Battlecruiser Raid on Hartlepool: 22/11/1914.

[Paul_G_Baker]

Author's Note: This is a modified, slightly earlier, interpretation of a historical event; one in which the German High Seas Fleet came closest to achieving their prime strategic goal of engaging an isolated element of the British Grand Fleet with the possibility of destroying it; thereby changing the balance of Naval power (expressed in terms of Capital Ships per fleet) in their favour - which, at this time in the OTL, was closer than at any other. My intention is to use contributors' input to examine the whole operation stage-by-stage and see what might have happened.


In Naval terms, 3rd November 1914 was a sad day for Britain and a mixed day for Germany. The British Admiralty learned that morning of the defeat (the first for a century) of the South Atlantic Squadron, with the loss of two Armoured Cruisers, HMS Monmouth and HMS Good Hope (flagship of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Craddock, who died in the battle); and had further suffered a humiliating raid (albeit with only the loss of one submarine and three trawlers) by German warships on the port of Yarmouth. On the German side, their Battlecruisers had successfully completed their first offensive operation of the war; but without (as had been hoped) drawing any isolated parts of the Grand Fleet into an ambush. On returning to port the next day, they were heartened by hearing about the victory at Coronel by the East Asiatic Squadron, commanded by Vice-Admiral Maximillian Graf von Spee; but saddened by the loss (in the early hours of 4th November) of the Armoured Cruiser SMS Yorck, which had blundered into one of their own minefields in fog. Yorck's former crew had been transferred en-masse to SMS Seydlitz eighteen months earlier when that ship was commissioned.

Over the following two weeks the British appointed a new First Sea Lord (by re-appointing an old one) 74-year-old John "Jacky" Fisher (Admiral of the Fleet The Right Honourable the Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, to give him his proper title) and, among other things, started to plot the downfall of Admiral von Spee and his squadron, eventually deciding to send three of the Grand Fleet's precious Battlecruisers to American and South American waters. One Battlecruiser, HMS Princess Royal, was sent to cover the East Coast of America then to the eastern exit of the Panama Canal while the other two, HMS Inflexible and HMS Invincible (flagship of Vice-Admiral Doveton Sturdee), were sent to form the nucleus of a powerful hunting group covering the southern tip of South America, based on the Falkland Islands.

On the German side, Rear-Admiral Franz von Hipper (commanding the German Battlecruiser force) agitated for permission to take his ships (except SMS Blücher) south to rendezvous with the victorious East Asiatic Squadron and escort it back to Germany, but this was refused.

On 16th November (six days after sailing from Devonport) Invincible and Inflexible stopped to coal at the small Portuguese harbour of Sagres (near Cape St Vincent) and 24 hours later steamed over the horizon in the approximate direction of Brazil; seemingly oblivious to the fact that Portugal was neutral and there were several German merchant ships laid-up in the harbour. Local telegraph operators lost no time in chatting to their opposite numbers in South America about the British ships' movements. Also on 16th November (although unknown to the British Admiralty at the time) SMS Derfflinger, the lead ship in a new, more powerful, class of German Battlecruisers, was passed fit for active service with the fleet after having damaged one of her steam-turbine engines during trials.

It didn't happen historically, but What If the intelligence on the British Battlecruisers' movements had been passed to Berlin and von Hipper had learned of it? It could, so easily, have been!

One consequence would almost certainly be that German Diplomatic outposts in Chile and Argentina would be telegraphed orders to pass that intelligence on to Vice-Admiral von Spee at all costs - if not to give him fresh orders to keep out of sight for a period and certainly not to initiate any more offensive action.

Another consequence (in this ATL) occurred on Sunday, 22nd November 1914. It was an overcast, wet and breezy dawn at Hartlepool, visibility out to sea was limited by rain showers sweeping in periodically, driven by an on-shore breeze. The Army and Navy personnel stood-to as normal, but when nothing was sighted after the stipulated period the 'stand-to' gave way to a more relaxed Sunday morning wartime routine. At 9:00am most of the Civilian and Military populations were starting their particular format of Divine Worship (the more devout among the Civilian population had already attended Early Service, the less devout had used the time for extra sleep!). At 9:30am, their devotions were rudely interrupted by the express-train whistle of incoming shell-fire, followed by the crash of detonating rounds. Destroyer HMS Waveney didn't stand a chance, being hit simultaneously by two 21cm shells from Blücher's first salvo, one of which struck her torpedo launchers. She disintegrated in a massive explosion, showering nearby ships and buildings with wreckage and half-stunning all exposed personnel nearby - none of her crew survived.

