Help with context for a Photo of the Iron Guard ++

[aues_ghueder]

I need help with the context for this Photo of the Iron Guard. I could not find any information to help me understand what was being portrayed in the Photo. On the back of the Photo is written "Eiserne Garde in Bauern Tracht" which means "Iron Guard in traditional folk costume". I got this photo in an album with quite a lot of Photos of Romania and the Romanian military. It almost looks like they have something like an Alphorn of the smaller more mobile variety. When I saw this photo I thought it was a very interesting picture. There are also a lot of other interesting Photos in this album.

rumanien_iron_guard_800.jpeg

Also any ideas who these people could be?

On the back is written something about a Gedanktag (memorial day) and the date 1940. It is interesting that the person in civilian clothes with the sheep-skin hat is giving a Roman salute and not a military one are the officers.

rumanien_1940_800.jpeg

Thanks for any help on this

[Arto O]

Hi
How about if you ask moderator to remove this to the Foreign Volunteers, it could catch more attention. Really interesting pictures, which I dont have experience to say anything more.
But I am sure there will a lot of interest to see more. Thanks.

Arto

[LascarGroup]

For the first picture: the Iron Guard was a populist movement which combined fascist ideology with traditional Romanian peasant culture. This was not isloated, in inter-war Romania the Romanian peasant was held up as the 'pure' and 'true' example of Romanian nationhood, especially in omparison with more Westernized/Modernized city dwellers. These ultra-nationalist demonstrations by the Iron Guard, the Lanceri, and other similar groups often incorporated local peasants. If you look on Youtube you can find video of the mass Iron Guard rally in Bucuresti with General Antonescu and see the very evident peasant presence (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V_zLlPcXBXo), along with the 'Greenshirts'. These peasants are probably locals, the mountain horns lead me to believe that they are from the Transylvanian region (although that is an educated guess as I am not an expert on Romanian peasant costume), which would have been a VERY nationalist message, as Transylvania had only recently been annexed by Romania after WWI. Demonstrations like this were very successful in attracting widespread support, especially from the less well educated peasants in the countryside, and the increasingly radical youth/students of Romanian cities.

In the second picture: the evident success of fascism was attractive in Romania. Romanian fascism was more akin to Italian Fascism, especially because of Romanian 'Latininity' which nationalists tied to Rome. So, I am not surprised to see a civilian diplomat give the Roman salute.

I agree, those are very interesting pictures. I am preparing to begin my PhD research into the Romanian Army during the war period. I hope to see more of these pictures! Thanks for the post.

[aues_ghueder]

Thanks for that informative comment! I could imagine that the Romanian officers caste was more likely royalist and probably less fascist orientated. Perhaps even as was the case in Germany there was tension between the traditional officers caste and the non-traditional (in the sense of generations of royalist officers families) fascist movement which did have an element of anti-aristocratic thinking. The Transylvania origin would surprise me because of the ethnic German and Hungarian presence there. cheers!

[LascarGroup]

You are correct in your assumption about the Romanian officer corps. From my research and study it is clear that the Romanian officer corps remained very much a bastion of 'conservative' power. I put it in quotations because even most Romanian officers were extremely nationalistic, as were most politicians and leaders of the time. General, later Marshal, Antonescu is a prime example of the extreme's that 'conservatives' of the time could go to.

The Army stood by the King, especially as he embarked on a grand modernization program and allocated large sums for the military (even if much of this was siphoned off by the King himself and his cronies). This power base allowed the 'conservatives' to combat the Iron Guard. King Carol supported the other ultra-nationalists to the detriment of the Guard and dealt the Guard a severe blow in 1938 when he had its leader, Corneliu Codreanu, arrested and executed. The royal-dictatorship of King Carol in 1938 paved the way for Antonescu's own dictatorship during the war.

During the war it is clear that the officer corps was extremely nationalistic. Similar to Poland and Finland, Romanians feared and hated the Soviet Union. Anti-Semitism and belief in a Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy was rampant in the Army, and not just among the rank and file who had been radicalized by the populist fascists and semi-fascist movements of the last decades. Officers, Franophile or Germanophile, were ready and motivated to go to war against the Soviet Union and most were ready to support Nazi Germany in this.

