The Sino-Japanese War(Campaigns in detail)

[Akira Takizawa]

> Hmm interesting. I wonder how effective it was.

There were about 20,000 Chinese troops on Shandong Peninsula and they were destroyed.

> Too bad. It would be nice to find out the details on those.

When I go to the library, I will check.

> Where there any operations along those lines in Central or South China?

1/28 第１次後套作戦 - The first battle of Wuyuan in Inner Mongolia
3/25 第２次後套作戦 - The second battle of Wuyuan
1/22 第１次浙東作戦 - First East Chechiang Operation
2/15 第２次浙東作戦 - Second East Chechiang Operation


Taki

[asiaticus]

There were about 20,000 Chinese troops on Shandong Peninsula and they were destroyed.

This operation not mentioned in Hsu Long-hsuen.

> Too bad. It would be nice to find out the details on those.

When I go to the library, I will check.

I think the group following our postings will be grateful. I certainly will be. Given these were the areas of some of the main efforts of the Chinese army Winter Offensive it had to be significant.

1/28 第１次後套作戦 - The first battle of Wuyuan in Inner Mongolia
3/25 第２次後套作戦 - The second battle of Wuyuan

I think I mentioned the activities of these in my article section on the battle of Wuyuan. Its good to know the name of the Japanese operations covering their activity. Is there info on the Japanese units involved besides the Japanese Cavalry Group? I am thinking that the 26th Division would have been involved and some troops from the Peiking area are mentioned. I would guess these would have been units directly under the Front Army and maybe some from 15th IMB or 27th Division.

1/22 第１次浙東作戦 - First East Chechiang Operation

This sounds like the operations south of Hangchow carried out by the 22nd Division I mentioned in my article on the Winter Offensive.

2/15 第１次浙東作戦 - Second East Chechiang Operation

What was going on here? 22nd Division again I would assume.

[Akira Takizawa]

> I think I mentioned the activities of these in my article section on the battle of Wuyuan. Its good to know the name of the Japanese operations covering their activity. Is there info on the Japanese units involved besides the Japanese Cavalry Group?

It was fought by 駐蒙軍(Mongolia Stationed Army). 駐蒙軍 consisted of Cavalry Group, 26th Division and 2nd IMB.

> This sounds like the operations south of Hangchow carried out by the 22nd Division I mentioned in my article on the Winter Offensive.

Yes

> What was going on here? 22nd Division again I would assume.

Yes, 22nd Division carried out.

Taki

[asiaticus]

It was fought by 駐蒙軍(Mongolia Stationed Army). 駐蒙軍 consisted of Cavalry Group, 26th Division and 2nd IMB.

This make sense. I wasnt thinking about the 2nd IMB but it came from near the Peiking area but was part of that Mongolian Stationed Army.

2/15 第１次浙東作戦 - Second East Chechiang Operation

Yes, 22nd Division carried out.

What happened over the course of this operation? It must have been fairly successful if they could loan troops for the I-chang campaign.

[Akira Takizawa]

> What happened over the course of this operation? It must have been fairly successful if they could loan troops for the I-chang campaign.

I don't know the details. I will check it in the library.


Correction

2/15 第２次浙東作戦 - Second East Chechiang Operation

Taki

[asiaticus]

2/15 第２次浙東作戦 - Second East Chechiang Operation

Yeah that looks better. :^)

[asiaticus]

Tsaoyang-Yichang Campaign (Early May - Late June 1940)
From: Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, History of The Sino-Japanese War,
Page 334-339.

Modern locaton names in [ ].

Having been delt a heavy blow by our [Chinese] forces in the Winter Offensive, the Japanese in Wuhan increasingly felt the threat of our forces in Ta-hung Shan and Tung-po Shan [Dabie Shan]. They were unable to make use of the rice growing region of the Chiang-Han plains. In mid April the Japanese abandoned strong points of Ma-cheng in eastern Hupei province [at the foot of the Dabie Shan mountians], Feng-hsin [Fengchuan] and Ching-an [Jing'an] in northern Kiangsi [ Jianxi], pulled portions of the 6th Division in northern Hunan and 40th Divison in northern Kiangsi [ Jianxi] and the 3rd, 13th and 39th Divisions formerly stationed in Hupei [Hubei] Province, and massed them in Chung-hsiang [Zhongxiang], Sui Hsien [Suizhou], Hsin-yang [Xin-yang] attempting to cast all he had in a single throw.

