Chinese 200th Division: descriptions of actions needed!

[asiaticus]

sjchan
Thanks, I seem to have overlooked the presance of the Reserve Regiment .

So besides the 589, 599 and 600 Regiments there was a Divisional Reserve Regiment present?

Was that typical of all these new Chinese triangular Divisions at the time? I know they had reserve regiments for the old Square Divisions.

pitman
No I think northern most position is 2nd Battalion of the 143rd Regiment that was sent north to Yedashe. However I dont think they got that far. I think that might be Nangyun they are in. New 22nd Division was sent south to support the 200th D and they reached as far as the Nangyun railway station. I think they were able to push the Japanese out of there and diverted their attention somewhat, helping the 200th to withdraw.

[sjchan]

I think the reserved regiment was actually under Corps control; the original text was a bit obscure. To be sure I will have to find additional information. Chinese military formations varied quite a bit in practice, so it is not easy to generalize, specifications regarding a typical divison not withstanding.

The airfiled in the map is the circle with the # ; asiaticus is right, the northern most position is indeed the 2nd Battalion /143rd Regiment. The New 22nd Division never fully controlled the Nangyun railway station area. The Chinese description of the battle says that there were 5 well-built houses; the Japanese managed to hang on to three of them and the two sides were in kind of a standoff. But the Chinese did send out raiding parties to the south since the Japanese troops were not numerous enough in this area and did help to distract the Japanese.

[asiaticus]

Hmm. Interesting, http://homepages.force9.net/rothwell/bu ... XForce.htm shows the 5th Corps had

Training Depot
* 1st Reserve Regiment
* 2nd Reserve Regiment

So the reserve regiment at Toungoo could have been either of these.

Also, I read elsewhere that the commander of the New 22nd Division was not willing to commit to a full attack toward Toungoo on the direction of Stilwell. Some problem with Stillwell getting proper authorization from Chiang to command the Expeditionary Army was supposedly the problem. So this was probably just a probe by the New 22nd. The Division was digging in around Yedashe apparently. Unfortunate, a full counterattack could have really hurt the Japanese at that time.

[major grubert]

IMHO, Tachiao doesn't sound very Burmese. In Burma 1942: The Japanese Invasion Nyaungchedauk is given as the name of the 200th Division's first covering position; a quick look on the AMS map shows it to be located on the northern banks of the Kun Chaung. Perhaps that is where the first skirmishes occurred?

[sjchan]

You may well be right; actually Tachiao was refereenced in Tsu and Chang. My knowledge of Burmese is of course very limited

I had a really hard time with names because there are different Chinese translations for the same names, and mapping them to the correct spots on the AMS map is difficult, particular for small villages. I will be getting my hands on Burma 1942: The Japanese Invasion to see if I can get a better mapping before I go on to describe the 200th D's later engagements.

[asiaticus]

It would be nice to clear up the location of the Tachiao action. Gombe is a village just to the north and there is quite a bit of settlement right along the river in the bridge area with no location name. Nyaungchedauk seems a bit too far to the flank to be the location of the conflict.

Another thing is the conflict between the Chinese and Japanese on how the Toungoo battle ended.

The Chinese claim their 200 Division were out by 0400 and even the rearguards were out of the city by dawn. Yet the Japanese 55th Division claims the fighting continued until after 0850 when the two forces linked up in the city after 3 hours of heavy fighting. Perhaps the Chinese rearguards had not retired completely by dawn? Or maybe the 55th Division command was covering up for being given the slip.

[pitman]

It is possible that some of the rearguards were unable to get out.

[asiaticus]

What is the publishing info on this Chinese translation of Senshi Sosho commissioned by the Ministry of Defense in Taiwan in 1997? Was that published and out in the market so one could get hold of it?

[sjchan]

It is possible that some of the rearguards were unable to get out.

It is quite possible that Chinese rearguards stayed a bit longer than reported in some of the Chinese sources and not all got way, it is also likely the Japanese vastly overestimated the strength of the remaining Chinese forces (not that they are alone, overestimate of Japanese strength and casualties is extremely common in Chinese accounts).

