Japanese invasion of Hawaii December 1941.

[mescal]

While the OTL Japanese could NOT know for sure that the still peacetime Americans would be totally unprepared for war, they made their air attack plans on that basis

Simply put :
No.

You still fail to understand the Japanese OTL plan.

[RichTO90]

.I don't think it at all unreasonable that they might easily have produced a couple of broad spectrum radio jammers that could have been carried and used by a 17,000 ton cargo-liner just off of Oahu's shores.

Note that the reply to Terry's posting of additional information is hand-waving...the same hand-waving that was used to "rebut" Terry's original posts some ten or twenty pages ago...yet robdab begged to have this idiocy reopened so that he could present new evidence". Where is it?

BTW, Weddington's complete, but somewhat contradictory testimony (at one point he says there was no rifle or MG ammunition there, then that there was "some") may be found in the Hearings Record, Part 23, pp. 741-745 and is that he gave to the Robert's Commission in January 1942. However, the Commission Report, Part 1, page 51, which includes additional testimony excerpts (see also Part 23, page 294), indicates that, in fact, there was rifle ammunition available. Which makes sense, since the Japanese attack there was initially met by rifle and BAR fire, followed by .30 caliber MG fire from the flexible machineguns of the observation craft, which were hastily mounted on the planes. The apparent shortfall, upon examination, was belted ammunition for the two .50 caliber AA MG of the 298th Infantry "hastily emplaced" at the end of the runway. They attempted to use aircraft belts, but those would not work.

[robdab]

.
bf109 emil provides,

asleep perhaps as surprise was achieved by aircraft, not by troops ships steaming within range and sight of Oahu by a landing armada...using this same scenario one could say Britain could have landed and seized Tarranto by achieving the same surprise upon the Italians and helping to blueprint the IJN assumption it could achieve surprise over pearl...Not going to happen by amphibious craft and troop ships all standing off shore and with destroyer escort patrols off Pearl

no it was reported,

Indeed the Ward sent not just one but rather TWO radio reports of the sinking and still NO Oahu wide warning was issued.

but couldn't be confirmed thus an warning was not sent...

And how would a USN warships, of any size, that stumbled on a darkened armada of (loaded for bear) IJN warships in peacetime waters off of Oahu even stay afloat long enough to figure out that they were NOT fellow Americans ? I'm sending 9 IJN battleships (and their historical escorts) in with my ATL 1st wave of troop landing transports. What peacetime US destroyer would survive that broadside surprise for long enough to get off any message at all to PH, let alone survive long enough to respond to the sure to follow request fo confirmation as happened in the OTL to the USS Ward ? I just can't imagine it. Besides which, in the OTL there were NO USN destroyers out there on patrol to the west, north or east of Oahu, save for the USS Ward just off of the PH approaches. To the south.

[phylo_roadking]

1.) USS Ward sinks a submarine in the PH aproaches and even though Kimmel has indicated to all and sundry that a submarine attack on the PH approaches might signal an all out Japanese attack on Oahu, NO Oahu wide alert goes out. The US Army on Oahu is not even informed until hours later.

It seems that the American military mind on Oahu that morning was more typically half asleep, doesn't it ?

Er - no it doesn't; it shows the NAVY side of the equation was particularly lax, and there was little crossover liaison Navy -> Army...

But in THIS case...it'll be the ARMY that reacts first with its ring-round of defence establishments, their patrolling and beachwatching responsibilities etc....

[robdab]

.
RichTO90 replies with,

Note that the reply to Terry's posting of additional information is hand-waving...the same hand-waving that was used to "rebut" Terry's original posts some ten or twenty pages ago...yet robdab begged to have this idiocy reopened so that he could present new evidence". Where is it?

I don't recall stating that I had any new evidence ? Just that I had replenished a few of my original sources and wanted the opportunity to reply to the critics of my scenario.

I would like to point out that if one is not going to allow any variation from the OTL then few ATLs will have any chance of working at all. That seems to be the gist of your complaints about my Oahu invasion scenario does it not ?

BTW, Weddington's complete, but somewhat contradictory testimony (at one point he says there was no rifle or MG ammunition there, then that there was "some") may be found in the Hearings Record, Part 23, pp. 741-745 and is that he gave to the Robert's Commission in January 1942. However, the Commission Report, Part 1, page 51, which includes additional testimony excerpts (see also Part 23, page 294), indicates that, in fact, there was rifle ammunition available. Which makes sense, since the Japanese attack there was initially met by rifle and BAR fire, followed by .30 caliber MG fire from the flexible machineguns of the observation craft, which were hastily mounted on the planes. The apparent shortfall, upon examination, was belted ammunition for the two .50 caliber AA MG of the 298th Infantry "hastily emplaced" at the end of the runway. They attempted to use aircraft belts, but those would not work.

Which merely confirms that one cannot always fully trust the PHA testimony. Those 40 volumes are a great resource but are not always correct. Thanks for the source details though.

