June 1941 is most favourable date to attack Russia ?

[takata_1940]

Hello Carl,

Hello Carl,
Industrial capacity wasn't a problem at all. Germany had a fair amount of excess capacity for motor vehicules production unused

Hmmm... I'm skeptical here. If there was excess capacity why was it not used?

The answer for that is already in my post about which you are "skeptical".
The reason was steel shortage due to raw materials and gold shortage to buy some.

Why were trucks purchased and requisitioned from German industry and the occupied terriitorys, both to prepare for the Barbarosa operation, and to sustain German military operation elswhere?

Because those foreign and civil trucks were already produced. They didn't need steel, iron ore, coke, etc. to be built.

Why was it necessary to remove the trucks from the 1st Wave infantry divsions for the use of the new tank and motorized infantry divsions?

Because Germany was limited in the amount of truck that can be operated with its Armed Forces by the amount of synthetic Gazoline and Rubber that was delivered to the Wehrmacht (without crippling the vital reserve stock).

Ellis (table 54 from Brute Force) gives gross German truck output for 1940 as 53,348 for 1941 as 51,085 and 1942 as 58,049. The differnce between 1940 and 1942 is only 10% increase. Why such a small increase when the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe together had sustained losses of trucks exceeding 25% in the winter of 1941-42 and continued substantial losses thorugh the spring and summer of 1942?

I don't know what is the figure computed by Ellis, but I do know quite well what the German Automotive Industry produced between 1934 and 1944. You should keep in mind that the production capacity is not what it is produced at any one time but what the industrial ressources are: i.e. floor space, machine-tools, engineers, specialised workers, etc. The level of production then reflect what other ressources were allocated to make it running. The most important one being Steel and Alloys as far as this Industry is concerned, as well as Energy and Manpower.

If we take together the 3 main groups of German production: Truck/Lorries, Passenger Cars, Motorcycles, it is easy to show that the production was never increased during the war (as your numbers may show it) but was seriously reduced, peak production was in 1938 with 576,698 Vehicles produced:

Total Vehicles produced (index 1938):
1934 — 44
1935 — 63
1936 — 78
1937 — 90
1938 — 100
1939 — 97
1940 — 43
1941 — 30
1942 — 28
1943 — 30
1944 — 24
This table would be pondered in value as the most affected group in number was the Passenger Cars produced which peaked at 289,108 in 1938 (50%) down to 21,656 in 1944 (16%) when the Truck/Lorries accounted for 15% in 1938 vs 55% in 1944.

Now, if you look to the Wehrmacht deliveries following the same method, peak is in 1943 with 151,004 Vehicles delivered vs 50,775 in 1938:
1934 — 17
1935 — 44
1936 — 47
1937 — 55
1938 — 100
1939 — 160
1940 — 239
1941 — 209
1942 — 231
1943 — 297
1944 — 236

So, looking at the Wehrmacht deliveries won't tell you much about the German Automotive Industry capacity.

For comparison British truck production for the same years was 1940 89,582; 41 88,161; 42 87,499.

Comparison with British, US or whatever won't tell you anything about German industry capacities. Just what was produced here and there; and nothing about the needs, or the reason why it was like that in different places.

Germany did undertake a expansion program of its truck manufactoring capacity in 1942. When complete it did allow a increase of 28% to 74,181 trucks for all of 1943. The British also increased its truck production by 23% to 113,912 for 1943

In 1939-1940 the US managed 32,604 trucks. That was increased by 560% to 181,614 trucks in 1941, and by 1900% to 619,735 total for 1942. In 1944 truck production was allowed to drop to 596,963 or by 4% or 23,100 trucks. That would be nearly one third of Germanys gross production in 1943, its peak year.

So no I dont see any 'excess' capacity for truck production. Not excess in terms of the needs of Germanys military. Even with its partially motorized army and airforce Germany could not build enough trucks to replace losses. The squeezing out of trucks from the occupied territorys, and then Italy in 1943 made up for part of the shortfall.

Well, you might don't see anything, comparing apples with trees. What you may understand is that the Wehrmacht needs were not covered by British or American standards, taking into account that Germany fielded many more divisions than the Allies, but, that's all.
So. Your conclusion is totally irrelevant as far as the "'excess' capacity for truck production" is concerned.
S~
Olivier

[Carl Schwamberger]

Your two posts are unconvincing. I'll stick with Ellis, Tooze and the others who indicate Germanys capacity for manufactoring trucks fell short of both their needs & desires, and that gross industrial capacity as well as the automotive industry size limited production.

