1941: What if Germany refuses troops for North Africa

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T. A. Gardner
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Re: 1941: What if Germany refuses troops for North Africa

#76

Post by T. A. Gardner » 18 Feb 2017, 05:41

Keitel wrote:[
If we ignore the virulent anti-war movement in the US. Till Hitler declares war, FDR doesn't have the backing to jump in and the US public isn't enraged enough to fight Hitler. A majority were still of the opinion to let them kill each other.
In November 1940, FDR won a third term in the election over Wilke who was advocating a more measured response to Germany.
The occupation of French and Dutch territories in the Western Hemisphere was overwhelmingly approved by Congress on 6/17/40 by 76 to 20 in the Senate and 380 to 8 in the House, as but one example.
Regardless of public sentiment, the US was headed to war. FDR's third term pretty much guaranteed it.

Actually it made all the difference by starting the war. US public is not enraged enough to go to war for Britain's Colonies. If the Japanese just ignore the PI and go straight in for the DEI and not waste time with the Pearl Harbor strike, there isn't much FDR can do.
The US would have definitely gone to war with Japan if they attacked the DEI or Malaysia. The US was already making active military plans with what was called the "ABCD" (America, Britain, China, Dutch) powers in Asia for a coordinated defense. The majority of Americans were also willing to go to war with Japan, far more willing, than with Germany.
Japan's joining the Axis on 9/27/40 was met largely with derision in the US. Japan thought that having a treaty of support with Germany would temper a US response making them think twice about starting a two ocean war. Instead, Secretary of State Hull called the treaty "A bluff." Two weeks later the State Department warned all US citizens to get out of Japan and areas they occupied.
The day after Japan signed that treaty, FDR promised China $100 million in new military aid on top of the $500 million already extended.
On November 26 1941, the US passed to Japan a comprehensive note on foreign policy. It included demands... note that demands that Japan withdraw all forces from China, sign a treaty supporting the Nationalist Chinese government, enter a mulit-nation nonaggression pact, and guarantee the borders and territory of nations in Asia. In exchange the US would ease up their embargo on Japan and unfreeze their assets in the US.
Japan basically said, no way and that was that.
The US and Japan were going to war.
Half the US Military was deployed in the Pacific Theater for 1942-43, many of the units landing at Normandy cut their teeth here. The bulk of the USMC was deployed to the Pacific. Hell the bloodiest battles the US fought were in the Pacific and substantial forces needed in the ETO were tied down.

So yes Japan did draw off substantial forces. No German Declaration of War and no Japanese sneak attack means FDR can't jump in.
The US Army sent exactly 7 infantry divisions into the Pacific in 1942, and stood one up out of local units (the Americal Division on New Caledonia). After that, no more were sent. The USMC went from 0 to 6 divisions over the course of the war. The rest of the US Army divisions raised all went to the ETO or MTO.
Japan was beaten on land by a tiny fraction of US military strength. At sea, the bulk of the USN was deployed to the Pacific. The Atlantic really only required ASW assets. Most of the US ships deployed elsewhere (like South America and the Caribbean) were units unsuited to front line naval combat like the old Omaha class cruisers or Erie class gunboats, along with old "four piper" destroyers.
The US also, right after taking Vichy French colonies in North Africa began rebuilding the French army, eventually supplying equipment for 12 divisions. The British Commonwealth received like masses of material, as did the Russians and Chinese.
"Yawn" Same old tired nonsense and I gave you the source too.
Then humor me. How many asphalt plants? How many bulldozers? How many dump trucks? How many gravel plants? How much mechanization did they have?
Just in the Pioneer Companies assigned to Infantry Regiments, they had 9 large compressors, 20 power saws, and 6 welding sets for construction work and were noted for how quickly they could lay corduroy roads.
:lol: What a joke! One US construction engineer battalion (TO 5-75) with 946 men has:
10 bulldozers
27 2 1/2 ton trucks
13 2 1/2 ton dump trucks
1 4 ton wrecker
8 2 1/2 ton trucks with air compressors

Image

4 road graders
4 2 1/2 ton trucks forming a mobile machine shop (with generator trailers)
2 crawler tractor crane / shovel / excavator
6 earth movers / scrapers

Image

3 truck mounted cranes
2 10 cf trailer mounted cement mixers
12 20 ton lowboy trailers
1 skid mounted earth auger
2 10 ton road roller
3 8 ton road rollers
2 3 tooth rotary trenching machines.
That doesn't include their air driven jack hammers, chain saws, portable saw mill, and a plethora of other equipment in addition to hand tools.

Corduroy roads? Like this you mean?

Image

How about airfield construction?

Image

Two companies of US engineers (about 300 men) bridged the Rhine... Most likely in a matter of a day or so too...

Image

I doubt that 3000 German construction troops with their gear could do it in under a week.
The separate road construction battalions had a minimum of 4 concrete mixers on 5 ton trailers pulled by four heavy trucks, 4 oil or steam powered rollers, and 2 five-ton with asphalt surfacing equipment pulled by a tractor. In just three months, they doubled the amount of supplies reaching the deployed divisions. That is what really matters more than what equipment they have.
So, basically they had next to nothing. A few concrete mixers, some ancient steam rollers, and an asphalt spreader. Pathetic...
Finally the Germans had an SDE value that was 4 times larger than the Soviets who really struggled to keep its forces supplied. The Germans also brought twice as many trucks as the Soviets did and their 495,800 trucks had 24 times the total lift capacity of all the Wehrmacht's horses. The Soviets were heavily dependent on horses and suffered more from the bad roads than the Germans did. As the Germans get closer to Moscow the more the roads improve.

So if the proposed Rommel Corps is committed and pushes off from Yelniya, the Soviets are fucked.
Nope. You forget its not a linear function, but an inverse square one. Adding a little... Which is really all Rommel had, buys the Germans very little additional in Russia.

