Chinese 200th Division: descriptions of actions needed!

[pitman]

sjchan, thank you very much for your last two posts! Very informative, interesting, and useful. I really appreciate it.

[sjchan]

Some additional information on the use of armor to support the 200th D at Kunlun Pass (and Toungoo) this week some 68 years ago (abstracted from this on-line material on the developed of the Chinese armored forces: http://www.superarmy.com/zzms/others/ot ... 111_01.htm)

In Jan 1938, the Chinese government received 82 T-26, 92 Italian CV-33, 18 German armored cars and 100+ Mercedes trucks as well as 400 Ford 4 cylinder trucks. On the basis of this equipment the 200th D was built.

In early 1939 the division has been expanded into the 5th Coprs. Note that all the armor (1st and 2nd Tank Regiments) was attached to corps command; thus none of the divisions which constituted the army (200th D, 1st Honor D, New 22nd D) was really armored (or arguably mechanized), although they were often considered as such. In reality these divisions enjoyed the support of armor mostly when they were designated as the main assault force in a particular battle.

During the attack by the 1st Honor D on Kunlun Pass on Dec 18, one of the T-26 of the supporting tank force (1st and 2nd Battalion, 1st Tank Regiment) was destroyed by Japanese fire. The tanks played a major role in the assault and capture of Point 653 on Dec 19. In the attack on the main Japanese defensive lines on Dec 20, more Chinese AFVs were destroyed. By early 1940, the 5th Corps was taken out of the battle but the 7th Company, 2nd Battalion of the 1st Tank Regiment was left behind. Unfortunately, this unit was totally annihilated in later battles due to poor coordination with its support infantry from the 73rd D. After the battle, the commander of the division, Dai An-lan, discussed the improper use of tanks in the battle of Kunlun Pass: “The Japanese frequency placed their anti-tank capabilities in disguised flanking positions. Hence it is important to send a reconnaissance vehicle to lure the Japanese anti-tank guns to expose their positions so that these can be neutralized by our anti-tank guns and heavy artillery. Otherwise it is not only impossible to use the tanks to their fullest advantage but heavy and needless losses will be incurred as well. For instance, the Japanese did not dare to use tanks in the Battle of Kunlun Pass”.

When the 5th Corps entered Burma, the 3rd Battalion of the Armored Regiment was left behind in Kwangsi. However, since some of the bridges between Kunming and Burma could not even handle 10 tons, only some Renault and CV-33 light tanks were deployed at the front and took part in the fighting between the 200th D and the Japanese. In the Battle of Toungoo, the 5th, 6th and 10th Companies (minus the heavier T-26s which were still awaiting transport at Lashio) of the Armored Regiment were attached to the 65th and 66th Regiments of the New 22nd D during its foray to relieve the encircled 200th D. On March 27, Yedashe was captured but 4 tanks were destroyed and the commander of the 6th Company killed. On March 28, with support from the tanks, some of the buildings around the Nangyun railway station were taken and Japanese gun positions destroyed. By April 25, the situation in Burma had deteriorated to such an extent that it was decided to withdraw the armor and mechanized forces back to Yunnan to stop further Japanese advances. A composite force of some 10 tanks and 4 anti-tank guns were deployed in a blocking position in a mountain pass. Unfortunate the supporting infantry troops were raw recruits and the result was that the entire force was wiped out. Not all Chinese tanks were able to withdraw back into China; in fact only 46 made their way back. Fortunately since the T-26s were never sent to the front, they were all able to get back

[asiaticus]

Chinese government received 82 T-26, 92 Italian CV-33, 18 German armored cars

I think these numbers are wrong. I have a post that quotes a Du Yuming memoir that the the Chinese had 20 CV-33 remaining in 1938 of 20 purchased several years earlier. Also in 1938 the Soviets sent 50 FAI and BA 3/6/10 type armoured Cars as well as the T-26 tanks (70 went to 200th Division then 5th Corps) and 4 BT-5 tanks.

I imagine 18 of the old German armoured cars might still be on hand too.
They were with the 3rd Tank Battalion:
15 x PzKpfw I/A light tanks (from Germany)
20 x Fiat CV33 tankettes (from Italy)
18 x Sdkfz 221 and 222 armd cars (from Germany)
Battalion Formed in 1935; in the Battle of Nanking (4th to 13th Dec 1937).

I think the PzI/A were destroyed there.