As the Military abandoned 'Church' and rushed to man their weapons, several more ships appeared; three of them large. The first two of these targeted the headland batteries with their broadside armament in passing (no doubt aided in finding the range by the batteries' proximity to the lighthouse tower) and then proceded to fire into the docks and warehousing areas. The third ship (actually SMS Moltke) slowed as she came opposite the batteries and kept them under fire (over three hundred shell craters were later counted around their wrecked positions), again using just her broadside guns. Destroyers HMS Doon, HMS Test and HMS Moy (all outside the harbour) came under a hail of long-range fire from three Light Cruisers and were forced south without being able to launch a torpedo atack. While no direct hits were scored on them, they did suffer significantly from shell splinters, but only being armed with 12pdr guns were hopelessly outranged.

The two Scout Cruisers inside the harbour (HMS Patrol and HMS Forward) were unable to engage. HMS Patrol was spotted while moving by SMS Von der Tann and took a 28cm shell through her engine room, which (fortunately) did not explode but did cause rapid flooding, leading her Captain to run her aground in an effort to preserve her. HMS Forward (without sufficient steam in her boilers) attracted two full secondary armament broadsides from SMS Seydlitz and was left a floating pyre. HM Submarine C9 (having been peppered with debris from Waveney) also attempted to sail but was repeatedly rocked onto her beam-ends by random near-misses and lost electrical power.

The noise of the bombardment (and the impact of the inevitable 'overs', some of which hit houses and at least one church) caused panic among the civilian population, who started fleeing into the countryside, however the local telephone operator stayed at her post, frantically trying to get the alert out. Eventually, she got a connection to the Admiralty in London, and morse-keys began tapping-out 'Most Immediate' signals to Grand Fleet units.

After forty minutes of bombardment, the German ships moved slowly eastward, back out to sea, leaving the remaining inhabitants (once whe worst of the smoke and dust had cleared) to survey the wreckage of their ravaged town and start firefighting and rescue/recovery actions.

First point for discussion: The British Battleships have a maximum speed of about 21 or 22 knots; Beatty's Battlecruisers (if driven hard) can make about 27: a difference of about one hour for every 100 miles steamed - so would Beatty (in the Firth of Forth, 100 miles from the scene, and expecting to encounter only three, inferior, enemy Battlecruisers and a large Armoured Cruiser) keep to the slower pace of his supporting Battleships or (as Jellicoe historically feared) would the combination of the words 'German', 'Battlecruisers' and 'Blücher' act as a red rag to a bull and send him charging off unsupported on a best-guess interception course?

Your views please!

Please also read the "Background" post (below) before replying.

[Paul_G_Baker]

Von Hipper knew that only eight British Battlecruisers had been fully completed and were in service. Of these, HMAS Australia was the flagship of the Royal Australian Navy and was currently searching for von Spee's Squadron in the Pacific; HMS Invincible and HMS Inflexible were on the same mission in Central or South American Waters; HMS Indefatigable was currently in the Mediterranean - in part to guard against the former German Battlecruiser Göben (now in service with the Ottoman Empire and renamed Yavuz Sultan Selim) breaking out. HMS Princess Royal had been escorting troop convoys from Canada, and was believed to still be tasked to that. Excluding HMS Tiger (the ninth Battlecruiser, still fitting out and training her crew) that should leave only HMS Lion (Admiral Beatty's flagship), HMS New Zealand, HMS Indomitable and HMS Queen Mary to oppose his own four Battlecruisers. Even numbers - five to four at worst! True, the British ships were slightly faster and had heavier guns, but his were more heavily armoured; they had been designed to exchange fire with Battleships, which the British ships had not!

Alight with enthusiasm for mauling (at the very least) the reduced British Battlecruiser force, von Hipper attempted to contact his immediate superior, Admiral von Ingenohl, only to learn that he was "suffering from an indisposition" and quarantined in his cabin. In frustration, von Hipper sent a telegram direct to Admiral of the Fleet Alfred von Tirpitz in Berlin. The reply came in the form of an order (copied to Vice-Admiral Reinhard Scheer) to travel to Berlin immediately for a meeting with Admiral von Tirpitz. Expecting to be disciplined for his impulsive act, von Hipper was pleasantly surprised (and quite relieved) to find that von Tirpitz was also enthusiastic about the idea, had known of von Ingenohl's "indisposition" (described as 'not very serious, but highly personal, deeply embarrassing and thought to be contagious!', and of a nature that a ship's motion in any kind of seaway would be liable to make worse) and had selected Admiral Sheer to help refine the idea into an operational plan (he had been Chief of the General Naval Department under von Tirpitz from late 1911 to January 1913) and - most important of all - obtain the Kaiser's permission to involve the Battleships of the High Seas Fleet.