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Re: 1941: What if Germany refuses troops for North Africa

#77

Post by Keitel » 18 Feb 2017, 14:40

T. A. Gardner wrote:
In November 1940, FDR won a third term in the election over Wilke who was advocating a more measured response to Germany.
The occupation of French and Dutch territories in the Western Hemisphere was overwhelmingly approved by Congress on 6/17/40 by 76 to 20 in the Senate and 380 to 8 in the House, as but one example.
Regardless of public sentiment, the US was headed to war. FDR's third term pretty much guaranteed it.
It still took Pearl Harbor and Hitlers DoW to get it done. If Hitler leaves the Japanese hanging like he is with the Italians here and doesn't declare war on the US, FDR will not have the political capital to spend for a war with Germany when the US is fighting Japan which will require substantial forces.
The US would have definitely gone to war with Japan if they attacked the DEI or Malaysia. The US was already making active military plans with what was called the "ABCD" (America, Britain, China, Dutch) powers in Asia for a coordinated defense. The majority of Americans were also willing to go to war with Japan, far more willing, than with Germany.
Japan's joining the Axis on 9/27/40 was met largely with derision in the US. Japan thought that having a treaty of support with Germany would temper a US response making them think twice about starting a two ocean war. Instead, Secretary of State Hull called the treaty "A bluff." Two weeks later the State Department warned all US citizens to get out of Japan and areas they occupied.
The day after Japan signed that treaty, FDR promised China $100 million in new military aid on top of the $500 million already extended.
On November 26 1941, the US passed to Japan a comprehensive note on foreign policy. It included demands... note that demands that Japan withdraw all forces from China, sign a treaty supporting the Nationalist Chinese government, enter a mulit-nation nonaggression pact, and guarantee the borders and territory of nations in Asia. In exchange the US would ease up their embargo on Japan and unfreeze their assets in the US.
Japan basically said, no way and that was that.
The US and Japan were going to war.
Yet unless Japan attacks the US, the public would not be willing to die for the European Empires. This ignores that for this Op Scenario, the plan to attack the European Powers is dead in the water for the Japanese. They took the gamble on their attack because they knew they would face extremely weak resistance that would enable them to quickly gain ground.

This scenario ends that planning and the Army doubles down on China, gambling if that they knock the Chinese Government out, they can save face and create a puppet Government and then pull out the bulk of their troops. Not going to happen and the Japanese basically implode into a palace civil war.
The US Army sent exactly 7 infantry divisions into the Pacific in 1942, and stood one up out of local units (the Americal Division on New Caledonia). After that, no more were sent. The USMC went from 0 to 6 divisions over the course of the war. The rest of the US Army divisions raised all went to the ETO or MTO.
Again you miss the point. For 1942 to 1943, half the US Divisions were in the PTO to prevent a fall of Australia.After that the US Army finally started growing explosively as the training pipelines opened wide.
Then humor me. How many asphalt plants? How many bulldozers? How many dump trucks? How many gravel plants? How much mechanization did they have?
Enough to embark on the largest infrastructure building program since the Romans and asphalt the Ost Front to the point Bagration had good roads to maneuver upon.

Its not really how much they have, but how well its used. The Fact remains the Germans had no problems getting supplies forward.
:lol: What a joke! One US construction engineer battalion (TO 5-75) with 946 men has:
They also weren't engaged in direct combat like German Pioneer Companies assigned to its Regiments. We also aren't counting the 23 independent Motorized Pioneer Battalions deployed for Barbarossa.Composing three combat companies equipped with assault tanks,assault boats, and other equipment including construction equipment. They also had motorized bridging columns type B. The 31 Semi-motorized Pioneer Battalions differed little in equipment. In addition 25 Engineer Bridge Construction Companies were deployed with 1300 men each and were totally motorized, Six independent Motorized Assault Boat Companies were also deployed.
Two companies of US engineers (about 300 men) bridged the Rhine... Most likely in a matter of a day or so too...

I doubt that 3000 German construction troops with their gear could do it in under a week.
The Germans had no problem bridging the Soviet Rivers which were far wider than the Rhine and deployed the majority of their motorized Bridge Columns to the Ost Front along with all their Bridge Laying Tanks which the US never deployed. They also had 179 independent Motorized Type B Bridge Columns (not counting their other bridge columns) of which all but one were deployed to support Barbarossa. Ah here it is, http://www.wwiidaybyday.com/kstn/kstnmain.htm, I had to dig through my bookmarks to find this again, I really need to clean those up sometime and organize them. Any event, most of what I'm talking about is here, though its far from complete and some of the links are sadly broken. Niehorster, is still up though.

Also look up KStN 733 for the B bridge Columns. One column could make either a 16 ton military bridge 54 meters long, an 8 ton 83 meters long, or a 4 ton 130 meters long bridge, likewise they could be used to build ferries of varying sizes to support between 4 and 20 tons. They were able to bridge rivers 130 meters in length in less than half a day despite having only 102 men in the company. So that is a damning indictment of US Engineers needing roughly three times the men, and more than double the time, and more than quadruple the equipment. Lets see, to cross the Rhine at Remagen, the US needed to go 233 meters. http://www.150th.com/rivers/c_rhine.htm It took a few days to get going.

Now contrast that with Ancenis where 14 B Columns were thrown together on the fly and forced 16 ton bridge 375m long across a heavily defended Loire river in 22 hours start late afternoon on 22nd of June 1940 and finishing the next day in the face of stiff resistance by British and French Forces.

So clearly the Germans were were more efficient in use of engineering equipment. Your argument fails. What matters is not what equipment the Germans had, but how efficiently it was used and what they accomplished with it. I haven't even gotten to the German Heavy Bridge Units yet either.
Nope. You forget its not a linear function, but an inverse square one. Adding a little... Which is really all Rommel had, buys the Germans very little additional in Russia.
Your argument fails again.

In early August, when Rommel is proposed to be unleashed with the proposed Rommel Corps, there is practically no effective Soviet Combat Units in his way, he has access to thousands of tons of fuel captured from the Soviets, good roads leading to Moscow, a fully rested and full up TO&E, and secure flanks.