[pitman]

I have seen from other sources that the Soviets sent the armored cars mentioned by asiaticus above, as well as the lower number of CV-33. I don't have them handy, so I can't say which ones said that. I think Chuikov mentions the armored cars, tho', if my memory serves me correctly.

[sjchan]

On researching the number of CV-33s further, the figures regarding the CV-33s actually came from more definitive sources, including official history of Chinese armored forces published by the ROC Ministry of Defence. For instance, a recent book 抗戰時期國軍機械化/裝甲部隊畫史1929-1945‪ by 滕昕雲 (published in 2003) stated that 20 CV-33s were first bought by the Chinese and 94 more CV-35 (a later variant) were bought later (p.66), and it is these that together with the T26s that constituted the backbone of the armored forces in the 5th Army. Regarding the Soviet armored cars, there is no record (or pictures) of them in action in official Chinese records, though the author noted claims of their use by foreign sources and did not rule out the possibility that they were indeed used in China.

There was much information in this book (and lots of pictures) regarding the development of the Chinese armored units as well as some description of their tactics and how they fared in the various battles (including Kunlun Pass and Toungoo).

Incidentally I have located the official battle diary and detailed after action reports of the 200th D for the Battle of Toungoo. Can post them later if there is still interest on this topic; they contain minor but vivid details of the battle from the perspective of General Dai.

[asiaticus]

94 more CV-35 (a later variant) were bought later (p.66),

Interesting, never heard of this before. Nothing before has ever mentioned these. When were these bought and received in China?

[sjchan]

Well, many Chinese sources refer only to CV-33 as well, but perhaps that's because they do not differentiate between the two models (e.g. see http://www.hoplite.cn/templates/hpjh0066.htm which has some nice drawings) -- the CV-35 were introduced in 1935 (hence the model #) and included a number of improvements over the CV-33

According to the book I referenced, the CV-35 (should be called L-3/35) were bought in 1937. Most of the CV-35 bought by the Chinese carried only dual 8 mm machine guns, which were not of much use in the most combat situations. Moreover, the Chinese found out that while the T-26 often survived combat in good enough shape to be salvaged (especially when the Chinese controlled the battlefield after a battle such as in the Battle of Kunlun Pass), the CV-35 tankettes were total write-offs when hit -- with the crew typically all killed.

The original configuration of a tank company in the Panzer Regiment of the 5th Army consisted of 3 tank platoons, each with 5 CVs and 7 T26Bs. There were 12 tank companies organized into 4 battalions. Note only two battalions joined the fight in Kunlun Pass; the 3rd and 4th Battalion were sent to Shensi as a mobile reserved for the Northwest theater of operations.

[pitman]

Incidentally I have located the official battle diary and detailed after action reports of the 200th D for the Battle of Toungoo. Can post them later if there is still interest on this topic; they contain minor but vivid details of the battle from the perspective of General Dai.

Please do, I am very much interested in this, as I am actively working on my Toungoo project. Thanks so much!

[sjchan]

The material in this series of posts are based on a book published to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the birth of General Dai titled壯烈輝煌 : 紀念民族英雄戴安瀾將軍誕辰九十周年 edited by General Dai’s son and published in 1994 (ISSN1003-9473 CN32-1287/K).

The information is abstracted from primary source material i.e. the after action reports filed after the Battle of Toungoo and the battle diary of General Dai An-lan. I have not made any attempt to reconcile the description here with that of other sources, though I have tried to avoid excessive duplication where possible.

(1) Terrain:

Toungoo city was quite modern but most buildings were constructed of wook, except for a small fortress to the south-east there are few sturdy buildings which can be used for defence. Ruins of the old city in the north west were nothing more than fragile earthwork. After the repeated bombings starting March 16, most of the houses in the city had already been burnt down. The city wall was very strong. Outside the city itself lots of trees reduced field of fire. Hilly terrain started 5 and 8 miles east and west of town respectively. Both the Pyu River (30 miles south of the city) and the Kabalng River (immediately south of the city) can be easily forded in the dry season and did not constitute an obstacle for attackers. The Sittang River, though wider, can also be forded at many different sites.

