KDF33 wrote:1)It was the German POV that if the SU would be defeated in a short campaign,Britain would give up .
That's debatable. A lot of Germans thought Britain would go on fighting, and Hitler himself made contradictory statements on that point. It was more the expression of Hitler's hopes than a serious war aim.2)Whatever:even if the war in the west was continuing,Germany would not need al those tanks :
German tank production : in 1941:3600,1942:5500,1943:13600
If the SU was out in september 1941,there would be no need to produce 13600 tanks in 1943.
This is true... but then German tank production consumed virtually no important resources. Rolling stock, ammunition, the aircraft industry - those were the big industrial sectors.3)About the transport problems and the German capacity to transport 11 million tons in 1943: that thus not mean that in 1943,the Germans could transport 11 million ton of all sort of goods to Germany,because,millions of tons would be needed for the occupation forces,and for the repair of the railways and the industries .
In fact they'd probably be able to transport way more, since trains do round trips. All the trains bringing supplies to the East could bring resources back to Germany (or Romania, if Germany expanded the petro-chemical industry there to reduce travel time) on the return trip.4)About the fuel:if the war in the east was ended,less fuel would be needed,thus the need for the oil of the Caucasus would be questionable :in 1941,1942,1943,Germany was waging war against the west and the SU,with as oil sources:foreign oil (mostly Romanian),home crude production (always forgotten),and the oil production from coal(Fischer/Tropf),and this without shortages(even of Afgas).
If the SU was out in 1941,there would be not even no shortages,but even an abundance of oil .
Shortages are always relative. If oil and coal hadn't become industrial resources, nobody would have a "shortage" of them, even if nobody produced any. In a similar fashion, Germany may well have produced enough avgas to supply it's immediate needs in 1942-43 (although it constrained the training program), but it wasn't producing enough to last in a long war with the United States and Britain.5)About the exploitation of European Russia generally :if there was peace (no more war with the west),this exploitation would result in an economic catastrophe for Germany :
coal :German production 300 million of tons,let's assume 100 million more from the SU. Who would buy this coal ? Normally:no one,because it would be more expensive than the German one .If Government (=the taxpayer) would subsidize this coal,with as result that it would be cheaper,it would be the end for the coal mines of the Ruhr.
oil :idem :if the Caucasian oil was available and cheaper than the domestic oil/Fischer oil,it would be the end for these industries,resulting in the loss of billions of taxpayers money .
grain :idem :if people were buying Russian grain,they would not buy German grain,which would result in the end of the German agriculture.
The German government was subsidizing the German agriculture,would be forced to subsidize the "Russian " agriculture,and these two would enter into competition with each other at the cost,again,of the taxpayer .
Honestly I think that makes no sense. Europe suffered from a shortage of coal, so obviously the rebuilt Eastern industry would find customers. The same is even truer for oil, whose usage would grow exponentially in the postwar years. I really don't understand your point.
That the rebuilt (when ?) Eastern industry would find customers,is a platitude :it only would find customers,if these could pay for this expensive coal .May I remind you that post 1945,there was no shortage of coal,and,there was no exponentially growing usage of oil .After the war,Europe was depending (as before the war) on coal,coal and coal .And,the European reconstruction was done,without the Soviet coal .
The oil era in Europe started only after 1960.Before 1960,everything was done by coal :trains,heating,industry.