During the first phase of operations, the enemy [Japanese], regarded Tsao-yang as his advance objective. By adopting converging tactics, it atempted to envelop and destroy our [Chinese] forces in the vicinity of Tsao-yang. He had hoped to swing west upon capture of Ming-kang by his Right Flank Force (in Hsin-yang) and move north from Ching-hsiang with his Left Flank Force attempting to effect a pair of pincers. In the center, the enemy force moved along the Hsiang-Hua Highway from Sui Hsien hoping to draw our forces in the Tsao-yang area so that his right and left flank forces could envelop our forces in that area.

Knowing that our possession of the rice bins of Chiang-Han Plain would realize the objective of sustained attrition of the enemy, our forces dispatched a force to launch guerilla operations in the enemy's rear areas thereby increasing enemy attrition and assigned the River Defense Force the mission of defending Ching-men [Jingmen] , Sha-shih [Shashi] and I-chang [Yichang ] on the immediate front. The 33rd Army Group was assigned the garrison of the Hsiang River. In the central area, the 45th Corps of the 22nd Army Group and the 84th Corps of the 11th Army Group respectively undertook the garrison west of Loyangtien [Loyangdien] and Sui Hsien [Suizhou], and the area north of Sui Hsien and south of Kao-cheng [Gaocheng]. In southern Honan, the 30th Corps and the 68th Corps of the 2nd Army Group respectively undertook the garrison east of Tung-po [Tongbai], and the area north of Ping-chang-kuan [Pingchangguan] and Ming-kang [Minggang]. The 41st Corps was held in readiness in the vicinity of Hsiang-yang [Hsiangfan] as the war area reserve. The 29th Army Group was held in readiness at the Ta-hung Shan area with a portion undertaking the garrison north of Tung-chiao Chen [Dongqiao] and San-yang-tien [Sanyang]. The 31st Army Group, located between Chueh-shan [?] and Yeh Hsien [Xinye] as the mobile army, awaited the opportunity to strike the invading enemy.

On May 1, 1940, the enemy moved from Hsin-yang, Sui Hsien and Chung-hsiang for the attack. The enemy force from Hsin-yang [Xinyang] and Sui Hsien [Suizhow] was divided into 2 routes. Altogether, the enemy's advance was divided into 5 routes. The first route advanced from Chang-tai-kuan [Changtaiguan] via Ming-kang [Minggang] to Pi-yang [Biyang] and Tang-ho [Tanghe]. The second route moved from Hsinyang [Xinyang] to Tung-po [Tungbai]. The third route moved from Sui Hsien [Suizhow] to Tsao-yang [Zaoyang]. The fourth route moved from Sui Hsien [Suizhow] to Wu-chia-tien [Wudian]. The fifth route moved from Chung-hsiang [Zhongxiang] to Shuang-kou [Shuanggou].

On May 1, the enemy's 3rd Division and a portion of the 40th Division advanced from Hsin-yang [Xinyang] by several routes and took Ming-kang [Minggang], Lions Bridge, and Hsiao-lin-tien [?]; and on May 5, took Pi-yang [Biyang], and Tung-po [Tungbai]. Meanwhile our 31st Army Group which had massed northeast of Pi-yang[Biyang] joined force with the 68th and 92nd Corps in attacking the flanks and tail end of the enemy. Apart from leaving a portion of the forces west of Tung-po [Tungbai] to attack the enemy, the main force of our 30th Corps attacked the enemy flanks. On May 7, after the capture of Tang-ho [Tanghe], the enemy moved south toward Tsao-yang [Zaoyang]. On May 8 and 9, our 31st Army Group successively recovered Tang-ho [Tanghe] and Hsin-yeh [Xinye] and continued the pursuit.

