An earlier 'Doolittle' raid
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Re: An earlier 'Doolittle' raid
From December to March the US carriers were sent on a variety of raids. The earliest in December was a aborted for several reasons, including a attempted & canceled relief of Wake island. There were raids on the Central Pacific islands, on Rabual, on a Japanese troop convoy approaching New Guinea. These raids were embarassing to the IJN & efforts were made to keep them & the results secret. They also caused the IJN to place priority on tracking the US carriers. While the Japanese code breaking was mostly a failure their other signals analysis was effective in 1942. In Dolittles biography 'I Could Never Be so Lucky Again' - Chapter 10 he cites post war studies of Japanese records as revealing the Japanese naval intelegence suspected a raid would be made in mid April. Their signals intelegence unit was able to track the Hornet in its preperations , identified a probable course for the Hornet into the North Pacific, and found signals evidence for a second carrier accompanying the Hornet. 14th April was identified as the earliest date such a raid might take place.
Resulting from this intelegence analysis the IJN home fleet was placed on alert, and the second picket line was sent out to 650 miles. The permanent standing picket line was maintained at approx 300 miles, with provisions for extending a second screen of scout boats. The Japanese assumption was a 650 mil screen would allow the home fleet to sortie time to intercept the USN before it reached the raiding distance for its single engine dive bombers. That would be around 280 miles by Japanese calculation. Even at that range the losses to USN dive bombers from navigation error (=fuel depletion) and mechanical failure would have been relatively high. 200 to 250 miles would have been better for reducing operational losses. The planned launch point for the B25 raiders was 450 miles.
Dollittle identifies the original ideas for such a raid as emerging in December-January. Preparing the bombers and training the crews required well over two months, even with Gen Hap Arnold frequently intervening to remove 'obstructions'.
Assuming the IJN picket screen was only 300 miles in December 1941, or January; and assuming the IJN signals intellegence was not searching for the US carriers as it was from March then yes it would be possible for the USN to make a suprise raid on Japan. In this case the USN would probablly try to concentrate on a main IJN naval base, with a few secondary targets. I'm also estimating the US aircraft losses would run towards 33% due to mistakes in planning by the staffs and inexperience of the aircrew, as well as Japanese defense. The Japanese carrier fleet and battle ships were split between bases in the home islands and Truk in the Central Pacific, with part of the carriers on operations in December/January. So, with enough suprise only a small portion of Japans aircraft carriers would have been close enough to do anything about intercepting the US strike force.
Resulting from this intelegence analysis the IJN home fleet was placed on alert, and the second picket line was sent out to 650 miles. The permanent standing picket line was maintained at approx 300 miles, with provisions for extending a second screen of scout boats. The Japanese assumption was a 650 mil screen would allow the home fleet to sortie time to intercept the USN before it reached the raiding distance for its single engine dive bombers. That would be around 280 miles by Japanese calculation. Even at that range the losses to USN dive bombers from navigation error (=fuel depletion) and mechanical failure would have been relatively high. 200 to 250 miles would have been better for reducing operational losses. The planned launch point for the B25 raiders was 450 miles.
Dollittle identifies the original ideas for such a raid as emerging in December-January. Preparing the bombers and training the crews required well over two months, even with Gen Hap Arnold frequently intervening to remove 'obstructions'.
Assuming the IJN picket screen was only 300 miles in December 1941, or January; and assuming the IJN signals intellegence was not searching for the US carriers as it was from March then yes it would be possible for the USN to make a suprise raid on Japan. In this case the USN would probablly try to concentrate on a main IJN naval base, with a few secondary targets. I'm also estimating the US aircraft losses would run towards 33% due to mistakes in planning by the staffs and inexperience of the aircrew, as well as Japanese defense. The Japanese carrier fleet and battle ships were split between bases in the home islands and Truk in the Central Pacific, with part of the carriers on operations in December/January. So, with enough suprise only a small portion of Japans aircraft carriers would have been close enough to do anything about intercepting the US strike force.
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Re: An earlier 'Doolittle' raid
One thing that should be emphasized is the importance of the Tokyo raid to US signals intellegence. The USN had made some progress breaking the Japanese Navy code number 25 (JN25) up to March 1942. This was the primary operating code for the IJN fleet in 1941. When the bombers were sighted over Tokyo the Japanese navy leaders went into a instant frenzy or panic. The result was a massive number of radio messages broadcast over several days in all the IJN codes, and procedures became very sloppy. The USN cryptographers were handed dozens of openings into the JN25 and other IJN codes. Without that event it is unlikely the Midway operation would have been nearly as clear to US intellegence. When the IJN changed the JN25 again in May the US was deep enough into the message traffic the change was not decisive.
