Alt WWI Hist Project - Japanese Options 1939+

[hselassi]

All,

This is part of my on-and-off WI project, you can see the earlier posts/questions with the Alt WWI Hist Project prefix. I have further studied the Chinese side of things, changing my earlier structure (http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 1&t=157624) as outlined below. My current stumbling block concerns Japan's actions.

1. The KMT is supported by Germany beginning in 1928 (with effective training/materiel support beginning after the Northern Campaign).

2. There is no Central Plains War (German support makes Chiang unassailable so those conflicts are solved politically).

3. A German brokered treaty with the USSR clears up territorial issues (mostly in the USSR's favor) and leads to the construction of a TSR-Shanghai railway (single tracked by 1935 partially double tracked before slowed down by war in 1936).

4. The CCP is crushed in the south in 1932 and chased north by the German-trained divisions and KMT-German air support and destroyed in the north in 1934.

5. The Chiang-German plan is to consolidate KMT power in unoccupied China, keep the Japanese north of the Yellow River, and continue to improve Chinese logistics to support a modern army and air force (currently there are only 20 "German" armies (3 divs ea.- the army is equivalent in firepower to 1 Japanese square div) (15 Chiang & 5 warlord)), then begin offensive operations against Japan in 1941 aimed at recovering China's 1890 borders.

6. There is no kidnapping, but political pressure forces Chiang to begin hostilities against Japan in 1936. Shanghai is brought under KMT control in 2 months and the Yellow River line is consolidated in 3 months (the specie reserves are removed from Tientsin before its fall - the only use of Chiang's "German" units in the Peiping theater)). The Japanese clear the Chinese from the "northern" side of the Yellow river by 1937 (only guerrilla/partisan/bandit units remain), but Chinese mining, airplanes, and artillery still render it generally unnavigable (The Chinese strategy remains the same, only the offensive phase is pushed back to 1944).

7. Germany calls on the members of the Central European Union to join it in China. They join the German embargo and provide additional fighter planes and advisors, but the only ground troops are the German-Polish Mtn. Corps (Bav., Wurt., & Carp. Mtn. Divs) which will protect the German training/production hub in Canton.
Per the earlier treaty, the USSR declares war on Japan (once Japan is fully occupied with Shanghai & the Yellow R) and captures S. Sakhalin. Beyond that operation (completed by the end of 1936) it limits itself to supporting the Manchurian Red Army and air raids/artillery duels.
NEI oil previously sold to Japan is sold to Chinese front companies in FIC (supported by France as part of Franco-German rapprochement). Using similar tactics, the sale of any dual-use products previously sold to Japan by European nations ends.
Chinese officials and their allies in the US begin to push for a similar "embargo" from the US which will become an official embargo in 1939. After the US embargo is official, the non-CEU European nations follow on making theirs official.

8. Japan and USSR sign a 5 yr renewable truce in 1938. Front lines are frozen and Soviet support for the Manchurian Red Army ends.


Based on this scenario, what does Japan do in 1939+? Which of the below options is it most likely to take or are there others that I am missing.

1) Double down on China: Fully mobilize and try to break the Yellow R line and defeat China before the embargoes cripple the economy, then try to wind back the embargoes as the war is over. This would require Japan to occupy all of China by 1941 and hope that the USSR does not violate the truce (on its own or due to German pressure).

2) Establish status quo: Pacify occupied China and create a working "independent" satellite which can lobby for recognition, then turn the truce with the USSR into a peace treaty. This will force China to face a strong Chinese/Japanese opponent if it decides to cross the Yellow R. The danger is that China will eventually be strong enough to head north and the USSR can always violate a peace treaty.

3) Southern Option: Stabilize the situation in China and turn to the Navy's Southern Option for resources. This follows our time line except FIC is part of a free France so there is no Franco-Thai War and Japan has to face France along with the US, UK/CW, and Neth in 1941 as it moves south. In such an option the CEU would add submarines and seaplanes to the allied fleet (the few German, Italian, and Habsburg capital ships (about 20) are strictly for home defense and could not politically be used in foreign waters).

4) Civilian takeover: The least likely, but here it goes, the stalemate/defeats in China/Sakhalin lead to such loss of face/prestige that the civilian govt. is able to exert control over the armed forces and offer China a peace treaty with the 1914 boundaries and some retention of Japanese rights in China. Japan then joins the international disarmament movement to further weaken the military.