Once he hits Moscow, the Soviets are done and the Soviet Rail System can now be used against it and the entire Red Army Logistical System will implode along with their Central Bureaucracy. That means once Kiev falls, effective organized resistance west of the Urals collapses rather quickly. This means the logistics needs of the Germans decline dramatically while its supplies increase dramatically due to all the captured Soviet Gear they take and control of the main Russian Rail Hub.

The Soviet Military was simply too front heavy on weapons, and lacked critical signals, logistic, and engineering support units. Hell their artillery, which on paper was superior to Germans ones, were utterly incapable of indirect fire support and could only engage what they could see due to their signals and artillery observers being either totally inadequate or missing altogether.

Nor did the Soviets have sufficient trucks to support its units.

The Propose Rommel Corps would be fully motorized, and have far more combat power than whatever Stalin could scrape up on short notice.


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Re: 1941: What if Germany refuses troops for North Africa

#78

Post by Richard Anderson » 18 Feb 2017, 19:47

Keitel wrote:It still took Pearl Harbor and Hitlers DoW to get it done. If Hitler leaves the Japanese hanging like he is with the Italians here and doesn't declare war on the US, FDR will not have the political capital to spend for a war with Germany when the US is fighting Japan which will require substantial forces.
It certainly was a relief and simplified things for FDR, but given the not so subtle US provocations in the Atlantic, I suspect that Hitler would have done so anyway sooner rather than later.
Again you miss the point. For 1942 to 1943, half the US Divisions were in the PTO to prevent a fall of Australia.After that the US Army finally started growing explosively as the training pipelines opened wide.
No, sorry. As of 31 December 1941, 36 US Army divisions were active: 29 infantry, five armored, and two cavalry. One was lost in the Philippines on 9 April 1942. However, as of 30 June 1942, 47 US Army divisions were active: 33 infantry, eight armored, four motorized infantry, and two cavalry. Yes, not all were ready for deployment, however, for example, 27 of the 37 infantry divisions were.
They also weren't engaged in direct combat like German Pioneer Companies assigned to its Regiments. We also aren't counting the 23 independent Motorized Pioneer Battalions deployed for Barbarossa.Composing three combat companies equipped with assault tanks,assault boats, and other equipment including construction equipment. They also had motorized bridging columns type B. The 31 Semi-motorized Pioneer Battalions differed little in equipment. In addition 25 Engineer Bridge Construction Companies were deployed with 1300 men each and were totally motorized, Six independent Motorized Assault Boat Companies were also deployed.
No, but the Engineer Combat Battalion was engaged in direct combat like German Pioneer companies, and there were ever so many more of them than there German Pioneer battalions. Operationally, the German corps typically had one or possibly two Pioneer battalions assigned from the Heerstruppen for general support. An American corps typically had two Engineer Combat Groups, with six to eight battalions, so typically two to three general support battalions per division. In your Barbarossa example, those 54 Heerestruppen Pioneer battalions were supporting some 145+ divisions, so typically one-half to one-third general support battalions per division.

Similarly, each US Army Engineer Combat Group typically had assigned a Light Ponton Bridge Company and a Treadway Bridge Company, while each army had at least one Heavy Ponton Bridge Company, and, perhaps more importantly, any Engineer battalion could assemble and emplace a Bailey.

Nor was there a significant difference in the equipment outfit for an Engineer Combat Battalion (TO&E 5-15) versus an Engineer Construction Battalion (TO&E 5-75), although they had less manpower. Meanwhile, each Engineer Combat Battalion was equipped with 14 assault boats, so not far short of the 18 assigned to the German Sturmboot Kompanie. Again, that means each US corps typically had as many assault boats as the entire German Ostheer for Barbarossa.
The Germans had no problem bridging the Soviet Rivers...
To clarify, the 150th Engineer Combat Battalion completed the first Rhine bridge near Oppenheim, beginning operations at 0630 23 March and completing it at 1830 the same day - in 12 hours, not "a few days". The first bridge was a class 40 M2 Treadway 1,280 feet long as you note. They completed a second one the next day. Both bridges were capable of handling 40-ton (36 metric ton) loads, rather than the 16 metric tons of the Bruecko B bridge at Ancenis. Yes, the Bruecko B was similar is capability to a US Army Engineer Light Ponton Company, the Bruecko K to an Engineer Treadway Bridge Company or Heavy Ponton Bridge Company. However, the 150th Engineers were not a specialized bridging unit.
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Re: 1941: What if Germany refuses troops for North Africa

#79

Post by T. A. Gardner » 18 Feb 2017, 20:49

Two points to add to Richard's

I count 37 divisions (the Philippine probably being the difference) By the end of 1942 there were just 6 US Infantry divisions in the Pacific:

Philippine Division (Bataan Luzon) destroyed.
24th Infantry Hawaii. Went to Australia 7/43
25th Infantry Hawaii To Guadalcanal 12/42
32nd Infantry (NG). To Australia 5/42 then New Guinea
41st Infantry (NG). To Australia 3/42 later New Guinea
Americal division. Stood up from units on New Caledonia 5/42

The USMC had 1 division, the 1st in the PTO

The next US Army division to arrive in the PTO is the 43rd 2/43.

The US combat engineer battalion was also almost infinitely better equipped for construction than a German pioneer battalion.
Each battalion had:

4 Bulldozers
27 2 1/2 ton dump trucks
22 2 1/2 ton trucks
1 4 ton wrecker
4 2 1/2 ton trucks with air compressor
1 machine shop truck
14 assault boats (plywood, rowed or motorized) carries 12 men max

As for bridging, there's a whole 32 page thread in the equipment section of this board about German equipment. It should be noted, that in all of that 32 pages you never see any mechanized equipment assisting German engineers building a bridge, pontoon bridge, whatever. It's all done with muscle and masses of men.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0&t=168276

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Re: 1941: What if Germany refuses troops for North Africa

