How could the Germans have won the Battle of Stalingrad?

[Lkefct]

As an alternative to Blau, the satellite armies do not necessarily have to be holding sections of front. The map that I have seen depicting the Eastern front do not show them holding the front initially and that they where brought in later after the mobile divisions advance to hold the front.

http://www.geocities.com/sonzabird/blue.html

I agree, with all the captured equipment, plus the hulls of vehicles that are built in Czech, Hungary and leftover French hulls would make decent chassis for mounting captured French 75 or Russian 76 guns. They wouldn't be great, but they would provide some measure of protection at that stage. IN addition, you could issue large quantities of those guns to German units holding static sections of the line to give them more teeth.

The other things that could be done is large quantities of Soviet prisoners and satellite armies units could be used to build field fortifications on the Dneiper and to make the Atlantic Wall.

I think the key thing is to launch more limited attacks against the Soviets. There are several improvisations that along with limited scale Pz korp or army level attacks that could be used to pierce the front and allow the German armor to encircle soviets, as well as disrupt soviet offensives before they can be launched. They are outlined in a US army document

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/milimprov/fm.htm

THe ones I am thinking of specifically are the use of a Flak Division as Corp Artillery during Kursk (XI Army Korp I believe as part of the flank defense for III Pz Korp) as well as what became known as the Snail and Scorpion offensives. THe Flak division or large numbers of captured soviet 75 or 122 guns could be used to bring Soviets under intense direct fire on some quite sector and driven back. The Scorpion and Snail offensives where methods to use a minimum of men, material and not expose the Germans to the danagers of conventional attacks where the soviets would be able to attack them and inflict considerable losses to already weakened units. None of these modes of attack are going to win the war outright, but rather be part of an inventory of tactics to use to mix things up and keep the Soviets off gaurd, and hesitant.

Additionally, the Germans can use some limited withdrawals to keep the soviets off guard. Retreating from the Hindenburg line in WW1 gave the Germans a big advantage in the fighting in 1917. Similarly the retreats from the Rhzev and Demyansk salients could be used to provide a fair # of reinforcements for both AGC and AGN. Retreats in threatened area of the front would disrupt soviet preparations or even encourage them to launch attacks without the usual heavy artillery barrages, giving the Germans a fighting chance to stand and fight them.

Clearly, if the Soviets choose to launch a determined attack, they can. But if the Germans are launching limited attacks to encircle and destroy small units in the Soviet army as well as to keep the soviets from launching all but the most determined offensives, it gives the Germans a chance to get stronger across the board while keeping the soviet losses mounting. Battles like Stalingrad are horrible for the Germans because they lose their advantage of attacking quickly and in overwhelming strength plus it gives the soviets a chance to fight back in areas where they have strong defensive potential. The soviets lost huge losses at Moscow and Stalingrad, but the German losses could not be made good and the soviets can. For the Germans to maintain some element of maneuver and retain at least a tactical or operational initative or the soviets will steam roller them.

[JonFromPeoria]

I will not accept any opinions such as, "A German victory in Stalingrad would not have been possible."

You might not want to accept that conclusion, but it's the truth. Stalingrad might have indeed been taken in August or early September had Hitler not messed around with the deployment of 4th Panzer Army. However, holding Stalingrad for any length of time after it had fallen would have been impossible. The Russians still would have struck with their massed reserves somewhere along that broad front and retaken it. The Germans should never have tried to gain both the Volga and the Caucaucus at the same time - far too much territory to hold onto once they took it. They would have been better off had they shortened their lines in the summer of 1942, rather than extend them. They didn't have the resources. Hitler was completely out of touch with the realities of the tactical situation in the East and he was always convinced that the Russians were on the verge of collapse when in fact they were shifting entire armies around the front, and creating entirely new ones the whole time the Germans were advancing on Stalingrad. Rather than going for Stalingrad and the Volga, IMO, they should have used German armor formations to clear the west side of the Don river all along the front and then stood back in a defensive posture with German units mixed between the allied ones, using strong mobile armor reserves to contain any Russian attack and breakthrough. This may have secured the flank and allowed for an advance into the Caucaucus that could have been sustained. By advancing to the Volga while leaving serveral Russian bridgeheads along the Don to the north, they were asking for exactly what happened to them at Stalingrad! When the advance was at it's peak and had begun to stall in the suburbs/city of Stalingrad, and when Kleist had moved into the southern Caucaucus and towards the Caspian sea it became to the Germans like a team trying to play a baseball game in the field with 6 players - not enough to cover the field so the ball is going to drop somewhere!