[glenn239]

I don't understand (4) because it's combining things that don't really look like they need to be combined. Why couldn't Japan just withdraw its forces back to Manchuria after unilaterally declaring that the Chinese have been suitably punished?

[hselassi]

I don't understand (4) because it's combining things that don't really look like they need to be combined. Why couldn't Japan just withdraw its forces back to Manchuria after unilaterally declaring that the Chinese have been suitably punished?

That would be more a rework of (2) since it leaves Japan holding land that China will not (cannot) leave occupied.

Option (4) is the collapse of the military's political power at home, which means the politicians would be looking for an end to the war not just a "cold war" which would turn hot as soon as China was able. This means offering China a deal that gives it all the land it considers indispensable (N China and Manchuria) while keeping peripheral areas (Korea and Formosa) that China may not think are worth the blood and treasure to recover. Such a deal would be a victory for the politicians because they could go back to their constituents stating that Japan lost nothing, rather withdrew from areas illegally occupied by the military.

[glenn239]

That would be more a rework of (2) since it leaves Japan holding land that China will not (cannot) leave occupied.

No, it's not (2), which was defined as freezing the status quo, which by 1939 had the IJA deep in Chinese territory. It would be a withdrawal back to the 1937 line without any of the other political complications listed in either (2) or (4).

Option (4) is the collapse of the military's political power at home, which means the politicians would be looking for an end to the war not just a "cold war" which would turn hot as soon as China was able.

You're saying then, essentially, that it was politically impossible for the Japanese military on its own to have decided to withdraw from China?

[hselassi]

That would be more a rework of (2) since it leaves Japan holding land that China will not (cannot) leave occupied.

No, it's not (2), which was defined as freezing the status quo, which by 1939 had the IJA deep in Chinese territory. It would be a withdrawal back to the 1937 line without any of the other political complications listed in either (2) or (4).

I am sorry, but I do not see how China would allow Japan to keep any of its post 1930 gains. If we are dealing with semantics, then let me clarify option (2)

2) Establish status quo: Pacify occupied China and create a working "independent" satellites which can lobby for recognition, then turn the truce with the USSR into a peace treaty. This will force China to face a strong Chinese/Manchurian/Japanese opponent if it decides to cross the Yellow R. The danger is that China will eventually be strong enough to head north and the USSR can always violate a peace treaty.

Option (4) is the collapse of the military's political power at home, which means the politicians would be looking for an end to the war not just a "cold war" which would turn hot as soon as China was able.

You're saying then, essentially, that it was politically impossible for the Japanese military on its own to have decided to withdraw from China?

Yes I am. I have not read anything that would lead me to think the IJA/IJN was capable of backing down from its expansionist plans.

[T. A. Gardner]

I would say that their best option is the one I have advocated before: They negotiate a peace with China, and opt for "Japanification" of Korea and Manchukuo. That is, begin a program to turn those areas into Japanese home ones. Japanese is made the official language. Children are raised and schooled in it. There is an official policy to encourage Japanese citizens to move to these areas (maybe grants of farm land, business privileges, etc.) and one that makes it desirable for the Koreans or Chinese to immigrate elsewhere.
Japan does not expand into the rest of China instead fortifying its border with Russia and working on the conversion of territory already in hand.

Maintain a truce with the USSR, work to keep China less than stable with no one faction being in control, and above all make nice with the US so you don't end up in a war. By 1942 /43 the Japanese might even consider entering on the Allied side to reap the benefits of a victory.

This is somewhat possible if the Army faction loses their bid to gain control of the government and the Navy continues to have the upper hand.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I would say that their best option is the one I have advocated before: They negotiate a peace with China, and opt for "Japanification" of Korea and Manchukuo. That is, begin a program to turn those areas into Japanese home ones. Japanese is made the official language. Children are raised and schooled in it. There is an official policy to encourage Japanese citizens to move to these areas (maybe grants of farm land, business privileges, etc.) and one that makes it desirable for the Koreans or Chinese to immigrate elsewhere.

Maybe I'm wrong, but I thought all that was Japans policy in Korea/Manchuria?

Maintain a truce with the USSR, work to keep China less than stable with no one faction being in control, and above all make nice with the US so you don't end up in a war. By 1942 /43 the Japanese might even consider entering on the Allied side to reap the benefits of a victory.