#80

Post by Richard Anderson » 18 Feb 2017, 23:22

T. A. Gardner wrote:Two points to add to Richard's

I count 37 divisions (the Philippine probably being the difference)
I'm not sure? I count the 1st and 2d Cavalry, the 1st-5th Armored, and the 1st-9th, 24th-38th, 40th, 41st, 43d-45th, and Philippine division. Are you counting the 39th?
The US combat engineer battalion was also almost infinitely better equipped for construction than a German pioneer battalion.
Indeed, however I forgot to mention that the Engineer Construction Battalion (TO&E 5-75) was a late war organization (fall of 1943) originally intended to replace the Engineer General Service and Engineer Special Service regiments and to mirror the USN CB Battalion. The thing is though, overseas theater commanders were allowed to retain the previous organization of they preferred and so none ever existed in the ETOUSA . As of 30 June 1945, there were 79 Engineer GS and 5 Engineer SS regiments, all in the ETOUSA. Another 3 special brigades, 36 construction battalions, 8 GS battalions, and 4 shop battalions were also in existence, plus 135 dump truck companies, 12 port construction and repair groups, and 59 petroleum distribution companies. And that was just Army Service Forces. Army Air Forces included another 11 Engineer Aviation Regiments and 124 Engineer Aviation Battalions, which were configured specifically to rapidly build air installations.

Overall, the 89 active divisions were supported by their assigned Combat Battalions and Squadrons, plus 204 non-divisional Combat Battalions, 15 Heavy Ponton Battalions, 7 Combat Companies (Separate), 54 Depot Companies, 38 Light Equipment Companies, 44 Light Ponton Companies, 33 Treadway Bridge Companies, 83 Maintenance Companies, and 238 other Engineer ground force companies and platoons.
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Re: 1941: What if Germany refuses troops for North Africa

#81

Post by T. A. Gardner » 19 Feb 2017, 01:28

Not sure where the difference is on divisions, but it's moot. There weren't "...half the US Divisions were in the PTO to prevent a fall of Australia." There were two National Guard divisions moved there during 1942... The 32nd and the 41st. The 25th went to Guadalcanal to relieve the 1st Marine division at the end of 1942 (12/42).
The 24th and 25th were in Hawaii when the Pacific War started.

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Re: 1941: What if Germany refuses troops for North Africa

#82

Post by Keitel » 19 Feb 2017, 02:11

Richard Anderson wrote:
It certainly was a relief and simplified things for FDR, but given the not so subtle US provocations in the Atlantic, I suspect that Hitler would have done so anyway sooner rather than later.
Not a given, and it took the wild success of Japan's opening moves to get the ball moving.
No, sorry. As of 31 December 1941, 36 US Army divisions were active: 29 infantry, five armored, and two cavalry. One was lost in the Philippines on 9 April 1942. However, as of 30 June 1942, 47 US Army divisions were active: 33 infantry, eight armored, four motorized infantry, and two cavalry. Yes, not all were ready for deployment, however, for example, 27 of the 37 infantry divisions were.
I'm talking deployed troops, troops still in the US are not deployed yet, also we are forgetting the millions of support troops also needed. For the initial period of 1942 to 43, half the troops being shipped out were indeed going to the PTO. This is a fact well known at the time and a source of friction between Allied Generals.
]
No, but the Engineer Combat Battalion was engaged in direct combat like German Pioneer companies, and there were ever so many more of them than there German Pioneer battalions. Operationally, the German corps typically had one or possibly two Pioneer battalions assigned from the Heerstruppen for general support. An American corps typically had two Engineer Combat Groups, with six to eight battalions, so typically two to three general support battalions per division. In your Barbarossa example, those 54 Heerestruppen Pioneer battalions were supporting some 145+ divisions, so typically one-half to one-third general support battalions per division.
The US Engineers needed outside help to be combat effective though and weren't as well trained for it. Also each German Division had its own Battalion of Pioneers. The Independent Battalions were allocated as needed.

Again, what is not important is the numbers assigned, but how effective they were, and what they accomplished. For the German Pioneers, they were able to keep the roads open and double the supply reaching the Heer, all while conducting independent combat actions. The US Engineers despite having more and better equipment, never achieved that efficiency.

To clarify, the 150th Engineer Combat Battalion completed the first Rhine bridge near Oppenheim, beginning operations at 0630 23 March and completing it at 1830 the same day - in 12 hours, not "a few days". The first bridge was a class 40 M2 Treadway 1,280 feet long as you note. They completed a second one the next day. Both bridges were capable of handling 40-ton (36 metric ton) loads, rather than the 16 metric tons of the Bruecko B bridge at Ancenis. Yes, the Bruecko B was similar is capability to a US Army Engineer Light Ponton Company, the Bruecko K to an Engineer Treadway Bridge Company or Heavy Ponton Bridge Company. However, the 150th Engineers were not a specialized bridging unit.
Re-read the narrative, two days spent reconning the river and getting the supplies, 2400 hours 22 March 1945 the actual building started and ran into delays, 1745 hours the bridge was complete with only light harrassing fire. So it took nearly three days against light resistance to cross.

The Pioneers built theirs faster across a wider span against heavier resistance and on the fly with little reconnaissance. The Germans already knew they needed to cross the Loire and the bridges were already assembled before the Heer reached the river and went right with them.

The US on the other hand forgot there was a river and didn't have the stuff ready and thus the delays.

Efficiency, it really helps in planning.

