Cancelled airborne operations

[phylo_roadking]

WE can see it as preferable rather than going for it several months later and after the Germans had "hardened" their positions. However - originally it was planned that Monty's forces could assist in clearing the Scheldt estuary...I.E. AFTER Arnhem... And historically, that didn't leve Allied airborne forces in a great shape...

EDIT: just thinking...IIRC September - after all, Antwerp was taken on the 4th - is pretty bad for fog in the North Sea. That, plus landing zones being marginal on defended islands, probably ruled out consideration of an airborne operation to clear them.

[Carl Schwamberger]

WE can see it as preferable rather than going for it several months later and after the Germans had "hardened" their positions. However - originally it was planned that Monty's forces could assist in clearing the Scheldt estuary...I.E. AFTER Arnhem... And historically, that didn't leve Allied airborne forces in a great shape...

EDIT: just thinking...IIRC September - after all, Antwerp was taken on the 4th - is pretty bad for fog in the North Sea. That, plus landing zones being marginal on defended islands, probably ruled out consideration of an airborne operation to clear them.

Conversely Blackburn describes the weather over the land as fair and the Germans not fit to defend anything those weeks. The entire area is flat fields with a occasional orchard or cluster of farm buildings. If that is a marginal DZ what is acceptable?

[phylo_roadking]

Conversely Blackburn describes the weather over the land as fair

Yes, we know that NOW - retrospectively....but at the time seasonal weather patterns and trends would have to be taken into account.

The entire area is flat fields with a occasional orchard or cluster of farm buildings. If that is a marginal DZ what is acceptable?

There's also the entire issue of what airborne forces are used for; the Allies used them for "carpet" spoiling actions, or "surgical" operations like the Orne. In other words - operations with either very closely defined objectives, or so wide that the airborne element's role isn't the actual main objective of the whole operation. Remember, Crete left a sour taste in everyone's mouth about large-scale airborne operations that were ONLY to be achieved by the airborne element; even at Arnhem, the seizure of the various bridges was only to facilitiate XXX Corps' dash to the other side of the Rhine

Which brings me at last back to landing zones; Arnhem is a prime example of a fast-planned operation let down by unsuitable landing zones...I.E. too far from the Bridge at Arnhem for Urquart's element. The Scheldt Islands are the same issue; fast-planned, no guarantee as to suitablity...don't forget that at Normandy, the Allies had been getting intelligence in depth from the French Resistance for MONTHS as well as all levels of photo recce. Every little change was mapped for months - remember John Howard's detailed and ever-changing table model of the Orne operation? And for an island landing, LZs have to be perfect - level, safe, undefended, no obstacles - AND large enough to allow a big-enough force to actually achieve their objectives to be landed. Crete - BOTH sides were aware - was very nearly a failure for the attackers because not enough second and third wave airlanded forces could be put into the island.

Struggling to find the right term for what I mean, here. It's a "scale" issue; to guarantee success from the air of an operation to be carried out FULLY by airborne forces, they HAVE to be able to land as much as they could need, and be able to reinforce it if necessary. And trying to do that on relatively small islands puts you right up against a geographical limit on how much you CAN land. Better of course if the airborne element is just a spoiling or diversionary element, and the REAL attack is then from the sea....

But in THAT case - instead of "wasting" expensively-trained and valuable, hard-to-replace airborne forces at all, why not just carry out the WHOLE attack from the water anyway??? Landing craft were ten-a-penny by that point in the war.

Also - remember how Market Garden came about; the initial jumping-off date for the original Operation Comet as planning began was to have been the 2nd of September It was a way to open up the route into the North German Plain WITHOUT the need for Antwerp and the Scheldt, using what logistical resources could be allocated to the plan for one throw of the dice, one thrust into Germany BEFORE the deteriorating weather affected the over-the-beach supply routes through Normandy Waiting to open Antwerp guaranteed as of the summer of 1944 that the war in the West would drag well into 1945. So PLANNING to open the Scheldt Estuary first instead....would have been a low second on any list of ideas.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Conversely Blackburn describes the weather over the land as fair

Yes, we know that NOW - retrospectively....but at the time seasonal weather patterns and trends would have to be taken into account.