What is the publishing info on this Chinese translation of Senshi Sosho commissioned by the Ministry of Defense in Taiwan in 1997? Was that published and out in the market so one could get hold of it?

The formal name of the series is 日軍對華作戰紀要叢書published by the 國防部史政編譯局; the first 40 odd volumes were published in the 1980s I believe, and the three volumes on Operations in Burma published in 1990s. I think the number of printed copies is very small and most went to the libraries.
Note that Senshi Sosho volumes related to China were actually first translated into Chinese in mainland China; although long out of print they are still readily available in used bookstores. There are even scanned copies of some volumes that were posted on certain Chinese Web sites. However, unlike the Taiwanese translations, these were abridged versions with few maps.

[sjchan]

It would be nice to clear up the location of the Tachiao action. Gombe is a village just to the north and there is quite a bit of settlement right along the river in the bridge area with no location name. Nyaungchedauk seems a bit too far to the flank to be the location of the conflict.

Unfortunately none of the Chinese / Japanese sources I have seen so far agree exactly on when, where and how the skirmishes occurred.

Version 1 (memoirs of the commander of the 598th Regiment): Chinese troops ambushed the Japanese on March 18 as they drove up the road

Version 2: (Yuan zheng Yin Mian kang zhan p.93): Chinese troops set up false positions 12 miles south of River Pyu, then set up a trap near the river itself. On March 18, Japanese troops moved as far as 12 miles south of River Pyu. On March 19, they blew up the bridge over River Pyu when the Japanese were crossing and ambushed the rest

Version 3: (Hsu and Chang): Chinese covering positions first probed by Japanese forces at Tachiao some 12 miles south of Pyu on March 18.

Version 4: (Tai An Lan’s biography, pp. 72-3) Chinese blew bridge over Pyu on March 18; Japanese forded river at 9 p.m. and Chinese troops retreated by midnight to Nyaungchedauk (?) On March 22 (should be March 20?) Japanese attacked Nyaungchedauk but was ambushed by Chinese forces as they drove up the road

Version 5: (Senshi Sosho, Taiwan translation, p. 433) Drove off 1000 Chinese troops at Kyanktaga (?) on March 17 (location as shown on the map is about a few miles south of the River Kan on the railway, so I assume it's the Kyanktaga station) On March 18, about 600 troops along the northern bank of River Kan were attacked and defeated in night attacks. Pyu attacked on March 19 and captured by 10 a.m.

As usual, mapping the Chinese names to actual locations on the AMS maps proves to be very difficult indeed.

[sjchan]

sjchan, I don't suppose you'd happen to have access to Chinese accounts of the fall of Lashio and the retaking of Taunggyi?

As I read through Chinese and Japanese accounts of their battles in Burma, discrepancy is really the norm (the Battle of Toungoo is an exception). The Battle of Taunggyi provides just such an example.

The Chinese view, as represented by Zhongguo yuan zheng jun zhan shi (A History of the Chinese Expeditionary Army) by Xu Kangming, pp. 123-127, as well as Dai Anlan Zhuan (Biography of Dai Anlan), by Dai Chengdong, pp. 85-87, is as follows.

The 200th D was next engaged in the battle for Taunggyi. It was sent by Stillwell and Luo Zhuoying on April 19 together with the New 22nd D to the area around Kyaukpadaung based on false intelligence that there were 3000 enemy troops, despite objections by General Du Yuming that the New 38th D was at Yenangyaung and the ‘enemy’ troops were probably the 112nd Regiment of the New 38th D. This resulted in the most combat-worthy divisions of the Chinese Expeditionary Force in the wrong place (western part of the front) while a major disaster was brewing in the weakly held eastern front.