(2) Detailed OOB of the 200th D

598th Regiment
599th Regiment
600th Regiment
Divisional troops include a battalion each of artillery, engineers and supply troops, plus a company each of cavalry, recon and misc other troops

5th Corps units attached to the division:
(i) The Corps Cavalry Regiment, but only a single company of motorcyclists, two 3.7 cm anti-tank guns and a company of cavalry actually reached Toungoo.
(ii) A battalion of 5th Corps artillery (4 companies with a total of 16 3.7 cm guns).
(iii) Corps Engineers Regiment (minus the 3rd Battalion)
(iv) Corps 1st Replacement Regiment (minus 3rd Battalion and a company of the 2nd Battalion)

(3) Initial Defensive Plan (formulated on March 10)

Main focus of defence: Toungoo city itself, with emphasis on the frontal positions on the right flank.

Outside perimeter: Kaunghmuddwvwatrit – Kyundawgon – Pebokkon – Shanzugyi / Lawkoktaya – western bank of Sittang River

Core positions: Toungoo city.

Disposition of troops:

Corps Cavalry Regiment plus one company from the 598th Regiment to occupy forward positions

Right Flank

600th Regiment (Kaunghmuddwvwatrit – Kyundawgon)
1st and 3rd Company, Mortar Regiment
Two companies of artillery

Left Flank (Pebokkon – Shanzugyi / Lawkoktaya – western bank of Sittang River)

599th Regiment
2nd Company, Mortar Battalion
Two companies of artillery

Reserve

598th Regiment (minus one company)

(4) Revised disposition of troops (0800 on March 19)

Cavalry Regiment located near Pyu. If pressured to retreat and defend Kandaubank .

598th Regiment was to send a battalion plus a mortar platoon to take up forward positions at Oktwin.

599th Regiment was to send a company of troops with a mortar platoon to hold forward positions at Tanabin. Another company was to patrol the area east of Sittang to cover the left flank of the division.

The regimental boundary between the 600th Regiment and the 599th Regiment was to be along the railway from Natsingon to Htinigon.

The divisional reserve was at Kyandaw near the airport.

The divisional cavalry company was to recon the eastern bank of Sittang River and to maintain contact with the forward troops at Tanabin; it would then move northward to screen the division’s left flank east of Toungoo.

Supply battalion to be located at Yedashe, with ammunition supplies set up near Kyandaw. Medical facilities set up at Kanyo with a satellite facility at Kydeayagon. Field hospital at Kyungon. Divisional HQ at Nyaungthonbin.


(5) The First Skirmishes at Pyu (note there are hand-written battle maps for each major action; they are barely legible in the book but I will attempt to scan and upload the more useful ones later)

The Cavalry Regiment and the company of supporting infantry from 598th Regiment first brushed with Japanese advanced troops on March 18. The bridges over the Pyu River were destroyed. The two sides faced off across the river on March 19. Around 2100 the Japanese crossed the river at a spot downstream and outflanked the Chinese, which withdrew around midnight towards Nyaungchidauk. At dawn on March 20 the Japanese attacked the positions at Nyaungchidauk. Scouting troops were surprised by the Chinese (with the capture of important maps and other information) but the Japanese pressed on with their attacks and inflicted considerable casualties on the Cavalry Regiment, whereupon the 1st Battalion, 598th Regiment was sent to reinforce this position by trucks. Further attacks were repulsed and both sides settled into an uneasy lull in the fighting, which did not last long. At around 0400 on March 21, the Chinese found they were outflanked on both sides and had to retreat to Kywebwe. The Japanese followed up and continued to attack the two flanks using two heavy guns. The fighting was at its peak between 1600 and 1800. At night the Japanese attempted yet another envelopment, and the Chinese forces, satisfied that their task of blunting initial Japanese assaults, fell back around midnight towards Yetho. (Note that apparently Dai An-lan had a fairly dim view of the commander of the Cavalry Regiment. In his battle diary, without naming him explicitly, he described the commander as inept, timid and trying to avoid action).

(6) Battle at Oktwin and Tantabin

At dawn on March 22, about a battalion of Japanese troops with a few guns followed up the retreat of the 1st Battalion of 598th Regiment and ran into the prepared positions of the 1st Battalion, 600th Regiment at Oktwin. The Japanese tried yet another flanking movement to the left with some cavalry troops while pinning down the Chinese with infantry assaults supported by artillery. The Chinese were driven back but counterattacks by reserve troops reversed the initial lossed. The battle continued throughout the night without major gains by either side.