[Lkefct]

Adding truck lifting capacity to the Whermacht doesn't help the overall situation that much. First, even under ideal conditions, trucks effective range is limited to about 500 miles from their railheads. They can go somewhat further then this, but the amount of fuel and lubricants they need to carry for each other other trucks in the column starts to rapidly diminish the ability to move supplies forward. Wear and tear for frequent trips.. 500 miles is about how far they are really effective. So, just because of the distances involved, you are very limited in your ability to supply large formations . Also, many of the trucks and cars that are cited as being available are not really up to being used for long range supply transport. Not everyone in Europe is running around with a deuce and a half, and the vast majority of armies don't have anything as capable as that for their preferred truck of choice. If those trucks are pressed into service, the vast majority will break down, but without the production of spares, many of those will never get fixed.

For combat operations an infantry division requires about 100 tons of supplies a day, pz about 200 tons. This seems like a lot, but a single train carries about 450 tons of supplies and each single rail line can have about a dozen trains a day, double lines up to 24. The German truck companies each have an organic capacity of about 60 tons, so it takes a lot more trips by them to keep a division supplied and as you move away from the railheads, they have to carry their own fuel/lubricants for the return trip. The horse drawn companies are more limited in that their effective range is probably around 60 miles, but that can take a wagon around 2 days to travel, each way, so they severely limit the pace of operations. The Soviets are more limited in that they quickly converted many of their truck production to building light tanks, so until lend lease picks up in 1943, they are limited in where and when they can attack because all the rail lines in Russia are single sets of tracks. Germany is fairly limited in 1941 and early 1942, but by late in the year they had converted all of the major lines to being double lines. Since an armored division takes almost a full day's capacity on a double line to move by rail, Germany has somewhat greater operational mobility. But no matter how much you rely on rail, you still have trouble moving men and equipment via roads in the spring and fall RASPUTITSA. Many of Germany's losses in 1941 where due to running the men and machines hard to make minimal advances in this period of 1941. German forces that had been highly concentrated got strung out and had to leave a lot of material behind. When the roads firmed up when they froze, much of this material, especially artillery had to be recovered later. It was employed piecemeal and the German armies where not nearly as effective. It was in these battles and due to the weather that the German armies where effectively robbed of their combat efficiency

The flip side of this is that by the time the Germans start to drive on Moscow in 1941, the Soviets have used up their prewar armies and basically have to start from scratch. Not really from scratch, as they have cadre's to build new formations around, but it still takes time to rebuild formations. Many of these cadres are men who have escaped encirclements and have no weapons. Specialists like gunners and heavy weapons crews are in short supply as are the weapons themselves. The Soviets pull off most of their attacks in the winter of 1941 with just infantry. Entire armies lacked tanks and artillery, which isn't that much of a limitation because they had no way of moving supplies to them if they did have them. So those specialists as well as the rest of the Red Army are not nearly as combat effective as they would become later. 1942 the Red Army spends most of the time training their new army. 1943 they get their combat experience. 1944 they equal the Germans in skill and by later in the year probably pass them. The Soviets just take time to get there. However, the Germans never really did anything to take advantage of it, due to their own weakness. Only the armies in the South made up their losses from 1941. The rest of the army was only fit enough to defend, so the Soviets really had the initiative in that they can break through where they will if they can just mass enough men, tanks and guns. Their limit is that they cannot launch deep attacks or on really wide fronts until the US trucks come, and that is not until late 1943 and 1944.

So for Germany to win, they need to avoid having the defensive capability of their infantry destroyed in 1942-1943, while still launching attacks, that are limited in their nature to avoid losing a lot of men, but still large enough to surround small soviet formations and destroy them. By taking on a major operation like Plan Blue, you have the chance to win the war in one swoop, but it ended up in having 2 army groups that largely lost their combat effectiveness in the Stalingrad operations. This is a major problem when these where the only troops fit for offensive operations at the time.