[/quote]

You mean the same weather patterns of the same area and dates that were taken into account for Market Garden?

The entire area is flat fields with a occasional orchard or cluster of farm buildings. If that is a marginal DZ what is acceptable?

There's also the entire issue of what airborne forces are used for; the Allies used them for "carpet" spoiling actions, or "surgical" operations like the Orne. In other words - operations with either very closely defined objectives, or so wide that the airborne element's role isn't the actual main objective of the whole operation. Remember, Crete left a sour taste in everyone's mouth about large-scale airborne operations that were ONLY to be achieved by the airborne element; even at Arnhem, the seizure of the various bridges was only to facilitiate XXX Corps' dash to the other side of the Rhine

Which brings me at last back to landing zones; Arnhem is a prime example of a fast-planned operation let down by unsuitable landing zones...I.E. too far from the Bridge at Arnhem for Urquart's element. The Scheldt Islands are the same issue; fast-planned, no guarantee as to suitablity...don't forget that at Normandy, the Allies had been getting intelligence in depth from the French Resistance for MONTHS as well as all levels of photo recce. Every little change was mapped for months - remember John Howard's detailed and ever-changing table model of the Orne operation? And for an island landing, LZs have to be perfect - level, safe, undefended, no obstacles - AND large enough to allow a big-enough force to actually achieve their objectives to be landed. Crete - BOTH sides were aware - was very nearly a failure for the attackers because not enough second and third wave airlanded forces could be put into the island.

Struggling to find the right term for what I mean, here. It's a "scale" issue; to guarantee success from the air of an operation to be carried out FULLY by airborne forces, they HAVE to be able to land as much as they could need, and be able to reinforce it if necessary. And trying to do that on relatively small islands puts you right up against a geographical limit on how much you CAN land. Better of course if the airborne element is just a spoiling or diversionary element, and the REAL attack is then from the sea....

[/quote]

I've read through this multiple time and cant make heads or tails of what you are at here. There seems to be a idea that I proposed securing the Scheldt estuary & the adjacent terrain soley thru airbourne operations. That is not the case. My proposal was touse the airbourne to support a earlier attack by the Canadian army to clear the Scheldt. But, there is a great deal else there I cant follow so maybe I misunderstood that too.

But in THAT case - instead of "wasting" expensively-trained and valuable, hard-to-replace airborne forces at all, why not just carry out the WHOLE attack from the water anyway??? Landing craft were ten-a-penny by that point in the war.

And, why not use both the airbourne and regular divisions in combination to clear the area as fast as possible? Using the airbourne to capture ferry sites & remaining bridges, block main roads and otherwise disrupt the movement of the German. In early to mid September the German 15th Army & others moving into this area, Walchern & Beveland islands and the area north of Antwerp. They were neither completely in position, entrenched, or even well organized. Mines, wire, or demolition charges on bridges were few or nonexistant. Beyond that the morale of the Germans was lacking. This is not say this Schedlt operation would be a walkover, but the Germans in this sector were in worse shape than those assembling in the Nijemegan-Arnhem area. The tactical objectives are much more favorable to the Allies as the scope is far less than Market Garden. Chasing the Germans 10-15 kilometers away from the Scheldt accomplishes the basic goal and removing them from a 25 to 30 km area north of the waterway is all that is required.

Landing craft being "ten a penny" strikes me as a exaggeration. One must then consider where the assualt force must embark. Back in England? The few continetal ports available were overtaxed as it was and those open in September were in Normandy. Beyond that the larger amphibious craft could not reach the area due to the Scheldt & other adjacent waterways being closed with mines. The estuary had to be cleared first before they could be used. The smaller boats, those used for river crossings and the LVT (Buffalos) were brought overland at yet another cost to the overtaxed Allied logistics tranportation of September/October. The initial water crossings of the Canadian army was mostly accomplished with its limited river crossing equipment in th divsion & corps engineer battalions.