Antonescu himself had served as a liaison in France and Britain, yet remained on of Germany's staunchest allies. His regime ended any chance of Romanian fascism controlling Romania, even after the Guards brief revival in 1940. The Army helped him put down the Iron Guard revolt in January 1941. It also participated enthusiastically in the invasion of the Soviet Union and conducted pogroms against the Jews in Iasi and Odessa killing tens of thousands. Antonescu, a 'conservative' approved of and enacted a policy of deportation, which the gendarmes and Army carried out, and concentration of Jews from Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria into camps along the Bug river in conditions which resulted in mass starvation, disease, and exposure.

So, while not 'fascist' per se, the Romanian officer corps was complicit, often approving, of these actions. Relations during the war with Antonescu was good because he was one of the most respected leaders in the Army, only falling apart as the war turned against the Axis, like with the Wehrmacht and Hitler, but unlike in Germany, Antonesu was forced out by the King, with the support of a military faction.

P.S. While Transylvania was Hungarian controlled and had large Hungarian and German minorities, especially concentrated in the cities, Romanians made up the majority of the population as peasants. There was a extensive program of 'Romanization' in Transylvania during the interwar years by the government in Bucuresti. Demonstrations of Romanian 'strength' in Transylvania, the heartland and homeland of the Romanian nation in the eyes of Romanian nationalists, were very important. Even the statue of Matthew Corvinus in Cluj, the former Hungarian capital of Transylvania, had the word Hungarian taken off of it.

[aues_ghueder]

Thanks for that very good summary. I have read briefly of some of these events and I know I was never too clear on what role the Iron Guard had in the whole picture. As far as the complicity of the officers caste in war crimes, that also makes sense. The old world monarchistic officer's castes of many nations ended up in a similar situation.

[aues_ghueder]

I now believe that those horns are a type of Romanian Alphorn called a Bucium (not to be confused with the Romanian Folk-Metal band of the same name...). Wikipedia states that "it was used in the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia as signaling devices in military conflicts" along with the uses of the typical alphorn.

[Victor]

Y The Army helped him put down the Iron Guard revolt in January 1941. It also participated enthusiastically in the invasion of the Soviet Union

That is not 100% accurate. The enthusiasm lasted only during the operations in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. After that it was mostly gone. There were many, including very high ranking officers that were against continuing the war effort much beyond the old borders. Actually, after the fall of Odessa and the return home of the bulk of the mobilized Army, the general feeling was that the war was over from the Romanian point of view.

The idea behind all this was that Romania should not waste soldiers and equipment it needed to fight Hungary for Transylvania once the opportunity arrived. The motive for the dismissal and retirement of general Iosif Iacobici from the position of Chief of the General Staff in early 1942 was precisely his opposition to Antonescu's desire to send the bulk of the army into Russia in 1942 (measure which ended in disaster near Stalingrad). Iacobici was a Transylvanian, a former KuK officer. His main desire was to retake Transylvania. And like him felt many other officers. His replacement, general Steflea, was much less senior in the officer corps and was the appropriate yes-man Antonescu wanted. After all, Steflea had been before the CO of Antonescu's "household" 3rd Division.

The bottom line is that yes, the officer corps generally hated the Soviet Union, but it wasn't thrilled to go thousands of kilometers from home to fight it. The enthusiasm lasted during the retaking of the territories lost in 1940. After that only several fanatics were enthusiastic about it.

[Victor]

Regarding the photos:

1. As LascarGroup said, the Legionnaires often dressed as the peasants did, both because they liked the "back to the roots" ideas and because the peasants were roughly 78% of the population and there were votes to be won. However, the parade is probably photographed in late 1940, after the Legionnaires took the power and the votes were meaningless at that point.

2. Since the event took place during late 1940, after the German Military Mission arrived in Romania, the civilian is most likely an official of the Iron Guard, hence the salute. The desire of the Iron Guard was to infiltrate all the organizations of the State, including the Army. Thus, it is not surprising that there would be a Legionnaire "clinging" to the Romanian general and the Germans.

Ironically, many of the "fascist" members of the Iron Guard ended up in the Communist Party after the war.

[aues_ghueder]

That is not 100% accurate. The enthusiasm lasted only during the operations in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. After that it was mostly gone. There were many, including very high ranking officers that were against continuing the war effort much beyond the old borders. Actually, after the fall of Odessa and the return home of the bulk of the mobilized Army, the general feeling was that the war was over from the Romanian point of view.