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Not just raids
March 8, 1942.
Japanese forces seize Lae and Salamaua, New Guinea.
CruDiv 6. 4 x Furutaka class cruisers.
CruDiv 18. 2 x small CL (Tenryu and Tatsuta)
AV Kijokawa Maru (i.e. seaplane tender)
4 x troop transports.
March 10, 1942.
The tiny Japanese Lae invasion force is attacked by a USN fleet that includes CV Lexington and CV Yorktown. Dispite being completely outmatched the Japanese invasion is a success.
FDR hails the USN operation as "the best day's work we've had". If true that doesn't say much for the fighting qualities of the USN during the first three months of the Pacific war. The Lae invasion should have been completely crushed.
Japanese forces seize Lae and Salamaua, New Guinea.
CruDiv 6. 4 x Furutaka class cruisers.
CruDiv 18. 2 x small CL (Tenryu and Tatsuta)
AV Kijokawa Maru (i.e. seaplane tender)
4 x troop transports.
March 10, 1942.
The tiny Japanese Lae invasion force is attacked by a USN fleet that includes CV Lexington and CV Yorktown. Dispite being completely outmatched the Japanese invasion is a success.
FDR hails the USN operation as "the best day's work we've had". If true that doesn't say much for the fighting qualities of the USN during the first three months of the Pacific war. The Lae invasion should have been completely crushed.
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Re: An earlier 'Doolittle' raid
There also might have been a major public relations issue if there had been a major "raid" against the Home Islands...bypassing coming to the assistance of the Philippines, exactly the public reaction MacArthur would have wanted. It would have been VERY hard to "sell" post-raid the decision on risking SO much of the USN's remaining offensive (and defensive) capability on what would still in the great scheme of things have been a pinprick - as opposed to expending it coming to the aid of tens of thousands of beleagured US servicemen in the Philippines. The American public would NOT have seen it as the right threat/risk weigh-up...
And if there had been losses to the raiding fleet as well - would have been the Commander-in-Chief's head on a platter.
And if there had been losses to the raiding fleet as well - would have been the Commander-in-Chief's head on a platter.
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
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- Markus Becker
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Re: Not just raids
No wonder, the attack simply came too late. Still, three transports and a minesweeper sunk, plus several more ships damaged was not bad considering half the TBD were armed with bombs out of the fear they might not make it over the Own Stanley Range with a torpedo.Dave Bender wrote:March 8, 1942.
Japanese forces seize Lae and Salamaua, New Guinea.
March 10, 1942.
The tiny Japanese Lae invasion force is attacked by a USN fleet that includes CV Lexington and CV Yorktown. Dispite being completely outmatched the Japanese invasion is a success.
Re: An earlier 'Doolittle' raid
I disagree. The historical Doolittle raid was in the planning stage long before the fall of Bataan, and the raid took place before the fall of Corregidor.phylo_roadking wrote:There also might have been a major public relations issue if there had been a major "raid" against the Home Islands...bypassing coming to the assistance of the Philippines, exactly the public reaction MacArthur would have wanted. It would have been VERY hard to "sell" post-raid the decision on risking SO much of the USN's remaining offensive (and defensive) capability on what would still in the great scheme of things have been a pinprick - as opposed to expending it coming to the aid of tens of thousands of beleagured US servicemen in the Philippines. The American public would NOT have seen it as the right threat/risk weigh-up...
And if there had been losses to the raiding fleet as well - would have been the Commander-in-Chief's head on a platter.
Also, if the objective was changed from bombing Tokyo to attacking the Japanese carrier force in harbour, that directly helps the Philippines since if the Japanese carriers were to be all sunk, that would enable the US Navy to get supplies through to the garrison.
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attack simply came too late
The Japanese "invasion" was only about battalion strength. At least they were before losing most of their equipment, ammunition and supplies on the sunken transports. The Japanese had no air cover at all (unless you want to count a few seaplanes). Nothing prevented the USN from detaching the cruisers to completely wipe out Japanese shipping at Lae. And following it up with a counter invasion by 31st Australian Infantry Regiment which was sitting at Townsville.
Re: attack simply came too late
??? You don't just launch anphibious invasions on the spur of the moment. What transports and landing craft were available? Did the Australians have any training in Amphibious operations? Whose comand were they under? I suspect not the same as the USN fleet units involved. Do you know how long it would have taken for the curisers to get there? And what the risk was? Especially since they were suppose to be escorting the carriers.Dave Bender wrote:... Nothing prevented the USN from detaching the cruisers to completely wipe out Japanese shipping at Lae. And following it up with a counter invasion by 31st Australian Infantry Regiment which was sitting at Townsville.
