This is an apolitical forum for discussions on the Axis nations, as well as the First and Second World Wars in general hosted by Marcus Wendel's Axis History Factbook in cooperation with Michael Miller's Axis Biographical Research and Christoph Awender's WW2 day by day.
Kelvin wrote:Hi, Hitler launched his attack on Russia on 22nd June 1941. British military historian Liddell Hart said Hitler failure was caused by lack of motor vehicles especially tracked vehicles. In June 1941, German army possessed 600,000 vehicles and 625,000 horses plus Hungarian Carpathian army group 's 5800 motor vehicles and Italian expeditionary forces 's 7,550 motor vehicles. I don't have data on Finnish and Romanian forces. With that figures, German Heer only possessed 19 panzer and 14 motorized divisions for that war, it was unreasonable.
Hitler believed in panzer troop and motorization but Hitler , unlike British , did not commit resources to fully motorized his army. Did Hitler believe in motorization was vital in future war ? But if he delayed the war one more year, did he achived more in motorization and had more chances to win the war or his misconception in his own strength and miscalculation already doomed him to failure, anyone have ideas ?
Carl Schwamberger wrote:The number of motor vehicals in the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe was limited first by production capacity.
USSBS wrote:ATTACK ON THE MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY
[...] Production which expanded
rapidly from 1934 through 1939 actually
declined in the early part of the war. The value
of vehicles produced in 1941 was only about one half
of the 1938 figure. After the military reverses
in Russia in the winter of 1941-42, motor
vehicle programs were expanded and production
The mobility of the German Army depended to
a great extent upon trucks, the most important
segment of the motor vehicle industry. Three
plants accounted for most of the truck production
in 1944. The direct and indirect effects of bombing
in the latter half of 1944, together with loss of
territory to Allied forces, reduced production in
these three plants from approximately 4,500
trucks per month in July to zero in November,
and there was no significant recovery during the
remainder of the war.
During 1940 and 1941 Germany had an abundance
of trucks for its then needs and, in addition,
excess capacity which could easily have been
brought into motor-vehicle production if necessary.
The decline in production reflects the effect not
only of air raids on truck producers, but loss of
deliveries from the occupied countries, loss of territory,
and the indirect results of the bombing of
other targets, chiefly transportation and cities.
Nevertheless, damage to motor-vehicle plants was
probably the greatest single cause.
The decline in the fuel supplies in 1944 which
occurred simultaneously with air attack on truck
manufacture immobilized much of the motor
equipment in the hands of the military, thus minimizing
the significance of the production loss.
takata_1940 wrote:Hello Carl,Carl Schwamberger wrote:The number of motor vehicals in the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe was limited first by production capacity.
Industrial capacity wasn't a problem at all. Germany had a fair amount of excess capacity for motor vehicules production unused
Ellis (table 54 from Brute Force) gives gross German truck output for 1940 as 53,348 for 1941 as 51,085 and 1942 as 58,049. The differnce between 1940 and 1942 is only 10% increase. Why such a small increase when the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe together had sustained losses of trucks exceeding 25% in the winter of 1941-42 and continued substantial losses thorugh the spring and summer of 1942?
Why such a small increase when the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe together had sustained losses of trucks exceeding 25% in the winter of 1941-42 and continued substantial losses thorugh the spring and summer of 1942?
Germany did undertake a expansion program of its truck manufactoring capacity in 1942. When complete it did allow a increase of 28% to 74,181 trucks for all of 1943.
Kelvin wrote:If you both sides were bad, Ukrainan and the Baltic people remain neutral is good option. But I would like to know when Russian recaptured most of Ukraine in 1943 and Byelorussia, Moldova and the Baltic states in 1944, did those people join the Red army ?
Carl Schwamberger wrote:...Hmmm... I'm skeptical here. If there was excess capacity why was it not used? Why were trucks purchased and requisitioned from German industry and the occupied terriitorys, both to prepare for the Barbarosa operation, and to sustain German military operation elswhere? Why was it necessary to remove the trucks from the 1st Wave infantry divsions for the use of the new tank and motorized infantry divsions?
Ellis (table 54 from Brute Force) gives gross German truck output for 1940 as 53,348 for 1941 as 51,085 and 1942 as 58,049.
...Germany did undertake a expansion program of its truck manufactoring capacity in 1942.
When complete it did allow a increase of 28% to 74,181 trucks for all of 1943...
phylo_roadking wrote:...However - let's not miss out another important aspect of this; look at ther names of some of the pre-war German lorry builders - and you'll find by the end of 1940 into 1941 their names cropping up on OTHER vehicle types; a lot had converted to producing light armoured and halftrack vehices of various classes...
...by the middle of 1941, a large number of pre-war French manufacturers were busy converting over to wartime production of AFV parts and subassemblies for the Germans, and a lot of aviation work...
Very little if any direct French production for the Germans already in 1941; that only really began in 1942.
Join might not be the best word here. Some were taken to Soviet death camps, some were impressed into the Red Army, some were murdured by the Soviets on the spot, some took to the woods, either to hide or to fight.
My father remembers a 16-17 year old Belarus in the Red Army unit (almost certainly a 1944 adition from the "liberated areas") that had occupied his town in February 1945.
Dave Bender wrote:Many ethnic groups like Ukraine and the Baltic States still preferred Hitler over Stalin. That tells you a lot about just how bad life was under Stalin.
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