Could the Soviet Union have won by itself?

[BDV]

Soviets were all in, with the exception of short periods of amassing a reserve to be deployed at the next opportunity.

Sounds like the German position as well.

That's correct only if one accounts for UK & Commonwealth, and USofA.

Our aim is to wipe out the entire defense potential remaining to the Soviets, and to cut them off, as far as possible, from their most important centers of war industry.

All available forces, German and allied, will be employed in this task. At the same time, the security of occupied territories in Western and Northern Europe, especially along the coast, will be ensured in all circumstances.

Adolf Hitler - Directive 41 / Fall Blau

Having ones cake and eating it too...

Add to the North Africa seesaw, the Badekers, the Murmansk interceptions, the Battle of Atlantic, etc. and you have Germany facing Soviet Russia's 100% with 60%, 70% tops of its warmaking potential.

[Politician01]

Add to the North Africa seesaw, the Badekers, the Murmansk interceptions, the Battle of Atlantic, etc. and you have Germany facing Soviet Russia's 100% with 60%, 70% tops of its warmaking potential.

Russia was at 110% to 120% - dont forget Lend Lease.

Also. many claim that 3/4 of all German losses occured on the eastern front - but then also that from 1942 onwars over 50% of the Luftwaffe losses were in the West/South/North - not eastern front.

How would the Russians have fared in the air war without 22 000 LL aircraft while the Germans could double their air strenght at any given time?

One Soviet propagandist in another forum (dont worry I dont mean ljadw) clamed that the Luftwaffe lost 50 000 aircraft in the east and only 30 000 in the west.

So even if we take these numbers - Russia has 22 000 Aircraft less - no LL
Germany has 30 000 aircraft more - no losses against Western allies.

So Russia can win while facing a deficit of some 50 000 aircraft?

[Michael Kenny]

Russia was at 110% to 120% - dont forget Lend Lease.

How could we.It is the standard whine of those who believe the wrong side won!

You can not say the Soviets had no slack in their economy. They were masters of improvisation and could tighten their belts another notch if needed.
Let me put it a bit simpler for you. The US produced 40,000 Shermans but never had more that 6000 in combat.
They could just as easily get by with a production run of 20,000.
Ditto for The Soviets.

How would the Russians have fared in the air war without 22 000 LL aircraft while the Germans could double their air strenght at any given time?

Another common mistake.
If you had asked anyone in 1941 that Germany needed to double her tank park they would have pointed out how hard it would be to build and man that many. However by 1944 Germany had doubled her field strength by an increase in production of several times that. Slack in the system.

One Soviet propagandist in another forum (dont worry I dont mean ljadw) clamed that the Luftwaffe lost 50 000 aircraft in the east and only 30 000 in the west.

And I can point you to several sites where German propagandists seriously claim it took 5 Shermans to knock out a Panther and a single Tiger II could knock out 50+ T34 tanks in one action.

So even if we take these numbers - Russia has 22 000 Aircraft less - no LL
Germany has 30 000 aircraft more - no losses against Western allies.

So Russia can win while facing a deficit of some 50 000 aircraft?

I am suprised you don't bring in the fleets of Me 262's and Panzer Divisions full of infra-red equiped Maus tanks............

[Terry Duncan]

Russia was at 110% to 120% - dont forget Lend Lease.

That is not quite correct. The USSR was not operating a full war economy prior to being attacked, and then suffered the loss of production as facilities were moved eastwards. It would be safe to say the USSR was not operating to its full potential until late 1942 or early 1943 because of this.

LWD,

Without the war with Britain the major reason for him rejecting what his intel people were reporting goes away. This suggest that the Red Army would be in a significantly higher state of readiness and makes it unlikely that the initial couple of months are nearly as disasterous for the Red Army as they were historically.

I did post to this effect earlier, there would be no mistaking the German intent as deploying several million men near the Soviet border was explained at the time as being moved there to train for an invasion of Britain and to move the troops away from British bombing. Neither reason would be valid in this scenario, and it is unlikely Stalin will believe it is a boy scouts convention aiming to form a human chain down the border as a sign of friendship. Three and a half million troops can only be being assembled for one purpose, to attack the USSR. That will see the Soviets avoid a forward deployment and certainly the idiotic order to not fight back.