Attacks on the Chinese left was resumed on the morning of March 23, but the Chinese held their ground. At 1600 the Japanese tried a flanking move on the right with a company of infantry and scores of cavalry troops but this too was rebuffed. The Chinese held their ground though with substantial casualties until the Japanese capture of the airfield on March 24, at which time they withdrew back into the main positions within Toungoo city for the main battle.

(7) Battle near Kyandaw

On March 23 elements of the Corps 1st Replacement Regiment was transported by trucks from Pyawbwe and promptly assigned to defend the area around Kyandaw and divisional HQ near Nyaungthonbi. The bulk of the 598th Regiment was move into reserve. However on March 24 over a thousand Japanese troops made use of the jungles to the west of Toungoo to launch a surprise attack on the Kyandaw train station and airport. The 1st Replacement Regiment on the right was pushed back, exposing the 2nd Battalion of the 598th Regiment, which was ordered to retreat towards Nyaungthonbi. The 1st Replacement Regiment was eventually ordered to taken over positions to the east of the Sittang River and extend northward to cover the division’s only link to the rear. The 2nd Battalion, 598th Regiment took over positions to the north of Toungoo. The 3rd Battalion of the 599th Battalion and the Engineers Battalion took up position along the high ground next to Pyonchaung. Divisional HQ was moved to Inainggan to the east of the River Sittang and divisional troops moved to Pathichaung. These movement were completed by the evening of March 23.

[pitman]

Some western sources say that the Chinese burned down some of the city themselves, to somehow make it more defensible. I could not understand that, unless they meant parts of the city outside the walls (to increase fields of fire), but the references did not specify where the burning was taking place.

[sjchan]

Some western sources say that the Chinese burned down some of the city themselves, to somehow make it more defensible. I could not understand that, unless they meant parts of the city outside the walls (to increase fields of fire), but the references did not specify where the burning was taking place.

Among the instructions for preparation of defensive positions (which I have omitted in the previous post) is the following item:

For a clear field of fire, cutting down or burning obstacles can be considered based on the actual environment.

Hence it is quite likely that the Chinese did try to clear fields of fire in the suburbs, though I agree that it does not make much sense for them to burn down the city.

I found a couple of entries in Dai An-lan’s personal diary in which he expressed dismay that his subordinates were generally not much interested in the construction of defensive positions, and that he had to oversee, check and re-check how the positions were constructed. Given that the Japanese thought quite highly of the 200th D’s defence, Dai probably did a reasonably good job. Of course, the Japanese had not been able to bring up their heavy artillery until fairly late in the fight, but they had total command of the air to make up for it, not to mention good recon (not just from the air but also the presence of many sympathizers in the population).

Anyhow, to continue with the description of the battle,

(8) The Main Battle at Toungoo

At dawn on March 25, outposts along the north bank of Kabaung were attacked and the troops pushed back after about two hours; the bridges were destroyed. There was no further action during the day as the Japanese tried to probe the various Chinese positions on this part of the front. Meanwhile, at 1000 the position of the 3rd Battalion, 600th Regiment to the north-west of the city was infiltrated by plain-clothes troops followed by a full battalion in a major attack. Counterattacks by local reserves were launched and there was hand-to-hand fighting. However the Japanese who had broken through clung to houses and the wall surrounding the cemetery and inflicted heavy losses on the Chinese. After night fell, the 600th Regiment was withdrawn to take up new positions between the 598th and 599th Regiment; all three units now faced the Japanese to the north, west and south and with their backs to the Sittang River.

Full scale attacks by the Japanese commenced on March 26, first along the front of the 600th Regiment, then spreading to the 599th Regiment where Japanese artillery support was particularly strong (the bridge over the Sittang was destroyed in the bombardment). The Chinese held their positions, however, and the Japanese tried their luck on the 598th Regiment in night probes but to no avail.

Dawn on March 27 brought a lull in the ground action which rapidly gave way to continuous attacks by large groups (20+) of Japanese aircrafts. Follow up attacks by the Japanese were repulsed and the 2nd Battalion, 599th Regiment actually counterattacked and drove back the Japanese towards the bank of Kabaung momentarily. After 1500, the Japanese tried firing tear-gas at the south-west portion of the Chinese line but there was no breakthrough.

Battle continued to rage throughout March 28 and March 29 but there was no change in the Chinese line and morale was still high despite the emerging fight at the divisions HQ near Indaingon (see below). Ammunition was running to run low.

