The Second Forgoing of Moscow

[BDV]

Following 4 weeks of mostly successful operations ( the completion of the Vyazma-Briansk encirclements through end October) the already battle damaged german units of AGC were ordered to keep pressing on Moscow. Ultimately, this led to further damage and reduction of their battle worthiness, feeding into the great disaster (for the Axis) of December 1941.

What would happen if at the beginning of November, Hitler/OKW would have ordered AGC to stop the offensive (rest/reinforce), except for local attacks and attacks of opportunity, and refit with winter gear in expectation of a winter attack on Moscow in the 15 December-15 January timeframe. During these 6 weeks (November 1st - December 15th) a significant part of Luftwaffe assets supporting AGC operations would be moved to support AGS operations (the attacks on Sevastopol and Rostov) and AGN operations (the drive to River Svir).

[Carl Schwamberger]

Counting the weight of supply delivered during those weeks would be a good start to a answer. How far would the historical supply delivered go in restoring the strength of the forward combat units?

[Kingfish]

I would think the delay and weather would benefit the defense in this case

[BDV]

Counting the weight of supply delivered during those weeks would be a good start to a answer. How far would the historical supply delivered go in restoring the strength of the forward combat units?

The AGC units (three panzer armies/groups 2,3, and 4 and three armies 2, 4, and 9) that's about what 24? (even if understrength) divisions. At 250 tons/division per day (kinda minimal) - that's ~60,000 tons of supplies for the November 1st - December 5th period, which germans have kept it up despite lenghtening supply lines in the midst of Rasputitsa.

Sitting pretty on the (recently conquered) rail junctions of Rzhev-Vyazma-Sukhinichi-Orel-Kursk, looks to me that AGC could really ready itself for the wintery confrontation during the month of November, rather than waddling foolishly throughthe November mud.

By freeing Luftawffe resources, AGC discretion would also improve the chances of german success at Rostov and of linking-up with the Finns on the Svir River.

[Unterdenlimeys]

I think this is an intriguing scenario.
They actually paused from the very end of October to 15 Nov.(Col. Albert Seaton part of the final drive on Moscow
started on 7 Nov.).
I thinka pause from about 20 October would have been in order if no other variables are changed in the scenario.
A book was mentioned a few months ago that suggested it was NOT supplies or the weather that were decisive, but a matter of not setting priorities and being over-ambitious. That is to say, other offensive operations could have been cancelled in favour of Moscow alone and Hitler shouldn't have insisted on both an inner and outer encirclement.
I guess that means the thrust towards Kalinin should have been limited to a much shorter attack to mask the northern flank of Typhoon, erhaps aimed only at taking Rzhev, and Guderian's Pz Gr.2 should
have attacked futher north.
Right after the end of the Rasputitsa in mid-Nov the ground is hardened but it's still mostly not much colder than a German winter.
BTW muddy season is a relative word and AFAIK it only gets WORSE from mid Oct.-mid Nov. and in Eurpean Russia even Sept. and early Oct. can be rainy and therefore muddy.
I always thought the Germans were doing the Russians a favour by attacking in the mud, but I'd like to find out what this book says on the matter.
If the Germans were doing the Red Army a favour by attacking in the mud, then waiting until the ground was hard would have been a good idea.
Of course the questions remain:
-Would the supply effort actualy succeed? Warm winter clothing, antifreeze, crampons for the tanks
-and all of this getting all the way to the fighting units?
Possibly, but I recall reading a German quartermaster recommending AGC pull back all the way to Smolensk. It seems the sore point in supplies was anything east of Smolensk. I believe it was mainly a matter of the railways being in ruins.
How well were rear service personel equipped for the winter?Did clerks
in places like Smolensk get winter clothing?
-Air support thus freed could have gone to the Med. The 1941/42 blitz on Malta could have started a month earlier-they sent the luftlotte supporting Typhoon to the med at the end of Nov. Who knows what results that may have had?
-What I'm getting at in the above poit is simply that they could have considered stopping and improving the supply situation elsewhere in the east, not just in front of Moscow.
Historicall, a few pathetic units were
still attacking Moscow in early December, so in the 3 weeks from mid-Nov until early Dec., a fresher, better-
supplied army starting from not much further west than historically (they gained relatively little ground during the rasputitsa), just might have done it.



.

[Unterdenlimeys]

I made a mistake-the WI concerns resuming the attack on Moscow from mid-Dec., though Ithe points I made in my vert first AHF post are still I believe relevant. Apologies for any confusion.