[wisbechlad]

By the way, what use are naval bombers to the Luftwaffe? An arial blockade of Britain isn't going to work, most imports can come via the ports in the west (Liverpool/ Bristol etc) and the LW can't get air superiority even over the Channel, so those bombers are going to be sitting ducks for the RAF.

Naval bomber would need to be long range 4 engine aircraft. They could easily fly out over the Atlantic and away from shore, with no radar to guide the fighters, they would not lose many to fighters. The FW 200 Conders where possible the worst military aircraft in ww2, yet because most ships are totally unarmed, they could afford to fly low and slow over them and drop a few small bombs which sank a rather large amount of shipping. Had Germany had a force of a hundred or more long range aircraft to spot for the U boats and attack stragglers, Germany would be able to increase the sinking totals quite a bit and destroy with it much more allied material. In addition the limiting factor in the early allied offensives is not equipment and men as much as it is lack of shipping to move them around.

So the Allies arm their merchant ships with AA guns, and introduce escort carriers/ catapult launched aircraft. Which is what they did...

Germany did have a force of 100 or more long range aircraft to spot ships - 276 Condors were built.

[Lkefct]

A force of a hundred means that they would have up to 100 bombers available at any one time. There where rarely more then a few dozen Conders in any of the groups in KG 40, so there where only a handful operational at any one time. Re-reading Blair's account of Donitz and Uboat operations, the most I can find that where used in a single convoy battle was 6 Conders in a single battle.

Conders where extremely vulnerable to low level AA fire which is what ultimately did them in as a maritime strike role. Of course the Conders also had a tendency to fall apart on the runways because they where simply adapted civilian airliners and could not handle the additional weight. They where not a robust aircraft. The bomb load was marginal as well. The Conders also where forced to drop bombs at very low levels.

Despite the limitations, Conders sank a fair amount of allied tonnage. Mostly single ships, I would believe. IF a sizable force had been available to perform maritime recon and low level bombing with a stronger structure and heavier bomb loads so that larger bombs could be dropped, a much more significant tonnage could be sunk as well as Uboats more effectively vectored into Convoy attacks instead of spread out in rakes to search for the Convoys.

[cueball]

Anyway this is all right out because scraping the Kriegsmarine would have handed the Baltic to the Russians.

[Roddoss72]

Salutations All

Would it have been better for the Axis had Army Group South to go after such cities as Saratov and Astrakhan with German forces and allow the much weaker Roumanian/Hungarian/Italian forces under German command go after Stalingrad. Also i would send the 11th and 17th Armies into the Caucasus to capture the Maykop oilfields and to tie down the North Caucasus Military District.

Once the German assualts on Saratov and Astrakhan are completed then begin a river crossing to secure riverheads on the eastern River Volga and begin to encircle Stalingrad thus isolating Stalingrad

What i am saying is this, the Germans form the stronger flanks.

Regards

Roddoss72

[erichkrieger]

My plan would be the cleaning of the left-bank of Don,taking more bridgeheads in the right-bank,with 2nd Army,4th Panzer Army and 6th Army.After this,from this bridgeheads,I would attack southeast,creating a continuous line,attacking Stalingrad from northwest.To take the city,I would cross the Volga,to have a provisional bridgehead,and take the city in October.The 17th Army would be a best south flanking force to this offensive,with 11th Army and romanian troops,like the Vanatori, supporting the 1st Panzer Army in Caucasus.In my opinion,this would not permit a victory in Caucasus in 1942,but would inviabilize a big Soviet offensive in Winter and the link to the Caspian Sea could be made in a offensive like Kharkov.