(9) Battle near Indaingon

Around 2000 on March 28, about 200+ Japanese troops appeared near the divisional HQ at Indaingon in front of the position of the 3rd Battalion, 599th Regiment and were driven off. Around midnight more than 1000 Japanese troops with cavalry and artillery support captured the Point 150 high ground brought the whole area under fire. Since the divisional HQ was in danger of being attacked, the 3rd Battalion of the 598th Regiment as well as part of the Corps 1st Replacement Regiment were urgently dispatched to deal with this threat. Flanking moves by the Chinese helped to stop the Japanese attack, but counterattacks against the high ground failed repeatedly with heavy losses.

(10) The Withdrawal

On the morning of March 29, orders were received from Corps HQ to retreat. It was not possible to disengage at that point, but preparations were made and the following order sent out at 0900.

(a) The 3rd Battalion of the 598th and 599th Regiment were to come under the command of the Corps 1st Replacement Regiment and continued to defend existing positions near Indaingon and to cover the retreat of the main divisional force.

(b) the 599th, 598th and 600th Regiments were to retreat in order after dusk towards Karen Chaung

(c) Divisional HQ and other divisional troops were to retreat to Karen Chaung via Thandaung.

This was achieved although a small contingent of Japanese troops made their way along the main road and received the eastern ramp of the Sittang bridge; they were dislodged by the 7th Company, 598th Regiment. The withdrawing troops forded the Sittang at different crossings and moved north in good order despite all the fighting around them.

The entire division reached Karen Chaung at 1000 on March 30, set up positions and established contact with the New 22nd D. On March 31 it moved north to Thagaya and reached the town during the evening of April 1. Order was received on April 3 to move to Yezin north of Pyinmana; trucks were dispatched for the move and the move was completed by April 5. Corps level troops were now detached from the division and returned to Corps command.

(11) Lessons Learned from the Battle

Characteristics of Japanese tactics

(a) Favored flanking movements
(b) Good in combined arms combat
(c) Showed great flexibility in deployment of troops
(d) Often attacked on a broad front to conceal the main point of attack
(e) When there is a lull in action, the Japanese were up to some alternate plans
(f) Avoided frontal attacks on strong positions
(g) Often attempted to lure Chinese troops into combat outside prepared positions
(h) Sharps attacks typically followed bombardments and aerial attacks
(i) Cavalry used extensively to envelop exposed flanks
(j) Artillery often moved close to Chinese positions

Japanese combat techniques (excerpts)

(a) Liked to position machine guns on trees
(b) Often carried ladders in night attacks to get onto roof tops or trees in preparation for assaults on the following day
(c) Often used Chinese-speaking troops to confuse the defenders in close range fighting (actually General Dai claimed that some Chinese troops who were captured at Kunlun Pass were used in this role)
(d) Sneaked up to Chinese outposts at night to snoop on the password from the sentries
(e) Recon troops often dressed in Chinese uniform
(f) Left small number of troops hiding within Chinese lines during night attacks to coordinate with attacks during the following morning
(g) Frequent use of plain-clothes troops for infiltration purposes
(h) Lots of fifth columnists among the monks

Attached a hand-drawn battle map of the Battle of Toungoo on March 25 (3rd picture - I always got the order reversed). Indaingon marked in green; Nyaungthonbi marked in red. The second diagam shows the shrinkage in the defense perimeter in the last stage of the battle; the relocated divisional HQ marked in blue. Finally the retreat path in the first diagram (route marked in red)

[sjchan]

Now on to the ill fated battle at Kankang and chronology of the retreat. I will have some more regarding the use of AFV in the Toungoo Battle, though it involved the N 22nd and not the 200th D, in a later post.

(12) The Battle at Kankang

Now something regarding the fateful fight at Kankang (hi asiaticus, you did a good job in locating that village – I don’t know how you manage to find it within the jumble of Burmese names that all sound the same to me)

On March 18, the division has reached to Hsipaw to Mogok road. At 1900 the troops were about 5 miles from the road. Troops probing Mongeong on the road did not report any Japanese and it was decided to complete the crossing of the road by dusk.

However, when recon troops reached a point 1.5 miles from the road, they encountered some Japanese and killed some. They then discovered that the Japanese had already occupied Kankang village south of the village, as well as the important high grounds flanking it.