As it turned out, Du was correct. On April 20 threatened by the Japanese 56th Division, Chinese 6th Corps HQ retreated and the Japanese easily took Taunggyi . The 200th D had to move back hastily on April 21 after spending a crucial 3 days on a wild goose chase, and ran into Japanese troops at Heho some 15 miles west of Taunggyi. The 598th Regiment and the Cavalry Regiment of the 5th Corps pushed forward but was stopped about 6 miles from the town. At first light on April 24th, the 600th Regiment made a frontal attack with fire support, with the 598th Regiment (minus one battalion) on its left and the 599th Regiment on its right. Good progress was made, and the high grounds to the west, south and north of the city was reached by noon, and by 4 pm some of the troops had broken into the city. By 11 p.m. part of the Japanese forces had escaped to the east, while the rest continued to resist with the aid of a number of firmer buildings. After midnight, Japanese brought up reinforcement along the road and recaptured some of the high grounds to the east and northwest of the city, and attempted to encircle the Chinese forces. By afternoon, April 25, with the supporting howitzers moved well forward for fire support, the Chinese had restored the situation and completely recaptured the high ground as well as eliminated the last pockets of resistance within the town. The divisional commander, Dai An-lan, was at the front lines most of the time and the fighting was so fierce that his aide was wounded and personal guard was killed. Since the Japanese had by now progressed well to the north, the 200th D was ordered on April 26 to abandon the town they had fought so hard to take.

Japanese account of the same battle, (in the Chinese translation of Senshi Sosho), simply stated that the Chinese troops only managed to capture part of the Japanese positions in the western part of the town and failed to make additional progress despite a monetary reward promised by Stillwell.

There is yet another point of view: that of the Americans. An oft-repeated account was that the Chinese refused to attack. Stillwell resorted to a prize of 50,000 rupees if Taunggyi were captured by 5 p.m., and sure enough it was captured with an hour to spare. There was also the story of how Stillwell exhorted and personally led a Chinese company at the front lines. Not surprisingly, there is no record of these events in Chinese writings.

[asiaticus]

The formal name of the series is 日軍對華作戰紀要叢書published by the 國防部史政編譯局; the first 40 odd volumes were published in the 1980s I believe, and the three volumes on Operations in Burma published in 1990s. I think the number of printed copies is very small and most went to the libraries.
Note that Senshi Sosho volumes related to China were actually first translated into Chinese in mainland China; although long out of print they are still readily available in used bookstores. There are even scanned copies of some volumes that were posted on certain Chinese Web sites. However, unlike the Taiwanese translations, these were abridged versions with few maps.

Thanks for that info. What are the volumes on the Burma Campaign?
Sometime it would be nice to get a list all the 40 volumes and what they cover on the the forum reference list. That sounds like quite a resource.

[asiaticus]

Map of the Heho and Taunggyi area:

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/burm ... f47-13.jpg

Heho was an airfeild.

[sjchan]

What are the volumes on the Burma Campaign?
Sometime it would be nice to get a list all the 40 volumes and what they cover on the the forum reference list. That sounds like quite a resource.

Here's the list of the 46 volumes, and their mapping to the volume numbers of Senshi Sosho.

1 從盧溝橋事變到南京戰役 86
2 華中華南作戰及對華戰略之轉變 89
3 歐戰爆發前後之對華和戰 90
4 香港.長沙作戰 47
5 華中方面軍作戰/ 55
6 第六方面軍作戰 42
7 投降前後之派遣軍  64
8 河南會戰  4
9 湖南會戰 16
10 廣西會戰 30
11 大戰前之華北 治安 作戰 18
12 大戰期間華北治安作戰 50
13 九一八事變與關東軍 27
14 後期關東軍作戰：關東作戰(二) 73
15 盧溝橋事變前之海軍作戰 72
16 盧溝橋事變後之海軍作戰 79
17 關外陸軍航空作戰 53
18 關內陸軍航空作戰 74
19 從日俄戰爭到盧溝橋事變 8
20 南進或北進之抉擇 20
21 開戰前期陸戰指導 35
22 太平洋陸戰指導  59
23 盟軍反攻  63
24 戰局逆轉下之陸戰指導 66
25 全面潰退與最後防線  67
26 東條內閣之最後掙扎 75
27 「捷」號作戰指導  81
28 波茨坦宣言與投降  82
29 戰前之大本營海軍部 45
30 從偷襲珍珠港到中途島海戰 80
31 瓜島攻防戰與海運力量之調整 77
32 海軍戰略重建與第三階段前期作戰 39
33 潰敗整編與阿號作戰 71
34 聯合艦隊之最後決戰 91
35 決號作戰與投降 93
36 戰前世局之檢討  65
37 德義日三國同盟  68
38 對中俄政略之策定 69
39 德俄宣戰與開戰「御前會議」/ 70
40 宣戰 76
41 盧溝橋事變前之海軍戰爭指導 100
42 戰前海軍部之和戰抉擇 101
43 大事年表與軍語 102
44 緬甸攻略作戰  5
45 伊洛瓦底會戰：緬甸防衛的失敗 25
46 西唐作戰與明號作戰  32

