British Preserve Amphibious skill 1914

[Carl Schwamberger]

And there was no need for planning for close air support, there was no need to plan for armoured support, there was no real need to plan for artillery support in an era before time-fused explosive shells (these were for period mortars IIRC) In fact - I can't see there was any need for a "doctrine" - all they were doing then was what ships' captains had always been doing since Drake plodded across the Isthmus of Panama!

? ?

[Takao]

I thought the "shallow draught" battle cruisers were built specifically for Fischer's planned "Baltic Project", not to mention the several hundred other ships he needed for this project.

You might want to look at "Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918" by Shawn T. Grimes. He gives a lot of coverage to amphibious planning of the British prior to World War I. You can find a fairly reasonable preview over at Google Books.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Maybe I missed him in the crowd, but Gibsons article linked twice above here seems to mention every author on the subject of amphibious warfare except Grimes. He even mentions magazine articles of the past five decades.

[phylo_roadking]

And there was no need for planning for close air support, there was no need to plan for armoured support, there was no real need to plan for artillery support in an era before time-fused explosive shells (these were for period mortars IIRC) In fact - I can't see there was any need for a "doctrine" - all they were doing then was what ships' captains had always been doing since Drake plodded across the Isthmus of Panama!

? ?

My point is that there wasn't a need...in the eyes of the Admiralty...for a new "doctrine". The Royal Navy - however it was comprised - had always mounted amphibious operations in the rowboat centuries. Remember, in the Elizabethan age, commanders like "Captain-General" Drake even had a dual sea/land rank given to them, so that they could command at sea AND ashore!

And nothing changed for the RN until the technology changed If anything...the REAL changes in amphibious technology was on the OTHER side...take a look at a good study of Napoleon's preparations for invading the UK 1803-05, including ordering the production of hundreds of small, shallow-draught, low-freeboard vessels up and down the coasts of France and the Low Countries - optimized for English river estuaries and river mouths...

Whereas the British visibly kept on doing what they'd been doing for centuries - landing troops/marines from ships' boats as and when necessary.

I would further venture that there was actually no lesson to be learned from the Napoleonic period as far as the Royal Navy was concerned They TOOK Gibraltar, and all those Carribean islands, didn't they? As far as Their Lordships would have been concerned - the "Carry On" level of amphibious action, rowing Marines and soldiers ashore in ships' boats...worked

And there was NO body as conservative in the face of change as the Admiralty!

[Carl Schwamberger]

I wonder how 1915, 1916, or 1917 versions of Op Hush would have gone? Each would have been different from the 1918 version. Stratigic & operational objectives, as well as differing levels of experience and technology. The German counter would have been different in each case I supose.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I thought the "shallow draught" battle cruisers were built specifically for Fischer's planned "Baltic Project", not to mention the several hundred other ships he needed for this project.

Missed the implication in that remark first time around What was Fischers "Baltic Project"?

[Orwell1984]

Missed the implication in that remark first time around What was Fischers "Baltic Project"?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baltic_Project
Brief out line here.
Further details are available from the Nation Archives for those interested
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cata ... =1#summary

[Carl Schwamberger]

Thats a start.

The proposal for landing on the Frisian coast in 1914, the Dardanelles campaign, this Baltic Project, Operation Hush, I wonder what others there may have been. A lot of incomplete execution there. If one had the time to review the original plans, memos, diary entries, ect... for those .... The lecture I refered to, of the rights and wrongs of the Gallipoli landing operation was facinating. Wish I'd preserved the notes.

[OldBill]

I wonder if the X lighters had appeared even a couple of years earlier if they would have changed anything. They were very modern craft, and with another couple of years of development time could have evolved into an amphibious assault craft.
http://www.navypedia.org/ships/uk/brit_aws_x.htm

[Carl Schwamberger]

Thats a fair number of specialized small craft.

I think how much difference they would have made a couple years earlier would come back to doctrinal development. Generally hardware does not get built without some sort of previous doctrinal development, however simple/complex good or bad, creating a context for the hardware requirement. Since I dont know the specifics of the requirements for these 'lighters' I can only make wild guesses about the nature of the doctrine that triggered their development.

I have to wonder if there was any technical connection between these designs and the small landing craft the British came up with in 1941-42?

[phylo_roadking]

Carl - in this case they appeared not because of doctrine (see my note below!)...but because of the appearance of the requirement...

http://www.xlighter.org/

In February 1915, Walter Pollock of James Pollock and Son was sent for by Lord Fisher, who was known to him through Walter’s 1903 book of ship designs entitled ‘Vessels of Various Types’. Walter Pollock was asked on behalf of the Admiralty to design and oversee the construction of 200 motor landing craft for the Gallipoli campaign and to be designated as ‘X’ Lighters. The offices of James Pollock were at 3 Lloyds Avenue, London EC3; the plans were drawn up within 4 days of instruction.

With spoon-shape bow to take the steep shelving beaches, and a drop down brow (ramp). Dimensions were length 105-6” breadth 21’-0” (ex rubbers) depth 7’-6” with a light displacement of 135 tons, internal cubic capacities @ 1 ton = 100 cubic feet....

I.E. the requirement emerged because of the geography...so it could be argued that they were required only because the British attempted to land in an unsuitable location! Well...we KNOW they did I mean that they obviously knew beforehand that the beaches didn't suit what passed for amphibious doctrine as of then....

[Carl Schwamberger]

Again, I'm having trouble grasping what are getting at there. Perhaps we are once again being divided by a common language?

[phylo_roadking]

Very likely!

The British chose the Gallipoli peninsula because of its position and their hope to establish a bridgehead threatening the Turks before they could rush reinforcements there; in other words, they picked the objective...THEN gave some thought to the fact that the OTHER major requirement for a successful amphibious landing - suitable beaches - were not quite as suitable as they needed to be! Hence their issuing a requirement for a landing vessel that could supposedly handle the steeply shelving Gallipoli beaches.

"Doctrine" - such as there was - should have told them to leave well alone! Instead, they were blinded by the supposed strategic virtues of the operation

[PMN1]

From ‘Amphibious Operations: The Projection of Sea Power Ashore’ by Colonel M.H.H. Evans - one of the Brassey’s Sea Power series of books

Admiral Fisher contemplated the establishment of a flotilla of suitable craft for landings, but few were built. There was no support for a proposal in 1905 that the Royal Marines should form a force in readiness, trained to disembark rapidly on a hostile shore.


Be interesting to know what Fisher had in mind.

[PMN1]

US Amphibious Ships and Craft: An Illustrated Design History by Norman Friedman

Page 624

The British had actually considered converting merchant ships to carry tanks for a projected 1918 assault on Zeebrugge in Belgium. According to Lt. Comdr. The Hon. J. M. Kenworth, Sailors, Statesmen – And Others: An Autobiography, the Admiralty war staff proposed ‘to fit out old merchant ships too carry a dozen tanks each in their holds. The bows were to be reconstituted in such a way that they would run up on the beach in the known state of the tide….Slung up in the forepart of each vessel was to be a kind of drawbridge which would be lowered into the shallows and the tanks would trundle into the shallow water and ashore’. This proposal was ultimately rejected, but it was surely widely known within the war staff, and to the commander of the Zeebrugge attack, Adm. Sir Roger Keyes.


Sounds like a similar arrangement to the US Newport class LST.