It had been raining heavily since 1600, and the dense mist together with the lack of moonlight made it extremely difficult to see anything in the dark.

The division still had about 5800 men (it had 6200 before the fight at Taungyi), with only 1 company of guns left.

General Dai was at the vanguard, and made the following arrangement for the attack:

(a) The 600th Regiment in the vanguard would made a frontal attack and capture the high ground at Point 3213 .

(b) The 599th Regiment was to cover the flanks and block any reinforcing troops from interfering with the crossing of the highway.

The 2nd Battalion, 600th Regiment commenced the attack at 1700 (the time does not match!) and captured Point 3213 by 1900 amidst swirling mist. The main body of the 3rd Battalion guarded the left flank and a smaller force moved towards two minor hills on the right and captured them. At 2000 Dai ordered the main body of the 600th Regiment to block the road in the Hsipaw direction and the 3rd Battalion to face the Mogok direction. This was achieved at 2200 despite Japanese resistance and the main body of the division was set to cross the road within the 3 mile gap between the two blocking positions. At that moment more than 20 Japanese armored cars appeared and broke through the road block of the 600th Regiment. General Dai together with the commander of the 599th Regiment took its 1st Battalion to try to blunt this attack but was met with heavy fire; the commander of the 599th Regiment was killed and Dai mortally wounded in the crossfire.

Dai then ordered the 598th Regiment which was moving up to capture the high ground 5 miles from Kankang, and the rest of the division to retreat and regroup at Kuwhou. Most of the division managed to disengage by morning and by the time the bulk of the dispersed troops reassembled at Kuwhou in torrential rain it was late at night.

(13) Movement of the 200th D after Toungoo:

April 5: Preparation for the Battle of Pyinmana for the next 2 weeks.

April 18 Received orders to retreat to Meiktila. Walked to Totkon and then transported by trucks and train to Meiktila.

April 20 Received orders to leave Meiktila in the evening for Kyaukpaelaemg

April 21 At 1000 received orders to move to Taungyi vi Meiktila

April 23 Advanced towards Heho after disembarking some 15 miles from the town; fought for Taungyi for the next 3 days.

April 25 Ordered to move over the hills towards Loilem to block Japanese move towards Lashio; the journey took 4 days.

April 29 Assembled at Laiwtng northwest of Loilem to prepare for attack on the town

April 30 Received orders to move rapidly towards Kotha since Lashio had already fallen.

May 1 Started to retreat to the north via small roads.

May 5 Lost its way (no guide), by the time it found the required path other Chinese troops had passed and all the local populace had fled. No food for the next three days.
May 10 Crossed the Namtu River over rafts; completed by noon May 11.

May 13 Passed through the Mandalay-Lashio road at night; repulsed attack by 100 Japanese troops and 4 armored cars after the troops had passed through

May 18 Passed through the Hsipaw-Mogok road at night; ambushed by the Japanese at Kankang and had to retreat and regroup.

May 19 Assembled at Kawpow (Kuwhou?)

May 20 Passed through the Hsipaw-Mogok road safely at night.

May 26 Dai passed away.

May 27 Crossed the Shweli near Molo using local rafts; crossing completed by noon May 28.

June 2 Crossed the Bhamo-Namhkam road at night without incident.

June 5 Moved across Chinese border. Have to move between areas occupied by the Japanese as they have already captured part of Yunnan by then.

Hand drawn map of the Battle of Kankang (Kankang marked in blue, main body of division marked in red and the blocking positions of the 600th Regiment marked in green) and also the retreat route after the Battle of Taungyi in the after action report:

[pitman]

Regarding the maps in your post on Toungoo, am I correct in interpreting these maps as suggesting that the Japanese captured the western/northwestern parts of the city first and pushed the Chinese eastward towards the river? Or am I misreading that? It is hard to understand what the circles, etc. in the vicinity of Toungoo are supposed to represent.

These are very interesting posts, by the way.

[pitman]

On March 18, the division has reached to Hsipaw to Mogok road

March 18? Do you mean May 18?

[pitman]

Sjchan, asiaticus, and Edward Chen, I hope you realize how appreciative I have been of your willingness to discuss these battles and to provide translations and condensations of materials. It is more than I dared hope and I am very grateful.

I would like to mention your help in the acknowledgments of the design project I am working on, if you would be willing. You could e-mail me the name you would like me to use if you don't wish to post it here.