On May 3, the enemy's 13th Division, attacked with more than 20 tanks, 40 planes and artillery and cavalry units moved north from Chung-hsiang [Zhongxiang] and took Chang-shou-tien [Changshoudien ] and Tien-chia-chi [Bajiao?]. Later it took Feng-yao [Fangji] and Chang-chia-chi [Zhangjiaji] on May 6. Taking advantage of favorable terrain, our 33rd Army Group intercepted the enemy. Our 29th Army Group attacked the flanks and back of the enemy at Chang-chia-chi [Zhangjiaji] and Wang-chia-tien [Wangdian?]. Our 41st Corps, fought hard to stop the enemy. By May 7, enemy advance elements reached Chang-chia-chi [Zhangjiaji] on the Tsao-Hsiang Highway, and a portion invaded Shuang-kou [Shuanggou]. On May 8, enemy's rear cavalry unit took Hsin-yeh [Xinye]. Commander in Chief Chang Tze-chung personally lead his forces in attacking the enemy along the line from Tien-chia-chi [Bajiao?] to Huang-lung-tang [Huanglong]. Our 29th Army Group also intercepted and attacked the rear of the enemy violently.

Awaiting the completion of flanking actions the enemy's 39th Division and a brigade of the 6th Division from Sui Hsien did not attack our 11th Army Group until May 4. As our positions at Kao-cheng [Gaocheng] and An-chu [Anju] were overrun by the enemy on May 5, our forces fell back to the line from Huan-tan [Huantan] to Tang Hsien [Tangxianzhen] and north of Kao-cheng [Gaocheng]. Meanwhile, as our 33rd Army Group encountered reverses in its operations, a portion of the 11th Army Group was dispatched to assist the operations there. Our 175th Divison was left in the vicinity of Tang Hsien [Tangxianzhen] to stop the enemy advance, and the main force fell back to the vicinity of Tsao-yang [Zaoyang]. While the army group was in the process of moving, the enemy at Tang Hsien [Tangxianzhen] massed its forces for the attack and employed tanks for the envelopment. Our 174th Division found itself engaged in bitter fighting as the Tsao-Hsiang Highway had already been cut off by the enemy. In order to break out, our forces abandoned Tsao-yang [Zaoyang]. In addition to employing the 173rd Divison in sustained resistance to cover up our intention, the main force of the 11th Army Group moved to the west bank of Tang River and Pai River. The enemy took Sui-yang-tien [Suiyangdien] and Wu-chia-tien [Wudien] on May 7 and Tsao-yang [Zaoyang] on May 8. During the breakout, our 173rd Division suffered heavy casualties including the death of Gen. Chung Yi its divisional commander.

On May 10, the enemy completed the encirclement with the invading forces massed by the Tang River and Pai River east of Hsiang-tung [?]. However the encirclement fell through, as our forces on the exterior outflanked the enemy forces on the right and left flanks and pressed against the central area. As a result, the bulk of the enemy forces was surrounded in the Hsiang-tung Plains. Upon completion of the encirclement, our 2nd and 31st Army Groups and 92nd Corps moved south, 39th and 75th Corps moved east and 33rd and 29th Army moved north to attack the encircled enemy. The 94th Corps operated on the Han-Yi Highway reaching deep into Ching-shan [Xinshi], Tsao-shih[Zaoshi], Ying-cheng [Yingcheng], and Yun-meng [Yunmeng] to attack the enemy's lines of contact with the rear areas. Meanwhile, or 7th Corps and eastern Hupei guerrillas had already occupied such strong points as Chi-kung Shan [Jigongshanzhan, Henan], Li-chia-chai [Lijiazhai, Henan], and Liu-lin[Liulin, Henan] RR Station on the Peiping-Hankow Railway. Or 92nd and 68th Corps successively recovered Tsao-yang [Zaoyang], Tung-po [Tungbai] and Ming-kang [Minggang] encircling 4 enemy divisions in Hsiang-tung Plains.

By May 11, the enemy having suffered heavy casualties, retreated to the east, pursued by our forces which attacked its flanks and rear. The enemy left many bodies on the battlefeild. On May 16, our 31st Army Group recovered Tsao-yang [Zaoyang]. By May 16 our confirmed reports indicated 45,000 enemy troops were wounded or killed and 60+ field guns, 2000+ horses, 70+ tanks and 400+ trucks were captured. To destroy the enemy reminants, our 33rd Army Group fought hard to intercept the enemy. As a result large bodies of enemy troops fled to the vicinity of Nan-kua-tien [?]. Taking personal command of his Guard Battalion and the main force of 74th Division, Gen. Chang Tze-chung was unfortunately killed in action at noon of May 16. As our preasure on the enemy's left flank was reduced, the enemy staged a counterattack against Tsao-yang [Zaoyang] on May 17 and took it again. Hence, our forces fell back to Hsin-yeh [Xinye] on the west bank of the Tang-Pai River and the area north of the Tang River awaiting the opportunity to launch the counteroffensive.