The bottom line is that yes, the officer corps generally hated the Soviet Union, but it wasn't thrilled to go thousands of kilometers from home to fight it. The enthusiasm lasted during the retaking of the territories lost in 1940. After that only several fanatics were enthusiastic about it.

I once read an autobiographical book about a liaison-officer for the 20th Romanian Division in during the last few months of the battle of Stalingrad. The Author, an Austrian named Fritz Wöss, was really in Stalingrad, and really was liaison-officer to the 20th Division. It documents many of his experiences (as well as a general overview of the collapse) with the Romanian Army before the encirclement and after until the surrender. One of the main documentary points of the novel was explaining the situation and attitudes of the Romanian Division, it's officers and men. It was quite interesting. To sum up the book in a sentence, he states that the Romanian Division was demoralized because of lack of heavy weaponry to combat Tanks and frustrated that the Germans were not taking the Romanian pleas for support on their front seriously. He states the moral of the Romanian Division as "good" before the encirclement. Most of the book before the encirclement is about the military culture of the Romanian Division, it's eating habits (He constantly described how important gourmet cuisine was for the Romanian officers), the way the officers interact with the men compared to the Wehrmacht. He almost goes out of his way to dispel any image of demoralization or lack of support for the war against the Soviet Union amongst the Romanian Division. Perhaps this was not so objective an opinion as he was liaison-officer and had a loyalty to "his" Romanian Division. The book is called Hunde wollt ihr ewig leben. I googled for the book and I could not find any evidence that it was ever translated into English which is quite amazing as in Germany they even made a film of this book in the late 50s. PS, thanks for info about the photos.

[LascarGroup]

Morale is a very difficult thing to measure Victor, but from my research in the archives in Bucuresti, reading memoirs published by veterans, and even talking to veterans, I have found little evidence that morale drastically fell after liberating Bukovina and Bessarabia. Romanians were fighting alongside the 'greatest' army in the world (as seemed bared out by the Fall of France) and were victorious, a good motivator.

The Siege of Odessa was a horrendous experience for the Romanian army, however, the massive causalities and exertions made were rewarded with the fall of the city (on of the biggest and most important in the Soviet Union and the first to have a City Defense Medal issued for its defense by the Soviets, like Stalingrad or Leningrad) and receiving Transnistria. Additionally, and most importantly, most of the soldiers were demobilized and allowed to return home for leave, excepting those cavalry and mountain units sent to assist Manstien in breaking into the Crimea.

The Romanians were shocked that the war against Russia did not end in 1941, but most, including officers, continued to believe in German superiority. From my research, it was Stalingrad that really irrevocably harmed Romanian morale. Not only was the Romanian Army almost destroyed (also the Hungarians were too, their commitment forced by Antonescu's desire, as you are quite correct in stating, to keep the Hungarians from building up against Romania in Transylvania), but the entire of German attitudes against their Romanian allies became increasing hostile.

I just wrote my Masters dissertation on this subject. After Stalingrad, the Germans blamed the Romanians for their defeat, and retroactively for previous failures, and the hostility from the Germans started a vicious cycle of hostility between the two peoples.

However, many Romanians continued to fight even until August 1944 because of the hatred/fear of the Soviet Union and the army collapsed in August 1944 more because of its poor equipment and rawness of untrained recruits rather than from popular dissatisfaction among the men. Many frontline commanders were not informed of King Mihai's coup because they were regarded as too pro-German.

I believe the Romanian Army was very motivated by the 'Crusade against Bolshevism' and the Romanians felt that they were fighting a 'Holy War' to liberate fellow Orthodox Christians from the atheist yoke of the Soviets, reclaim land which was considered rightfully Romanian and won through Romanian blood in WWI, convince the Germans to return Transylvania through their superior force of arms (the way to the west is through the east-paraphrasing Antonescu and much Romanian military propaganda), defeat the traditional foe and threat to the East which Russia had represented to Romania for far longer than just since the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, by lingering impact of two decades of ultra-nationalistic, populist movements in Romania encapsulated by the Legionary Movement and the Lancieri, and anti-Semitism common to most Romanians.

I disagree that Romania was a 'Reluctant Axis' as characterized by some. The Romanian Army had its own, independent and powerful motivations which ran on a parallel tract with that of Nazi Germany until Stalingrad shattered the alliance and sent the nations on different paths.

