German focus on Russia in 1914.

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Dave Bender
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France ran out of manpower, not industrial output.

#2311

Post by Dave Bender » 10 May 2011, 16:54

That's not entirely correct.

After August 1914 the French economy relied on massive imports of food, coal, steel, industrial chemicals etc. These materials were obtained on American and British credit to a considerable extent. Just as Russia did during both world wars. Without foreign economic assistance France and Russia would have collapsed in short order.

France and Britain solved manpower shortages by conscripting millions of Africans and Asians to serve as cannon fodder. They aren't going to run out of Third World natives.

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Baltasar
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Re: German focus on Russia in 1914.

#2312

Post by Baltasar » 10 May 2011, 17:09

No, just no. Russia intended to deploy deep to avoid a German/Austrian steamroller. There was no plan to let the Germans roll up their flank. Instead they would use their strategic depth to wear out the Austrians and Germans by forcing them to advance away from the border region, have to deal with the change in rail gauge, and them attack them, or just site trenches where, the enemy will be exhausted and suffering from attenuated supply. OTL Russian forces did not have time to fully deploy before they were ordered to attack. Here they will be and will be ready to fight the enemy on home soil with their full strength. The Germans can only use 4 armies in the East if they hope to hold in the West, which means that combined 7 Austro-German armies will still be outnumbered by the Russians and fighting deep in Russia on Russian terms.
Russia is too big to make us of trench lines to a degree where they would be as decisive as in the west. While the Russians would deploy in the depth of their own territory, the Central Powers could knock out the Polish Salient, both getting rid of Russian forces and shortening the frontline. At the same time, seeing that Germany actually moves east, Austria-Hungary would not need to hastily redeploy her 2nd army away from the Balkans, thus having about two times the forces she had historically available vs Serbia. This should easily be enough to crush the Serbs, if not in 1914 then in early 1915 at the latest. An additional benefit would be that the AH forces would suffer a lot less, not being forced into the maw of Russian armies.

Again, this has been discussed earlier in this thread.
There will be no quick victories. The Germans knew this, which is why they turned West in 1914 and were planning to do so for some time.
Germany turned west mostly because they thought Britain would stay out of this and if they participated, their puny army wouldn't make a difference anyway. The were wrong on both accounts.
air bombing range of the Ruhr
Planes were almost non-existent in the plans of the armies around the world prior to WWI, certainly no air bombing campaign was envisioned either. I'd like to see evidence that bombing missions actually had any effect at all apart from frightening civilians. Payload was neglectible, damage done probably too. The RAF didn't manage to hit much during the first 18 months of WWII, all sides will be far less able to inflict damage here.


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stg 44
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Re: German focus on Russia in 1914.

#2313

Post by stg 44 » 10 May 2011, 17:32

Baltasar wrote:
No, just no. Russia intended to deploy deep to avoid a German/Austrian steamroller. There was no plan to let the Germans roll up their flank. Instead they would use their strategic depth to wear out the Austrians and Germans by forcing them to advance away from the border region, have to deal with the change in rail gauge, and them attack them, or just site trenches where, the enemy will be exhausted and suffering from attenuated supply. OTL Russian forces did not have time to fully deploy before they were ordered to attack. Here they will be and will be ready to fight the enemy on home soil with their full strength. The Germans can only use 4 armies in the East if they hope to hold in the West, which means that combined 7 Austro-German armies will still be outnumbered by the Russians and fighting deep in Russia on Russian terms.
Russia is too big to make us of trench lines to a degree where they would be as decisive as in the west. While the Russians would deploy in the depth of their own territory, the Central Powers could knock out the Polish Salient, both getting rid of Russian forces and shortening the frontline. At the same time, seeing that Germany actually moves east, Austria-Hungary would not need to hastily redeploy her 2nd army away from the Balkans, thus having about two times the forces she had historically available vs Serbia. This should easily be enough to crush the Serbs, if not in 1914 then in early 1915 at the latest. An additional benefit would be that the AH forces would suffer a lot less, not being forced into the maw of Russian armies.
Again, this has been discussed earlier in this thread.
You're right Russia is too big, but trenches appeared anyway historically. It was because of distances that advances were forced to cleave within 50miles of rail lines. Since there were only a finite number of routes, advances could only happen along certain avenues. Trench lines could be set up along these, which is what happened historically.
You need to read more about the Eastern front and war planning. The Polish salient would be gone, you are correct, but the Russians never intended to deploy in that area anyway. Behind the Vistula and their fortresses they were intending to deploy, or even, in the case of the Baltic area, further back near Riga.
Much of these benefits you describe were unknown in 1914 or prior. Its only with hindsight you can state anything, whereas the planners of the 1914 offensives had to rely on their knowledge and theories, not our 21st century perspective.