It was decided that the Yarmouth raid pattern was sound (signals analysis had shown that the British Navy had, in fact, responded; but von Hipper's force had reached the safety of German waters before British Heavy Units had entered the North Sea. The coastal town of Hartlepool was selected as the target. Admiral Scheer proposed that only the latest (best armed, armoured and fastest) two classes of Battleships, the Kaisers (less Friedrich der Grosse, Admiral von Ingenohl's flagship) and the Königs, should provide the covering force and that Blücher should be with the Battlecruiser force (but not a part of it) to conduct most of the bombardment, to act as a lure to Beatty and to hide Derfflinger's presence in the Scouting Group for as long as possible. As a response was expected, the covering force should be much closer to the Battlecruisers than previously and all forms of reconnaissance (including Zeppelin airships) should be liberally used to guard against surprise. If approved, the operation should be launched as rapidly as possible (preferably on a Sunday) and the Battlecruisers should come within sight from the English coast no earlier than 09:30 hours (German time) to allow the hoped-for engagement to take place before dusk but while still allowing evasion and escape under cover of darkness, should that be required. Von Hipper's force would be screened by four fast Light Cruisers (SMS Strassburg, SMS Stralsund, SMS Graudenz and SMS Kolberg) accompanied by eighteen Torpedo Boats. Scheer's Battleships would be screened by the pick of the remainder of the HSF's light forces including the Armoured Cruiser SMS Roon (Yorck's sister ship), the Light Cruisers SMS Stettin, SMS Stuttgart and SMS Hamburg, accompanied by thirty Torpedo Boats.

At the Admirals' audience with the Kaiser, von Hipper concluded his presentation with "Sire, an opportunity like this may never come again!". Sheer and von Tirpitz were more measured in their approach, concentrating on the German ships' superior armour protection, but von Tirpitz added a bombshell that, according to a telegraphed summary of von Spee's after-action report, British shells were unreliable; the two that had hit SMS Scharnhorst had not exploded and the four that had hit SMS Gneisenau had only caused light, easily repairable, damage and had only slightly wounded three men! Partially reassured, the Kaiser gave provisional permission for the Battleships to participate in the operation, but instructed that they were only to engage if they were at least equal in numbers to any British Heavy Ships encountered. The three Admirals readily agreed to this stipulation. On the recommendation of von Tirpitz, the Kaiser appointed Reinhard Scheer to be overall commander of the operation; he would transfer his flag to the Battleship Kaiserin.

In Britain, thought had been given to preventing (or at least intercepting) a repeat of the Yarmouth raid. Due to the forced redeployment of half of Beatty's Battlecruiser force, reinforcements had been assigned in the shape of the Second Battle Squadron of six Orion and King George V class Super-Dreadnoughts under Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender (who was, in fact, senior to Beatty). Another Orion class ship, HMS Thunderer, was under repair and HMS Audacious (the fourth King George V class) had been lost by mining on 27th October in the Irish Sea. The scouting and screening element was formed of the four Armoured Cruisers of the Third Cruiser Squadron, the four Light Cruisers of the First Light Cruiser Squadron and one Light Cruiser and twenty-one Destroyers (detached from Commodore Tyrwhitt's Harwich force and temporarily based with the other ships in the Firth of Forth). Local defence forces at Hartlepool were one submarine, two Scout Cruisers and four Destroyers. Also installed on the Hartlepool headland were a total of three six-inch guns in two battery positions.

The British held a potential trump-card, since a code book (salvaged from the wreck of SMS Magdeburg) had just been received from the Russians. However, Room 40 was still getting to grips with this and training extra cipher-clerks. The speed with which the German operation had been laid on, Scheer's (hand-delivered) issue of operational orders together with revised, operation-specific, Fighting Instructions to each Battleship, Cruiser and Torpedo Boat Command Ship and the lack of any signals emanating from SMS Friedrich der Grosse (which the British knew to be the High Seas Fleet Flagship) led them to believe that only Hipper's forces would be involved. What German wireless traffic was decoded did not contain any target-specific information; being limited to orders to confirm readiness for sea in all respects on the evening of 21st November. The general feeling in Room 40 was that there was either a local exercise planned, or that there would be a sortie into the Baltic, however a warning order was passed to the fleet units waiting in the Firth of Forth (marked, unfortunately, 'For Information').

[Polar bear]

hi, Paul,

::: would the combination of the words 'German', 'Battlecruisers' and 'Blücher' act as a red rag to a bull and send him charging off unsupported on a best-guess interception course?

having read Roskill´s Beatty biography just recently, I have no doubts that he would have gone "after the bait" without further considerations.