Using a elite stratigic strike force like two or three airbourne divisions to accomplish a much needed stratigic goal, opening Antwerp to traffic, seems to make sense to me.

Also - remember how Market Garden came about; the initial jumping-off date for the original Operation Comet as planning began was to have been the 2nd of September It was a way to open up the route into the North German Plain WITHOUT the need for Antwerp and the Scheldt, using what logistical resources could be allocated to the plan for one throw of the dice, one thrust into Germany BEFORE the deteriorating weather affected the over-the-beach supply routes through Normandy Waiting to open Antwerp guaranteed as of the summer of 1944 that the war in the West would drag well into 1945. So PLANNING to open the Scheldt Estuary first instead....would have been a low second on any list of ideas.

Opening Antwerp was at the top of the list from the intiall planning back in 1942 and remained there right up into 1945. The logistics commanders and staff of both the British and US forces were desperate for this port due to the failure of the port plans for the Brittiany area. By the begaining of September the logistics command and Normandy beach/port operations command were already anticipating closing the Normandy beaches as subsitute port due to the October weather. Cargo discharge was at its peak in late August and scheduled unloading was being reduced for late September . The expected closure of the Normandy beaches was late October as the weather would be too rough for both beach and the Mulberry port cargo discharge. Most of the other French & Belgian ports they anticipated using were either still in German hands or discharging a entirely inadaquate amount of cargo. The use of Antwerp also reduces the land transportation distance by half from that of the French Atlantic ports and Normandy beaches. Transport of supply across France was a second serious problem for which Antwerp was a solution. Eisenhower was aware of all this & the opening of Antwerp was at the top of his list. His approval of Market Garden was based on the assumption that 21st Army Group would accomplish both MG & opening Antwerp during September.

[phylo_roadking]

You mean the same weather patterns of the same area and dates that were taken into account for Market Garden?

And were got wrong anyway, hence the issues in the UK with fog.

And, why not use both the airbourne and regular divisions in combination to clear the area as fast as possible? Using the airbourne to capture ferry sites & remaining bridges, block main roads and otherwise disrupt the movement of the German. In early to mid September the German 15th Army & others moving into this area, Walchern & Beveland islands and the area north of Antwerp. They were neither completely in position, entrenched, or even well organized. Mines, wire, or demolition charges on bridges were few or nonexistant. Beyond that the morale of the Germans was lacking. This is not say this Schedlt operation would be a walkover, but the Germans in this sector were in worse shape than those assembling in the Nijemegan-Arnhem area. The tactical objectives are much more favorable to the Allies as the scope is far less than Market Garden

...because a successful market Garden removes the perceived need to do it at all

Using a elite stratigic strike force like two or three airbourne divisions to accomplish a much needed stratigic goal, opening Antwerp to traffic, seems to make sense to me.

Opening Antwerp was at the top of the list from the intiall planning back in 1942 and remained there right up into 1945.

...IF the prospect of Market Garden putting the British into the Ruhr BEFORE Christmas hadn't materialised (so they thought), using that same perceived German weakness in Holland as a whole. Antwerp was planned, yes....but Market Garden and what it could do to end the war sooner was viewed as a short-cut to the same objective.

[Carl Schwamberger]

You mean the same weather patterns of the same area and dates that were taken into account for Market Garden?

And were got wrong anyway, hence the issues in the UK with fog.

Got what wrong? Three airbourne divsions were landed on time & on target. Walchern & Beveland islands are less than half the area covered by the MarketGarden airbourne operation. Even with the districts directly north of Antwerp tossed in the battlefield is still a little more than half the size of the MG battlefield. Neither is there a need for a deep penetration into enemy territory by the Canadian Army to link with the paras. The distance from Antwerp to Walchern Island is less than 30th Corps covered from its starting line to Nijmegan. Counting up the Ferrycrossing and bridges on my map and comparing the total road distance to be traveled it looks like the goals could be accomplished withjust two airbourne divsions. Two or three that could have been sent in in a single day of clear weather.