Baltasar wrote:
There will be no quick victories. The Germans knew this, which is why they turned West in 1914 and were planning to do so for some time.
Germany turned west mostly because they thought Britain would stay out of this and if they participated, their puny army wouldn't make a difference anyway. The were wrong on both accounts.
Read more about the Schlieffen plan. Hew Strachan is a good start, but try checking the primary documents, some of which are available because of Terrence Zuber now. There are plenty of books that deal with this topic exclusively, check them out.
Baltasar wrote:
air bombing range of the Ruhr
Planes were almost non-existent in the plans of the armies around the world prior to WWI, certainly no air bombing campaign was envisioned either. I'd like to see evidence that bombing missions actually had any effect at all apart from frightening civilians. Payload was neglectible, damage done probably too. The RAF didn't manage to hit much during the first 18 months of WWII, all sides will be far less able to inflict damage here.
http://www.amazon.com/Luftwaffe-Creatin ... 252&sr=1-1
I'm reading about Luftwaffe doctrine in WW2 right now and the author of the above gets into prewar German doctrine for the German army. It was quite advanced and involved bombing defense provisions, including flak defenses. In WW1 psychological attacks had their place too. Look at what happened in London as a result of the negligible bombings there: vast increases in defenses at the expense of the front, large absenteeism from factories, flight from the city, etc. Strafing of the Rhein barges would be 'inconvienet' too.

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Baltasar
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Re: German focus on Russia in 1914.

#2314

Post by Baltasar » 10 May 2011, 18:19

I'm reading about Luftwaffe doctrine in WW2 right now and the author of the above gets into prewar German doctrine for the German army. It was quite advanced and involved bombing defense provisions, including flak defenses. In WW1 psychological attacks had their place too. Look at what happened in London as a result of the negligible bombings there: vast increases in defenses at the expense of the front, large absenteeism from factories, flight from the city, etc. Strafing of the Rhein barges would be 'inconvienet' too.
That may have been the case during WWI, but certainly not before. It even took people quite some time to actually arm planes!
Read more about the Schlieffen plan. Hew Strachan is a good start, but try checking the primary documents, some of which are available because of Terrence Zuber now. There are plenty of books that deal with this topic exclusively, check them out.
Thanks, I'm familiar with the Schlieffen plan and the way the Germans tried to impose it with too few forces. Don't see how this figures in here, though. It's about the Brits staying on their island.
Much of these benefits you describe were unknown in 1914 or prior. Its only with hindsight you can state anything, whereas the planners of the 1914 offensives had to rely on their knowledge and theories, not our 21st century perspective.
As much as your bombing of the Ruhr valley by aircraft.
The Polish salient would be gone, you are correct, but the Russians never intended to deploy in that area anyway.
Seems like they were in two minds about this, since they actually did build siginificant fortifications in the area. If they deploy in the Russian interior, those fortresses and everything within them will be wasted effort.

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stg 44
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Re: German focus on Russia in 1914.

#2315

Post by stg 44 » 10 May 2011, 18:37

Baltasar wrote:
I'm reading about Luftwaffe doctrine in WW2 right now and the author of the above gets into prewar German doctrine for the German army. It was quite advanced and involved bombing defense provisions, including flak defenses. In WW1 psychological attacks had their place too. Look at what happened in London as a result of the negligible bombings there: vast increases in defenses at the expense of the front, large absenteeism from factories, flight from the city, etc. Strafing of the Rhein barges would be 'inconvienet' too.
That may have been the case during WWI, but certainly not before. It even took people quite some time to actually arm planes!
Read Corum, he cites the regs and reports that talk about this from 1913. The military realized armed aircraft were a matter of time and it was better to prepare ahead of it. Besides...armed Zepplins were technologically feasible from 1908 on.
Baltasar wrote:
Read more about the Schlieffen plan. Hew Strachan is a good start, but try checking the primary documents, some of which are available because of Terrence Zuber now. There are plenty of books that deal with this topic exclusively, check them out.
Thanks, I'm familiar with the Schlieffen plan and the way the Germans tried to impose it with too few forces. Don't see how this figures in here, though. It's about the Brits staying on their island.
Apparently not, because it had nothing to do with the British and everything to do with establishing a solid continental position for a multi-year campaign.
Baltasar wrote:
Much of these benefits you describe were unknown in 1914 or prior. Its only with hindsight you can state anything, whereas the planners of the 1914 offensives had to rely on their knowledge and theories, not our 21st century perspective.
As much as your bombing of the Ruhr valley by aircraft.
No, 1913 reports describe potential effects of armed aircraft on civilian targets and what it means for industrial production. They acknowledge that the tech wasn't there yet, but it was coming.
Baltasar wrote:
The Polish salient would be gone, you are correct, but the Russians never intended to deploy in that area anyway.
Seems like they were in two minds about this, since they actually did build siginificant fortifications in the area. If they deploy in the Russian interior, those fortresses and everything within them will be wasted effort.
[/quote][/quote][/quote]
Strachan again describes this in detail. Yes The older, unmodernized forts were to be abandoned and not everyone was happy about it.

