June 1941 is most favourable date to attack Russia ?

[Dave Bender]

Many ethnic groups like Ukraine and the Baltic States still preferred Hitler over Stalin. That tells you a lot about just how bad life was under Stalin.

[Kelvin]

Hi, Adam, I doubt that. If a large number of Russian really want to revolt,NKVD cannot stop, Russia inside already collapsed in the winter of 1941 and summer of 1942 after German successul campaign in Kharkov and Kerch Peninsula. After 1941, Stalin began to stimulate Russian with Nationalism rather than Communism. Not Russian dared not to protect her motherland from invader. But minorites like the Ukrainan and the Baltic people was exception. German did recruit them as combat troop. Although Russia was mulitnational empire and he also knew the minoirites was unreliable. Russian occupied over 50% of population and Russian was the mainstay of the army and Russian nationalism and past glory made them resist German without delay. You know, several centuries ago, nationalism is not so popular and widespread, British could use Indian to fight against Indian and gained a huge empire, it did not work in 20th century, If we can, 400 million population of India could mobilize at least 40 million for war.( Russia only mobilized 34 million people for war), British did not need Russian and Amercian help. Of course, the equipping of that size Indian army for British or that size Russian for German is another question. Did British and German arm them ?

[Borys]

Germany, or better - German National-Socialist Comrades - botched it.
Disbanding the "kolhoz" and giving the land to peasants would had meant the end of the Soviet Union in 1941.
Russians would had happily participated in this as well. Think about hunderds, thousands of "Kaminsky's".

Borys

[Carl Schwamberger]

Hi, Hitler launched his attack on Russia on 22nd June 1941. British military historian Liddell Hart said Hitler failure was caused by lack of motor vehicles especially tracked vehicles. In June 1941, German army possessed 600,000 vehicles and 625,000 horses plus Hungarian Carpathian army group 's 5800 motor vehicles and Italian expeditionary forces 's 7,550 motor vehicles. I don't have data on Finnish and Romanian forces. With that figures, German Heer only possessed 19 panzer and 14 motorized divisions for that war, it was unreasonable.
Hitler believed in panzer troop and motorization but Hitler , unlike British , did not commit resources to fully motorized his army. Did Hitler believe in motorization was vital in future war ? But if he delayed the war one more year, did he achived more in motorization and had more chances to win the war or his misconception in his own strength and miscalculation already doomed him to failure, anyone have ideas ?

The number of motor vehicals in the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe was limited first by production capacity. More could have been provided by requisitioning more from German civilian users, as well as taking the remainder from the occupied nations. That would temporarily boost the numbers. But, over the next twelve months it would have severe conssequence on industrial output. One of the factors that kept the increase of Germanys GDP limited to one or two percent (re: post of 8 Nov by Bender) was the actual requisition of appropriate vehicals from industry. A draw on the most suitable models had already been made in both Germany and the occupied nations. Similarly there was a diversion of railroad construction resources to support the 1941 attack. For supporting Barbarosa this was probablly more important than trucks and definitly more important than tanks. Railroads are vastly more efficient for moving the volume of supply required by a army or group or armys. At the distances required for conquoring the USSR railroads are really the only way to transport the necessary supply. Trucks could not do it, even with the quantities used by the US or British Armys in 1944-45.

I dont really know if Germany could have provided better rail transport for its eastern campaign. It certainly was pushing the limits with automobile transport.

[takata_1940]

Hello Carl,

The number of motor vehicals in the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe was limited first by production capacity.

Industrial capacity wasn't a problem at all. Germany had a fair amount of excess capacity for motor vehicules production unused (see below a quote from the Strategic Bombing Survey on motor vehicule industry). In fact, Germany was short of about everything but Industrial capacity. Everything was in order:
1. Gold & Foreign exchange
2. Fuel & Lubricant
3. Steel (high grade iron ore, specific alloys and energy)
4. Natural Rubber
5. Manpower
6. Coal & Coke
7. Transportation (Railways, locomotives, rolling stock, river barges)

Consequently, Germany could not produce enough of everything she needed: it was lots of Aircraft or Tanks or Vehicules or Ammo or Artillery, or...
About motorisation, if one is lacking Fuel, steel and Natural Rubber, whatever happen, he would never be able to build a large motorised army which could not operate without any of these three components.