The young prowar army officers can be afforded the opportunity to die for the emperor in the Western Desert or the hills of Italy. Akin to Franco sending the restless facist trouble makers off in the Division Azul to fight in Russia.

[T. A. Gardner]

Japan's policy to Manchukuo and Korea was to make them puppet governments rather than annex them outright. What I'm proposing is that Japan pulls back from expansion in China and as part of that deal internationally other nations ignore that they do annex these regions as part of Japan.
They did industrialize both Korea and Manchukuo heavily.

What they do different here is institute policies to switch languages from Korean and Chinese to Japanese, encourage immigration from Japan rather than just let it happen on its own, and also encourage the non-Japanese population to immigrate somewhere else. Maybe one way would be to do what the French and British already did: Manchukuo had a military of the equivalent of 6 divisions.
Join the Allies and commit lots of Chinese and Korean troops to combat. Offer them to the Russians to fight the Germans... I'm sure a few tens of thousands of casualties would help the Japanification process... Let the problem officers lead these units in battle...

So, instead of a puppet state, Manchukuo becomes part of Japan itself and eventually has a majority Japanese population.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I was remembering US soldiers who had been ther ecirca 1946-53 remarking that Japanese had be required in Korean schools, and most Koreans over the age of fifteen in1950 had a working knowledge of Japanese. General Dean in his autobiography noted that when he was wandering the countryside before capture he communicated with the Koreans with Japanese.

[OpanaPointer]

You might want to check this over.

Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War

[Carl Schwamberger]

That is a good one. It seems to be the basis for a number of other English language histories of the development of the Pacific war.

[hselassi]

Thank you all for the additional ideas.

T.A. G's idea of adding cultural and/or physical genocide to Option 2 is rather interesting.

Personally, I favor option 3 since everything I have read about Japanese military in the 26-41 period seems geared toward an eventual reach south for raw materials/oil and a fight with the US for control of the W Pacific/E Asia (China was an Army forced interlude in that plan). Options 1 & 2 cannot guarantee relief for Japan from the near total trade embargo before it cripples its ability to wage war. Option 4 would be great for Japan (Chiang would gladly give up Korea & Formosa for a peaceful Japanese trading partner), but nothing I have read would lead me to think it is a viable option.

Also to clear up some of the ATL's history (since some have spoken of Japan joining the Allies), there is no war in Europe nor a chance of war (the WWI settlement and women's suffrage have made offensive war in W Europe a near impossibility [which is why Fr & Ger officials hammer out a deal on how to support their allies in the SCW without risking a wider war] and in E Europe the USSR depends on Ger's Ukr satellite for its food).

[OpanaPointer]

If you can find it Japan Subdued would be useful. It's Togo Shigenori's memoirs of being Foreign Minister under Tojo and Suzuki.

[hselassi]

I did not want to start a new thread since this question is pretty much a follow on to this thread, but what is the earliest Japan could have attacked Pearl Harbor?

In this ATL, China starts the 2nd Sino-Japanese War in 36, instead of Japan in 37, and the heavy trade sanctions against Japan are effective by 1939 (the Soviet truce is signed in 38 instead of 41 and the Chinese stalemate is reached in 38). In OTL, Japan only had about 2 yrs of fuel/raw materials in 1941, so in this ATL the same would be true in 1940, so can Japan attack PH in Dec 1940 (or Spring/Summer/etc 1940) or is 1941 the earliest date possible?

[T. A. Gardner]

I did not want to start a new thread since this question is pretty much a follow on to this thread, but what is the earliest Japan could have attacked Pearl Harbor?

In this ATL, China starts the 2nd Sino-Japanese War in 36, instead of Japan in 37, and the heavy trade sanctions against Japan are effective by 1939 (the Soviet truce is signed in 38 instead of 41 and the Chinese stalemate is reached in 38). In OTL, Japan only had about 2 yrs of fuel/raw materials in 1941, so in this ATL the same would be true in 1940, so can Japan attack PH in Dec 1940 (or Spring/Summer/etc 1940) or is 1941 the earliest date possible?

The problem would likely be that attacking Pearl Harbor a year early would be largely a waste. If I recall correctly, the Pacific Fleet would still be based on the US West coast and out of harm's way. That means the Japanese would be attacking mostly land bases, airfields, and fortifications.