並待命出動，擔任抗日前線之職責。

When the Communists announced to join the National Revolutionary Army to fight the Japanese, they confirmed to the public, using the Nationalist party’s newspapers media, that they will strictly follow the orders from the National Military Council. But in fact it turns out to be the Communists only listen to their own commanders that result in The New 4 Army Incident........One bright point here. The communists who strictly follow the route assigned by the National Military Council resulting in no loss, but the one didn't follow suffered heavy losses.

Like other warlords, the Communists quickly set up their own taxation system, recruit news troops and build its own kingdom. Unlike other warlords, the Communists troops are poorly equipped. It is simply because the National Revolutionary Army only supplies the needs of the original numbers of the troops, 35,000 but the communists had 400,000 troops (about half guerrillas and half regular troops) during The Hundred Regiments Offensive on 20 August 1940.

[YC Chen]

The New 4 Army Incident........One bright point here. The communists who strictly follow the route assigned by the National Military Council resulting in no loss, but the one didn't follow suffered heavy losses"
Do you mean the "Wannan Incident"(皖南事变) as it is called in Mainland China? No wonder the one didn't follow Nationalist rule suffered great loss, the whole thing is a bit like a civil confilct between the Communist and Nationalist right in the middle of WW2. It's meaningless to argue "who was right and who was wrong" in this much debated event, but one can not overlook that the tension between KMT and CCP was still very high even during the WW2, especially in the 1940s(as you can see in Nationalist documents during the war, the Communists were still regarded as "bandits"(匪)).

And I also challenge your view that the Chinese Communist forces were poorly equipped. Interestingly, not only many KMT sources said so, most of the CCP propogenda here in the Mainland also speak exaggeratedly of "how difficult our force was at its beginning", thus create a historical illusion. However, if you read the original documents and memoirs carefully, you can easily see that even in the difficult "Long March" the Communists' weapons were much superior than most warlord(or you may regard them as Nationalist) forces standing in their way(for example, the MP18I SMG was a common weapon in Communist force during the Long March, but many warlord forces in Sichuan didn't even have many good rifles); and knowing this one can also easily understand how the Red Army can conduct two sieges of the large city Changsha(one succeeded and one failed) against Chiang Kai-shek's force in 1930.

During WW2, it is right to say that the Communists' weapons were inferior to some Nationalist central forces, but even the more difficult N4A could boast over 100 pieces of artillery(I think 81 and 82mm mortars included) in 1940s, and the 8RA had 300+ pieces of artillery(can't remember the exact number), among them about 100 to be infantry and mountain guns from 37mm to 75mm. And the Communist were even able to design and build its own artillery pieces in 1940s. The 37mm infantry guns designed and built by Wu Yunduo(吴运铎) for N4A's 2nd Division is well documented, and some sources even metioned that N4A's 3rd Division built 10 37mm guns in Spring 1942. And the design roots of many weapons built by the Communists during the Civil War can also be traced back into the WW2 era.

As to the designation of "Warlords", I think if you use the designation "Warlord is the one who has his own force. To protect his own best of interests, he will not always listen to the central government", that Chiang Kai-shek falls well into this category - he has his own force, he protect his own interest(at least before 1930), and he never listen to the 1927 Central Government of Marshal Chang Tso-lin and the 1930 Central Government of Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang and Li Zongren.

[L1E1]

Of course Chiang Kai Shek is a warlord. I never said he was not (Please refer to this link, I wrote that long time ago not today).
viewtopic.php?f=101&t=191393.
I also mentioned Cantonese was one of the warlords. The word wardlord never carry any negative meaning. The Cantonese built up their own area, called the golden ten year.

It is a common sense that a troop should follow the high commander’s order to defense one area. And then a troop should also strictly follow the route assigned by the high commander to move from one area to another area. What will happen, if a troop lose the land, or don’t follow the route? In China, the answer is, the military polices might shoot the senior officers. As a result, all the Chinese officers pay great attentions when they need to move from one area to another area. In case they need to retreat, they will ask for approval. If they don’t have the approval, they will try their best to fight back. In case a new troop received an order to take up the area, the old troop must ask the new troop to sign with a chop. It is because without this black and write document, the old troop is the only one who is liable to the loss of land.