And, why not use both the airbourne and regular divisions in combination to clear the area as fast as possible? Using the airbourne to capture ferry sites & remaining bridges, block main roads and otherwise disrupt the movement of the German. In early to mid September the German 15th Army & others moving into this area, Walchern & Beveland islands and the area north of Antwerp. They were neither completely in position, entrenched, or even well organized. Mines, wire, or demolition charges on bridges were few or nonexistant. Beyond that the morale of the Germans was lacking. This is not say this Schedlt operation would be a walkover, but the Germans in this sector were in worse shape than those assembling in the Nijemegan-Arnhem area. The tactical objectives are much more favorable to the Allies as the scope is far less than Market Garden

...because a successful market Garden removes the perceived need to do it at all

A sucessfull capture of the Arnhem bridge & the Deleen airfield does not teleport the 20,000+ tons per day of supply needed to carry the 21st Army Group on into Germany. The need to have Antwerp open and forwarding supply was very real not "perceived". Aside from the inadaquate port capacity of the western coast the Allied transportation routes from the French western coast had extended further than practical for truck transport. The miracles had already been used up on what had already been accomplished.

Using a elite stratigic strike force like two or three airbourne divisions to accomplish a much needed stratigic goal, opening Antwerp to traffic, seems to make sense to me.

Opening Antwerp was at the top of the list from the intiall planning back in 1942 and remained there right up into 1945.

...IF the prospect of Market Garden putting the British into the Ruhr BEFORE Christmas hadn't materialised (so they thought), using that same perceived German weakness in Holland as a whole. Antwerp was planned, yes....but Market Garden and what it could do to end the war sooner was viewed as a short-cut to the same objective.

You lost me again. Is a wrong guess by 21st Army Groups leaders susposed to make my proposal wrong? Using the airbourne corps and the available supplies to allow the Canadian army to open Antwerps port is a low risk operation that secures a absolutely essential goal, and secures it two months earlier.

[Gooner1]

How is it that the German forces that successfully stymied Market Garden would not be able to impose checks on the Canadian Armys clearance of the Scheldt?

[phylo_roadking]

and secures it two months earlier.

WE know that retrospectively...but at the time that planning would have had to begin, it would have appeared to the Allies that with the collapse of the germans in Northern France etc., the ground forces would be there before an airborne/combined operation could be planned and mounted

Using the airbourne corps and the available supplies to allow the Canadian army to open Antwerps port

Carl - that's exactly the point; The Allies at the end of the summer were more attracted by a one-time use of those supplies to "bounce" the British into North Germany and the Ruhr...not to "merely" put them in a position to consider that move "sometime after Christmas 1944".

[Carl Schwamberger]

How is it that the German forces that successfully stymied Market Garden would not be able to impose checks on the Canadian Armys clearance of the Scheldt?

First these were not the same 'forces'. During early/mid September the German 15th Army was retreating up the Belgian & Dutch Coast. Some by boat along the coast to Holland, Other marched along the coast paralle to the advance of the Canadian army, & then cross the Scheldt by boat to Walchern & Beveland or continued on further north. Some in he area may have been of the pre September garrisons, I dont have a OB at hand. These were largely of the static and second rate infantry divisions left in the 15th Armys sector as the battle in Normandy developed. No elite paras or SS, no panzer divsions, tho some of the regiments were fairly solid material.

Second, as I pointed out in the last post the distances for the ground advance and the overall territory to cover is about half that of Market Garden. Neither are there any major rivers on Walchern or Beveland. The drainage cannals could usally be bridged by Bailey Bridges or short pontoon bridges. It would be usefull for the Canadians to make one or more assualts across the Scheldt but not essential. They can make the primary advance up the isthimus

Third it is difficult for the Germans to turn around and reinforce the area. There is only one direction they can approach from, and there are a limited number of routes to send reinforcements. Those routes are the ferry docks which should be primary targets for the airbourne forces. Unlike Market Garden the Germans would not be able to counter attack from multiple directions along the salient. Neither were there any woods for concealed approaches or assembly areas. Once the air drop is made you have a lot of isolated pockets. The Paras are trained to fight this way. Some of the Germans were Eastern Front vets & had experince at this as well, but the bulk of them were not.

