Japanese invasion of Hawaii December 1941.
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British loaned Robert Watson-Watt
It's my understanding the British sent a radar expert to the Philippines prior to December 7, 1941. However Gen. Brereton and/or Big Mac had their own ideas and did not want to implement the British suggestions.
Re: Japanese invasion of Hawaii December 1941.
KI-27 would have been difficult to get to Hawaii. To my knowledge, they were never used on distant island atolls due to their exceptionally short range. Either the IJA would skip sending fighters to Hawaii, or they would have to specially equip with A5M4 Claudes coming surplus from Navy units switching to Zeros.BTW, the Ki-27 (Nate) was the primary IJA fighter aircraft in the Philippines. It would be the primary IJA fighter in Hawaii also.
USAAF intercept techniques were no match for IJN carrier attack doctrine in December 1941. On December 10th, the Philippines command managed to perform a large-scale radar directed intercept of Japanese air raids, and for their efforts the USAAF fighters were badly mauled without achieving anything of note. At Pearl Harbor, the only reason 20 aircraft were lost in the 2nd raid was because Genda committed the error of allowing his dive bombers to become separated from their fighter escorts. This cost about 10 bombers to US fighters, and would not have been repeated.The Philippine based air force correctly identified the incoming aircraft as Japanese and attempted to intercept. However this had apparently not been practised during peacetime and combat is the wrong time to learn a complex new procedure. After failing to find the incoming air raid the American fighter aircraft landed to refuel and the pilots went to lunch. While they were eating the Japanese bombed the American P-40s into scrap.
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Would not have been repeated
You cannot prevent things like this from happenening during the chaos of combat. Expecially with IJN aircraft which often flew without a radio installed in order to save weight.Genda committed the error of allowing his dive bombers to become separated from their fighter escorts. This cost about 10 bombers to US fighters, and would not have been repeated.
It's more likely that early model Ki-43 Mk Is which historically went to China during 1941 go to to Hawaii instead. Hawaii based units would continue to receive priority for this brand new fighter type.specially equip with A5M4 Claudes coming surplus from Navy units
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Additional Changes to Japanese Time Line
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/australi ... _pol01.jpg
If the Japanese seize Hawaii they need a supply line across the Pacific. I would expect these islands to be occupied during December 1941 as part of the Hawaiian operation:
Gilbert Islands.
Howland Island
Baker Island
Palmyra Atoll
Phoenix Islands
Jarvis Island
Johnston Atoll.
Kiribata.
Wake Island.
Midway.
Resources for this invasion effort must come from somewhere. I suspect the New Guinea operations would be placed on hold. Perhaps Burma also.
If the Japanese seize Hawaii they need a supply line across the Pacific. I would expect these islands to be occupied during December 1941 as part of the Hawaiian operation:
Gilbert Islands.
Howland Island
Baker Island
Palmyra Atoll
Phoenix Islands
Jarvis Island
Johnston Atoll.
Kiribata.
Wake Island.
Midway.
Resources for this invasion effort must come from somewhere. I suspect the New Guinea operations would be placed on hold. Perhaps Burma also.
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Re: Japanese invasion of Hawaii December 1941.
It does not matter in this scenarion but it´s not the what but the how!phylo_roadking wrote:[
Problem is - a Hawaiian campaign isn't going to be a wide-front campaign; "applied technology" is going to play a MUCH greater part in determining the outcome of the battle than normal....aircraft, ships etc. And in December/January 1941/2 American fighter aircraft weren't by any means the equal of the Japanese, not for another 6-8month window. The defenders would be using...what?....
The P-38 did not see combat until 1943 in the PTO. In the meantime Japanese military aviation was worn down by P-39, P-40 and F4F. All the planes were technically well enough suited for the task provided the pilots used the right tactics. The USMC got beaten at Midway beause of how they flew, not what they flew.
Regarding the P-39, it could beat the crap out of Zeros as long as the altitude not much more than 12,000ft. At low altitudes even the early versions were hot brids: 360mph@12,000ft, climb time to 10,000ft was 4 minutes.