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Re: 1941: What if Germany refuses troops for North Africa

#83

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Feb 2017, 02:16

T. A. Gardner wrote:Not sure where the difference is on divisions, but it's moot.
Indeed, most of this is moot. :D
There weren't "...half the US Divisions were in the PTO to prevent a fall of Australia." There were two National Guard divisions moved there during 1942... The 32nd and the 41st.
Yes indeed again. The 32d departed the US on 2 March and the 41st on 19 March. The next was the 37th on 11 May 1942. However, the first overseas deployment of a US Army division in World War II was the 34th Infantry on 8 January 1942. And it went to...? :D
The 25th went to Guadalcanal to relieve the 1st Marine division at the end of 1942 (12/42).
The 24th and 25th were in Hawaii when the Pacific War started.
The 24th and 25th were barely in existence given both stemmed from the triangulation of the Hawaiian Division on 1 October 1941. Of course, they were reinforced by the 27th Division, which left California on 28 February 1942.
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Re: 1941: What if Germany refuses troops for North Africa

#84

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Feb 2017, 04:02

Keitel wrote:Not a given, and it took the wild success of Japan's opening moves to get the ball moving.
Really? Hitler declared war on the US on 11 December 1941. What "wild success" had Japan had, other than the attack on Pearl? I'm not even sure he was aware of the sinking of Repulse and PoW at that time?
I'm talking deployed troops, troops still in the US are not deployed yet, also we are forgetting the millions of support troops also needed. For the initial period of 1942 to 43, half the troops being shipped out were indeed going to the PTO. This is a fact well known at the time and a source of friction between Allied Generals.
No, I don't think I'm forgetting much of anything. As of the end of 1943, 25 US infantry divisions, 2 airborne divisions, 3 armored divisions, and 1 cavalry division had deployed overseas, not including the Philippines Division, but including the 24th and 25th ID. Of those, 7 were in the Pacific. That is a fact well known at the time.
The US Engineers needed outside help to be combat effective though and weren't as well trained for it. Also each German Division had its own Battalion of Pioneers. The Independent Battalions were allocated as needed.
Sorry, but that is specious. Neither the German Pionier Batallion or the American Engineer Combat Battalion were intended to be primarily engaged as infantry; they were combat engineers. That the German battalions were more engaged in duties better fulfilled by infantry speaks more to the dearth of German infantry than to their prowess as engineers.
Again, what is not important is the numbers assigned, but how effective they were, and what they accomplished. For the German Pioneers, they were able to keep the roads open and double the supply reaching the Heer, all while conducting independent combat actions. The US Engineers despite having more and better equipment, never achieved that efficiency.
Um, no, the German Bautruppen and OT were those mainly engaged in keeping the roads and railroads open and are a different subject entirely. Meanwhile, it would be interesting to see some evidence for how American combat engineering failed to achieve "that" efficency.
Re-read the narrative, two days spent reconning the river and getting the supplies, 2400 hours 22 March 1945 the actual building started and ran into delays, 1745 hours the bridge was complete with only light harrassing fire. So it took nearly three days against light resistance to cross.
Oh, and here I thought you wanted to compare bridge building times. Instead you want to shift goalposts.
The Pioneers built theirs faster across a wider span against heavier resistance and on the fly with little reconnaissance.
Yes, all that heavy resistance at Ancenis in the afternoon of 22 June :D ...so what happened at 1836 on 22 June near Compiègne? The fighting at Ancenis was finished on 19 June. It was defended by remnants of the 3e and 18e GRCA, which had just been returned from Englanf after evacuating at Dunkirk.
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Re: 1941: What if Germany refuses troops for North Africa

#85

Post by Keitel » 19 Feb 2017, 16:51

Richard Anderson wrote:]Really? Hitler declared war on the US on 11 December 1941. What "wild success" had Japan had, other than the attack on Pearl? I'm not even sure he was aware of the sinking of Repulse and PoW at that time?
Both the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets were destroyed, alongside the Far East Air Force in the PI. And of course Malaya was invaded, and the Japanese sunk PoW and Repulse on the 10th of December.
No, I don't think I'm forgetting much of anything. As of the end of 1943, 25 US infantry divisions, 2 airborne divisions, 3 armored divisions, and 1 cavalry division had deployed overseas, not including the Philippines Division, but including the 24th and 25th ID. Of those, 7 were in the Pacific. That is a fact well known at the time.
I'm talking the period of Jan 1942 to Jan 1943, a critical year in the Pacific when there was a perceived threat that Australia might fall. After Jan 1943, it was clear Australia was safe and the Japanese were a glass cannon.

Sorry, but that is specious. Neither the German Pionier Batallion or the American Engineer Combat Battalion were intended to be primarily engaged as infantry; they were combat engineers. That the German battalions were more engaged in duties better fulfilled by infantry speaks more to the dearth of German infantry than to their prowess as engineers.
No it is not. The Pioneers were elite troops in the German Army. They were expected to both perform engineering tasks and act as sappers. Its one of the key reason why it took as long as it did to bring these murderous mother-fuckers down. Hell Nigel Askey has this as a free sample.

http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/wp-c ... f-Sqds.pdf

You can get the books yourself. They're expensive as fuck, but once you understand the methodology, it becomes frighteningly clear just how the Germans were able to essentially take on the entire world and last as long as they did.
Um, no, the German Bautruppen and OT were those mainly engaged in keeping the roads and railroads open and are a different subject entirely. Meanwhile, it would be interesting to see some evidence for how American combat engineering failed to achieve "that" efficency.
The Bautruppen were Combat Engineers, and they worked under heavy fire. While not expected to do close assaults, they were trained to force a river and had GPMGs and explosives. Organization Todt followed later and focused on getting captured factories on line and mines reopened. RAD was also involved and they were directly used by the military while under fire despite not being combat troops.

US Engineers needed other units to assist them in assaults, while German Pioneers didn't and often could wreck Tank Units. So yeah a German Pioneer Unit was more effective while using fewer men and less equipment with only marginal difference in construction times if we exclude reconnaissance and surveying.
Oh, and here I thought you wanted to compare bridge building times. Instead you want to shift goalposts.
No it isn't shifting goal posts. Its stating a fact. It took two days per SOP back then to recon the river, draw up the plan, get the supplies and then do the deed. Even then there were hiccups getting things done.
Yes, all that heavy resistance at Ancenis in the afternoon of 22 June :D ...so what happened at 1836 on 22 June near Compiègne? The fighting at Ancenis was finished on 19 June. It was defended by remnants of the 3e and 18e GRCA, which had just been returned from Englanf after evacuating at Dunkirk.
French Units were still fighting on June 22nd and 23rd as the orders still had yet to go out, and not all units quit fighting, some continued alongside the II BEF to resist and joined up with DeGaule.