[Deans]

Salutations All

Would it have been better for the Axis had Army Group South to go after such cities as Saratov and Astrakhan with German forces and allow the much weaker Roumanian/Hungarian/Italian forces under German command go after Stalingrad. Also i would send the 11th and 17th Armies into the Caucasus to capture the Maykop oilfields and to tie down the North Caucasus Military District.

Regards

Roddoss72

The Germans barely had the fuel to reach Stalingrad. Saratov and Astrakhan were much further away.
They did send 2 Armies into the Caucasus ( 1 Pz, 17 A & Elements of 4Pz.) adding 11th Army would have depleted AG North and created more logistics bottlenecks.

[Roddoss72]

Salutations All

Would it have been better for the Axis had Army Group South to go after such cities as Saratov and Astrakhan with German forces and allow the much weaker Roumanian/Hungarian/Italian forces under German command go after Stalingrad. Also i would send the 11th and 17th Armies into the Caucasus to capture the Maykop oilfields and to tie down the North Caucasus Military District.

Regards

Roddoss72

The Germans barely had the fuel to reach Stalingrad. Saratov and Astrakhan were much further away.
They did send 2 Armies into the Caucasus ( 1 Pz, 17 A & Elements of 4Pz.) adding 11th Army would have depleted AG North and created more logistics bottlenecks.

Salutations Deans

My senario indicates that the bulk of Army Group South goes after and secures the southern part of the River Volga (Saratov-Astrakhan), this was never done. I have also included that the 11th Army was not sent north in which it proved a waste of time, but to immidiately work with the 17th Army in a two pronged attack on the Maykop Oilfields just after the capture of the Crimea. The 11th Army crosses the Kerch Peninsula while the 17th Army launches a drive from Rostov na Donu thus tying down the North Caucasus Front, this was never done. Once the Maykop oilfields were brought back online the Germans could have in conjunction of the Roumanian refineries begin to supply Army Group South.

Regards

Roddoss72

[T. A. Gardner]

In my opinion the single biggest failure of the Wehrmacht in this campaign was simply not providing sufficent engineering support to AGS to open rail lines forward as the army advanced. At the onset of the campaign AGS' furthest forward railhead was at Stalino about 300 miles from Stalingrad. This was a single track line supporting an army group that by German calculations should have had a minimum of three in operation. Advancing 300 miles meant that virtually all of the available motor transport was engaged in hauling supplies rather than in tactical support. About half of all Luftwaffe sorties were supply missions rather than support missions. Given the German material conditions this was nothing short of insane.

What the Germans needed first and foremost were sufficent railway engineers and other construction engineer units to build or restore a rail line forward to Stalingrad. Had this been the case the force multiplier in terms of efficency would have been sufficent to allow 6th Army to take the city and also hold their positions in the face of a counter offensive. I would estimate that about 10,000 to 20,000 OT workers (or military construction engineers) would have been necessary for the support of this operation to do things right. The best thing the Germans could have done was simply strip these from construction projects in the West.
If the number seems high it is because the Germans really lacked the kind of mechanized support Western armies had in this area. A single US CB (Seabee) battalion or construction engineer battalion could have produced equivalent work to two or three regiments of German construction engineer troops or more. This was a major flaw in the German operational plan.

[Deans]

Stalingrad was prettu much `unwinnable' for the reasons posted earlier i.e. the objectives of Blau being incompatable with German resources and the underestimating of Soviet reserves and production capacity.
That said however, I believe their best chances would have ben if they did the following:

1. Start of Operation Blue:

- Broad objectives remain the same.
- Dissolve 11A. Manstien gets to command the thrust to Stalingrad. The Southern thrust is led by Von List (both under
the command of Von Bock)
- 1 Corps of 11A moves to AG North (instead of the whole of 11A).
Another corps reinforces 17A and 1 PzA in the drive South. 1 remaining division of 11A, stays back around Rostov.
- List's forces get the Italian Alpine Divisions, instead of infantry formations that were provided.

