Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onwards

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alltoes
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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#46

Post by alltoes » 22 Jul 2014, 06:21

BDV,
You provide great details. Thanks for the map. WOW....great map. IIRC I read where there was a European gauge railway from Riga to near Moscow. This was used for high level western dignitaries. It appears from the map you provided, there must have only been one European rail line.
Also, I was under the impression the 12th mech was severely mauled in the Battle of Raseiniai and retreated into Estonia until disbanded in August. The Russians "scampered' across the Dvina with the 18th Army in pursuit.....albeit waiting 1 week for the blown bridge over the Dvina to be made usable.
IMHO troops along the Finnish frontier would not be deployed to south of Leningrad. Finnish troops began to move to the border at the start of Barbarossa. Leningrad reserves were not as great. IIRC I read how some of the Russian tankers were women and cadets driving the new tanks out of Leningrad factories in August '41.
Reinforcements could have been rushed from Moscow.....there was a direct railway!!! But after the Battle of Smolensk...August 5, Zhukov told Stalin of the reduced armor and men in between Smolensk and Moscow. Therefore, these men and materials were needed were Stalin was.
I understand your "lunacy" statement. But sometimes utter luck combined with confusion and strength can turn the day.
I still believe Stolfi's essay. It is possible his essay could have worked......as much as his essay could have brought an unprecedented disaster to AGN.
WOOP WOOP

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BDV
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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#47

Post by BDV » 23 Jul 2014, 22:16

alltoes wrote:But sometimes utter luck combined with confusion and strength can turn the day.
And it did, in the border battles. However, "fool me twice". After the great success in the opening phase, there was time for settling down to business of fighting a methodical battle and the task of gradual, persistent elimination of the Soviet forces.

I still believe Stolfi's essay. It is possible his essay could have worked......as much as his essay could have brought an unprecedented disaster to AGN.
Soviets had already proven their abilities against numerically inferior forces, twice (second part of Winter War and Khalkhin Gol). They had also demonstrated enough ability to put up a good fight during the Spanish Civil War.

Had there been some special arrangement in place (significant airsupply, airborne/amphibious invasion between Luga and Narva mouths simultaneous to arrival of panzer spearheads - which would have required significant KM effort) yes, it would have made sense. But just relying on continuous soviet bumbling, is unrealistic. Actually Germany and its parters were lucky historically that Soviets had not developed adequate armor doctrine, and their "bolshoy" tank masses choked on their own inadeaquate supply lines.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion


steinmetz
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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#48

Post by steinmetz » 28 Sep 2014, 12:55

ljadw wrote:
David1819 wrote:After the success of Third Battle of Kharkov Hitler decides to go with Von Manstiens backhand blow approach to the eastern front.

This will mean the German army tactically retreats allowing the Red army to fill the void. Once overstretched and in open space the Germans lying in wait launch counter attacks on the soviet advance cutting off and surrounding the spearheads of the Red Army's advance.

This will definitely mean no battle of Kursk as the soviets will have to be on the offensive like the Germans where at Kursk
This is not correct, as after the summer of 1943,Germany no longer had the mobile forces needed to hold the front in the East ;thus,there would be no German counter attacks .
Then you must not have looked very well as there were counterattacks anytime the occasion presented itself.

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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#49

Post by steinmetz » 28 Sep 2014, 12:59

David1819 wrote:
Don71 wrote:
Von Manstein said after the war, the German eastern front campaign could have been won if Hitler had relinquished control and allowed the professionals to conduct the war as they saw fit. Manstien realised that Germany could not defeat Russia in a static defence like Hitler "temporary fortress" idea which is just hold your ground last man to the last bullet, A kamikaze style stupidity.
Hardly. A possible draw is what he really stated.

steinmetz
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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#50

Post by steinmetz » 28 Sep 2014, 13:02

BDV wrote:
David1819 wrote:Manstein said after the war, the German eastern front campaign could have been won if Hitler had relinquished control and allowed the professionals to conduct the war as they saw fit. Manstein realised that Germany could not defeat Russia in a static defence like Hitler "temporary fortress" idea which is just hold your ground last man to the last bullet, A kamikaze style stupidity.
Who would those be? Even with the Ostfront fractured into three pieces, aside from Runstedt (maybe) no commander demonstrated ability to command effectively at Army Group level. Among the Panzer army commanders the sole bright spot is Kleist, the other three demonstrating significant deficiencies during 1941, Hoeppner being IMO the worst.