S~
Olivier

ATTACK ON THE MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY
[...] Production which expanded
rapidly from 1934 through 1939 actually
declined in the early part of the war. The value
of vehicles produced in 1941 was only about one half
of the 1938 figure. After the military reverses
in Russia in the winter of 1941-42, motor
vehicle programs were expanded and production
again rose.

The mobility of the German Army depended to
a great extent upon trucks, the most important
segment of the motor vehicle industry. Three
plants accounted for most of the truck production
in 1944. The direct and indirect effects of bombing
in the latter half of 1944, together with loss of
territory to Allied forces, reduced production in
these three plants from approximately 4,500
trucks per month in July to zero in November,
and there was no significant recovery during the
remainder of the war.

During 1940 and 1941 Germany had an abundance
of trucks for its then needs and, in addition,
excess capacity which could easily have been
brought into motor-vehicle production if necessary.

The decline in production reflects the effect not
only of air raids on truck producers, but loss of
deliveries from the occupied countries, loss of territory,
and the indirect results of the bombing of
other targets, chiefly transportation and cities.
Nevertheless, damage to motor-vehicle plants was
probably the greatest single cause.

The decline in the fuel supplies in 1944 which
occurred simultaneously with air attack on truck
manufacture immobilized much of the motor
equipment in the hands of the military, thus minimizing
the significance of the production loss.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Hello Carl,

The number of motor vehicals in the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe was limited first by production capacity.

Industrial capacity wasn't a problem at all. Germany had a fair amount of excess capacity for motor vehicules production unused

Hmmm... I'm skeptical here. If there was excess capacity why was it not used? Why were trucks purchased and requisitioned from German industry and the occupied terriitorys, both to prepare for the Barbarosa operation, and to sustain German military operation elswhere? Why was it necessary to remove the trucks from the 1st Wave infantry divsions for the use of the new tank and motorized infantry divsions?

Ellis (table 54 from Brute Force) gives gross German truck output for 1940 as 53,348 for 1941 as 51,085 and 1942 as 58,049. The differnce between 1940 and 1942 is only 10% increase. Why such a small increase when the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe together had sustained losses of trucks exceeding 25% in the winter of 1941-42 and continued substantial losses thorugh the spring and summer of 1942?

For comparison British truck production for the same years was 1940 89,582; 41 88,161; 42 87,499.

Germany did undertake a expansion program of its truck manufactoring capacity in 1942. When complete it did allow a increase of 28% to 74,181 trucks for all of 1943. The British also increased its truck production by 23% to 113,912 for 1943

In 1939-1940 the US managed 32,604 trucks. That was increased by 560% to 181,614 trucks in 1941, and by 1900% to 619,735 total for 1942. In 1944 truck production was allowed to drop to 596,963 or by 4% or 23,100 trucks. That would be nearly one third of Germanys gross production in 1943, its peak year.

So no I dont see any 'excess' capacity for truck production. Not excess in terms of the needs of Germanys military. Even with its partially motorized army and airforce Germany could not build enough trucks to replace losses. The squeezing out of trucks from the occupied territorys, and then Italy in 1943 made up for part of the shortfall.

[Adam Carr]

[But minorites like the Ukrainan and the Baltic people was exception. German did recruit them as combat troop.]

They only recruited a small minority of what they could have recruited if they had pursued different occupation policies. The great majority of the population of Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltics would have enthusiastically supported the Germans if only they had (c) dissolved the collective farms and given the peasants their land back and (b) allowed local autonomy. But they did neither, because Hitler, Himmler and Rosenberg despised all Slavs and wanted to turn Ukraine and Byelorussia into a "German California" run by a settler class of SS aristocrats. The Baltics were treated a bit better, but were not given their independence back. After experiencing the reality of German occupation, most of the population generally welcomed the Red Army, which given how much they hated the Soviets shows you how bad the German occupation was. Thus Hitler lost the support of 50 million people who would gladly have supported him.

[Kelvin]

If you both sides were bad, Ukrainan and the Baltic people remain neutral is good option. But I would like to know when Russian recaptured most of Ukraine in 1943 and Byelorussia, Moldova and the Baltic states in 1944, did those people join the Red army ?