[Carl Schwamberger]

and secures it two months earlier.

WE know that retrospectively...but at the time that planning would have had to begin, it would have appeared to the Allies that with the collapse of the germans in Northern France etc., the ground forces would be there before an airborne/combined operation could be planned and mounted

No it did not appear that way. The Canadian Army was halted to divert it remaining fuel for Market Garden. Patton was not the only commander complaining about this. The Germans instantly stopped retreating as well and deployed into a defense. Blackburn describes observing this from his OP on the northern side of Antwerp during September.

Using the airbourne corps and the available supplies to allow the Canadian army to open Antwerps port

Carl - that's exactly the point; The Allies at the end of the summer were more attracted by a one-time use of those supplies to "bounce" the British into North Germany and the Ruhr...not to "merely" put them in a position to consider that move "sometime after Christmas 1944".

Why would they wait until sometime after Christmass? Where fuel & artillery ammo were availalble the offense was imeadiately resumed. Once Antwerp was recieving cargo the general offense was resumed in early December. Devers Army Group never ceased the offense for that matter. His armys were drawing supply via Marsallies, & had a railroad network that was never very badly damaged.

Looking over the numbers I dont see there being enough fuel or ammo available to bounce even a corps all the way to the Ruhr let alone two or three corps. The forward supply dump establisihed near Brussels just does not appear to have enough material at hand, and both Montys and Bradlys Army Groups were operating at the extreme edge or beyond what automotive transport could accomplish.

Securing the Scheldt in September allows the intended logisitcs plan to be executed, without a seven or eight week delay. That allows attacking the Germans with two army groups vs the two corps of Market Garden, or the other stunted attacks of October/November.

Last who do you mean by "Allies". The logistics officers certainly did not endorse this plan. Bradley thought it wrong. Eisenhower assumed Antwerp would be opened concurrently with Market Garden. Alan-Brooke appears to have thought the same thing, tho I dont think his opinion was needed for approval.

[Von Schadewald]

How comes the Germans didn't blow up Antwerp docks, or at least the cranes? Were they short of explosives?!

If the Germans had pulled out of the Scheldt totally, reinforcing Eindoven road, Antwerp starts taking shipping in October instead of December. But would the Germans then be too strong for XXX Corps, even without an Arnhem?

With no Arnhem, would the Allies then use their airborne divisions as ground troops to at least liberate Amsterdam, and then turn east?

[Carl Schwamberger]

How comes the Germans didn't blow up Antwerp docks, or at least the cranes? Were they short of explosives?!

I'm not certain. The Canadians arrived at high speed, the Belgian underground had organized a 'brigade' which went active a few days before the Canadian arrival. They did what they could to secure and guard the cities infrastructure. There was some destruction of the docks & railroads, but nothing on the scale of Cherbourg or Brest.

If the Germans had pulled out of the Scheldt totally, reinforcing Eindoven road, Antwerp starts taking shipping in October instead of December. But would the Germans then be too strong for XXX Corps, even without an Arnhem?

My first thought is Monty would organize one of his 'Colossal Cracks' and kick the Germans back a bit in a spectacular fashion in the late fall. Further south Bradley would order a continuing series of attacks across the army group. What some refer to has his 'Bite and Hold' tactics. Think of the border battles of October-November on a far larger scale as ammo, fuel, and additional combat units arrive. The Third Army may be able to take Trier by November, making the assembly area for the Ardennes offensive untenable, and all Bradleys armys will have several exta divsions and more artillery by December. Either the December offensive of the Germans will halt earlier, or the reserves will be sent east to fight the Red army.

With no Arnhem, would the Allies then use their airborne divisions as ground troops to at least liberate Amsterdam, and then turn east?