List of Senshi Sosho volumes based on http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=103246.

1 Advance into Malaya. (1966)
2 Occupation of Philippines. (1966)
3 Occupation of Dutch East Indies. (1967)
4 Ichi-go Operation (pt. 1): Campaign in Honan (China). (1968)
5 Occupation of.Burma. (1967)
6 Army Operations in Central Pacific (pt. 1): Before the Loss of the Mariana Islands. (1967)
7 Tobu Nyuginia homen rikugun koku sakusen: Army Air Operations on the Eastern New Guinea Front. (1967)
8 Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial HQ (pt. 1): To August 1942. (1967)
9 Industrial Mobilization of War Supply Production (1): Program. (1967)
10 Hawai sakusen: Hawaii Operation. (1967)
11 Army Operations in Okinawa Area. (1968)
12 Marianas oki kaisen: Sea Battles off the Marianas. (1968)
13 Army Operations in Central Pacific (pt. 2): Peleliu, Anguar and Iwo-Jima. (1967)
14 Minami Taiheiyo rikugun sakusen: Pooruto Moresubi - Ga shima shoki sakusen (pt. 1): Army Operations in the South Pacific: Port Moresby to the First Phase of Guadalcanal (pt. 1). (1968)
15 Imphal Operation: Defense of Burma. (1968)
16 Ichi-go Operation (pt. 2): Campaign in Hunan (China). (1967)
17 Okinawa homen kaigun sakusen: Okinawa Area Naval Operations. (1968).
18 Hokushi no chiansen (pt.1): The security fights in North China . (1969)
19 Hondo boku sakusen: Homeland Air Defense Operations. (1969)
20 Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial HQ (pt. 2): To August 1942. (1969)
21 Army Operations in Northern Pacific Area (pt. 1): Loss of Attu. (1968)
22 Seibu Nyugineya homan rikugun koku sakusen: Army Air Force Operations on the Western New Guinea Front. (1969)
23 Army Operations North of Australia. (1969)
24 Philippines-Marei hoomen kaigun shinkoo sakusen: Philippines-Malay Area Naval Attack Operations. (1969)
25 The Irrawaddy Campaign: Collapse of the Defense of Burma. (1969)
26 N.E.I.-Bengaru wan hoomen kaigun shinkoo sakusen: N.E.I.-Bengal Bay Area Naval Attack Operations. (1969)
27 Kwantung Army (pt. 1): Military Disposition Against USSR and Nomonhan Incident. (1969)
28 Minami taiheiyoo rikugun sakusen: Gadarukanaru - Buna sakusen (pt. 2): Army Operations in the South Pacific: Guadalcanal - Buna Operations (pt. 2). (1968)
29 Hokutoo hoomen kaigun sakusen: Northeast Area Naval Operations. (1969)
30 Ichi-go Operation (pt. 3): Campaign in Kwangsi (1970)
31 Kaigun Gunsembi (pt. 1): The Navy’s Armaments Program (pt. 1): Up to November 1941. (1969)
32 Defeat on Burma Front and Defense of Indo-China Peninsula. (1969)
33 Industrial Mobilization of War Supply Production (pt. 2): Execution. (1970)
34 The Army Air Force’s Drive to South Pacific Area. (1970)
35 Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial HQ (pt. 3): To August 1942. (1970)
36 Army Air Operations in Okinawa, Formosa and Iwo-Jima. (1970)
37 Kaigun Sho-Go sakusen (pt. 1): Taiwan oki kokusen made: Naval Sho-Go Operations (pt. 1): Up to Air Battle off Taiwan. (1970)
38 Chuubu taiheiyoo hoomen kaigun sakusen (pt. 1): Central Pacific Naval Operations (pt. 1): Before May 1942. (1970)