To all posters,

Whilst I dont moderate this forum I would ask for people to avoid posting personal comments about other posters as they are against the rules and it would be a shame to see this thread closed because of such behaviour. I know we all get annoyed at times and allow emotion to get the better of us, but it would be best if people tried to cool off and maybe even remove any unfortunate comments from their posts.

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[David Thompson]

An exchange of insulting posts between Michael Kenny and Politician01, which added nothing of informational value to this discussion, was removed by this moderator -- DT.

Gentlemen -- If you can't be civil, be gone.

[BDV]

The reason why the Eastfront is a good WhIf setting, is that the battle was well balanced. The Germans did overrun a number of key Soviet centers of industry, but in the end they were nevertheless stopped by the Soviet forces, and even thrown back, that without significant UK intervention (e.g. invasion of France) during the early (June '41-Oct '42) battle. So, having a side increase its effectiveness some way would lead to the changing in the lines of battle.(A good whatif for the Soviet side would probably be the survival of M. P. Kirponos.)

But, the more I think about it, airpower stands out as the greatest weakening of the Nazi war machine at the hands of Great Britain. I think airpower is what had bailed out again and again the flimsiness of land based forces, from the Battle of Bzura, to Norway, to France itself. Again and again the german aircraft straffed and bombed the lights out the counterattacking forces. Even in opening phases of Barbarossa airforces dealt severe blows. But then, the Luftwaffe on the East Front just fades away. Of course, credit goes to VVS and soviet AA. But by Barbarossa time, Luftwaffe was half of what it could have been, if not for the british and commonwealth efforts.

[Kilgore Trout]

1. For those unable to realise the degree of change in historical events that would derive from this hypothesis:
The improbability of the hypothesis is irrelevant. Unexpected events occur. This hypothesis may exist in recognition of that. (E.g.; Churchill dies on or about the day France surrenders: would Britain's new P.M. and Cabinet stay in a war that was apt to be long, costly, and perhaps unable to be won?) It is only relevant to gauge the change the hypothesis would create & determine the likely results of that change. This has nothing to do with one's whether one believes the result of WWII was good or bad. It is simple analysis.

2. For those who think this hypothesis gives the S.U. an advantage because there would be no gain to other nations to join the Nazi attack.
If so, why did so many other nations or their citizens willingly participate WHILE the Nazis & Italy were at war with Britain? If they would join the Axis despite the potential handicap of possible eventual repercussion on them, then it logically follows they would be MORE apt to join if the handicap was removed, as it would be in this hypothesis. Many governments or individual citizens might want to help eliminate the "foul baboonery of ... Bolshevism (Churchill, 1919 speech to Parliament)" before it took over in their country. In particular, Vichy France might have such interest: Communism had strong support in France. This might be greatly exacerbated if Britain, while on the cusp of making peace with the Axis, still sent the R.N. against the French fleet at Oran. That might literally drive the Vichy into the Axis. (Historically, this nearly happened. Vichy bombed Gibraltar in Sept. 1940 after the British tried to seize Dakar.) Historically, most anti-fascist partisans were communists/communist sympathisers. However, the general political stance in most of the occupied European nations was conservative to authoritarian.

3. For those who argue it would be costly & difficult to keep these armies standing without being used.
Why would armies have to stand idle? That rarely happens when a war starts. By the 1940's, armies could fully mobilise from virtually nothing within 2-3 weeks & go straight into combat.

4. For those who argue this means the S.U. is not "surprised" by the attack .
The "surprise" is myth. Many sources told the S.U. a major attack was pending AT LEAST weeks before it occurred. E.g.'s; The British; the Rudolf Hess flight to Britain; Polilsh resistance; etc. No surprise: only Soviet government & military incompetence from the highest to lowest levels. The "West" was not surprised on 10 May 1940 when "Fall Gelb" was launched. That did not change the result by one iota.

5. For those who argue this alleged "new" forewarning would make a significant difference in S.U. preparation & troop deployment.
Allegedly, S.U. troops near the borders were aligned in an offensive posture. To change to a meaningful defensive posture would need prepared defenses in which to deploy. Where were these? Not the mythical "Stalin Line." The Wehrmacht penetrated that "Line" in true Pattonesque fashion ("Like s... through a goose.")