[takata_1940]

Hi again,

Your two posts are unconvincing. I'll stick with Ellis, Tooze and the others

Maybe you could quote these authors rather than drawing your own conclusion about what they wrote. I haven't read "Others", nor Ellis which is rated low, but I've read Tooze, Harrison, Overy and I've got the USSBS report on German Automotive Industry (which you could read thru the link provided above). The USSBS provided most of the primary sources for all Economists mentioned above.

who indicate Germanys capacity for manufactoring trucks fell short of both their needs & desires, and that gross industrial capacity as well as the automotive industry size limited production.

Quote, please, Tooze on this.
I wonder if you are not confused somewhere: gross industrial capacity? what does it mean related to Automotive industry in 1940-1941, the inhability to provide Steel or adequate manpower maybe? Tooze emphazise the shortage in currency for imports as the origin of many Industrial shortage, not the lack of it.

Just look how it is ridiculous: in 1940-1941, Germany had conquered France+Belgium+Holland which together certainly had a larger automotive industry than Germany alone, not even talking about the addition of Czechoslovakia and Austria. France alone still outproduced Germany until 1935 and had some of the largest European car manufacturers like Renault, Citroën, Peugeot, Panhard, Simca, Saurer and many others specialised in industrial vehicles.
How much of this could be used by Germany any time soon? almost nothing because Germany didn't get the Steel to fuel it, neither could Germany be able to release the French manpower, rolling stock, steel, coke and coal industries, etc. because they were used for German industry as replacement to the German manpower and ressources drafted.
By 1939, Germany had finished the "Largest Car Factory in the World" => Porsche's Volkswagen factory which should have reached an impressive planned output of 400,000-500,000 cars per year. How much of it was in use in 1940?... barely nothing, the Volkswagen project being scrapped, few other production will ever go here.

Last, everything is related to the time considered: if a large excess capacity existed in 1940-1941 for whatever reason, it would not have been there in 1943-1944 because of the needs fullfiled for other industries (Armament, Aircraft, Ordonnance, etc.). By all period, manpower would be a problem as the Army drafted many qualified men that could not be easily replaced in the short term by unqualified people.

Now, to go out of your confusion, you should read the part of the USSBS about it. If it is not so precious when it speculate on the reason of the low production in the early years (short-war planning or no planning at all rather than short supply in raw materials and monetary problems) but it is accurate by many of the figure provided:

a. No evidence was discovered of a systemic plan for converting the industry to war production. Actually most of the productive facilities were not utilized even their prewar extent until 1942 or 1943, and then their excess capacity was converted chiefly to production of components for the aircraft and tank industries. Thus, the first and third largest automobile producers in Germany, Adam Opel at Russelheim and Daimler-Benz, at Unterturkheim, after 1942 became to an increasing extent sub-contractors for the aircraft industry as the aircraft industry expanded to offset the effects of Allied strategic bombing. While the second largest automobile factory, Auto Union, Zwickau, remained a motor vehicle producer throughout the war, it wasn't until April 1943 that the plant was utilized completely by converted from the production of light armored cars to three-ton half-tracks.

b. The Volkswagen plant in Fallersleben was another example of non-utilization of motor vehicle facilities. This plant, finished in 1939, was the largest factory of the type in Germany, had the largest press shop in Europe, and was capable of producing in excess of 150,000 cars per year. According to the management, however, the start of the was found the plant's management as well as the authorities in Berlin unprepared for utilization of the plant in the war effort. The German government expected a short war and accordingly remained virtually idle, its 1941 production representing only 20-25 percent of the plant's capabilities. During the entire course of the war the plant never produced more than 50 percent of its capacity.

c. Production in 1938 and 1939 was largely limited by the amount of raw material allowed the industry by the Four Year Plan. This partly checked the expansion program.

d. The fact that the German Army even in 1944 used a large proportion of standard civilian trucks, in contrast to the American Army, which required principally all-wheel drive military trucks, is a further indication that the German government did not fully mobilize the motor vehicle industry, but rather planned to keep it intact to the greatest extent possible in order to reconvert easily to peace time production.

e. Both Dr. von Heydekampf, head of the Main Committee for Motor Vehicles, Tanks and Locomotives, and Mr. Vorwig, manager of the Committee for Motor Vehicles, expressed the opinion that the automotive industry was not utilized during the war to anywhere near the extent possible, and that if a comphrensive program for conversion had existed at the beginning of the war the industry's contribution to the war economy would have been much greater.

und so weiter...

