Carl Schwamberger wrote:takata_1940 wrote:Hello Carl,
Industrial capacity wasn't a problem at all. Germany had a fair amount of excess capacity for motor vehicules production unused
Hmmm... I'm skeptical here. If there was excess capacity why was it not used?
The answer for that is already in my post about which you are "skeptical".
The reason was steel shortage due to raw materials and gold shortage to buy some.
Carl Schwamberger wrote:Why were trucks purchased and requisitioned from German industry and the occupied terriitorys, both to prepare for the Barbarosa operation, and to sustain German military operation elswhere?
Because those foreign and civil trucks were already produced. They didn't need steel, iron ore, coke, etc. to be built.
Carl Schwamberger wrote:Why was it necessary to remove the trucks from the 1st Wave infantry divsions for the use of the new tank and motorized infantry divsions?
Because Germany was limited in the amount of truck that can be operated with its Armed Forces by the amount of synthetic Gazoline and Rubber that was delivered to the Wehrmacht (without crippling the vital reserve stock).
Carl Schwamberger wrote:Ellis (table 54 from Brute Force) gives gross German truck output for 1940 as 53,348 for 1941 as 51,085 and 1942 as 58,049. The differnce between 1940 and 1942 is only 10% increase. Why such a small increase when the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe together had sustained losses of trucks exceeding 25% in the winter of 1941-42 and continued substantial losses thorugh the spring and summer of 1942?
I don't know what is the figure computed by Ellis, but I do know quite well what the German Automotive Industry produced between 1934 and 1944. You should keep in mind that the production capacity is not what it is produced at any one time but what the industrial ressources are: i.e. floor space, machine-tools, engineers, specialised workers, etc. The level of production then reflect what other ressources were allocated to make it running. The most important one being Steel and Alloys as far as this Industry is concerned, as well as Energy and Manpower.
If we take together the 3 main groups of German production: Truck/Lorries, Passenger Cars, Motorcycles, it is easy to show that the production was never increased during the war (as your numbers may show it) but was seriously reduced, peak production was in 1938 with 576,698 Vehicles produced:
Total Vehicles produced (index 1938):
1934 — 44
1935 — 63
1936 — 78
1937 — 90
1938 — 100
1939 — 97
1940 — 43
1941 — 30
1942 — 28
1943 — 30
1944 — 24
This table would be pondered in value as the most affected group in number was the Passenger Cars produced which peaked at 289,108 in 1938 (50%) down to 21,656 in 1944 (16%) when the Truck/Lorries accounted for 15% in 1938 vs 55% in 1944.
Now, if you look to the Wehrmacht deliveries following the same method, peak is in 1943 with 151,004 Vehicles delivered vs 50,775 in 1938:
1934 — 17
1935 — 44
1936 — 47
1937 — 55
1938 — 100
1939 — 160
1940 — 239
1941 — 209
1942 — 231
1943 — 297
1944 — 236
So, looking at the Wehrmacht deliveries won't tell you much about the German Automotive Industry capacity.
Carl Schwamberger wrote:For comparison British truck production for the same years was 1940 89,582; 41 88,161; 42 87,499.
Comparison with British, US or whatever won't tell you anything about German industry capacities. Just what was produced here and there; and nothing about the needs, or the reason why it was like that in different places.
Carl Schwamberger wrote:Germany did undertake a expansion program of its truck manufactoring capacity in 1942. When complete it did allow a increase of 28% to 74,181 trucks for all of 1943. The British also increased its truck production by 23% to 113,912 for 1943
In 1939-1940 the US managed 32,604 trucks. That was increased by 560% to 181,614 trucks in 1941, and by 1900% to 619,735 total for 1942. In 1944 truck production was allowed to drop to 596,963 or by 4% or 23,100 trucks. That would be nearly one third of Germanys gross production in 1943, its peak year.
So no I dont see any 'excess' capacity for truck production. Not excess in terms of the needs of Germanys military. Even with its partially motorized army and airforce Germany could not build enough trucks to replace losses. The squeezing out of trucks from the occupied territorys, and then Italy in 1943 made up for part of the shortfall.
Well, you might don't see anything, comparing apples with trees. What you may understand is that the Wehrmacht needs were not covered by British or American standards, taking into account that Germany fielded many more divisions than the Allies, but, that's all.
So. Your conclusion is totally irrelevant as far as the "'excess' capacity for truck production" is concerned.