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Re: German focus on Russia in 1914.

#2316

Post by glenn239 » 10 May 2011, 19:12

There are also German fears that the British intend to enter the war anyway, especially as the British hinted they would do so if Germany fought Russia...
The British navy has a big problem in a neutrality scenario, (I’ve never seen Jellicoe’s take on having his hands tied). The British have no fortified ports, meaning that if the HSF makes a surprise attack the Grand Fleet could be destroyed in port if at its war station in Scapa. The HSF is mobilized and can, in theory, carry out such an attack without repercussions if detected inbound. Germany’s neutrality means that the Germans are crawling all over the UK and know where the Grand Fleet is. To get around this risk, the Grand fleet must base on the west coast of the UK – perhaps at Liverpool. But this act surrenders the English Channel and the French coast to the German navy, which is a betrayal of the promise given to France in 1912, or it forces the British to blockade the Germans with secondary forces (behind which the French will wipe out Germany’s international communications), in which case the Germans would conclude the British were hostile anyways.

The sum total is British neutrality is irrational - the British are functionally anti-German but too cowardly to come out and admit it. Any blockade causes Germany to view Britain as an enemy, the lack of a blockade is the end of France and Russia. Germany will no doubt tolerate the mish-mash of contradictions of British neutrality while fighting Russia and France, but once Russia is knocked out of the war, look out. Either France surrenders part of her empire for a peace with Germany, or the Austro-German army will come around on France straight through Belgium - 200 or 250 divisions strong. What the 6-12 division strong BEF chose to do would probably be a matter of supreme indifference to Falk. or Ludendorff.
As much as your bombing of the Ruhr valley by aircraft
.

Bombing the Ruhr would be ineffective. Mining the Rhine and strafing barges and trains – that’s a whole different story, IMO.

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Re: German focus on Russia in 1914.

#2317

Post by BDV » 10 May 2011, 20:57

stg 44 wrote:No, just no. Russia intended to deploy deep to avoid a German/Austrian steamroller.


We will argue this till cows come home, neither side giving an inch. 1915-1917 Western Front style.

plus the fear that Belgium, with its French ruling class, will try and cement its power over the Flems by allowing the French to invade Germany through her territory or take active part in the war against Germany.
Nah, ah, ah, by Mariannes' hairy upper lip they di'n't! Not if they want British neutrality during their little revanchist adventure, that is!

Should France try any hanky panky in Luxembourg, much less Flanders, they'll receive a British "5 x the eye", that might very well be the end of France as a united entity. The germanophobe-in-chef himself, E. Grey, quoted the antifrench policy of 1870, when the issue was broached by the French Ambassador.

So there may be benefits by heading East, but there are drawbacks to letting the French run wild too.
Drawbacks mitigated by Moselstellung, the defender-favoring geography of Elsass and Lothringen, and the downgrading of Britain from full fledged brawl participant to (however partial) arbiter.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Baltasar
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Re: German focus on Russia in 1914.

