Poland and checoslovakia together in alliance

[wm]

The Benes-Skirmunt pact consisted of three parts, main accord containing nine articles, an annex, and a secret protocol. The main accord provided for mutual territorial guarantees, for concerted action on the application of treaties signed in common (Art. 1), and for benevolent neutrality in case of war and transit of war material (Art. 2).

Czechoslovakia expressed disinterest in Eastern Galicia and promised to dissolve Ukrainian organizations working against Poland. Warsaw promised to reciprocate for this measure (Art. 3). Both governments took cognizance of the treaties of the Little Entente and of Poland's alliances with France and Romania (Art. 4). They agreed on a commercial convention (Art. 5) and on arbitration (Art. 6). Czechoslovakia and Poland agreed not to sign treaties conflicting with the accord (Art. 7). The duration of the pact was set at five years, with provision for an earlier termination (Art. 8); it was to be ratified as soon as possible (Art. 9).

The annex to the political accord referred to the formerly disputed areas of Teschen, Spis, and Orava. Controversial matters in the districts under Czechoslovak rule were to be studied by a mixed delegation to establish “a state of legality, equity, and justice, and thereby to contribute to the appeasement in relations between the Czechoslovaks and the Poles.”
The two governments further agreed to settle within the next six months the fate of the border commune of Javorina in Orava.
The annex, unlike the main accord, was not subject to ratification and became binding immediately after its signature.

Although Benes carefully denied that the treaty with Poland contained any secret arrangements, there was a secret protocol attached to the political accord.
This protocol contained three main provisions:
first, Czechoslovakia promised to support Warsaw “within the limit of her possibilities” on the question of Eastern Galicia;
second, Czechoslovakia agreed not to do anything that could harm the eastern frontier settlement of Riga;
third, Poland promised not to recognize attempts of the Habsburgs to regain the throne of Austria or Hungary, though she made it clear that, not being a member of the Little Entente, she could not actively intervene.
The Benes-Skirmunt pact showed the extent of Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation possible in late 1921.

France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919-1925

[wm]

The question of Javorina (Jaworzyna, in Polish), which so grievously afiected Polish-Czechoslovak relations in late 1922 and throughout 1923, was connected with the old issue of Teschen, Spis, and Orava.
This tiny commune high up in the Tatra Mountains, inhabited by a few hundred people, came into the limelight when the final boundary was drawn between Czechoslovakia and Poland by an Allied delimitation commission. The members of this commission while investigating conditions on the spot felt that the frontier established by the Conference of Ambassadors on July 28, 1920, was “a monstrosity” and that the local population was “laboring under an injustice.”
They therefore took it upon themselves to improve it by making small changes required by the everyday needs of the inhabitants. Thus the Polish member of the commission agreed on April 28, 1921, to minor modifications in Orava favoring Czechoslovakia and made it clear that he expected a Czechoslovak quid pro quo in the case of Javorina.

When Skirmunt and Piltz began their rapprochement with Prague they used Javorina to convince the Polish public of a Czechoslovak spirit of conciliation and good will. The cession of Javorina to Poland was to obliterate the resentment at the Teschen defeat, and so Warsaw purposely inflated the importance of the tiny commune.
As the American chargé in Prague correctly estimated, the issue of Javorina “had been almost invented by the late Polish Minister, Mr. Piltz, with a view to its satisfactory settlement in the interest of friendly relations” between the two countries.

The annex to the Benes-Skirmunt pact of November 1921 singled out the case of Javorina for direct negotiation, and the Conference of Ambassadors agreed to suspend work of the delimitation commission for a couple of months to allow Warsaw and Prague to solve the issue. Everything seemed to indicate a smooth settlement.
Since then the Slovaks, in whose territory Javorina lay, had expressed some annoyance that the Czechs after gaining Teschen now proposed to sacrifice Slovak land,‘ but the Polish side agreed to compensate them with the villages of Niedzica and Kacvin (Felsztyn was sometimes named in place of Kacvin). Apparently the Slovaks found this course satisfactory, and Slovak Catholic deputies came out strongly in June 1921 in favor of such an exchange.

Benes had also been won over to the Polish proposal, and he told the American charge in Prague as late as June 1922 that an agreement had been reached “assigning the village of Javorina with its 400 inhabitants to Poland, and the villages of Niedca [Niedzica] and Fulzteyn [Felsztyn] with about 2,000 inhabitants to Czecho-Slovakia.” The Czechoslovak minister added that to prevent the question from becoming inflammable he had entrusted it to technical experts, and appointed National Democrats on the delegation “to allay their criticism.”

The issue, however, was far from settled. The Czechoslovak-Polish delegation established in accord with the annex to the Benes-Skirmunt pact met once on April 8, 1922, and then ceased to function because of difliculties raised by the Czechoslovak members. Several letters from Piltz to Benes pressing for a speedy settlement failed to produce any result, though the Polish diplomat emphasized that Javorina “weighs still on the fate of the Accord concluded between Poland and Czechoslovakia.”
The only outcome of Piltz’s interventions was a joint request by Warsaw and Prague to the Conference of Ambassadors for extension of the period for direct settlement. This extension the conference readily granted. But no progress was made and Piltz formally protested to the Czechoslovak government on August 7, 1022, about nonfulfillment of the annex to the Benes-Skirmunt pact.
The Polish minister received no reply and the affair was at an impasse.

Benes originally had favored the compromise settlement proposed by the Poles, but he began to change his position under pressure from the National Democrats who objected to concessions to Poland. Their party organ, Narodni Listy, was right when it boasted in December 1928 that the National Democrats had prevented settlement of the Javorina issue, and under their influence other groups began to vie with each other in ultra patriotic pronouncements.

The National Socialist Geske Slovo attacked the Slovak deputies who favored the settlement, and spoke of strategic dangers to the republic should Javorina become Polish." Benes, premier of a coalition government, was aware of his weakness and feared antagonizing Czech nationalists. As the Polish chargé in Prague wrote later, “Benes, enmeshed in the net of intrigues spread by his opponents in the Javorina question, did not want to and did not know how to cut or disentangle it.” Masaryk, on the other hand, apparently “cut himself off completely from the Javorina question” and declared that “he would never occupy himself with this silly trifle.” “ The president thus either failed to appreciate the efiect of the Javorina deadlock on Polish public opinion, or perhaps both he and Benes did not care too much about it. The fall of Skirmunt, and the weakened Polish position after Rapallo, did not make rapprochement with Warsaw seem very attractive, and Benes may have concluded that Polish friendship was not worth the risk of a domestic crisis over Javorina. At any rate he adopted a rigid attitude to any concessions.

France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919-1925