2. Start of the Stalingrad operation.
- SSGD (mot?) is not sent to France but forms a mobile reserve with 1 division of 11A and remains West of the
Don bend to secure the Flank along the Don bend, North east of Rostov.
- One of the 2 Romanian armies is sent into the Stalingrad meat grinder, along with as many Hiwi units that the
Germans can equip with light weapons. They would do far better in street fighting than they would facing tanks in
open steppe.
- An equivalent number of German divisions are withdrawn from Stalingrad and are embedded with the remaining
Romanian army to secure the flanks North and South of Stalingrad.
- A Panzer reserve is created by detaching 1 Pz Div from 6A with 1 Pz Corps of 4PzA. This has to be stationed
between the Don bend and Stalingrad.

3. Caucasus:
As winter approaches, assume a defensive posture and secure jump off points for the attack towards the oil fields.
The extra corps from 11A should be adequate to secure this formation against any Red Army attack northwards.
Use the inter to improve logistics and set up airfields from which the Luftwaffe can attack Baku or interdict the
Oil traffic from there.
Get the Chechens and Ingush (and other dissaffected Soviet peoples) to ally with the Germans.

4. Operation Uranus: The Germans announce victory once the city centre is taken and the rest of the city reduced
(which did happen quite early). The extra German strength on the flank and the Panzer reserve should be enough
to hold the forces deployed for Uranus.

The best case scenario for the Germans would have Red army attacks being held off throughout the winter. The
spring would see the Germans continuing to exert pressure on the Volga (Stalingrad being useless to both sides) and
threatening to cross the Don Northwards. Pressure would also be mantained on the Caucasus oil fields.
This would leave the Germans in a better position than during the winter of 1941-42.

[Deans]

Possible Red Army countermoves to my previous scenario.

1. Prelude to Blue:

- Cancel the Kharkov offensive once German deployment and intentions were known. The formations used during
this operation would withdraw across the Don, redeploy and present a threat to the Don flank North of Rostov, as
early as Sept (instead of in Dec).
- Avoid the costly attacks to retake the Crimea (with more competent generals in that front). This would save 5-6
divisions, which would be adequate to secure the Caucasus against any additional force the Germans could deploy.

2. Start of Stalingrad fighting:

- Partisan activity focusses on attacking Oil dumps and convoys.
- Move the equivalent of a Mechanised Corps, allocated for Mars, to the Don Front.

3. Operation Uranus:

- Given the strength of German reserves West of Stalingrad, launch a `mini Uranus', with 4 armies instead of 6.
This would have the objective of tying down the German Panzer reserve and securing the area between the Don
and Chir. Almost simultaneously, attack the Italians, south across the Don and West across the Chir. Given the
extra forces available for both thrusts, it would almost certainly destroy the Italians (despite SS-GD, 1 div from 11A
and anything else the Germans could deploy). This would have the effect of threatening Rostov and with it, the
whole Army group and not just 6A.

Dilute Operation Mars and the offensive to retake Leningrad. Mantain just enough pressure on the Rhzev salient to
tie down German reserves. Attack in the direction of Voronezh instead. The thrust would be aimed at knocking the
Hungarians out of the war and threatening Kharkov - which would force in immediate German redeployment away
from the South.

4. Caucasus: Concentrate early in the campaign to building an impregnable line in the Caucasus foothills. The Red
army moves to these positions with freshly deployed reserves and units making an orderly withdrawl South.
(these include the forces earlier earmarked for the Caucasus).

Give greater responsibility to more competent Generals like Malinovsky and Grechko instead of Stalin's cronies
like Budenny and Lazar Kaganovich.

Focus all partisan activity (supported by paratroopers) to interdict German supplies.

[Lkefct]

One of the problems with the idea of pulling in the engineering troops, is the Germans are undertaking a major effort to expand the rail transport in the rest of occupied Russia. They are in the process of turning all the soviet rail lines from narrow gauge to German gauge and convert them from single lines to double lines, while adding more North-South lines to allow reinforcements to be moved more easily.