S~
Olivier

[LWD]

Would be interesting to know if those "German" GDP figures are Germany itself or the Greater Reich as a whole...

Germany only. There are seperate listings for Austria, Czechoslavakia, Poland, etc.
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/

It is worth noteing that while German GDP increased from 1939 to 1942 those of that of the "Greater Reich" decreased. Indeed French GDP alone decreased more than Germany increased. One suspects that German GDP has been artifically raised by looting. It's also not clear to me how accurate the calculations can be in time of war. In the accompanying article it was mentioned that purchasing power was used rather than exchange rates. However in an economy under blockade I'm not sure that's much more accurate and perhaps less so.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Would be interesting to know if those "German" GDP figures are Germany itself or the Greater Reich as a whole...

Germany only. There are seperate listings for Austria, Czechoslavakia, Poland, etc.
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/

It is worth noteing that while German GDP increased from 1939 to 1942 those of that of the "Greater Reich" decreased. Indeed French GDP alone decreased more than Germany increased. One suspects that German GDP has been artifically raised by looting. It's also not clear to me how accurate the calculations can be in time of war. In the accompanying article it was mentioned that purchasing power was used rather than exchange rates. However in an economy under blockade I'm not sure that's much more accurate and perhaps less so.

I suspect output per labor hour (or other unit of labor time) is the only accuate measurement. One of my professors ad done research on the industrial basis and economic future of the Cezchoslovakian state during the 1930s. Later in the 1950s he went there to gather some comparative data and had the opportunity to look at some of the records from the 1939-45 period while the nazis managed the place. He noted a decline in output per labor unit during that era although the gross production increased. He thought this decline due to the substitution of conscripted labor & unskilled workers for the better paid and skilled laborers of the 1930s. Unfortunatly I cant find anywhere Flannigan published this, if he did at all. His resarch could have given usefull insight into the problem of wringing industrial output from stolen labor and industrial faciility.

Anyway the nazis engaged in trick bookeeping from 1933, and financed a significant part of their expenses from 1937 with cash and credit stolen from other nations banks and government treasureys. That sort of thing makes the usual economic measures inaccurate. The same problem exists in the other nation with wartime economys. Wage and price controls, labor performed by men in uniform, or by penal labor make the usual economic measures less accurate.

[LWD]

Even production per hour is suspect. How do you judge quality? If you are using conscript/unhappy labor you may get your quantity up at the loss of quality. If the situation is bad enough there can be sabotage. Pathological economies are hard to compare to rational ones.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Even production per hour is suspect. How do you judge quality? If you are using conscript/unhappy labor you may get your quantity up at the loss of quality. If the situation is bad enough there can be sabotage. Pathological economies are hard to compare to rational ones.

Agree there. You do have to allow for quality. Studying that and comparing it to the labor time and other factors is yet another usefull avenue for research. An in depth study on that in the 3rd Reich would be interesting for comparison in other economys. Particualry those where the compensation for labor is falling significantly over a decade or two. But all that is off topic.

[Carl Schwamberger]

It is worth noteing that while German GDP increased from 1939 to 1942 those of that of the "Greater Reich" decreased. Indeed French GDP alone decreased more than Germany increased. One suspects that German GDP has been artifically raised by looting. It's also not clear to me how accurate the calculations can be in time of war. In the accompanying article it was mentioned that purchasing power was used rather than exchange rates. However in an economy under blockade I'm not sure that's much more accurate and perhaps less so.

The industrial looting had be researched and analysed here & there. I've not collected a bibliography on that subject. The bits I have read describe a period of cherry picking of French and Belgian industry from 1940 thru 1941. Beyond that there does not seem to be much large scale or focused effort to turn the indiustry of occupied Europe towards coherent war production. Other than Tooze & Ellis are there any good summarys or analysis of nazi industrial policy for 1939-1943?.

[Jon G.]

I take issue with practically every number in your post, Lkefct:

Adding truck lifting capacity to the Whermacht doesn't help the overall situation that much. First, even under ideal conditions, trucks effective range is limited to about 500 miles from their railheads. They can go somewhat further then this, but the amount of fuel and lubricants they need to carry for each other other trucks in the column starts to rapidly diminish the ability to move supplies forward. Wear and tear for frequent trips.. 500 miles is about how far they are really effective...