Subsequent to the termination of operations on the east bank of the Hsiang River, the enemy was engaged in consolicaton ready for subsequent operations with I-cheng as the objective. The enemy's 4th Division and 18th Separate Brigade were respectively pulled from Manchuria and Wu-ning [Wuning south of the Yangtze in Jianxi] as reinforcements. The 4th Division took over the Sha-yang, Chung-hsiang area east of the Hsiang River. On the night of May 31st the enemy's 3rd and 39th Division crossed the Hsiang River at Yi-cheng [Yicheng] and Ou-chia-miao [Oumiao]. After taking Hsiang-yang on the night of June 1st its main force crossed the river toward the west and was separated into several columns. On June 3, the enemy captured Nan-chang and Yi-cheng. After attacking the enemy fiercely, a portion of our 41st Coprps took Hsiang-yang, as the main force fought bitterly against the enemy in the vicinity of Nan-chang. Meanwhile or 77th Corps also attacked the enemy in force. On June 4, our forces recovered Nan-chang with the enemy fleeing to the south. At this time, the enemy's 13th Divison and a portion of the 6th Divison on the Han-yi Highway made a forced crossing of the Hsiang River in the vicinity of Chiukou [Jiukou] and Sha-yang [Shayang] to link up with the enemy moving south from Hiang-yang, for an attack on our forces. Accordingly, our River Defense Force shifted our main force to defend the main positions, and a portion of our forces took advantage of the terrain to stop the enemy movng south and crossing the river.

Meanwhile our 2nd and 31st Army Groups separately chased the enemy south. On June 5, our forces were compelled to abandon Sha-yang [Shayang] and on June 6, Ching-men [Jingmen], Shih-li-pu [Shilipu], and Shih-hui-chiao [Shihuiqiao] were captured by the enemy. Nevertheless, our 77th Corps and river defense units fought hard against the enemy along the line from Ching-men [Jingmen] to Chiang-ling [Jingzhou]. After recovering Yi-cheng [Yicheng] our 2nd Army Group continued to pursue the enemy to the south. At this time the enemy's main force was massed in the Ching-men - Shih-li-pu area, and Ching-ling [Jingzhou] fell into enemy hands. On the morning of June 9, the enemy made a joint air-ground attack against our forces along the line from Tung-shih [Dongshi] to Tang-yang [Dangyang] and Yuan-an [Yuan'an]. In the afternoon, as our right flank position was penatrated by the enemy, our forces fell back at night to the line from Ku-lao-pei [?], Shuan-lien-shih [Shuanglian] and Tang-yang [Dangyang] along the Tsu River to Yuan-an [Yuan'an]. On June 10, the enemy took Ku-lao-pei [?] and Tang-yang [Dangyang] forcing our forces to defend the positionn on the outskirts of I-chang [Yichang]. The enemy followed up in the attack. After heavy fighting for several days, our forces suffered prohibitive losses and took the initiative to abandon I-chang [Yichang].

Later or 2nd and 31st Army Groups reached the area from Tang-yang [Dangyang] to the north of Ching-men. On June 16, our forces launched a general offensive. On June 17th, our forces recovered I-chang [Yichang] for a short time, while our 2nd Army Group joined force with 77th Corps to attack the enemy at Tang-yang [Dangyang]. Having cut the enemy's lines of communications between Tang-yang [Dangyang] and Ching-men [Jingmen], our 31st Army Group launched a violent attack against the enemy at Ching-men[Jingmen]. Our 5th and 32nd Divisions south of the Yangtze River crossed to attack the enemy at Sha-yang and Shih-li-pu. By June 18, the enemy's main force continued to mass in the vicinity of the area from Tang-yang [Dangyang] to Hsiang River offering stubborn resistance with its superior equipment. Fighting on the exterior lines, our forces separately reached the line from Chiang-ling [Jingzhou] to I-chang [Yichang], Tang-yang[Dangyang], Chung-hsiang [Zhongxiang], Sui Hsien [Suizhow] and north of Hsin-yang [Xinyang] to form an encirclement of the enemyand maintain surveillance over the enemy. Thus the battle of Tsao-Yi came to an end.