An additional disadvantage for the British side was, IMO, the weather, the visual conditions being much worse than at Doggerbank and at Jutland, reducing the British advantage in gun range.

greetings, the pb

[Paul_G_Baker]

Hi pb,

That was also my read on the likely scenario.

So, with Beatty "on the charge", how do you think he would avoid being ordered back into position by the senior Admiral (and avoid a Court Martial for disobeying a direct order)? A convenient 'wireless failure' on Lion, do you think?

Also, if he does ignore an order to hold back, what are his chances of encountering Sheer's Battleships (or the combined HSF force) rather than just von Hipper's ships?

Regards,

[Polar bear]

HI; pAUL;

A convenient 'wireless failure' on Lion, do you think?

no. Although very extraordinary and self-confident up to conceit, Beatty was still a true navy man. Very reluctantly and with gnashing teeth, he would obey and turn back.

But any whiff of the enemy, even a faint smoke, would give him an excuse he would make use of.

greetings, the pb

[Paul_G_Baker]

At 10:30hrs British Naval Wireless Stations pick up strong German wireless traffic. Direction finding places this in the vicinity of Hartlepool and is (on the third attempt at getting an acknowledgement) a long signal. When eventually decoded by Room 40, the message proves to be an after-action report and states an intention to pass to the north of Dogger Bank.

At 11:30hrs the Wireless Stations pick up a further signal (again requiring multiple call-ups), this time stating that the Scouting Group's speed has been reduced to fifteen knots due to poor quality coal. This signal is decoded quickly, but Direction Finding has in any case allowed a rough position and base course to be established and a speed to be calculated. Both are immediately passed on to the Grand Fleet Units.

On receipt of this information, Beatty immediately signals Vice-Admiral Warrender asking permission to intercept at maximum speed. A quick reference to the chart shows Warrender that the Second Battle Squadron would not be able to intercept before nightfall, but that Beatty's Battlecruisers would almst certainly be able to.

Question: With reports of substantial damage and numerous civilian casualties being relayed from Hartlepool via London, what does Vice-Admiral Warrender decide? Take the risk of letting Beatty off the leash, or let von Hipper get away scott-free?

[Baltasar]

The latter. Beatty would risk running into overwhelming opposition. He might have the speed to escape, but only if he manages to see the enemy quickly enough. With unstable weather conditions, this would be a risk. Another thing to mention would be the tides and currents. Different areas of the North Sea had different current directions, dependend on tidal direction. It would be possible to be slightly quicker when sailing with the current / tides than against them. If Beatty had to make his escape against the tides, he'd be slightly slower. This would probably only mean about a knot, but still more time under enemy guns.

Yet another question would be the possibility of enemy subs. The British must have realised that the Germans were trying to lure them across pre positioned submarines. Although Beatty's ships were fast, their course would be very predictable in a persuit.

[Paul_G_Baker]

The latter. Beatty would risk running into overwhelming opposition. He might have the speed to escape, but only if he manages to see the enemy quickly enough. With unstable weather conditions, this would be a risk.

We know about the 'overwhelming opposition' but; as far as the British Admiralty and Grand Fleet are concerned, only von Hipper's ships are involved - as at Yarmouth (in OTL).

Yet another question would be the possibility of enemy subs. The British must have realised that the Germans were trying to lure them across pre positioned submarines. Although Beatty's ships were fast, their course would be very predictable in a persuit.

The submarine threat doesn't seem to have factored into anyone's calculations in the OTL operation this WI is based on. Warrender happily went to sea without any destroyers at all (due to the sea state), and Beatty brought only seven with him. The two sets of British ships were also apparently happy to operate detached from each other (at either end of a British defensive minefield)!

Thw very slow speed of those early submarines meant that one would really have to be in exactly the right position to get a torpedo off.

[Terry Duncan]

Question: With reports of substantial damage and numerous civilian casualties being relayed from Hartlepool via London, what does Vice-Admiral Warrender decide? Take the risk of letting Beatty off the leash, or let von Hipper get away scott-free?

Warrender himself is the key to this question, and he is not the sort to take risks. Partially deaf by many accounts, dour, uninspired, and unimaginative are all terms I have seen applied to him, he would fall back on his first duty to preserve the fleet if in doubt. Very few if any of the GF admirals would have been likely to send Beatty off on such a chase with the chance of an encounter in failing visibility and quite possibly given the time of year poor conditions too.