500 miles is very far beyond effective truck range. Even 100 miles would be very far, if still manageable. It's true that trucks sometimes operated at ranges of 500 miles or more from supply heads - notably in North Africa - but even there, they were supplemented by cabotage, air lifted supplies and bits and pieces of railroad track.

Also see this thread

German logistics and supply flow
viewtopic.php?f=50&t=85630

...For combat operations an infantry division requires about 100 tons of supplies a day, pz about 200 tons.

Wrong, 300 to 350 tons/day is closer to the mark, although very dependant on the nature of operations. A Panzer division wouldn't need that much more than an infantry division, but it would tend to outrun its line of supply faster.

Also see this thread

Divisional daily supply requirements for various nations
viewtopic.php?f=34&t=90657

This seems like a lot, but a single train carries about 450 tons of supplies

400 tons in the average supply train, but at least you're closer than your truck estimate.

Also see this thread

Operation Barbarossa - The Case Against Moscow
viewtopic.php?f=55&t=124758

and each single rail line can have about a dozen trains a day, double lines up to 24...

No and no. 10 and 30 trains each way; double-tracked lines have more than twice the capacity of single-track lines.

[LWD]

... A Panzer division wouldn't need that much more than an infantry division, ....

It would be consuming a lot more fuel and water but not as much fodder. I would think it would be significant but not sure how much more. I think I've seen the numbers on the board somewhere perhaps in the horses in the wehrmacht thread.

[Jon G.]

... A Panzer division wouldn't need that much more than an infantry division, ....

It would be consuming a lot more fuel and water but not as much fodder. I would think it would be significant but not sure how much more.

Yes, but remember that fuel is only part of a unit's needs, and that ammunition is heavier than gasoline. Fodder, on the other hand, is a bulky item. It complicates the calculation that ammunition consumption is generally small in periods where fuel consumption is high.

I gave a link above to a thread where this is discussed much more thoroughly.

I think I've seen the numbers on the board somewhere perhaps in the horses in the wehrmacht thread.

...which can be found here viewtopic.php?f=76&t=121594

[phylo_roadking]

For amounts of fodder required by the average "divisional transport" a.k.a "stew" by day and by week - see Peter Fleming's Operation Sealion. He deals with the numbers there, in respect of daily and weekly totals needing transported by sea to England. But the divisional requirements will be the same, East or West.

[Harri]

In June 1941, German army possessed 600,000 vehicles and 625,000 horses plus Hungarian Carpathian army group 's 5800 motor vehicles and Italian expeditionary forces 's 7,550 motor vehicles. I don't have data on Finnish and Romanian forces.

According to "Motor Vehicle of the Finnish Defence Forces 1919 - 1959" (APALI, 2006) by Markku Mäkipirtti on 10 July 1941 alone Finnish Karelian Army had about 50% of all motor vehicles: about 5.200 trucks. By the end of October 1941 Karelian Army had nearly 8.800 trucks (this includes the major part of the German 163.I.D.). After the attack phase about 2.000 motor vehicles were returned to the home front.

In June 1941 Finnish Army had about 2.500 own trucks and more than 15.000 civilian trucks were expropriated. During autumn/fall about 5.500 trucks were returned away from the front. Finns captured about 5.250 Soviet trucks (mainly in 1940 and 1941) of which about 2.500 were repaired. Soviet motor vehicles were usually rather new although technically outdated and weak in use (like most of the civilian ones too).

Additionally Finns captured about 1.100 tracked tractors of which about 400 were in use in July 1941. There were also about 400 "own" tractors.

In June 1941 Finnish Army had about 9.500 own horses and about 35.000 civilian horses were expropriated. Total number was thus about 44.500 horses. During the war Finns captured about 12.000 Soviet horses. They were mostly in a very weak condition. During the Continuation War Finns lost about 15.000 horses which were replaced with new expropriated horses.

In June 1941 Finnish division had about 2.090 horses and 470 motor vehicles but additionally there were lots of separate both motorized and horse-drawn supply and combat units assigned to HQs.

[Kelvin]

How many motor vehicles possessed by Romanian Third and Fourth Armies and Slovakian Motorized corps ?