Your comments so far have been off base at best and way off in some cases such as the original one about the Doolittle raid not acomplishing anything. One begins to wonder about ajendas ....
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Re: attack simply came too late
You are very wrong Dave. Take a look at the map. Lae-Salamaua is marked by the upper X, the CV were somewhere 200 miles away on the other side of the New Guinea, so cruisers would have had to make a 500 to 700 mile trip, half of it or more within rage of planes base from Rabaul.Dave Bender wrote:The Japanese "invasion" was only about battalion strength. At least they were before losing most of their equipment, ammunition and supplies on the sunken transports. The Japanese had no air cover at all (unless you want to count a few seaplanes). Nothing prevented the USN from detaching the cruisers to completely wipe out Japanese shipping at Lae. And following it up with a counter invasion by 31st Australian Infantry Regiment which was sitting at Townsville.
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Re: An earlier 'Doolittle' raid
If Emperor Hirohito had the status of "a god" in Shintoism, what would have been the effect on the Japanese mindset and subsequent immediate strategy if all the US carrier aircraft had focussed on bombing the Imperial Palace, levelled it, and maybe even killing him, in 1941?
Who would have taken over as Emperor/Empress?
Who would have taken over as Emperor/Empress?
Re: An earlier 'Doolittle' raid
Schadewald, can you please stop posting pics when they have nothing at all to do with the current topic? Those are just a waste of bandwith...
As to your question: The Japanese would not wake up when the bombs were falling. As it has been said before, they would likely notice the force coming in on them earlier, early enough to bring Hirohito to a safe place in any case. Killing the emperor would be almost impossible and counter-productive. The whole of Japan would take up their collective swords, forget any other theater and try to kill as many americans as possible.
As to your question: The Japanese would not wake up when the bombs were falling. As it has been said before, they would likely notice the force coming in on them earlier, early enough to bring Hirohito to a safe place in any case. Killing the emperor would be almost impossible and counter-productive. The whole of Japan would take up their collective swords, forget any other theater and try to kill as many americans as possible.
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Re: An earlier 'Doolittle' raid
"It's my party and I'll cry if I want to!": I started this WI topic, and if the Moderator has objections, I'll take instructions from him,not you. Have you suddenly been appointed Moderator? Your WI scenario faculty seem rather staid.
Churchill said of the Germans "The Hun is always either at your throat or at your feet", and I think the same applies to the Japanese ie the death of Hirohito at American hands so early after Pearl Harbor would actually dampen down the Japanese for war rather than inflame desires for revenge, the opposite of the Western character.
Churchill said of the Germans "The Hun is always either at your throat or at your feet", and I think the same applies to the Japanese ie the death of Hirohito at American hands so early after Pearl Harbor would actually dampen down the Japanese for war rather than inflame desires for revenge, the opposite of the Western character.
Re: An earlier 'Doolittle' raid
If I'm not totally mistaken, the word 'please' in my request should indicate it was a polite request, nothing else.Von Schadewald wrote:"It's my party and I'll cry if I want to!": I started this WI topic, and if the Moderator has objections, I'll take instructions from him,not you. Have you suddenly been appointed Moderator?
Coming from you, I take it as a compliment.Your WI scenario faculty seem rather staid.
Apparently, the US commanders thought differently, as they strictly avoided hitting the imperial palace while running their bombing campaings on mainland Japan.Churchill said of the Germans "The Hun is always either at your throat or at your feet", and I think the same applies to the Japanese ie the death of Hirohito at American hands so early after Pearl Harbor would actually dampen down the Japanese for war rather than inflame desires for revenge, the opposite of the Western character.
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Re: An earlier 'Doolittle' raid
The Doolittle Raid was half of project to show that the US could strike back at the heart of Axis foes.
The ETO half was the June 1942 raid on the Ploiesti oil fields in Romania. This revealed a fundamental weakness in the in the European Axis led the Germans to invest heavily in air defenses in Romania.
The Doolittle Raid was basically a PR stunt for domestic US consumption, but did it also cause the Japanese to divert resources into air defence?
The ETO half was the June 1942 raid on the Ploiesti oil fields in Romania. This revealed a fundamental weakness in the in the European Axis led the Germans to invest heavily in air defenses in Romania.
The Doolittle Raid was basically a PR stunt for domestic US consumption, but did it also cause the Japanese to divert resources into air defence?
Re: An earlier 'Doolittle' raid
More than that it profoundly affected Japanese strategy. See the opening chapters of Shattered Sword for instance. Midway was in many ways a reaction to the Doolittle raid.Willi Alexander wrote:... The Doolittle Raid was basically a PR stunt for domestic US consumption, but did it also cause the Japanese to divert resources into air defence?