#2318

Post by Baltasar » 10 May 2011, 21:11

stg 44 wrote:
Baltasar wrote:That may have been the case during WWI, but certainly not before. It even took people quite some time to actually arm planes!
Read Corum, he cites the regs and reports that talk about this from 1913. The military realized armed aircraft were a matter of time and it was better to prepare ahead of it. Besides...armed Zepplins were technologically feasible from 1908 on.
It would be more important if anybody had flying units worth mentioning available, let alone units capable of flying long distances over hostile territory and carrying enough payload to make the effort worthwhile. However, nobody had anything for such operations. The armies were lucky enough to have a few planes per army for recon, even more so considering that most of the old guard generals in all armies didn't really strive to make use of the possiblities of air supremacy.
Afaik, even the first Zeppelins were not purpose built payload carriers but rigged transport craft. Considering all this, neither side would be thinking about the possibility of bombing the Ruhr area at the start of the war, at least nobody in the decision making ranks.
Apparently not, because it had nothing to do with the British and everything to do with establishing a solid continental position for a multi-year campaign.
What I meant was that Schlieffen isn't the issue here, it's winning a two front war, something the Germany always was afraid of.
Baltasar wrote:
Much of these benefits you describe were unknown in 1914 or prior. Its only with hindsight you can state anything, whereas the planners of the 1914 offensives had to rely on their knowledge and theories, not our 21st century perspective.
As much as your bombing of the Ruhr valley by aircraft.
No, 1913 reports describe potential effects of armed aircraft on civilian targets and what it means for industrial production. They acknowledge that the tech wasn't there yet, but it was coming.
Care to provide some more information about these theories? Written by whom and ordered by whom?
Strachan again describes this in detail. Yes The older, unmodernized forts were to be abandoned and not everyone was happy about it.
Would this be politically possible, actually? Back then, everybody only seemed to know one directon; forward. The Russians deploying in depth would be astonishing enough, having them abandon their fortresses in the process would be... well, I doubt they would really give these areas up without trying to put up a fight, even if it clearly is a lost cause.

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Re: German focus on Russia in 1914.

#2319

Post by Baltasar » 10 May 2011, 21:14

glenn239 wrote:Bombing the Ruhr would be ineffective. Mining the Rhine and strafing barges and trains – that’s a whole different story, IMO.
With the technology to drop bombs not being available and few planes carrying guns anyways, how feasible would be air-dropped mines? Besides, all this assumes that the Germans have neither AA nor own air capabilities in this scenario.

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Russian deployment

#2320

Post by BDV » 11 May 2011, 02:30

But wasn't Russian 9th deployed to Warsaw, before it was moved to the Galician front?

That necessarily had to be done before anything was clear.

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Re: Not as far as I know.

#2321

Post by princeliberty10311517 » 11 May 2011, 05:32

Dave Bender wrote:Then what makes you think 1914 Germany intended to defeat France in a 6 week campaign?
Isn't it common knowledge the plan was to take Paris in six weeks.

Of course it would have been longer before all of France fell. But the plan was to take Paris and bag the bulk of the French army in short order. The rest of France would be doomed to fall in short order.

Moltke had no plan B! 8O

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Re: German focus on Russia in 1914.

#2322

Post by Andy H » 11 May 2011, 11:27

Lets please keep this thread firmly focused upon the thread title and not drift into another theatre.

Regards

Andy H

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The Real German War Plan 1904 - 14

#2323

Post by Dave Bender » 12 May 2011, 03:36

Zuber's new book is out and I have my copy. So you may as well lock this topic. We can start a new discussion in a week or so that includes the new information.

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Terry Duncan
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Re: German focus on Russia in 1914.

#2324

Post by Terry Duncan » 30 Jun 2011, 00:54

Did try a 'Ost' plan using the Guns of August game. It worked ok tho I dont think the game properly modeled the morale effect on the Russians of a series of constant defeats in 1914-15.
The game is not a bad attempt at recreating the strategic situation, morale is somewhat harder as you say. I have not played if for many years, but it would be interesting to see if anyone else here had tried the game or any solutions to this sort of issue?

My thoughts would be a sort of 'house rule' where units lost or land lost counted towards a minus on morale. As it uses a D6 its somewhat brutal, but maybe 0.025 per unit or hex lost per month over the campaigning season - non-winter months - taken as a cumulative total for the year would work? That would mean a loss of 50 units or hexes giving a minus 1 on the morale checks already in game? Just a thought, but I have toyed with the idea of seeing if something more can be worked out using the game as a base.

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Re: The Real German War Plan 1904 - 14

#2325

Post by Baltasar » 28 Dec 2011, 16:24

Dave Bender wrote:Zuber's new book is out and I have my copy. So you may as well lock this topic. We can start a new discussion in a week or so that includes the new information.
So, what has Zuber to say about this?

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