[BDV]

-Would the supply effort actualy succeed? Warm winter clothing, antifreeze, crampons for the tanks
-and all of this getting all the way to the fighting units?

Why not, in the OTL the wares of war (benzin, ammo, chow, medical supplies) did get to the advancing german forces, rasputitsa and all. And you better believe germans had reasonable winter gear, because 20 months earlier Adolf had contemplated attacking France in February.

Possibly, but I recall reading a German quartermaster recommending AGC pull back all the way to Smolensk. It seems the sore point in supplies was anything east of Smolensk. I believe it was mainly a matter of the railways being in ruins.

Well, there would be time to fix the Vyazma-Orel rail-line, such that the german forces would be backed by a railline coursing parallel to behind their frontline through which forces could be easily shift from one sector to another. On the flip side, the russians would be supplied by sparse rail-lines (two from Moscow and one from Tula) running towards the front with big gaps in between. So should germans strike in the gaps, they could split nicely the front and repeat the twin pockets of Taifun (Vyazma + Bryansk). Historically the exhausted AGC run into the russian defenders backed by Moscow's dense ring-and-spoke rail, and got manhandled by a commander (Zhukov) with experience in effectively using brute force against a locally inferior opponent (Khalkin-Gol).

How well were rear service personel equipped for the winter? Did clerks in places like Smolensk get winter clothing?

I mean the german units did have standard winter clothing. Look at the german soldier's pictures of that winter (e.g. this famous image of troops unloading a Tante Ju in the Demyansk Pocket). While some pictures do show up (brrr) soldiers in summer clothes, most have what look regular army long coat. It was suboptimal for the worst of the russian winter, for sure, but rested, well fed troops could have dealt with the situation.

Now, tired, starving, on the run troops with "the runs", then suboptimal winter gear might complicate issues.

-Air support thus freed could have gone to the Med.

There was enough to do in the East. Tikhvin and Rostov were both occupied by germans, but fell to Soviet counterattacks. Counterattacks were not something new, everyone from Poles, to French, to early Barbarossa (e.g., Rovno) had tried to pounce on overextended german forces. However , Luftwaffe would always squash these attempts. Here, with additional airsupport, either/both of these targets might have held for the germans.

[Unterdenlimeys]

You learn something new every day. I knew Hitler was supposed to have wanted to attack in the West in the autumn of 1939, but I didn't know about February. Do you know where I can find this info?
Anyway thanks for your reply.
IMHO historically the Germans were not nearly as close to capturing Moscow as usually portrayed, because of the lack of winter preparation, depletion of their forces and the simple fact they weren't really right at the gates of Moscow. Looking at a map tells you this. Towns close to Moscow didn't fall-Serpukhov or Kolomna, for example. The right flank of the advance was not secured by capturing Tula, and the panzers didn't get behind Moscow from the east and reach places like Orekhovo-Zuyevo.
Any Russian counterattack during the Rasputitsa would itself come up against the mud.
I can see where you're coming from in saying AGC could take Moscow after a rest of 6 weeks or more.
The main problem I have with it is the mid-December date. It's one thing to be able to survive the winter, it's another thing to be able to take the offensive because it's so much colder than in middle Eurpopean and it was the coldest winter since about 1870.
German winter gear was I have read, adequate in that it would get you through the winter without you becoming a frostbite casualty, but it was never as good as Russian winter clothing. That might be a problem for them if they decided to try and take Moscow from the middle of December.

[BDV]

You learn something new every day. I knew Hitler was supposed to have wanted to attack in the West in the autumn of 1939, but I didn't know about February. Do you know where I can find this info?

I might be mistaken. I thought that Fuhrer Directive 6 set the date for attack in the West for November 12 1939, agreed for a few delays, then postponed it to February, and then ultimately to May, in light of Weserubung. I might be mistaken on the February, but I think it's pretty obvious that Germans were contemplating winter warfare - which could hardly happen without winterized gear.

Any Russian counterattack during the Rasputitsa would itself come up against the mud.

Historically Soviets were pushed quite a lot back in the 5 weeks preceding December 5. Any Soviet counterattack in the AGC sector in November will likely be unceremoniously squashed.

I can see where you're coming from in saying AGC could take Moscow after a rest of 6 weeks or more.
The main problem I have with it is the mid-December date. It's one thing to be able to survive the winter, it's another thing to be able to take the offensive because it's so much colder than in middle Eurpopean and it was the coldest winter since about 1870.

Moscow might be still a target too far... but Tikhvin (which also means Leningrad) plus Rostov, and AGC avoiding the shellacking of December-January would be definite positives.