[phylo_roadking]

Carl, I pick up a couple of classic military vehicle magazines every month, and the answer to your

Ellis (table 54 from Brute Force) gives gross German truck output for 1940 as 53,348 for 1941 as 51,085 and 1942 as 58,049. The differnce between 1940 and 1942 is only 10% increase. Why such a small increase when the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe together had sustained losses of trucks exceeding 25% in the winter of 1941-42 and continued substantial losses thorugh the spring and summer of 1942?

...is sometimes alluded to there. The softskin transport buildup for Barbarossa was indeed made up by pillaging captured nations, particularly of course France. - IIRC some 7000 Citroen and other trucks in 1940-41. So no real need to expand domestic production in advance of what was seen at the top as a one-year campaign. Especially French military softskins - for of course they came together with pillaged spares kits and stockpiles

However - let's not miss out another important aspect of this; look at ther names of some of the pre-war German lorry builders - and you'll find by the end of 1940 into 1941 their names cropping up on OTHER vehicle types; a lot had converted to producing light armoured and halftrack vehices of various classes.

So - the Germans mobilised looted "booty" transport...while their own capacity was turned over to AFV production. What I think you'll find if you get a chance to drill down further into this, is that those SMALL increases 1940-41-42...is actually VERY large percentage increases on the part of a smaller number of manufacturers and factories It'll balance out to that 10% increase you see.

However - THIS question

Why such a small increase when the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe together had sustained losses of trucks exceeding 25% in the winter of 1941-42 and continued substantial losses thorugh the spring and summer of 1942?

...brings us to another factor - the damage road conditions in Russia did to German transport. It decimated French beute trucks; they simply weren't designed for the terrible road conditions. Obviously suspensions, but also any engine or electrical components wrecked by vibration literally fell apart. Not only were those spares stockpiles from French depots rapidly emptied of certain types of vital spares - AND of course a good percentage of carrying capacity was used simply for carrying those spares forward to help keep transport echelons supporting the advance moving! - BUT by the middle of 1941, a large number of pre-war French manufacturers were busy converting over to wartime production of AFV parts and subassemblies for the Germans, and a lot of aviation work. They simply weren't able to convert back to running off batches of nice fragile bakelite magnetos for lorries etc.

Conditions in Russia - where the campaign lasted into the late Autumn and the Rasputitsa, and then the cold onset of a terrible winter, conditions also foreign looted vehicles weren't designed for - destroyed the Wehrmacht's looted transport. That's why the steep increase in "domestic" German production in 1942 and onwards...

Germany did undertake a expansion program of its truck manufactoring capacity in 1942. When complete it did allow a increase of 28% to 74,181 trucks for all of 1943.

...because not only did the "beute" lorries die in late 1941...but German "domestic" softskins were knackered after another spring and summer of Russian roads.

[Borys]

If you both sides were bad, Ukrainan and the Baltic people remain neutral is good option. But I would like to know when Russian recaptured most of Ukraine in 1943 and Byelorussia, Moldova and the Baltic states in 1944, did those people join the Red army ?

Join might not be the best word here. Some were taken to Soviet death camps, some were impressed into the Red Army, some were murdured by the Soviets on the spot, some took to the woods, either to hide or to fight.
My father remembers a 16-17 year old Belarus in the Red Army unit (almost certainly a 1944 adition from the "liberated areas") that had occupied his town in February 1945.

Borys

[Jon G.]

...Hmmm... I'm skeptical here. If there was excess capacity why was it not used? Why were trucks purchased and requisitioned from German industry and the occupied terriitorys, both to prepare for the Barbarosa operation, and to sustain German military operation elswhere? Why was it necessary to remove the trucks from the 1st Wave infantry divsions for the use of the new tank and motorized infantry divsions?

The Germans were requisitioning trucks from the civilian economy as a matter of routine already from 1940 on. Two of its three Grosstransportraum truck regiments were equipped with civilian trucks.

See this thread:

The expansion of the Grosstransportraum
viewtopic.php?f=50&t=108967

Ellis (table 54 from Brute Force) gives gross German truck output for 1940 as 53,348 for 1941 as 51,085 and 1942 as 58,049.

Ellis doesn't get his figures quite right - at least not if we look in the USSBS Motor Vehicle Industry Report which gives 63,296 trucks for 1940 and 62,400 for 1941. The tendency is correct, though...