[RichTO90]

Lets look at what actually happened in the OTL, shall we ?

Yes, shall we?

1.) USS Ward sinks a submarine in the PH aproaches and even though Kimmel has indicated to all and sundry that a submarine attack on the PH approaches might signal an all out Japanese attack on Oahu, NO Oahu wide alert goes out. The US Army on Oahu is not even informed until hours later.

Ward searched from 0357 when notified by Condor, to 0637 when it spotted the sub. It's contact and action report were transmitted at 0645, but not noted as received until 0712. HQ attempted to confirm the report, then received a second report at 0740 that a PBY had attacked a sub as well...but also at 0740 a confusing report that Ward was returning to harbor "towing a sampan". The attack began at 0755 (btw, Kaneohe reported being attacked at 0745, obviously digital watches were not being used). I am unclear how the Army was notified "hours later" that an attack was going on, unless the attack report by Ward is what was meant...

2.) American radar detects the inbound Japanese air armada 132 miles out yet no warning is issued Oahu wide. No warning at all is sent to the USN's warships in Pearl Harbor and the USAAF's airfield parked fighters are not alerted either.

A radar detected. If the Japanese launch two hours earlier, then all operational radars are...operational. At least three would detect and confirm the approach, from multiple vectors, about two hours earlier than the assumed appearance of the B-17 flight.

3.) Two Japanese cruiser scoutplanes are tracked by 3 seperate American radars on Oahu as they search Lahania Roads and even Pearl Harbor itself for the missing American carriers. No warnings are sent out to the American defenders.

We would now have at least three major and three minor aircraft radar contacts on the Army side. Plus one sub sighting report on the Navy side. Plus...how many unknown vessels approaching the shore?

4.)Japanese warplanes with clear painted red "meatball" markings (and weapons hanging underwing) overflew much of Oahu while on their way to attack Pearl Harbor and several USAAF airfields yet NO Oahu wide alert is issued

robdab is apparently unaware of the differing rates of advance of aircraft versus naval transports.

EVEN THOUGH there are (according to Rich anyway) some 1,100 anti-sabotage sentries arrayed all over Oahu watching for any form of attack.

robdab continues to prove how little use he has actually made of the Attacj Hearings...

More reinforcement for my belief that those US anti-sabotage sentries really were watching just for sabateurs in the bushes, rather than invasion transports offshore or for Nipponese bombers in Oahu's skies. Historically, one one at all there even noticed until AFTER the Japanese bombs had begun to explode on American targets.

robdab continues to build his house of cards on faith and hand-waving...and why units apparently - according to robdab - completely fixated on their mission would not be able to actually perform that mission also remains unexplained. BTW, the initial notice of the attack was apparently by Commander Martin at Kaneohe, who testified that he recognized the Japanese as attackers, after initially thinking they were carrier aircraft, because their initially approach to the station, which violated the landing pattern SOP, raised his suspicions (Hearing Record, Part 23, pages 738). Also BTW, that initial attack was strafing...

It seems that the American military mind on Oahu that morning was more typically half asleep, doesn't it ? The Japanese had totally deceived the Americans, who just could not bring themselves to believe that OTL Japan would attack Hawaii. That would not change in my ATL.

With much of the initial ammunition issue locked in the barracks armories the troops at various points began opening fire on the Japanese within five to ten minutes of the opening of the attack.

While the OTL Japanese could NOT know for sure that the still peacetime Americans would be totally unprepared for war, they made their air attack plans on that basis (as reported by Yoshikawa and friends ashore on Oahu) and got it oh so right. That would not change in my ATL.

Er, no, they did not, they predicated their attack on the possibility of three different scenarios, complete, partial, or no surprise. robdab's fantasy is based upon the Japanese presuming total surprise...along with variable sunrises, adjustable tides, non-existent Japanese capabilities, Americans incapable of looking seaward... :roll:

[RichTO90]

I don't recall stating that I had any new evidence ? Just that I had replenished a few of my original sources and wanted the opportunity to reply to the critics of my scenario.

Has anyone seen robdab do this since the thread was unlocked?

I would like to point out that if one is not going to allow any variation from the OTL then few ATLs will have any chance of working at all. That seems to be the gist of your complaints about my Oahu invasion scenario does it not ?

As anyone with half a brain might have noticed the "gist of my complaints" has always been the dishonesty repeatedly exhibited by robdab

Which merely confirms that one cannot always fully trust the PHA testimony. Those 40 volumes are a great resource but are not always correct. Thanks for the source details though.

So now the primary source documentation is discarded in favor of "well, if the Japanese wanted radio jammers that were outside their historical capability they would have just made them"... of course that also means that any arguments that robdab has posited based upon the Committee Reports and Hearing Record may now be discarded at will by any other poster too, since they are now all as suspect. :roll:

I remain underwhelmed by robdab's ability to craft a logical or even honest answer to the questions posed him.

[Jon G.]

On that note, I am locking this topic for the second time.

I'd like to thank everybody who has contributed information and sources to this massive subject.