German winter gear was I have read, adequate in that it would get you through the winter without you becoming a frostbite casualty, but it was never as good as Russian winter clothing. That might be a problem for them if they decided to try and take Moscow from the middle of December.

It depends if germans execute one more pocket maneuver in December... "Kommrades, pull out your boots and ushankas, and try on these less bulky ones. Schnell, bitte"

[Carl Schwamberger]

You learn something new every day. I knew Hitler was supposed to have wanted to attack in the West in the autumn of 1939, but I didn't know about February. Do you know where I can find this info?
Anyway thanks for your reply.

Of the books on my shelf Mays 'Strange Victory' is fairly recent, available, and has the most complete description of the German planning for the 1939 attacks.

A few older ones are Chapman 'Why France Fell', Horne 'To Lose a Battle', and Julian Jackson. All those refer to the 1939 preperations and how logistics, weather, wargames, and the Melechin incident combined to repeatedly stall the planned attack.

[Unterdenlimeys]

Thanks dor the info about the books.
All things considered, stopping within a few days of the rasputitsa (from around 15 Oct. in Central Russia usually, but in 1941 a few days later-around the 20th I believe) would have been much better no matter what options were considered.
There is still the issue of whether German wiinter gear was good enough to get them through a Russian winter on the offensive.
Also, to me, the territorial gains the Germans made in the last five weeks of their offensive don't look very impressive at all.
I've read that the Soviet counterattack of 5 Dec. was made worse by the fact there wasn't even 24-48 hours prep. to make plans to deal with it- a deficiency of staff planning making the lack of supplies for the Germans even worse. The origins of this seem to have lain in an obsession (Hitler's alone?) in continuing the offensiove at all costs.

[Deans]

With the benefit of hindsight, it seems obvious that the Germans should have halted in front of Moscow, just after the end of Operation Typhoon, before resuming the advance on Moscow. (Whatever gains they made in Nov 1941, were more than negated in the Red Army counterattack). I don't however believe, that an enhanced Luftwaffe presence with AGN & AGS would have made any difference to the outcome on those fronts.

However, I'd like to look at this scenario based on the info available to the Germans then.
In the beginning of Nov 1941, the Red army was actually outnumbered in front of Moscow. (Glantz & House). Both German and Soviet intelligence probably knew this. November would have therefore presented a great opportunity to continue the drive to Moscow and `win the race'. I believe the desire to continue the drive to Moscow, came not from Hitler but from Von Bock, since he assumed (correctly - based on whatever intel was available to him), that the Red Army was not going to be in a weaker condition than it was in Nov (with civilian morale also being low and Moscow being evacuated) and it could well be fatal to halt the advance just when the Red army was on the ropes and awaiting the knockout punch. He probably saw the drive to Moscow as a race which would be won by the side that had more willpower. - and probably end the war.

Historically, the Germans got negligible reinforcements between Nov & Dec, whereas the Red army brought up almost 2 million men. A delay in the drive to Moscow would have enabled these reinforcements to increase their effectiveness exponentially, because they would 1. Have a month to train (reasonable time to turn a raw recruit into someone who can perform basic defense related tasks) &
2. Dig into prepared positions.
Historically however, these reinforcements were thrown into battle piecemeal, were often deployed in the wrong areas and suffered the horrendous casualties associated with an untrained mass of men being forced into battle. This was probably what Von Bock would have assumed would happen to whatever reinforcements he thought the Red army might bring up.

If the offensive was delayed, the Red Army's reinforced defensive line in front of Moscow would have been unbreakable and the Red army would have lost fewer men in their own counterattacks, partly because they would have hesitated to attack a prepared enemy
and because they would have had more time to prepare. (The Red army's counterattacks actual counterattacks seemed to me to be a race in reverse - they were aware of their shortcomings but felt the Germans, who were retreating, would be far worse off.

What the Germans needed in Nov, to take Moscow, was not just winter clothing, but tanks, fuel, ammunition & trucks -
none of which was going to get to AGC before the spring of 1942.

[BDV]

With the benefit of hindsight, it seems obvious that the Germans should have halted in front of Moscow, just after the end of Operation Typhoon, before resuming the advance on Moscow. (Whatever gains they made in Nov 1941, were more than negated in the Red Army counterattack). I don't however believe, that an enhanced Luftwaffe presence with AGN & AGS would have made any difference to the outcome on those fronts.