I understand and agree with the sentiments that they are needed to support the strike to the south, I don't think Germany can afford to make the move until those other operations are complete. A major part of German defensive in the east is the fact that they can move faster and move supplies more effectively due to the better rail lines. Without that advantage, Soviet material advantages become almost overwhelming and difficult to counter.

I also think some are forgetting the battle of Stalingrad was a sideshow and not an objective unto itself. As I believe the historical Soviet response (Uranus) demonstrates, the Soviets do not need to hold Stalingrad to ensure a flanking move on the Germans to cut them off. So holding Stalingrad doesn't accomplish anything except a convient place to winter for the 6th Army or to cut off the river traffic on the Volga, which can be accomplished anywhere along the river.

The strategic objective is the oil at Baku, not the city of Stalingrad. Winning the battle doesn't decide anything for the Germans, particularly in light of the supply difficulties. The rate of the advance is slower then it should be due to the lack of supplies for the armies, but the choke point is the lack of another East West line (or double line) to get past the choke point at Rostov. Having only the single rail line (I don't recall if it was a double tracks or not) just doesn't have the capacity to move enough trains to supply 2 Romanian armies, and 4 or 5 German armies at the level they need. That extra capacity needs to be built from scratch back to the jumping off points, unless the advance is moved to cross the Volga east of Kursk. Other wise, you have to move all the supplies south through the choke points and then back up by rail to the units North.

[jccalvin]

Hi:

I will restrict my self to the actual battle and the resources available.

1. The first major bombing of the city took place on 9/23/42 with the factories receiving a significant number of attacks. Targeting should have been restricted to supporting the heavy fighting north and south of the city, the landing sites on both sides of the Volga, troop, concentrations on the east side of the Volga, and rail and road supply routes east of the Volga. This should have continued throughout the battle.

2. The 24th Panzer Division could have taken the Grain Silo on 9/16/42 with few casualties. They could have then attacked north relieving pressure on the 94th and the 17th Infantry divisions which were attacking east toward the mouth of the Tsaritsa River. This would probably have allowed the two infantry divisions to reach the mouth prior to 9/26/42.

3. In fact, the 94th Infantry Division did reach the Tsarista mouth late on 9/26/42. They were joined by elements of the 17th Infantry Division on 9/27/42. Significant elements of these divisions remained on the banks of the Volga on September 27th, 28th, and 29th for rest days. Instead of resting, they could have left part of the 94th Division to hold the Tsarista River mouth and attacked north along the Volga.

4. The Germans, at one point, occupied approximately 15 Km. of the banks of the Volga--maybe less. If a major effort had been made to bring direct fire weapons (including FLAK guns) to the river bank; the combination of these guns and the Luftwaffe would have significantly reduced the Russian resupply effort over the Volga.

5. The impact of 400,000 Russian civilians in a city not being heavily bombed is difficult to say. Certainly we can conclude that they would have begun to starve quickly. The city buildings would have been more intact without the bombing. Again, the affect on fighting is hard to estimate.

6. Assuming the Germans captured the city, they could have brought in Rumanian and Hungarian units to hold the city. The 6th Army could then have been used in attacks south of the city.

I am not saying it would have worked, but I do not think the results could have been any worse than the actual outcome.

John

[The_Enigma]

- A Panzer reserve is created by detaching 1 Pz Div from 6A with 1 Pz Corps of 4PzA. This has to be stationed between the Don bend and Stalingrad.

I do not for the life of me remember where i read it, but i am sure that at least one historian reached such a conclusion and stated such a move would have saved the Sixth army and others.

While not being able to win the battle in the long run i recall the author stating if the panzer divisions had been kept out of the fight for the city and kept in reserve they would have been able available to stall the Soviet blows giving the top brass more time to realise the enveitable and also giving the axis forces a clear line to the rear.


Edit: Btw what does SSGD stand for?