Perhaps, or save them for crossing the Rhine. If Monty does a Colossal Crack they might be used then. Think Market Garden on a army wide front after the ground has frozen. Or perhaps some would support attack/s from the border to the Rhine during the late fall & early winter. The possibilites are several.

[phylo_roadking]

Why would they wait until sometime after Christmass? Where fuel & artillery ammo were availalble the offense was imeadiately resumed. Once Antwerp was recieving cargo the general offense was resumed in early December. Devers Army Group never ceased the offense for that matter. His armys were drawing supply via Marsallies, & had a railroad network that was never very badly damaged.

Yes - but not a single, war-winning offensive as Market Garden was viewed.

The Canadian Army was halted to divert it remaining fuel for Market Garden. Patton was not the only commander complaining about this. The Germans instantly stopped retreating as well and deployed into a defense. Blackburn describes observing this from his OP on the northern side of Antwerp during September.

Looking over the numbers I dont see there being enough fuel or ammo available to bounce even a corps all the way to the Ruhr let alone two or three corps. The forward supply dump establisihed near Brussels just does not appear to have enough material at hand, and both Montys and Bradlys Army Groups were operating at the extreme edge or beyond what automotive transport could accomplish.

Securing the Scheldt in September allows the intended logisitcs plan to be executed, without a seven or eight week delay. That allows attacking the Germans with two army groups vs the two corps of Market Garden, or the other stunted attacks of October/November.

Yes - but a combined operation open the Scheldt first would add ITS POL, munitions etc. cost to what had then to be built up again.

Last who do you mean by "Allies". The logistics officers certainly did not endorse this plan. Bradley thought it wrong. Eisenhower assumed Antwerp would be opened concurrently with Market Garden. Alan-Brooke appears to have thought the same thing, tho I dont think his opinion was needed for approval.

A successful Market Garden and advance after that would have in effect bypassed Antwerp...thus making the position of the defenders in the Scheldt Estuart completely untenable. This was not "Festung Scheldt", there had not been the years of fortification and stockpiling put into the islands etc. as into the Channel Ports.

[Gooner1]

First these were not the same 'forces'. During early/mid September the German 15th Army was retreating up the Belgian & Dutch Coast. Some by boat along the coast to Holland, Other marched along the coast paralle to the advance of the Canadian army, & then cross the Scheldt by boat to Walchern & Beveland or continued on further north. Some in he area may have been of the pre September garrisons, I dont have a OB at hand. These were largely of the static and second rate infantry divisions left in the 15th Armys sector as the battle in Normandy developed. No elite paras or SS, no panzer divsions, tho some of the regiments were fairly solid material.

Moved across the Scheldt from Terneuzen and
Breskens from 4 – 23 Sep 44:
86,100 men
616 guns
6,200 horses
6,200 vehicles
6,500 bicycles

Add to that the men in the Breskens and Walcheren festung , throw in the Panzer units that were historically used against Market Garden and I think your idea that the Scheldt estuary can be taken in two weeks to be rather optimistic.

[Von Schadewald]

"Why did I receive no information about the German formations which were being rushed daily to our front? For me this has always been the sixty-four thousand dollar question. Looking back, I believe that the fly in the ointment was General Brereton's powerful Allied Airborne Army in the U.K. By now it was bursting at the seams, having had no fewer than sixteen operations cancelled at the last moment, owing to the rapidity of our advance. It is probable that the Arnhem operation had already been decided upon at the beginning of September, and the powers that be were not risking another cancellation at the last moment. Back in Washington, General Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, was urging Eisenhower to use this immensely powerful force in one great operation to finish the war in 1944. So Patton's two flanking thrusts on the right and my XXX Corps on the left were halted.

This was a great pity; if those transport aircraft, which had been sitting in the U.K. doing nothing, could have been used to supply us both, the war really would have been over in 1944. The fortnight's delay before the complicated Arnhem operation could be launched proved fatal, for the enemy was growing stronger every day."

General Brian Horrocks "Corps Commander" p74