Why not? The RKKA was not yet the coordinated applicator of bolshoy strength it became from mid-1943 on. Squashing an attack in a cloud of "butterflies" was always an option, if the means (i.e. Stukas) were there. However, foregoing the Tikhvin lunge, limiting AGN to a tighter sealing of Leningrad on the Ladoga shore and building up strength for a joint action with AGC (described below) could be a consideration.

Then the East Front Luftwaffe assets could be concentrated on securing Rostov, and maybe a November conquest of Sevastopol.

In the beginning of Nov 1941, the Red army was actually outnumbered in front of Moscow. (Glantz & House). Both German and Soviet intelligence probably knew this. November would have therefore presented a great opportunity to continue the drive to Moscow and `win the race'. I believe the desire to continue the drive to Moscow, came not from Hitler but from Von Bock, since he assumed (correctly - based on whatever intel was available to him), that the Red Army was not going to be in a weaker condition than it was in Nov (with civilian morale also being low and Moscow being evacuated) and it could well be fatal to halt the advance just when the Red army was on the ropes and awaiting the knockout punch. He probably saw the drive to Moscow as a race which would be won by the side that had more willpower. - and probably end the war.

A most fatal miscalculation. German officers should have known, and did know the limitations mud would place on operations. After all the the mud/rain question was key in planning boith the attack on Russia and on France.

Historically, the Germans got negligible reinforcements between Nov & Dec, whereas the Red army brought up almost 2 million men. A delay in the drive to Moscow would have enabled these reinforcements to increase their effectiveness exponentially, because they would
1. Have a month to train (reasonable time to turn a raw recruit into someone who can perform basic defense related tasks) &
2. Dig into prepared positions.

And Vyazma-Bryansk demonstrated how well supplied german troops with preserved mobility can waltz around groupings of million trained and dug in men.

Historically however, these reinforcements were thrown into battle piecemeal, were often deployed in the wrong areas and suffered the horrendous casualties associated with an untrained mass of men being forced into battle. This was probably what Von Bock would have assumed would happen to whatever reinforcements he thought the Red army might bring up.

Not solely. Moscow was not the end for the Russians, this source describes the dynamic bolshevik arrangements for fighting after fall of Moscow. Once germans had shot their wad these forces became a battering ram that Zhukov used (in a style known from Khalkin-Gol) to bowl over an overstretched enemy. That, not the mythical "syberyans", and the logistic+wear/fatigue pickle germans leadership placed their own troops in were the two pillars of the crushing german defeat.

If the offensive was delayed, the Red Army's reinforced defensive line in front of Moscow would have been unbreakable and the Red army would have lost fewer men in their own counterattacks, partly because they would have hesitated to attack a prepared enemy and because they would have had more time to prepare. (The Red army's counterattacks actual counterattacks seemed to me to be a race in reverse - they were aware of their shortcomings but felt the Germans, who were retreating, would be far worse off.

I agree. But you, like the german generals, have a fixation with Moscow. Moscow is only "worth" the right price. I see nothing wrong with two "attacks on Moscow" that turn to other, easier to achieve targets (Guderian to Kiev and ATL-Taifun). Possibly the Soviets won't take the third attack as seriously as the first two, and then Moscow will fall for a reasonable price.

What the Germans needed in Nov, to take Moscow, was not just winter clothing, but tanks, fuel, ammunition & trucks - none of which was going to get to AGC before the spring of 1942.

? They would and they did historically. What did everyone in the Reich, the vassal, and the occupied teritorries stop working and went on vacation Ocober 1941 - March 1942. And that's exactly what would happen November 1st to December 15 - resting, fixing, resupplying, and getting the gear in order for the next lunge.

One optimal/optimistic scenario for the axis would be the following:

With boosted Luftwaffe support, AGS and the hungaro-italo-romanian auxilliaries holds conquers Rostov and Sevastopol in November 1941, and advances to Donets by beginning of December.

In mid-December 1941 the fight begins between AGN+AGC and the Soviet Northwest/Kalinin/West/Bryansk fronts. The Germans feint an attack on Moscow, but end up (AGN and 3rd Panzer) completing the "Valday" encirclement trapping significant forces of the Kalinin and Northwest Fronts, while the 2nd and 4th panzer execute an encirclement around Tula, capturing a number of the Bryansk Front troops in a wide pocket.

To relieve the pressure on the adjacent fronts, the overstrength West Front troops launch desperate attacks against 4th and 9th german armies, but they are checked by the entrenched german forces.

That would be IMO the best germans could reasonably plan for in the beginning of November 1941.