Any US fighter could defeat Zeros in a dogfight if the pilot kept the speed above 250mph. Zeros and Oscars were designed for WW1-like fights in the 200mph+ range, at 300mph pilots could barely move the controls.
@Dave:
The two Army divisions consisted of four pre-war regular regiments with experienced GI´s and two of the better NG regiments. There was also a regiment of combat engineers on Oahu and a damn lot of shore and field artillery but not much room to manoeuvre. Since the IJA was not good at attacking under such conditions even three divisions would have a hard time. Especially because everything north of Wheeler does not need to be defended in the first place.
Re: Japanese invasion of Hawaii December 1941.
On the contrary.glenn239 wrote: At Pearl Harbor, the only reason 20 aircraft were lost in the 2nd raid was because Genda committed the error of allowing his dive bombers to become separated from their fighter escorts. This cost about 10 bombers to US fighters, and would not have been repeated.
In a prolonged battle both mistakes (bombers becoming separated from escorts) and enemy counteraction (e.g. using part of the attackers to peel off the fighters while others swoop in for the kill), increase in numbers. Like it happened at Midway with the torpedo and dive bombers.
The longer the battle the harder it becomes for the side using smoke'n'mirrors and trickery.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
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Re: Japanese invasion of Hawaii December 1941.
Obviously you din't read what I wrote in any detail - and missed this...
As for
The USN/USMC experience with the F2A as a plane was NOT good overall.
...when you saidThe P40 COULD take on the IJN's Zero - but only in favourable conditions that allowed them to gain the "upper" hand
All the planes were technically well enough suited for the task provided the pilots used the right tactics.
Any US fighter could defeat Zeros in a dogfight if the pilot kept the speed above 250mph
As for
The USMC got beaten at Midway beause of how they flew, not what they flew.
The U.S. Marines at the Battle of Midway
by Jarmo Mikkonen
The 25 aircraft of VMF-221 took off at 0600, 4 June 1942, to intercept a Japanese air raid. The squadron consisted of regular USMC pilots and new USMCR pilots. The green 2nd Lt.s were usually wingmen to regular pilots. Tactically the squadron was divided into five divisions that operated independently.
The Japanese raid was intercepted about 30-40 miles out. It appears that the escorting 36 A6Ms were not positioned above the bombers which allowed the first VMF-221 pilots one or two passes without fighter interference. After that the escorts attacked: the first division of five F2As, led by Major Floyd Parks, was completely destroyed. The second division of 6 F2As had two survivors. The third division, 6 F2As and 1 F4F, lost three of their number. Fourth division, only two F2As, lost one. The fifth division of four F4Fs operated in two separate two-plane formations. They lost only one pilot. After the combat only three F2A-3s and one F4F-3 remained in commission. The Japanese admitted losses of 9 aircraft.
The VMF-221 pilots were shocked by the abilities of A6M, as their estimates of its performance indicate. Capt. Kirk Armistead believed that the rate of climb of A6M was at least 5000 ft per minute. The very steep climb angle of the Zero apparently fooled him. Capt. P. R. White estimated the top speed of the Zero Fighter to be in excess of 450 mph!
Those pilots who managed to shake off Zeros used high speed split-S or very steep dives (F2A-3 and F4F-3 alike). These were later found to be the best manoeuvres to shake off a Zero. One F2A-3 pilot, Capt. Humberd, was able to outrun (by a small margin) a Zero at sea level and then commenced a head-on pass and shot his opponent down. Some F2A-3s and F4F-3s suffered from gun jams. Some F2A-3s did not carry head armour behind the pilot which made the pilots vulnerable to even a single bullet. The great pilot losses were also due to Japanese habit of strafing baled-out pilots.
The pilots knew that F2A was being phased out from active service and used as a trainer, which made their criticism fierce. However, the F4F was also criticised: one of the recommendations was that both F2A and F4F should be withdrawn from combat units and "retained for use at training centers only". Lt. Col. Ira L.. Kimes claimed that F4F "is hardly better in combat than is the F2A-3 type".
