All out war between Germany and Britain after Fall of France

[BDV]

(which is one of the factors the British would be banking on - the necessary huge shrink in the size of the German Army...while the rest of it is soaked up in occupation duites across the map of Europe...which means there's no way to re-mobilise and position in time to throw a British-only "Continental Breakin" back into the sea I.E. get ashore, and liberate enough of France or wherever to revisit a 1914-18 stalemeate...allowing time for the vaster manpower resources of the British Empire and the liberated nation (whichever one ) and its larger manufacturing and purchased/LL aid to slowly overxcome what the Germans can mobilise.)

An exceedingly difficult proposition for Great Britain, as illustrated convincingly by the developments at Dieppe on August 17, 1942. Nibbling at the edges with land attacks, while pouncing deep into the Reich lands with streams/swarms of Avro and Boeing bombers is probably the ticket.

[phylo_roadking]

An exceedingly difficult proposition for Great Britain, as illustrated convincingly by the developments at Dieppe on August 17, 1942.

Which was a raid, not an invasion - and a very illconceived raid at that....

...while the later success of OVERLORD indicated that important lessons had been learned at Dieppe.

[BDV]

An exceedingly difficult proposition for Great Britain, as illustrated convincingly by the developments at Dieppe on August 17, 1942.

Which was a raid, not an invasion - and a very illconceived raid at that....

...while the later success of OVERLORD indicated that important lessons had been learned at Dieppe.

Yes, but a good illustration of difficulties to be encountered by a British&Co invasion of Europe in the '42-'43 timeframe. The Dodecanese campaign is another vivid illustration of the dangers of applying less than overwhelming force to any german-manned theater.

[phylo_roadking]

Yes, but a good illustration of difficulties to be encountered by a British&Co invasion of Europe in the '42-'43 timeframe.

Apart from the fact that Dieppe was a totally imprractical target for an actual invasion, and one would never have been attempted there, you mean??? Limited beachfront, impossible to get tanks up, cliffed headlands on each flank....and not a "periphery"

P.S. don't forget the successful Allied amphibious "invasion" in 1940 ....

Nibbling at the edges with land attacks, while pouncing deep into the Reich lands with streams/swarms of Avro and Boeing bombers is probably the ticket.

But it doesn't actually finish the war - not until/unless Hitler makes/is forced to make his inevitable mistake and head East...not without an actual break-in back onto the Continent and defeating the Wehrmacht.

[BDV]

Apart from the fact that Dieppe was a totally impractical target for an actual invasion, and one would never have been attempted there, you mean??? Limited beachfront, impossible to get tanks up, cliffed headlands on each flank...

Fantastic issues to be considered before dumping 10,000 braves into the firepit. The relative isolation, along the coast of Dieppe is a big plus, on the other hand. As such one simply needed (from a July 1942 perspective) to apply the barbaric WWI philosophy, "throw in more troops than the enemy can kill".

However, as "no battle plan survives contact with the enemy", the ways in which the germans killed the battlepland, ergo what one NEEDED to do, of course some infantry/armor troops - wise*, but more importantly air-support and ship fire-support -wise was indeed found at Dieppe.

As Runstedt put it [the enemy] will not do it like this a second time!

However, if germans pull a mega-Dieppe against some GB effort of 1943, or some sort of Dodecanese Campaign three times larger, the conditions for a ceasefire might be reached.

and not a "periphery"

So peripheral it is ... not that one of Winny's "special" half-assed peripheral actions couldn't end in an utter debacle.

P.S. don't forget the successful Allied amphibious "invasion" in 1940 ....

Narvik?

Nibbling at the edges with land attacks, while pouncing deep into the Reich lands with streams/swarms of Avro and Boeing bombers is probably the ticket.

But it doesn't actually finish the war - not until/unless Hitler makes/is forced to make his inevitable mistake and head East...not without an actual break-in back onto the Continent and defeating the Wehrmacht.

So there'd be some sort of ceasefire signed '43-'44, and the Reich would be left to rot in its concrete "Atlantikwall" coffin.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________
*the troops did enter the city and the commandos did by in large succeed in their flank actions.

[phylo_roadking]

As such one simply needed (from a July 1942 perspective) to apply the barbaric WWI philosophy, "throw in more troops than the enemy can kill".

A geographically suitable area - such as the aforementioned Breton peninsula.