[Victor]

Excerpts from the report of the commission formed at the order of marshal Antonescu to investigate the causes of the prolonged and costly siege of Odessa.

[...]
C. MORALE
The army's morale in the battle of Odessa was not as high as that proven in the operations up to the Dnestr River. The causes for this could be grouped in the following categories:
1. Lack of preparation of the idea of the war East of the Dnestr.
The necessity of keeping the secret meant that the soldiers and even the officers could not be prepared for the need to continue the operations beyond the Dnestr. Even more, some commanders made the mistake to tell the soldiers that once the Dnestr was reached, the operations will cease.
Having the illusion that they will take part in an easy war, which will end once with the occupation of Bessarabia, the soldiers lacked the fighting spirit required by later operations.
2. Lack of offensive spirit due to lack of training
a). For 2 years the units were prepared strictly for defensive operations. Engaged all of a sudden in offensive actions, the soldiers lacked the warrior and sacrifice spirit that could not have been achieved without proper training.
b). Also, the lack of physical training had as consequence the inability to endure the rigors of life on campaign, which attracted a sensible decrease in morale.
c). Likewise, the lack of training in what concerns the technical and tactical knowledge of the modern weapons (AT guns, mortars etc.) led to a lack of confidence in the available equipment. The situation improved later when it became more familiar.
d). We can also qualify as lack of training the inadmissible tolerance of soldiers with an improper appearance. This had negative impact on the discipline and the obedience.
e). Finally, the peace time training did not develop the real military virtues like physical and moral courage or the spirit of sacrifice. This insufficiency was felt during the operations
[...]
4. Psychological causes
a). Only a part of the army was mobilized. Even more, before the operations were over, some of the units were demobilized (10th and 35th Divisions). Thus a psychosis was created among the soldiers, based on the following reasoning:
- it's not equitable that some fight and others don't
- demobilization it's a hint that the war will be easy and short, so one must avoid all risks.
b). The same effect was created by the rumor that after the fall of Odessa demobilization will follow. One tried to spare one's life during this last ordeal.
c). For many soldiers, the knowledge that Soviets treated very badly their prisoners made them become extra cautious. The hesitated to throw themselves at the enemy, for fear of being caught. It seems that our propaganda had negative results in this respect.
d). It was rumored that German reinforcements would come to Odessa. When they came only to one sector of the front, the rest were disappointed.
e). Mail and newspapers did not regularly reach the troops

The report is obviously much larger, but my time is limited. I tried to translate what I thought were the essentials.

You see there was no large enthusiasm for fighting beyond the 1940 borders in the masses of soldiers. No "Crusade against Bolshevism", no "Holy War". That was just propaganda, which in many cases was beyond the simple peasant's understanding and, more importantly, his common sense. With all the two decades of ultra-nationalistic, populist movements in Romania encapsulated by the Legionary Movement and the Lancieri, and anti-Semitism common to most Romanians the last free elections in the inter-war period resulted in 15.5% for the Legion and 9,15% for the PNC (the political party behind the Lancers). Thus just a minority of the population. If one takes into consideration also all the opportunists that joined the right-wing movements in hope material gains (many of the early members of the Communist Party were former members of the Legion as well), then the percentages further decrease.

Besides the lack of political fanaticism and the existence of a highly developed survival instinct (all those centuries of invasions and occupations tend to develop this trait), there were also other factors undermining the morale, especially after 1941: abuses of the officers or NCOs, lack of food (usually also due to some "businesses" of COs or administration personnel), clothing, leaves. In some cases this seriously reduced morale (see the reports of the Romanian military intelligence services in the books of Pavel Moraru).

About the officers, I have as well read many memoirs and discussed with veterans. With the exception of Ion Profir (who wrote his memoirs in the 50s or 60s) and of Teodor Greceanu, most weren't that enthusiastic about the war. I have also met people who did not want to speak about it in the first place and only gradually started to open up.

[LascarGroup]

With the Iron Guard and Lancieri that is a full 25 per cent of the country voting for radical right wing parties. Also, the Liberal and Peasant Parties had become "National Liberal" and "National Peasant" Parties, far from being merely 'moderate'.

As, as Holly Case argues in 'Between States: the Transylvanian Question', the issue of Transylvania and the belief in the return of Northern Romania to Romania in return for military contributions on the Eastern Front and this as a HUGE motivating factor in the Romanian Army. The soldiers knew that they were fighting in Russia for Transylvania after they had liberated Bukovina and Bessarabia.