Excerpts from a conversation with Gordon Firebaugh, former Naval Aircraft Pilot with VF-2, later Captain USN (date: 1-17-83)A problem with fuel tanks
John Lundstrom sends the following:
I finally ran across the message I saw that discussed the removal of the F2A-3s from the carriers in early 1942. It was sent on 28 January 1942 from Vice Admiral Bill Halsey's headquarters (Administrative Office, Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force) to BuAer. The key sentences are:
"Disintegration fuselage self sealing fuel tanks F2A-3 planes has resulted in removal this model from carrier operations earlier than anticipated. Failure occurs along vulcanized seams inner lining. Believe fuel leakage around fittings attacks outside rubberized cover and passes into active material causing selfsealing tank to burst inward. Leading edge and fuselage tanks being temporarily blanked off from fuel system."
John adds the following note: The same thing happened to the Wildcat fuel tanks in spring 1942, resulting in the crisis on the YORKTOWN just before Coral Sea. Regarding the F2A's, they evidently replaced the tanks in the Marine squadrons ashore (including lucky VMF-221).
Another issue with the "wet wing" - an aluminium fuel-bearing wing - was that it was VERY difficult to reseal if holed by enemy fire. Rivetting patches - the standard cure for battle damage on an aluminium-skinned aircraft - simply repalced one big bullethole-sized leak with four littl'uns! The only real cure then was changing the wingspar...Q: You felt the F2A was a better aircraft than the F4F?
GF: Well, remember, I'm thinking of the F2A-2. We had the F2A-3 for a couple of months, that was a different aircraft. It had too much fuel. I remember we could fly five hour patrols....
Q: Did you ever get an explanation for the extra tankage in the F2A-3?
GF: They had put in a wet wing - you were able to purge it with CO2 into the main tank, but it meant extra weight. That was maybe the reason we had strut failures - these wheels, the landing gear, landed pretty hard, negative 3 G's. The struts had a tendency to move forward. When you retracted the gear on the next flight, the box strut scraped on the wheel well. You couldn't have that happen, the gear not retracting, so the mechanics would file some off and get closer to the rivets...
Q: And if you did that enough times...
GF: Exactly, you have a gear failure.
Q: The Brewster had a reputation for bad landings...
GF: We didn't have too much trouble. For example, I never hear about anyone who could ground-loop a Brewster. We did have one problem, the first couple of months, we had about 8-10 engine failures, due to a faulty main bearing. I remember Bauer had his engine go out north of San Diego - I remember flying his lunch to him while they fixed it. The problem was also in VF-3 but they got all of them down okay. The first engines were 950 hp then 1200 hp on the F2A-3. The other trouble with the F2A-3's landing on the carrier deck, the landing gear struts would twist, move because of the extra gas on board.
The USN/USMC experience with the F2A as a plane was NOT good overall.
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Re: Japanese invasion of Hawaii December 1941.
I read what you wrote. I wanted to emphasise that altitude advantage -while very desirable- was not the sole way to beat japanese fighters. Speed worked too.
Regarding the fuel tanks and the gun stoppages, the early Wildcats had exactly the same problems as your sources show.
Of course the F2A was not a good fighter but the mess at Midway was the USMC´s responsibility. On top of the tactical mistakes, VMF-221 was outnumbered too, by pilots who unlike their USMC counterparts had actual combat experience.
Regarding the fuel tanks and the gun stoppages, the early Wildcats had exactly the same problems as your sources show.
Of course the F2A was not a good fighter but the mess at Midway was the USMC´s responsibility. On top of the tactical mistakes, VMF-221 was outnumbered too, by pilots who unlike their USMC counterparts had actual combat experience.
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Re: Japanese invasion of Hawaii December 1941.
Can I recommend you do some reading up on Clair Chennault and the AVG in China and how they went about GETTING that superior speed for a "boom and zoom" attack?I wanted to emphasise that altitude advantage -while very desirable- was not the sole way to beat japanese fighters. Speed worked too.