However, if germans pull a mega-Dieppe against some GB effort of 1943, or some sort of Dodecanese Campaign three times larger, the conditions for a ceasefire might be reached.

That's highly doubtful; at this point...the 1940-41 point...an invasion force of some ten divisions for a preripheral break-in was mooted - which would of course have left some 26 from the intended 36-division army STILL in the UK I.E. far FAR better defended than in the summer of 1940

So there'd be some sort of ceasefire signed '43-'44, and the Reich would be left to rot in its concrete "Atlantikwall" coffin.

No - because there's STILL the re-imposed economic blockade...or as far as the British could impose it - and the inevitability of war in the East to consider. If the British couldn't force a Continental break-in - they would have wanted a protracted war - until the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact fell apart.

[JKernwerk]

Isnt that where all these "useless" what iffs are about?
JK

[phylo_roadking]

Isnt that where all these "useless" what iffs are about?

Actually - no; they're not pure pipe-dreaming. They are...or should be!...good exercises in comparative history...if done properly.

Take an unanswered question - and attempt to answer it bearing in mind what DID happen, WHY it happened that way, and why it didn't happen differently at the time

In other words - you don't set aside real, hard-to-get-past concerns and historical factors by wishful thinking OR "Alien Space bats" You have to take on board the historical constraints and see where they leave you.

[JKernwerk]

Pffff Phylo,
can you write this down in Dutch........
Sometimes i hope they stop asking themselves these questions.
If you just ask why they did things?, you will get the same answers!
JK

[phylo_roadking]

while pouncing deep into the Reich lands with streams/swarms of Avro and Boeing bombers is probably the ticket.

At this point I can now point out that while a B-29 Superfortress cost ~$750,000...an Avro Lancaster cost "just" $141,050 That's FIVE full Lancasters for the cost of a Superfortress!

I've a feeling that at THAT price difference, the Air Ministry would keep on relying on "domestic" production for its nightbombing "Heavies" rather than buy from the U.S.!

[KDF33]

This thread is becoming a rerun of "Could the USA / British Empire win on their own", which I believe previously arrived at the conclusion that Hitler needed to attack the Soviets to break out of the stranglehold he was into after the Fall of France, assuming of course that the Americans offer Britain unlimited supplies and / or declare war.

Regarding the 3,500 British Heavies at the end of the war, I guess it refers to the total British park, and not the operational strength. Because the AIR 22 document indicates that on April 30th, 1945, Bomber Command had an establishment of 1,580 heavy bombers (Halifax + Lancaster), as well as a total of 1,581 serviceable aircraft, which would indicate that the BC squadrons were somewhat overstrength. Still, the operational units fell fall short of a 3,500 bomber fleet, or for the matter of the 4,000 bomber fleet that Churchill spoke of early in the war.

It also took a long time for the British to build-up their heavy bomber fleet. On September 1, 1943, Bomber Command still only had an establishment / serviceable strength of 840 / 547 Heavies (Halifax+Lancaster+Stirling). So unless the British can get their hands on a lot of American-built bombers, they won't be able to deliver optimum damage to Germany before 1944.

[glenn239]

This thread is becoming a rerun of "Could the USA / British Empire win on their own", which I believe previously arrived at the conclusion that Hitler needed to attack the Soviets to break out of the stranglehold he was into after the Fall of France,

Glad to get the heads up on that. Since that conclusion is obviously broken, the thread can be skipped in its entirety.

[Marcelo Jenisch]

I'm still not convinced that with all the LW in the West and a focus in the war with Britain, the British industry would be able to supply enough bombers for the RAF. I think that a night force of Liberators and Fortresses would be if not necessary, higly desirable. They also would be able to defend themselfs better against the LW night fighters.

[KDF33]

Glad to get the heads up on that. Since that conclusion is obviously broken, the thread can be skipped in its entirety.

How is that conclusion "broken"?

[phylo_roadking]

It also took a long time for the British to build-up their heavy bomber fleet. On September 1, 1943, Bomber Command still only had an establishment / serviceable strength of 840 / 547 Heavies (Halifax+Lancaster+Stirling). So unless the British can get their hands on a lot of American-built bombers, they won't be able to deliver optimum damage to Germany before 1944.

Which still gives BC the capacity to mount "1,000-bimber raids" on German cities...and don't forget the Wellington was still available and in use right to the end of 1943...