It was the "Professionals" that told Hitler that AGN could take Leningrad, it was the "Professionals" that stated (and fully expected!) at start of Taifun that Moscow will be taken by November 7th, etc. etc. etc. It was the "Professionals" that drafted the Barbarossa plan. It was the "Professionals" who planned that panzer armies would operate independent of infantry and with disregard to their logistical needs (thus allowing Soviets to defeat both panzers and infantry). It was the "Professionals" that planned the logistics which failed so spectacularly during Barbarossa and Taifun. It was the "Professionals" that promised Adolf Leningrad in 6 weeks and European Russia in 6 months, etc etc etc.
Manstein, OTOH, was the chief OstFront on-field blunderer, (although Hoepner and Bock played probably a bigger role in AGN's July 1941 debacle).
This is full of inaccuracies. You are also obviously omitting all the successes the professionals achieved.

steinmetz
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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#51

Post by steinmetz » 28 Sep 2014, 13:04

BDV wrote: The "Professionals" had their shot in 1941 and blew it. They almost blew it in 1940, too, only to be saved by Runstedt's and Adolf's supervision.
The last phrase is certainly original but that is all.

steinmetz
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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#52

Post by steinmetz » 28 Sep 2014, 14:02

BDV wrote:
alltoes wrote:Over the last few years, you've made negative statements towards the leadership of AGN during the initial stages of Barbarossa. I am always learning. Please give your reasons with detailed information. The Solzy incident was a tough fight. The essay by.....can't remember his name. Well his position was for a straight attack IN LINE towards Leningrad after the battle of Rez... (sp?) I felt was a good option and possible war winning strategy.
AGN failures are like a mosaic. One has to fit many parts to arrive at the conclusion, although none of this is some breaking news, just the standard historical data. Of course, the Soltsy debacle stands out most glaringly. But compared to what the attacker had in mind at the time, also the Soviet stopping the 41st panzer on the Luga has to qualify as failure. Speaking of which, sticking the mobile kampfgruppe Raus in a bridgehead to get its brains bashed in by relentless soviet attacks, at that particular moment does not strike me as some great military accomplishment or even reasonable use of scarce resources. And even then clearing Estonia took till the end of August..

While 41st and 56th panzer korps were getting abused in varied ways between Peipus and Ilmen, west of Peipus the 18th army had a very tough time advancing against soviet defenses that had found their footing (either 41st or 56th could have done wonders). Instead the Army Group had to throw in the last reserve (infantry Korps 50 I think).

Overall July 10 - August 1st a discombobulated affair, that reflects poorly on vLeeb and Hoepner, even without considering Soltsy. After August 1st, even with the 39th Panzer added to the roster, additional poor, unimaginative attacks, as a result failing to take the objective (Leningrad) despite the additional resources.
You are seriously overstating some justified criticism of the use of the mobile forces in the AGN area.There was no Soltsy debacle. Mobile forces will always outrun the infantry and that can get them into trouble but that is something that is expected and they can deal with that.

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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onwards

#53

Post by Erwinn » 27 Jan 2015, 17:07

Everybody is talking about AGN but nobody talks about it's forces being dragged away when it's needed "elsewhere". Air support, tanks, infantry. It was the stepchild of the whole operation. Hitler only cared about Ukraine and it's resources from the start.

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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onwards

#54

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 29 Jan 2015, 02:23

Probably why AGN was still between 20% & 30% under strength in early summer 1942?

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