[Deans]

BDV, I think we are really making the same points. I won't copy the whole of the previous post, but to clarify;

1. I think the Luftwaffe's effectiveness in the middle of winter (unheated hangars) is being overestimated. In any case the role of the Luftwaffe is probably secondary to this WI.
2. I agree the Thikvin lunge was unnecessary and too ambitious (with the benefit of hindsight!) but I don't see those forces being redeployed in time to help an attack on Moscow.
3. I don't think mud was a factor after early Nov, by then the frost had set in. (I've seen a lot of mud in rural Russia, in
Mid Nov, but that's probably global warming!)
4. Agree, Vzayma-Bryansk demonstrated that AGC would prevail over a numerically strong but disorganised force and for
this reason Von Bock would not have halted the drive on Moscow.
5. True, the Red Army would have fought on after Moscow, but Hitler and his generals were still in the `kick in the door
and.... frame of mind'.
6. I don't have a `Moscow fixation' but as you say, Hitler's generals did and I was trying to look at things as they saw
them. After trying to prevail upon Hitler a few weeks earlier, to resume the drive to Moscow and not be worried about:
Supplies, danger to the flanks and the `economic aspects of war', I hardly see Guderian/Hoth/Von Bock urging a halt,
when the capital was within reach & the people of Moscow in a state of Panic.
7. Agree that a Valday encirclement was doable, but not sure that could be done AND the forces involved redeploy for an
attack on Moscow. It would have to be either Moscow, or (as Hitler/Von Bock would see it), tinkering around the
flanks.

[BDV]

1. I think the Luftwaffe's effectiveness in the middle of winter (unheated hangars) is being overestimated. In any case the role of the Luftwaffe is probably secondary to this WI.

Winters are less taxing when flying missions from Kerson as opposed to Novgorod. Or, for level bombing missions, from Constanza . So in support of AGS, the fighter and bomber wings could have had the best efficiency in November.

2. I agree the Thikvin lunge was unnecessary and too ambitious (with the benefit of hindsight!) but I don't see those forces being redeployed in time to help an attack on Moscow.

I'm afraid I don't understand. Germans stayed in TIkhvin for a month (till December 8). This is just redeploying locally, for a force that was historically able to reach Tikhvin against Soviet resistance.

3. I don't think mud was a factor after early Nov, by then the frost had set in. (I've seen a lot of mud in rural Russia, in Mid Nov, but that's probably global warming!)

But then, once the frost set in, not having the winter gear must've taken the place of mud to hobnobbing the german machines.

4. Agree, Vzayma-Bryansk demonstrated that AGC would prevail over a numerically strong but disorganised force and for this reason Von Bock would not have halted the drive on Moscow.

I was under the impression that the units lost at Vyazma and Bryansk were well prepared and dug in. It's more about the germans being (when full strength, supplied, and mobile) still the superior fighting force.

5. True, the Red Army would have fought on after Moscow, but Hitler and his generals were still in the `kick in the door and.... frame of mind'.

With US-UK assistance kicking in, the ratio of support populace-frontline troops would allow Russians to put more men under arms. Also the evacuated industry is bound to start kicking in sometime.

Plus, for an economy with an large agrarian component, a large contingent of men become available at the end of October because of the end of the harvest. These men will trickle to the front in a few weeks, December, that is. Andits not like these things were unknown as both Romania and Hungarian auxilliaries had very openly released men for the harvest.

All that needs to be taken into account making a November mud-lunge a nonstarter.

6. I don't have a `Moscow fixation' but as you say, Hitler's generals did and I was trying to look at things as they saw them. After trying to prevail upon Hitler a few weeks earlier, to resume the drive to Moscow and not be worried about: Supplies, danger to the flanks and the `economic aspects of war', I hardly see Guderian/Hoth/Von Bock urging a halt, when the capital was within reach & the people of Moscow in a state of Panic.

I apologize for my presumption, and I thank you for your kindness about my mistake.

As November is nigh and the Wehrmacht is nowhere near Moscow, Hitler would more than reasonable in reigning in his armchair warriors, especially as the field warriors seemed to be somewhat hesitant about the continued assault (post facto sour grapes cannot be excluded, obviously)...

7. Agree that a Valday encirclement was doable, but not sure that could be done AND the forces involved redeploy for an attack on Moscow. It would have to be either Moscow, or (as Hitler/Von Bock would see it), tinkering around the flanks.

It still can be formulated as an "attack on Moscow", although in practice the Valday-Tula twin encirclements would be much less than that - except if russians REALLY blunder? opening the door for a Moscow attack. Per se, though, I don't see Moscow as that big of a deal especially if it comes at a steep price in german lives and equipment.