6. For those who argue the Red Army could simply fall back & lure the Wehrmacht into some devious trap.
The S.U. had just occupied eastern Poland (now Belarus) in Sept. 1939. It seized the Baltic states & Bessarabia only about one year before the attack. It had not yet completed its railway conversions, & certainly had not fully coerced obedience in the citizens of these areas. With each un-compelled backward step the Red Army took, even if it attempted "scorched earth tactics," it would allow the Axis easier access through those areas. This would provide a thousands of volunteers to the Axis armies, & freely give up those areas & that part of the S.U. that had the best & densest roads & railways as well as many seaports. This would greatly ease Axis supply & troop movement. Meanwhile, it would be retreating into, for the most part, a quagmire of ever-fewer roads or railways, & no seaports or ships by which to move large numbers of troops quickly.
Despite the wisecracks about the Axis "horse-drawn army", it used more trucks & tractors than the Red Army of 1941-3 & could move more troops further & faster. Axis forces, especially the Wehrmacht, were generally much better educated, led & trained, & much more skilled at operating independently. Even in 1945, S.U. units - especially armour - needed good leadership to do even minor tasks. A strategic withdrawal needs good leadership, good communication, & strong discipline. But the 1941 Red Army still suffered severely from the officer corps purges of 1937-8. Many S.U. units might lose coherence in a rapid retreat, & huge numbers of troops would be intercepted & destroyed. In such a situation, the S.U. might be apt to lose even more troops than it did historically by standing & fighting. Also, while the S.U. lacked the road/rail net of Europe, it had far more mobility infrastructure than 1812 Russia.

7. For those who argue the Axis would not be able to add any more troops to the attack.
Why not? No war with Britain means only about one corps would be needed to secure Narvik, Norway & the Swedish ore link against possibly S.U. attack. The rest of the garrison - at least 200,000 troops, could go on the "Barbarossa" order of battle. Ditto for Denmark: another 20,000 troops. Evacuate France south of Normandy, adding Armee 1 & Armee 7, etc.

I could go on, mentioning MANY other aspects of how I see no way the S.U. could survive in such a situation, let alone "win." But none of this will make the slightest difference ot the convinced.

[BDV]

"The kick the door and the whole rotten structure" business would likely work as poorly in ATL as it did in the OTL.

Now if Soviet Union has more of its forces on the border and the Wehrmacht gets its desired annihilation battle there, things might end in a Soviet collapse. But, if the Soviet generals on the other hand have more leeway to withdraw, that may balance out the german advantage. Timely Soviet withdrawals from both the Vyazma pocket and the Kiev pocket would have payed nice dividends against the brash germans.

[Kilgore Trout]

Except that, as I noted above, an army with weak leadership, communications and discipline (like the Red Army of the time) is apt to dissipate. Much equipment would likely be lost in retreats, and the troops prone to panic. You never win by constant retreat. It only postpones the necessary inevitable confrontation. The effect on troop morale is cancerous. The effect on civilian morale can be fatal. Eventualy, although S.U. citizens were denied access to news reports, the reports of refugees would reach a tipping point. Then, the whole system WOULD collapse. Notice how quickly the S.U. & its empire collapsed in late 1989 - early 1991 as the people "voted with their feet." Notice the Iraqi army in 2003. A dictator who tries to rule by fear eventually finds that a person is more afraid of an enemy tank before him RIGHT NOW than anything the dictator's minions might do later.

[BDV]

This speculation does not apply to the historical state of affairs in Soviet Union in 1941. The Wehrmacht and it's auxilliaries had to defeat RKKA on the battlefield before the state would collapse.

[Kilgore Trout]

SPECULATION!!?? "Does not apply to the historical state of affairs in Soviet Union"!? Tell us how. Was Stalin TRULY the "man of steel" (Clark Kent/Superman)? Throuhout history, people have been and are very much the same no matter where you go, no matter what time period. They want to live, to be happy, and to be comfortable. They sometimes tolerate a very great deal, but only when they believe they have no choice. When a perceived better option - or even something different - comes along, they are quick to take it. For all the rhetoric across centuries about "fighting to the last man (or last bullet, or last street, etc.)," it VERY rarely happens. You can probably count the occasions on the fingers of one hand. Almost everyone almost all the time prefers being alive to being dead.

[BDV]

Yes, but please provide evidence how this applied to Soviet Union historically, let's say around the time RKKA was bashing Wehrmacht's brains' in, not in one place, but in 3 places at the same time (Tikhvin, Moscow, and Rostov).

P.S. I would add that neither Germany, nor smaller countries like Poland, Greece, or Norway did not "collapse". In all those cases the opponents had to defeat the entirety of that nation's military and occupy all its teritorry. So just handwaving into the discussion a "collapse" of the Soviet State, that's a pretty sizeable (and IMO unsupportable) assumption.