Another account in http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:CPb ... =clnk&cd=1

Campaign Of Zao-Yi [Zaoyang-Yichang]

[Akira Takizawa]

Again, the Chinese much exaggerated the numbers of Japanese casualities.

The casualities of the Japanese during the Tsaoyang-Yichang Campaign are 1,403 men killed and 4,639 men wounded. On the other hand, the Japanese insisted that 63,127 dead Chinese were found and 4,797 Chinese were captured.


Taki

[asiaticus]

Again, the Chinese much exaggerated the numbers of Japanese casualities.

The casualities of the Japanese during the Tsaoyang-Yichang Campaign are 1,403 men killed and 4,639 men wounded. On the other hand, the Japanese insisted that 63,127 dead Chinese were found and 4,797 Chinese were captured.

Somehow I am not surprised. If the Japanese had suffered those casualties reported in those stories, they would not have been sweeping thru the countryside the way the map is showing. Between the questionable casualty reports, misIDed units and characterizing attacks on Japanese rearguards of advancing columns as chasing the fleeing Japanese it makes me really wary of anything they say.

BTW what is the source of those casuality numbers?

It would be nice to be able to read a Japanese account of this campaign (and other campaigns in China) to get a sense of just what the Japanese intended to accomplish and what their understanding of what the events of the battle ment and how they reacted to them.

[Akira Takizawa]

BTW what is the source of those casuality numbers?

Senshi Sosho. Senshi Sosho was written according to IJA official reports. The casualities in the official reports are almost correct, because they were used for the affairs on fallen or wounded soldiers.

On the other hand, enemy losses are not reliable. They were always exaggerated.

It would be nice to be able to read a Japanese account of this campaign (and other campaigns in China) to get a sense of just what the Japanese intended to accomplish and what their understanding of what the events of the battle ment and how they reacted to them.

I wish Senshi Sosho had been translated. I am irritated that Chinese propaganda is believed in the West.


Taki

[asiaticus]

asiaticus wrote:
BTW what is the source of those casuality numbers?

Senshi Sosho. Senshi Sosho was written according to IJA official reports. The casualities in the official reports are almost correct, because they were used for the affairs on fallen or wounded soldiers.

Thanks for the confimation. I though that might be the case.

On the other hand, enemy losses are not reliable. They were always exaggerated.

Sometimes the Chinese list the weapons captured, rifles and MGs and such and they usually are far lower in number than the Japanese manpower losses claimed but seem to be more in line with the losses of the Japanese reports. They seem to have been more accurate about material losses than manpower losses. I would guess that would be harder to fake, when you had to produce the weapons. However in this case they seem to have really wandered off into fantasy land. This Chinese history I have also doesnt report their own loss totals.

I dont know if its the fault of these authors following some party line to make things look better than they were or a problem with reporting from the feild at the time to keep the higher ups happy.

[Peter H]

As a side note Vietnamese accounts of the Battle of Long Tan in 1966 speak of having "eliminated 500 Australians and destroyed 21 tanks."

Australian losses were seventeen killed in action, one died of wounds, and 24 wounded.

Magnifying enemy losses seems common in Communist works from the 1960s,1970s.

[asiaticus]

This is the Nationalist Chinese though. What is their excuse?

[Akira Takizawa]

Hearing an extraordinary result of the Taierchwang battle, Kuo Mojuo, number of the Chinese Communist Party, said that it was a lie of irresponsible Chinese generals. They seemed to often lie for their distinguished services in the battle.

Taki

[asiaticus]

BTW I was thinking about this quote from the Chinese history of the campaingn:

13th Division, attacked with more than 20 tanks

Was wondering if this would have been some Divisional recon tanks or an attachement from a Tank Regiment with the 11th Army? According to the IJA in China orbat I have, by 1941 they had replaced the 17th Cavalry Regiment with a 骑兵队 which translates as Cavalry soldier team with Babblefish. I am guessing it might be a recon unit and maybe the change was done at this time?