There was also major differences between Vanatori de Munte, Cavalry, Engineer, Armor soldiers versus Line and Reserve Infantry soldiers.

Orthodoxy was also a motivating factor. Restoring Churches and Orthodoxy to Ukrainians and Russians. They saw themselves as liberators and crusaders for Christianity. See, Armata lui Stalin vazuta de Romani by Pavel Moraru.

Look to Maria Bucur's book 'Heroes and victims' on remembrance of Romania's participation in both world wars. Communist party line and official remembrance distanced them from their actions on the Eastern front which has been adopted by many veterans. Part of the weakness of oral history and interviews with veterans is the effect that time has on remembrance of the war. But the veterans I have interviewed had all told me 'Morale was very good' although they often betray the true realities of the war. I doubt morale was a good as they remember, but that is the effect of 60 years of distance from the war and assimilating the currents of historical memory.

[Victor]

The fact that 25% of the voters chose the far-right, does not mean that all of these people were hard-core far-right supporters. The phenomenon is much more complex and there were many works written on the subject of European far-right movements in the inter-war era.

The Peasant Party had become the National Peasant Party after it merged with the Romanian National Party from Transylvania (which was dating back to the times of the Habsburg Monarchy and was the political arm of the Romanians in Transylvania during that period). It did not add "national" to its name for the sake of capitalizing some political opportunity. The official position of the party was against the war beyond the 1940 borders.

The National Liberal Party was named this way from its very beginning in 1875. Again, it did not add "national" later, as you imply. The official position of the party was against the war beyond the 1940 borders.

I posted excerpts from an official military report following the 1941 campaign and focused on the siege of Odessa. You chose to ignore them. These are the primary sources one should use. You mentioned Pavel Moraru's book Armata lui Stalin vazuta de romani (I also recommended him in my earlier post). Please look at page 133. You will find an interesting idea from a soldier of the 1st Company/1st Mountain Battalion:

I heard from the people back home that the Germans promise to give us Transylvania with the condition to give more troops to the front. This we know it's the German deceit, because they tell the Hungarians to give us Transylvania and after we waste our forces, we will probably give all up without a fight.

Sure it's just one man's opinion, but probably much closer to the attitude of the average peasant towards this issue. But like I said in my initial post, even the highest ranking Transylvanian officer, general Iosif Iacobici, believed that the Romanian Army should send a limited number of troops on the front in the Soviet Union in 1942.

Also since you mentioned this book, please be kind enough to point me to the page where Romanian soldiers see themselves as "crusaders for Christianity". I couldn't find it. The Crusade against Bolshevism was propaganda. Few men on the front bought it, with the exception of the hard-core legionnaires and some officers. There were probably more people back home who thought of the war in this way.

[LascarGroup]

I am not ignoring the primary source material that you posted; If I seemed to disregard it that was not my intention.

I am saying that it does not mean that morale remained low for the whole of the campaign in the East after crossing the Dniester. Also, while the Romanians suffered major losses they continued the siege until the Soviet withdrawal, even in the face of superior armor and artillery and vital support from the Black Sea Fleet, showing that even under horrendous conditions that should have shocked the Germans, the Romanians continued to fight. I find that the report is very revealing, particularly as self-criticism by the Romanian military.

Immediately after crossing the Dniester into the Ukraine, it is clear from the report that many Romanians, both at the officer and enlisted level were not as prepared for the further operations in a logistical or planning sense. However, no veteran I have spoken to has said that crossing the Dniester was a major issue for them. Building on success and pursuing the enemy with the support of the Germans seems to have kept morale up and elicited few complains, at least until siege operations around Odessa took their toll on the Romanian Fourth Army. Yet, by the beginning of 1942 many things changed.