So what had happened during “The New 4 Army Incident”. It is very clear the Communists troop enter the area where it should be defensed by other troops. The Communists might not have invaded the area; they might just protect their wings while they saw other troops retreated. But no matter how, the Communists refused to hand over the land back to the original troops. Moreover the Communists set up their own Taxation system in those areas to fund their needs ( a fact to control the land in a long period of time). The troops who lose the lands have no choice to fight back. They would rather like to be killed under this action rather than to be killed by the Military polices.

The high commander doesn’t want these conflicts happened again. They ordered the Communists to move to new areas with assigned route. The Communists ignored this order and tracers even their Communists high commanders ordered them to move. 5 months later, they knew from the Communist high commanders that the Nationalist was about to lose temper, they started to follow their own Communists commanders to move.

The bright points I already mentioned were, to test the water, the Communists assigned 900 people to follow the route assigned by the Nationalist, that is moving to the east and then north. This 900 people marched to the new position without any lose. And then the next day, the rest 9,000 people were stupid enough to take another route, they moved to the southwest (not sure will turn to the north and turn to the east later). Few hours later, the Nationalist confirmed the Communists did not followed the route and gave warnings to the Communnists. The Communists refused to surrender that made the Nationalist had to opened fire. Another bright point here, a group of 2,000 people escaped. They followed the route assigned by the Nationalist to retreat. Again these 2,000 people, under the eyes of the Nationalist force along the road, suffered from zero loss.

“The New 4 Army Incident” is a punishment of Communist insubordination. It is an ironic fact that the Nationalist troops along the road followed the order from the high commender, that is not to open fire if the Communists troop follow this route to the new position. As a result the 900 and the 2,000 who followed the asigned route recevied no loss, but not the one who didn't.

I think it is meaningless to argue on "the Chinese Communist forces were poorly equipped" under your logic. I can show you for example the warlord in Chengtu had better equipments all the time than the Communists. But that doesn't mean a normal troop under this warloard had better equipments than the Communists all the time........ see the mistake.

[South]

Chozen L1 Ei (Good morning),

Re: "because once you stepped in the Military Academy, you are a Chinese Nationalist";

Many of us Americans learned that the Whampoa Military Academy was a source of some of the best CCP generals !

For all:

At the risk of appearing arrogant........I only seek to clearify for other Western forum participants......;

Re: "to sign with a chop":

that is, a formal document signed and sealed. ("chop" = seal).


Warm regards,

Bob

[L1E1]

Chozen (morning in Cantonese)

1) Whampoa Military Academy .
The set up of Whampoa Military Academy is during the honeymoon period between China and USSR. The money, weapons, teachers, necessary for the construction and support of the Academy in 1924-1925 was provided by the Soviets. The CCP made an agreement with the Nationalist that the Chinese communists students could join the Nationalist party in the school. The fourth term of the Academy saw Communists students not only from China, but also from different parts of Asia enroll, like Korean and Vietnamese. All these studnets must join the Nationalist party. It is quite sad that those classmates had to fight between each others.

2) "to sign with a chop":
It is equal to "a formal document signed and sealed" and that formal docuement could be anything. In case you cannot find a paper, you can use leaf, silk, uniform etc.

[YC Chen]

I never say that the word "warlord" carry nagetive meanings. In fact, Mr. Yan Xishan and Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the two men I admir most in China's modern history, are often regarded as "warlords"(although I think Yan Xishan doesn't fit my definition of "warlord").

I agree with you that some warlords in Chengdu has much better equipment(don't forget that the arsenal there was the first in China to make 15cm mortar, they also made good quality copy of ZB26 LMGs). My point is that the Communists were never "poorly equipped".