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Re: Japanese invasion of Hawaii December 1941.
The Philippine division consisted of pre-war regulars. So was the 26th Cavalry Regiment. The 10 Philippine army reserve divisions were established in 1936 and therefore were composed of veterans. In fact they probably had more experience then the average American National Guard division. Big Mac had more tanks then his Japanese counterpart and they were overall superior in quality. He even had mechanized infantry mounted in half tracks and Bren Carriers to accompany the tanks.Army divisions consisted of four pre-war regular regiments
None of these advantages matter if army leadership is incompetent. Was Gen Short more capable then Big Mac?
Re: Japanese invasion of Hawaii December 1941.
The problem with the 2nd wave at Oahu resulted from a specific tactical error by the planners, which was that the 2nd wave fighters were slated to attack the airfields and not keep tabs of the bombers. The bombers in turn were ordered to attack the harbor. If even half a dozen Zeros had been ordered to provide close escort for the dive bombers, the USAAF fighters, they probably would have saved about 5-7 bombers from being shot down.You cannot prevent things like this from happenening during the chaos of combat. Expecially with IJN aircraft which often flew without a radio installed in order to save weight.
KI43 was fully committed for the Malaya Op, so none were available for Hawaii.It's more likely that early model Ki-43 Mk Is which historically went to China during 1941 go to to Hawaii instead. Hawaii based units would continue to receive priority for this brand new fighter type.
Oahu’s airfields had already been reduced to the point that another set of strikes would have eliminated a coordinated air defence. As the Philippines showed, the USAAF simply did not have the training or doctrine to handle the IJN’s ability to deliver smashing large-scale assaults. Their air intercept network didn’t work, their fighters had poor endurance and got caught on the ground too often, and their bases were open to air attacks.In a prolonged battle both mistakes (bombers becoming separated from escorts) and enemy counteraction (e.g. using part of the attackers to peel off the fighters while others swoop in for the kill), increase in numbers. Like it happened at Midway with the torpedo and dive bombers.
The Zero was not “mastered” until 1943 when the Hellcat entered service and the IJN’s cadre of elite pilots had been diminished. For any campaign at Hawaii in 1941, the Japanese are not going to be facing Hellcats and they are not going to be using poorly trained replacements.I wanted to emphasise that altitude advantage -while very desirable- was not the sole way to beat japanese fighters. Speed worked too.
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KI43 was fully committed for the Malaya Op
Priorities will change if Japan wants to invade Hawaii. The Malaya operation will make do with Ki-27s. Or else Japan will increase Ki-43 production at the expense of something else.
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Re: Japanese invasion of Hawaii December 1941.
The A6M would still be the backbone of naval aviation so I don't think they will be giving up that plane to easily. It was fine against the american aircraft at that time and still will be until the introduction of the hellcat and corsair.
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A6M backbone of naval aviation
I agree. However that has nothing to do with IJA aviation. After getting ashore the IJA will provide their own land based air support just as they did in the Philippines and elsewhere.
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Re: Japanese invasion of Hawaii December 1941.
I know, I know! Still, Zeros had large ailerons; ideal for low speeds but above 250mph the air pressure made it hard to move them. US fighters had smaller ones, so they were much more nimble than their japanese counterparts the more the speed was above 250mph. And that speed could be reached without altitude superiority.phylo_roadking wrote:Can I recommend you do some reading up on Clair Chennault and the AVG in China and how they went about GETTING that superior speed for a "boom and zoom" attack?I wanted to emphasise that altitude advantage -while very desirable- was not the sole way to beat japanese fighters. Speed worked too.
Dave,
how did you get the idea "the 10 Philippine army reserve divisions were composed of veterans"? They might have been established in 1936 but anything I read says little was done between then and 41, so upon mobilisation the PI-Army lacked cadre and the men lacked even the most basic training.
glenn239,
the F4F was not superior to a Zero in all aspects but in many. With the result that the IJN´s aviation had been defeated before Hellcats entered service.