39 Daihonei kaigunbu - rengoo kantai (pt. 4): Imperial General Headquarters - Combined Fleet (pt. 4). (1970).
40 Minami Taiheiyo rikugun sakusen: Munda Saramoa (pt. 3): Army Operations in the South Pacific: Munda Salamaua (pt. 3). (1970)
41 Shogo rikugun sakusen: Reite kessen (pt. 1): Sho-go Ground Operations: The Decisive Battle of Leyte (1). (1971)
42 Operations by China Expeditionary HQ in 1945 (1): To March 1945. (1971)
43 Midooei kaisen: Midway Sea Battle. (1971)
44 Operations in the Northern Pacific (2): Kuriles, Sakhalin and Hokkaido. (1971)
45 Conduct of Navy Operations by Imperial HQ and Combined Fleet HQ (1): Before Outbreak of Pacific War. (1971)
46 Kaijo boei sen: Surface Defensive Actions. (1971)
47 Assault on Hong Kong and Chang Sha (1941). (1971)
48 Sho-go Army Air Operations in Philippines. (1971)
49 Nantoo hoomen kaigun sakusen: Southeast Area Naval Actions Until Guadalcanal Reinforcement. (1971)
50 Hokushi no chiansen (pt.2): The security fights in North China
51 Plan and Preparation for Defense of Japan’s Homeland (1): Defense of Kanto District. (1971)
52 Armament and Employment of Army Air Force (1): To the Initial Phase of 1934. (1971)
53 Army Air Operations in Manchuria. (1972)
54 Nansei homen kaigun sakusen: Dai Ni-Dan sakusen irai: Southwestern Area Naval Operations: From Second Phase Operations Onwards. (1972)
55 Operations by China Expeditionary HQ in 1942 and 1943. (1972)
56 Kaigun Sho-go sakusen Fuirippin oki kaisen (1): SHO-Go Naval Operations: The Naval Battle of the Philippine Sea (1). (1970)
57 Hondo kessen jumbi: Kyushu no boei (2): Preparations for the Decisive Battle of the Homeland: Defense of Kyushu (2). (1972)
58 Minami Taiheiyo rikugun sakusen: Fuinshehaahen-Tsurubu-Tarokina (4): Army Operations in South Pacific: Finschhafen-Tsurubu-Tarokina (4). (1973)
59 Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial HQ (4): To August 1942. (1972)
60 Sho-go rikugun sakusen: Ruson kessen (2): Sho-Go ground operations: The Decisive Battle of Luzon (2). (1972)
61 Offensive of Third Army Air Force in Burma and Dutch East Indies. (1972)
62 Chuubu taiheiyoo hoomen kaigun sakusen (2): Central Pacific Area Naval Operations (2) (after June 1942). 1973)
63 Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial HQ (5): August to December 1942. (1973)
64 Operations by China Expeditionary HQ in 1945 (2): March 1945 to the End of the War. (1973)
65 Army Branch of IGHQ: Circumstances Surrounding the Outbreak of Greater East Asian War (1). (1973)
66 Daihonei rikugunbu (6): Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial Headquarters (6): Before June 1943. (1973)
67 Daihonei rikugunbu (7): Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial Headquarters (7): From December 1943 to July 1944. (1973)
68 Army Branch of IGHQ: Circumstances Surrounding the Outbreak of Greater East Asian War (2). (1973)
69 Army Branch of IGHQ: Circumstances Surrounding the Outbreak of Greater East Asian War (3). (1973)
70 Army Branch of IGHQ: Circumstances Surrounding the Outbreak of Greater East Asian War (4). (1974)
71 Conduct of Navy Operations by Imperial HQ and Combined Fleet HQ (5): Middle Part of Third Phase Operation. (1974)