Odessa had fallen, which was a morale boost. Most of the army was given leave in the subsequent general demobilization during the winter, except for the soldiers fighting further on in the Crimea. Propaganda expanded under Mihai Antonescu as shown by Maria Anton in her book, Propaganda si Razboi. It seems clear that this propaganda was especially effective in convincing Romanian soldiers that they were fighting in the East for Transylvania. Thus, motivation among Romanians to fight in the East had increased. Additionally, many believed that Turkey would soon invade the Soviet Union as well, only after its continued neutrality did this morale boost fade.
I agree with the quote from Moraru you cited on page 133, but I feel that quote is more representative of feelings later in the war (it is taken from 1943), especially after the disaster of Stalingrad and its adverse effects on Romanian-German relations. Stalingrad was a disaster for both Romanian field armies, 3rd and 4th, and the increasingly hostile German sentiments toward the Romanians were also more consistent across the board, feelings which shocked Romanian Intelligence. Throughout Moraru’s book I got the impression of Romanian bewilderment in regards to the sudden change in German attitudes towards the Romanians after Stalingrad.

In Holly Case’s book, Between States, the opening of chapter 2 has the response of a Romanian soldier to German general Richard Ruoff when he was asked if he knew what he was fighting for on the Eastern Front ‘Jawohl, Herr General! For Transylvania!’ You are right to say that is was not always a morale boost, especially as the war dragged on and Northern Transylvania remained under Hungarian occupation, but in the opening year of the war in the East, expectations were high that Germany would force the Hungarians to give back the territory. On page 80 she also relates that papers with the words of Marshal Antonescu asserting ‘when I come back from Odessa I won’t be going through Cernauti, but through the princely Sighetu Marmatiei on towards Cluj’ were passed around by citizens in February 1942. After more than a year of combat, the losses at Stalingrad, and the continued feelings of the Germans leaving the Romanians to face another ‘Stalingrad’ in the Crimea, the Transylvania issue hurt Romanian morale and by mid-1943 few believed that Germany would return the territory.

About the motivation of Orthodoxy. Alexander Dallin’s work on Odessa mentions that ‘The Romanian army willing lent its chaplains for local services – indeed, so eagerly, at times, that, in mid-August, a German corps commander reported that “Romanian propaganda units criss-crossing the country were forcibly baptizing Ukrainian children.”’ Pg. 161-162 And he goes on to say that Romanians directly involved themselves in reopening churches, 300-400, to build relations with the locals. I found this picture very interesting http://www.ww2incolor.com/Romanian+Forc ... +1941.html The caption says 'Orthodox Church service, after the liberation of the city by the Romanian army. Field Bishop of the Romanian Army - Brigadier Partenie Ciopron blesses the crowds first time in 23 years. Transnistria, Tiraspol - September 1941'

On page 111 in the beginning of chapter 3 or Moraru’s book it says in the third paragraph, that “the Transnistrenii were very enthusiastic that ‘finally, they had escaped from the communists and this joy manifests the majority of the population, both Moldovan and also the Ukrainian. […]The delivered [dezrobita] Ukrainian population universally described our troops as some crusaders who went to sacrifice for faith in God and in the church [which had been] mocked by Judo-Communists; they see us as true liberators’”

In Charles King’s new book, Odessa: Genius and Death in a City of Dreams, he also relates that the Romanian administration entertained thoughts of rebuilding the demolished Preobrazhensky Cathedral to show Romanian support of Orthodoxy and to build relations with the locals. This did not take place until much later, the reconstructed Church was very beautiful when I saw it last summer in Odessa.

I don’t argue that Romanian morale was continually high before Stalingrad. Morale fluctuated among units and even durign battles. Those soldiers fighting in Crimea with the Germans had a different experience than those stuck before the defenses of Odessa under the guns of the Black Sea Fleet and even in the battle for Odessa it is clear that the Romanians’ morale was not constantly poor or excellent. At times it seemed the city was about to collapse and at others the decided Soviet advantages, especially in armor, caused some units to break and run.

So, I do not argue that every fourth Romanian soldier was a committed right wing fanatic whose morale remained high for the duration of the war. I merely assert that the issue of Romanian morale cannot simply be summed up as ‘poor’ after having crossed the Dniester. Units who did not fight in Odessa were not as affected by it. Those mobilized in 1942 for the summer offensive had hopes for final victory. Others, particularly those from Transylvania were less enthusiastic that they were not fighting Hungarians, cavalry units’ morale probably was better than that of infantry who had to march hundreds of kilometers, etc. etc.

This is a complex issue with no simple answer. Research on the German army, with much better documentation, shows these complexities. I hope that similar research can be done in regards to the Romanian Army and I hope I can contribute to it in my future PhD research to discover more about the up and downs of Romanian morale on the Eastern Front.