As for Ancenis, on the 19th its Bridge was blown. Since the Germans were already across the Loire elsewhere, it made no difference, but the town was not under German control at the time. Then someone made the decision to bridge it.

Now you don't force a bridge crossing without good reason, and assemble large number of pontoons and artillery support to make a crossing if a town is undefended and you have better crossing sites elsewhere.

But lets set all that aside along with the reconnaissance and resistance. And just focus on the building of the bridges themselves.

The 150th Engineers had 233 meters to go to get a 40 ton capacity bridge to support M4 Shermans.

The Germans have 14 Engineer Companies and 375 meters to go and get a 16 ton capacity bridge to support Panzer 38(t)s.

The US takes 17 and a half hours and dozens of specialized machines to get across.

Germans without all the gear the US has does theirs in 22 hours.

US speed is 13.32 meters per hour. Hell I'll be generous and ignore the hiccups setting up and give you 12 hours, that is 19.42 meters an hour.

German speed is 17.04 meters an hour. Little practical difference. Only the US is using far more resources to achieve the same task and getting only a marginal increase in speed ignoring the hiccups.

Your argument fails.

Next issue.

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Re: 1941: What if Germany refuses troops for North Africa

#86

Post by Kingfish » 19 Feb 2017, 19:17

You know you bean counters are getting deep in the weeds when you start debating bridge building in terms of meters spanned per hour
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
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Re: 1941: What if Germany refuses troops for North Africa

#87

Post by T. A. Gardner » 19 Feb 2017, 22:19

Keitel wrote:Both the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets were destroyed, alongside the Far East Air Force in the PI. And of course Malaya was invaded, and the Japanese sunk PoW and Repulse on the 10th of December.
Absolutely not true. The US Pacific fleet suffered the loss of 5 battleships, along with a few cruisers and DD. These were quickly made up and by Midway the Pacific fleet was as strong or stronger than it was on 7 December.
The ABCD fleet fought well into 1942 before being defeated. Yes, the RN threw away some of their fleet in Malaysia, but that's just their ships in that location. The RN's Indian Ocean fleet remained in being even after a short foray by the IJN into the area. The ABCD Asiatic Fleet was replaced in the SWPA by the 7th Fleet.

The other thing to remember is, that the US in particular would make good any losses and then some while the IJN couldn't do likewise. They lost a major fleet unit they weren't getting a replacement for it. Even replacing aircraft losses was difficult for Japan while the Allies could easily make their losses up.
I'm talking the period of Jan 1942 to Jan 1943, a critical year in the Pacific when there was a perceived threat that Australia might fall. After Jan 1943, it was clear Australia was safe and the Japanese were a glass cannon.
I gave a list, which Richard agrees with, of US divisions in the Pacific for that time period. The only reason 2 US infantry divisions even went to Australia was the British were loathe to release Australian ones in the Middle East for home protection.
As for "overseas," that's a canard... a red herring. There was no need for the US to rush divisions to the ETO where they'd just sit doing nothing. Why put divisions in England just to sit? That would have been a logistical strain on England and the US to supply them compared to leaving them in the US with the ability to move them pretty rapidly to the ETO when necessary.
The first US divisions to the MTO went in Nov 42 for Torch. That made sense as that was the first US offensive in the MTO, just as Guadalcanal was the first US offensive in the PTO.
No it is not. The Pioneers were elite troops in the German Army. They were expected to both perform engineering tasks and act as sappers. Its one of the key reason why it took as long as it did to bring these murderous mother-fuckers down. Hell Nigel Askey has this as a free sample.

http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/wp-c ... f-Sqds.pdf

You can get the books yourself. They're expensive as fuck, but once you understand the methodology, it becomes frighteningly clear just how the Germans were able to essentially take on the entire world and last as long as they did.
And, the Germans squandered them as assault infantry buying little. The US understood, as any rational army would, engineers are engineers first and infantry only when you have no choice. The Germans saw things differently.
If the US needed assault infantry they organized it from infantry assets. They'd have the chemical corps supply flamethrowers and training to the infantry. They'd form pioneer platoons for mine clearing from those same infantry assets, that sort of thing. Easier to train some infantry in the use of a few weapons or tools than waste engineers who have good construction skills and are building infrastructure to support operations.
The Bautruppen were Combat Engineers, and they worked under heavy fire. While not expected to do close assaults, they were trained to force a river and had GPMGs and explosives. Organization Todt followed later and focused on getting captured factories on line and mines reopened. RAD was also involved and they were directly used by the military while under fire despite not being combat troops.
Huh? German construction troops, including bridging units were not set up to be combat units. They were usually filled mostly with low grade men to do construction tasks (strong backs, weak minds). That they had arms is no different from US or British engineers. The big difference is they were equipped mostly, if not entirely, with hand tools and little more. US engineers in particular had masses of machinery and heavy equipment to do the same jobs. One US engineer with a bulldozer could do the work of a company of German construction troops and do it faster... say in repairing a road damaged by artillery fire, or clearing wrecks off a road.
OT was no better.
Also, Allied engineers worked under fire as much as German ones did so that is nothing but a strawman on your part.
US Engineers needed other units to assist them in assaults, while German Pioneers didn't and often could wreck Tank Units. So yeah a German Pioneer Unit was more effective while using fewer men and less equipment with only marginal difference in construction times if we exclude reconnaissance and surveying.
US engineers weren't used for assaults unless they were mixed with infantry units for a specific purpose. Normally, the US simply trained infantry to use whatever specialist equipment was necessary, issued it on an as needed basis, and use the infantry for the assault. US infantry units included pioneer platoons at battalion and regiment level with troops trained in things like mine clearing or use of demolitions to remove obstacles. They didn't normally require support from the division engineer battalion for that.
The big difference is in construction. German troops couldn't build roads overnight. They couldn't clear wreckage from ports or replace bridges or build air fields with anything approaching the rapidity the US, in particular, could.
For example German "experts" estimated that the port of Cherbourg would be closed for the rest of the war because of their demolition of it. The USN and US Army reopened the port in under 60 days and within 90 had it operating at a higher than pre-war capacity.