As Polar bear has said, Beatty may have taken risks and liked to play the heroic figure, but he was not one to disobey a direct order from a senior officer and certainly not on such a slim chance of getting a result that would vindicate him. If the enemy were in sight and already being engaged he might try to pull the 'unable to disengage without great risks to light forces' ploy at first to buy time, or even just risk a continuation of the engagement against orders under his right as the senior officer on the spot to make the decision, but with no enemy in sight and no certainty of finding them, he would not risk his career by just rushing off on what could be a fruitless chase.

[Polar bear]

hi,, Terry,

...his right as the senior officer on the spot to make the decision,

Do you know whether Jellicoe´s Battle Orders specified that right verbatim ?

or is this just like Nelson at St. Vincent or Copenhagen ?

greetings, the pb

[Paul_G_Baker]

Question: With reports of substantial damage and numerous civilian casualties being relayed from Hartlepool via London, what does Vice-Admiral Warrender decide? Take the risk of letting Beatty off the leash, or let von Hipper get away scott-free?

Warrender himself is the key to this question, and he is not the sort to take risks. Partially deaf by many accounts, dour, uninspired, and unimaginative are all terms I have seen applied to him, he would fall back on his first duty to preserve the fleet if in doubt. Very few if any of the GF admirals would have been likely to send Beatty off on such a chase with the chance of an encounter in failing visibility and quite possibly given the time of year poor conditions too.

As Polar bear has said, Beatty may have taken risks and liked to play the heroic figure, but he was not one to disobey a direct order from a senior officer and certainly not on such a slim chance of getting a result that would vindicate him. If the enemy were in sight and already being engaged he might try to pull the 'unable to disengage without great risks to light forces' ploy at first to buy time, or even just risk a continuation of the engagement against orders under his right as the senior officer on the spot to make the decision, but with no enemy in sight and no certainty of finding them, he would not risk his career by just rushing off on what could be a fruitless chase.

Ordinarily, probably - but politics and tradition both come into play here, IMHO.

Churchill and Fisher would have been informed very early on - and Churchill will know that he will be in for a rough time when he has to give a 'Statement to the House' sometime tomorrow. At present, he has to try to explain away how German ships have managed to bombard a British town (yet again!) without being intercepted or interrupted, leaving around 700 casualties (many of them civilians) in addition to all the property damage done to port facilities and town.

If the Royal Navy doesn't at least make an attempt to intercept and exact retribution, he will also have to try to explain away how ten British Capital ships ran away (for that is how it would probably be seen - particularly if 'Charlie' has a snipe at Fisher in 'the other place' or in the papers) from just three German Capital ships and a large Cruiser!

Of such humiliations are not "forced resignations" born?

We also both know how much WSC likes to have a finger or two in the operational matters pie! Could Fisher withstand a political directive from Churchill - and what of Fisher's own feelings? He invented the Dreadnought and Battlecruiser concepts, after all.

Best Regards,

[Terry Duncan]

The main problem is the fear of being lured into a trap, and a mixed force strung out across the North Sea is asking to be trapped, if not by a surface force then a submarine or mine. The distance involved in this chase also suggest there is little chance of interception. Certainly there would be a feeling that something more needed to be done after such a raid, such as a detachment of heavy ships further south so as to be better placed to intercept next time.

The GFBO's did allow for commanders to do quite a lot though they were seen by most as a rigid rule set that must not be deviated from in any way. I could not say that I can prove there was a specific 'do as you see fit' as I do not have a copy to check, but it is implied that there was by many authors when they note that most refused to use initiative. There is of course also the tradition of ignoring an order by the man on the spot, as well as the Troubridge/Milne incident from the very start of the war, so it would not be too problematic to say that initiative was expected.

[glenn239]

The main problem is the fear of being lured into a trap, and a mixed force strung out across the North Sea is asking to be trapped, if not by a surface force then a submarine or mine.

The problem is the same as all such ‘isolation’ schemes, including my own detailed elsewhere; the British had to willingly enter a trap because the Germans do not have a navy that can spring a trap without the cooperation of the victim. The Germans will also get only one shot at it, since failure would mean a tighter leash on Beatty.

It all comes down to the operational barrier of Germany having constructed the wrong fleet consisting of ships with the wrong characteristics.

[Paul_G_Baker]

It may clear up some confusion if I declare that the projected intercept point is only about 70 miles East of the English East Coast.

[Polar bear]

hi,

one opportunity might be to send in Reginald Tyrwhitt´s Harwich Force to make an attack on Hipper. In these visual conditions, light cruisers and destroyers may be able to do more harm to hostile heavy units than receive themselves.

If Room 40 was so good in intercepting and decoding as you propose, Paul, they will have intercepted any traffic of the HSF forces at sea, as well, and predict a trap.

greetings the pb