[Terry Duncan]

SPECULATION!!?? "Does not apply to the historical state of affairs in Soviet Union"!? Tell us how. Was Stalin TRULY the "man of steel" (Clark Kent/Superman)? Throuhout history, people have been and are very much the same no matter where you go, no matter what time period. They want to live, to be happy, and to be comfortable. They sometimes tolerate a very great deal, but only when they believe they have no choice. When a perceived better option - or even something different - comes along, they are quick to take it. For all the rhetoric across centuries about "fighting to the last man (or last bullet, or last street, etc.)," it VERY rarely happens. You can probably count the occasions on the fingers of one hand. Almost everyone almost all the time prefers being alive to being dead.

I cannot recall the date the German people rose up and overthrew their dictator or the date Germany collapsed rather than fight to the last man? They were even conducting impromptu lynchings right up to the point their cities were piles of rubble and enemy armies were fighting in them!

It didnt take too long into the German invasion for the Soviet people to find out what the Nazi's intended for them, mostly slave labour, starvation, as well as reprisals and the inevitable atrocities too. You could try to argue that Stalin had been little different, but he was one of the Soviet people and not an invader. When faced with the choice of which monster the Soviet people picked their own monster and stuck with him, showing little sign of wishing to become second class citizens in their own nation. Collapses and not fighting to the bitter end such as you suggest tend to only happen when people are fairly sure they will be better off by accepting peace than by continuing the war. It does not require too much insight to see the Soviet peoples made the correct decision, even if it was one of which monster to fight for.

You never win by constant retreat. It only postpones the necessary inevitable confrontation.

You dont win just by advancing either. Indeed, by advancing you must dissipate your strength by leaving troops to secure rear areas that are getting ever larger and deal with the probably none to happy locals, you also stretch your own logistics whilst shortening those of the enemy - problems illustrated well enough in the USSR and in North Africa during WWII. Advancing against an enemy you have still not defeated, over land of little strategic value, and with no obvious way to force the enemy to either surrender or fight a decisive battle so you can defeat him is or little use if not outright counterproductive.


This thread seems far more about Cold War preconceptions than the reality of WWII. Was there a planned date for the return to the topic of the thread, namely 'Could the Soviet Union have won by itself?'???

[Kilgore Trout]

I thought the topic was addressed. Q: Could the S.U. have won by itself? A: Absolutely NOT, & here is why ...
You can easily find a multitude of examples of the German military packing it in well before necessary. E.g.; the Ruhr Pocket easily could have held out for quite some time. They fought hard against the S.U. because they hoped to avoid capture by a nation that did not sign the Hague or Geneva Conventions. Can't say Poland didn't collapse. About 300,000 of its troops ducked out through Rumania rather than fight. Must consider Norway an atypical situation because of its geography. The Greek campaign was over almost as quickly as it began, & would have been over even sooner but for the presence of British troops. Too fast to say if it was a collapse or not.
You win by advancing & defeating whatever enemy stands in your path & capturing strategic objectives. With a coherent plan, Leningrad SHOULD have fallen by October '41. It would have been a superb supply & communications base. Moscow also SHOULD have been captured. There was little sense in racing to Rostov after Kiev fell. That armoured group should have been directed at Moscow. The loss of those two cities would have deprived the S.U. of about 25% of its industrial capacity & a huge amount of its communications net. The effect on Soviet morale would have been severe. In the paranoid psychopath S.U. government, the knives would have been out for Stalin & his close cronies. I don't find the S.U. people making any "choice" of Stalin over Hitler. They would have fought back against Stalin as easily if they had the chance. Certainly, vast numbers of captured Red Army soldiers were willing to fight against the regime if given the chance. But you can only very rarely say the same about captured Germans; they would not join the S.U. to fight against the Nazis.
As I have said before: no grand strategy. In the words of the illustrious philosopher Lawrence "Yogi" Berra: "You have to be very careful if you don't know where you're going, because you might not get there."

[Andy H]

Hi

Though I think the OP query has been answered as best it's ever going to get, I'm not going to lock this thread yet.
However could any future posts (maybe by new participants) please keep their posts relevant to this OP. If you feel your post is going to be about anything but the OP, then best you don't post it, otherwise the thread will get locked.

Thanks

Andy H