It was a mistake on Germany's part to place combat ahead of construction with their engineering units just as it was to not give them heavy construction machinery.

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Re: 1941: What if Germany refuses troops for North Africa

#88

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Feb 2017, 22:33

Keitel wrote:Both the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets were destroyed, alongside the Far East Air Force in the PI. And of course Malaya was invaded, and the Japanese sunk PoW and Repulse on the 10th of December.
The Asiatic Fleet was destroyed? That would be a surprise to the crews of Houston, Boise, Marblehead, and DESRON 29...

Meanwhile, Admiral Wenneker's report of the sinking of PoW and Repulse wasn't received in Berlin until 11 December, but the drafted German declaration was delivered to the Chief of the European Division, U.S. State Department, Roy Atherton at 0930 after making the appointment at 0800...i.e., Hitler's decision was prior to 0800 Eastern Standard Time, so before 1500 Berlin time and at least two hours before his Reichstag speech in which he made no mention of Japanese successes in his litany of Axis victories and sacrifices, other than Pearl Harbor.
I'm talking the period of Jan 1942 to Jan 1943, a critical year in the Pacific when there was a perceived threat that Australia might fall. After Jan 1943, it was clear Australia was safe and the Japanese were a glass cannon.
This is getting boring remarkably quickly. Thirteen US Army infantry divisions and two armored divisions "deployed" during the new goalpost shifting period. Both the 1st and 2d Armored Division went to North Africa, 27 October 1942. Of the 13 infantry divisions, two - the 24th and 25th, were in Hawaii already. Of the remaining 11, 5 deployed to support Britain. The 34th ID went to England 1 January, the first division to deploy overseas, and was followed by the 1st ID on 1 August. The 5th ID went to Iceland on 22 April. The 3d ID departed for North Africa with the 1st and 2d AD on 27 October and was joined on 25 November by the 9th ID.

The divisions deployed to the Pacific were the 27th ID, sent to Hawaii on 28 February, the 32d and 41st, sent to Australia on 2 and 19 March respectively, the 37th, sent to garrison Fiji 11 May, the 40th, sent to Hawaii 23 August, and the 43d, sent to New Zealand 6 September.

Of those six, two were deployed to defend Hawaii, two to defend Australia, and one to defend the communications from Hawaii to Australia. The last was sent to reinforce planned offensive operations.

In any case, during your new time period, 13 divisions deployed from CONUS. Five were deployed defensively to the Pacific - 38%, not your "Half the US Military was deployed in the Pacific Theater for 1942-43, many of the units landing at Normandy cut their teeth here." BTW, I forget to note the nonsense in that last phrase. None of the "units landing at Normandy cut their teeth" anywhere near the Pacific.
No it is not. The Pioneers were elite troops in the German Army. They were expected to both perform engineering tasks and act as sappers.
Oh dear, the old "'elite troops' are some dire motherfuckers" argument, wherein the arguer gets to define what they want "elite troops" to be. Newsflash old son, but all combat engineers are expected to perform both "engineering tasks and act as sappers". Its why they are called combat engineers...or Pionier or Genio Guastatori or Sappers...
You can get the books yourself. They're expensive as fuck, but once you understand the methodology, it becomes frighteningly clear just how the Germans were able to essentially take on the entire world and last as long as they did.
Um, I think I understand Nigel's methodology quite well thank you. Its called Military Operations Research. I did the same for twenty-one years from 1987 to 2008. :D
The Bautruppen were Combat Engineers, and they worked under heavy fire. While not expected to do close assaults, they were trained to force a river and had GPMGs and explosives. Organization Todt followed later and focused on getting captured factories on line and mines reopened. RAD was also involved and they were directly used by the military while under fire despite not being combat troops.

US Engineers needed other units to assist them in assaults, while German Pioneers didn't and often could wreck Tank Units. So yeah a German Pioneer Unit was more effective while using fewer men and less equipment with only marginal difference in construction times if we exclude reconnaissance and surveying.
No. Bautruppen were construction engineers. They were only titled as Bau-Pionier in September 1943 as part of the general Heer redesignations occurring then.

"Bau-Bataillonen wurden bei Mobilmachung aus dem Reichsarbeitsdienst 220 Bataillone (darunter 301-335 in Ostpreußen) aufgestellt. Die Bataillone hatten 4 Kompanien zu je 401 Mann und eine vom Heer gestellte motorisierte Kolonne. Die Angehörigen dieser Einheiten trugen die Uniform des Reichsarbeitsdienstes. Im Laufe des Winters 1939/40 wurden die Bau-Bataillone ungegliedert und feldgrau (mit hellbrauner Waffenfarbe) eingekleidet; die Kompaniestärke wurde von 401 auf 262 Mann herabgesetzt. Etwa zwei Drittel der Mannschaft wurde entlassen und den Wehrmeldeämtern als junge Jahrgänge zur Verfügung gestellt; dafür wurden noch nicht ausgebildete Wehrpflichtige der sogenannten weißen Jahrgänge eingestellt. Die Arbeitsdienstführer und Unterführer wurden durch Weltkriegsteilnehmer ersetzt.
48 Bataillone (darunter allein 29 aus Ostpreußen) wurden ganz aufgelöst; 10 Bataillone (225-234) wurden an die Luftwaffe als Luftwaffen-Bau-Bataillone 18-27/XI abgegeben.
Im Laufe der Jahre 1940 und 1941 wurden 14 Bataillone zu Nachschub-Bataillonen; 10 Bataillone wurden zunächst Wach-Bataillone, dann ebenfalls Nachschub-Bataillone (siehe G I. (Nachschubtruppen), Abschnitt 6). – Zu den Pionieren traten über:
10 Bataillone als Eisenbahn-Bau-Bataillone
15 Bataillone als Festungs-Bau-Bataillone
16 Bataillone als Brückenbau-Bataillone
Die Uniformen erhielten die schwarzen Kennzeichen, ihre Träger die Bezeichnung „Pioniere“ (statt „Bausoldaten“).
Neugebildet wurden im Laufe der Zeit die Bau-Bataillone 401 bis 434, darunter die Bau-Bataillone 427-429 (K) mit Kriegsgefangenen. Bei der Überführung der Bautruppen zu den Pionieren wurden die Bau-Bataillone am 19. 8. 1943 in Baupionier-Bataillone umbenannt." (Tessin, 1. F. II: S. 235-238)

Um, what other units did US Combat Engineers require to assist them in assaults that German Pionier did not require?