72 Naval Operations in China Area (1): Before April 1938. (1974)
73 Kwantung Army (2): Prewar Preparation Against USSR and Defense at End of War. (1974)
74 Offensive Operations of Army Air Force in China. (1974)
75 Daihon’ei rikugunbu: Showa 19 nen 7 gatsu made (8): Imperial General HQ: to July 1944 (8). (1974)
76 Army Branch of IGHQ: Circumstances Surrounding the Outbreak of Greater East Asian War (5). (1974)
77 Conduct of Navy Operations by Imperial HQ and Combined Fleet HQ (3): Before February 1943. (1974)
78 Armament and Employment of Army Air Force (2): 1934 to Beginning of 1942. (1974)
79 Naval Operations in China Area (2): After 1938. (1975)
80 Conduct of Navy Operations by Imperial HQ and Combined Fleet HQ (2): Before June 1942, (1975)
81 Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial HQ (9): Before January 1945. (1975)
82 Conduct of Army Operations by Imperial Headquarters (10): Before August 1945. (1975)
83 Nantoo hoomen kaigun sakusen: Southeast Area Naval Operations Until Guadalcanal Evacuation. (1975)
84 Minami Taiheiyo rikugun sakusen: Aitape-Puriaka-Rabaaru (5): Army Operations in the South Pacific: Aitape-Empress Augusta Bay-Rabaul (5). (1973)
85 Hondo homen kaigun sakusen: Homeland Area Naval Operations. (1975)
86 Army Operations in the China Incident (1): Before January 1938. (1975)
87 Development, Production, and Supply of Army Aviation Weapons. (1975)
88 War Preparations of Imperial Navy (2): After Outbreak of Pacific War. (1975)
89 Army Operations in the China Incident (2): Before September 1939. (1976)
90 Army Operations in the China Incident (3): Before December 1941. (1975)
91 Conduct of Navy Operations by Imperial HQ and Combined Fleet HQ (6): Final Part of Third Phase Operation. (1975)
92 Army Operations in Southern Theater: Defense of Malaya and Dutch East Indies. (1976)
93 Conduct of Navy Operations by Imperial HQ and Combined Fleet HQ (7): Ending the Pacific War. (1976)
94 Armament and Employment of Army Air Force (3): 1942 Until the End of the War. (1974)
95 History of the Naval Aviation Corps. (1976)
96 Nanto homen kaigun sakusen (3): Gato Tesshu-Go: Southeastern Area Naval Operations (3): After Withdrawal from Guadalcanal. (1976)
97 Construction and Use of Bases for the Army Air Force’s Operations. (1979)
98 Sensuikan shi: History of Submarines. (1979)
99 The Army’s Armaments and War Preparations. (1979)
100 Daihonei Kaigumbu: Daitoa Senso Kaisen Keii (1): Imperial General HQ, Naval Section: Circumstances of the Outbreak of the Greater East Asian War (1). (1979)
101 Daihonei Kaigumbu: Daitoa Senso Kaisen Keii (2): Imperial General HQ, Naval Section: Circumstances of the Outbreak of the Greater East Asian War (2). (1979)
102 A Chronological Table of the Army and Navy. (1979)

Actually, I wonder why the Americans, with all their resources, never bothered to translate Senshi Sosho into English.

[asiaticus]

Actually, I wonder why the Americans, with all their resources, never bothered to translate Senshi Sosho into English.

Considering all the daft stuff the government does spend money on, I guess its just too sensible.

Thanks for posting this listing.