...Germany did undertake a expansion program of its truck manufactoring capacity in 1942.

...what was happening in 1940-1942 was that the truck industry was still expanding capacity, rather than production, and that production for the Wehrmacht didn't pick up at the same speed that civilian production tapered off.

When complete it did allow a increase of 28% to 74,181 trucks for all of 1943...

The USSBS gives a truck production figure of 109,085 for 1943. I think Ellis has some difficulty seperating Wehrmacht truck inventories from annual production figures.

...However - let's not miss out another important aspect of this; look at ther names of some of the pre-war German lorry builders - and you'll find by the end of 1940 into 1941 their names cropping up on OTHER vehicle types; a lot had converted to producing light armoured and halftrack vehices of various classes...

You're right that some truck producers switched to building other stuff, but as long as we concentrate on trucks only, that happened in 1942-1943.

...by the middle of 1941, a large number of pre-war French manufacturers were busy converting over to wartime production of AFV parts and subassemblies for the Germans, and a lot of aviation work...

Very little if any direct French production for the Germans already in 1941; that only really began in 1942.

Also see these truck threads:

Diesel powered vehicles used by Heer
viewtopic.php?f=47&t=105721

Captured Allied trucks & spare parts
viewtopic.php?f=20&t=130047

[phylo_roadking]

Very little if any direct French production for the Germans already in 1941; that only really began in 1942.

True - it took a long time for production to commence, and certainly weren't producing their various pre-war ranges in the interim.

[Dave Bender]

Join might not be the best word here. Some were taken to Soviet death camps, some were impressed into the Red Army, some were murdured by the Soviets on the spot, some took to the woods, either to hide or to fight.
My father remembers a 16-17 year old Belarus in the Red Army unit (almost certainly a 1944 adition from the "liberated areas") that had occupied his town in February 1945.

A lot of people from the German occupied portions of the Soviet Union volunteered to work inside Germany rather then stay home and be "liberated" by the Red Army. When the war ended these people were returned to Stalin at gunpoint. He sent them all to the gulag where most died.

Central and Eastern Europe must have been a very unhappy place during the fall of 1945.

[Jon G.]

Many ethnic groups like Ukraine and the Baltic States still preferred Hitler over Stalin. That tells you a lot about just how bad life was under Stalin.

It also says a lot about which choices prospective HIWIs had. Either they could join by conviction, they could join the Wehrmacht at gun point, or they may have become HIWIs because the position offered rations and relative safety against German reprisal raids.

Suggesting that the Germans should have entered the Soviet Unions as liberators rather than as conquerors completely ignores why Hitler decided to attack the USSR in the first place. It's like saying that if Hitler had not been Hitler, things would have been different.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both citizen Kelvin and the community as a whole. Well sir, in reference to your original inquiry as broached within your introductory posting of Saturday - November 08, 2008 - 5:42am, old Uncle Bob is of the layman's opinion that postponing Operation Barbarossa by one more year would not make an appreciable impact on the dynamics of the Wehrmacht's combat operations in the western regions of the Soviet Union. From my anecdotal perspective on such technical matters, it would make little difference if the Fatherland's already pre-existing and newly created armored divisions were all brought up to year 1940 strength levels by early Spring of year 1942. After all is said and done, the obsolescent armored fighting vehicles of National Socialist Germany and its Axis Allies would still retain their inferior main armament and narrow catepillar tracks as they plunged into Koba The Terrible's "workers paradise". The Soviet Union's meteorological conditions and its primordial FOURTH WORLD road system would be no different in year 1942 than it would be in year 1941. Finally, by the late Spring or early Summer of year 1942, the reorganized Red Army would have that many more medium and heavy main battle tanks in its various mechanized formations. Finally, as professor Lkefct alludes to within his sage posting of Saturday - November 08, 2008 - 3:52pm, the Wehrmacht's proverbial Achilles Heel would remain logistics. Neither wheeled nor narrow catepillar tracked vehicles perform very well during that unique seasonal period infamously known as the RASPUTITSA. There is a great deal more that I could add on to this topic but I think you get the overall picture. Well, that's my initial two cents, pence, pfennigs or kopecks worth on this often reconstituted subject of interest - for now anyway. In anycase, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in your particular corner of the Middle Kingdom.

Best Regards From My Side Of The Pacific Rim,
Uncle Bob