So then the "eliteness" measure for combat engineers is whether or not they can "wreck Tank units"? :D
No it isn't shifting goal posts. Its stating a fact. It took two days per SOP back then to recon the river, draw up the plan, get the supplies and then do the deed. Even then there were hiccups getting things done.
Seriously? FM 101-10 provides no such "SOP" with regards to bridge building. In fact, its "SOP" time for construction for various stream widths specifically states "time is from the arrival of equipment on site", while mentioning it does not include "preparation of approach roads, which may govern". Those planning factors are the purview of the operational intent of the commanding general and his staff directing operations and are not at engineering "SOP".

However, if you have a source for that supposed SOP I would be fascinated to hear it.
French Units were still fighting on June 22nd and 23rd as the orders still had yet to go out, and not all units quit fighting, some continued alongside the II BEF to resist and joined up with DeGaule.
Um, sorry, but the last British units were evacuated as part of ARIEL by 20 June at la Pallice. The last evacuations from Bordeaux ports were mostly Polish and Czech forces and were only a trickle after 20 June. De Gaulle flew to Britain from Bordeaux on 17 June. Neither could have any effect on continued French resistance until 23 June and are not support for a claim of intense resistance given to the crossing at Ancenis.
As for Ancenis, on the 19th its Bridge was blown. Since the Germans were already across the Loire elsewhere, it made no difference, but the town was not under German control at the time. Then someone made the decision to bridge it.

Now you don't force a bridge crossing without good reason, and assemble large number of pontoons and artillery support to make a crossing if a town is undefended and you have better crossing sites elsewhere.

But lets set all that aside along with the reconnaissance and resistance. And just focus on the building of the bridges themselves.
Yes indeed, lets just put aside any evidence for actual resistance to the German bridge building effort... :roll:
The 150th Engineers had 233 meters to go to get a 40 ton capacity bridge to support M4 Shermans.

The Germans have 14 Engineer Companies and 375 meters to go and get a 16 ton capacity bridge to support Panzer 38(t)s.
You have a problem I see reading Askey's footnote. It was 14 Bruecko B bridge columns which were used...and six Pionier companies. The Bruecko B columns were equipment columns and were not capable of being emplaced without augmentation by engineer units.
The US takes 17 and a half hours and dozens of specialized machines to get across.

Germans without all the gear the US has does theirs in 22 hours.
And without conducting an assault crossing as part of the operation. The assault crossing of the Loire was on 19 June...the bridge was built 22-23 June.
US speed is 13.32 meters per hour. Hell I'll be generous and ignore the hiccups setting up and give you 12 hours, that is 19.42 meters an hour.
Oh, you mean "hiccups" like the dawn artillery fire and the strafing and bombing attack on the bridge site or the frogmen attack, which the Germans post-armistice did not face.
German speed is 17.04 meters an hour. Little practical difference. Only the US is using far more resources to achieve the same task and getting only a marginal increase in speed ignoring the hiccups.
A more important speed factor was the current. What is the flow of the Loire, which at Ancenis is a tidal estuary, versus the Middle Rhine?

Okay, the Mainz treadway was 1,876 feet (578 meters) and was 34 hours from beginning of assault to completion, the bridge itself took 22 hours (26.27 meters an hour)...under artillery fire.
Your argument fails.

Next issue.
Try addressing the other issues substantially first before you move to a next one.
Last edited by Richard Anderson on 19 Feb 2017, 22:38, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: 1941: What if Germany refuses troops for North Africa

#89

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Feb 2017, 22:34

Kingfish wrote:You know you bean counters are getting deep in the weeds when you start debating bridge building in terms of meters spanned per hour
Especially when false "equivalencies" get thrown in. :D

Meanwhile, I resemble that remark. :D
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Re: 1941: What if Germany refuses troops for North Africa

#90

Post by Richard Anderson » 20 Feb 2017, 00:18

Richard Anderson wrote:Yes, all that heavy resistance at Ancenis in the afternoon of 22 June :D ...so what happened at 1836 on 22 June near Compiègne? The fighting at Ancenis was finished on 19 June. It was defended by remnants of the 3e and 18e GRCA, which had just been returned from Englanf after evacuating at Dunkirk.
By the way, it might help all to note the extent of the insanity, by pointing out that a GRCA was a Groupe de Reconnaissance de Corps d'Armée - Army Corps Reconnaissance Group. In this case, the 3e GRCA was originally assigned to the Ve CA of 1re Armee of GA 1. The 18e GRCA was originally assigned to the XVIe CA of 7e Armee of GA 1. The 3e GRCA was battalion-size unit, motorized primarily with motorcycles and light trucks and consisted of three motorcycle companies and a heavy weapons company. Its heaviest weapons were three 60mm mortars and four 25mm AT guns. The 18e GRCA was a mixed horse cavalry and motorized unit, with two cavalry squadrons, a motorcycle company, and a heavy weapons company with the same weapons assortment. Of course, both units were Dunkirk evacuees and were hastily rebuilt after returning to France, so strength and capabilities were probably a mish-mash. Notably, the 18e GRCA officially surrendered at Dunkirk, but some men got off with the 3e. They returned from England to Brest on 4 June, then moved to Angers on 11 June and were joined by the 7e and 8e Dragoon squadrons from the depot there. They were assigned the defense of the river from Saint-Florent-le-Vieil-Ancenis on 17 June and began withdrawing south with the other forces of 4e Armee on 19 June, assembling at Saint-Laurent des Hommes in the Dordogne by 26 June, where they remained until disbanded.

Their opponent was the 12. Infanterie-Division of the II. AK of 4. Armee.
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