Operation Downfall

Discussions on WW2 in the Pacific and the Sino-Japanese War.
Mil-tech Bard
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Re: Operation Downfall

#16

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 05 Sep 2010, 16:05

This is the American military operation time line that American planners had for Operation Olympic as posted on :

http://www.ww2pacific.com/downfall.html


Sep 1 . Honshu, Kyushu, Strategic Air Force (B-29 Okinawa) ; continue strategic targets.
Sep 1 . Shimonoseki Straight / ports, Strategic Air Force ; continue isolation mining.
Sep 18. Hong Kong , British strikes.
Sep 28. Canton , British strikes.
Oct 1 . Ningpo , Chusan, China , Strategic Air Force ; isolation bombing.
Oct 18. Honshu, Inland Sea , 3rd Fleet : TF-38 (US) , TF-37 (UK) ; strategic support
Oct 21. Kyushu , Strategic Air Force ; N-S isolation and anti-buildup
Oct 24. Kyushu , 5th Fleet ; preliminary bombardment, mine clearing, interdict highways.
Oct 27. Outer Islands , 40th Inf Div
Oct 28. Tanega Shima , 158th Reg Combat Team
Oct 30. Shikoku , feint by 9th Corp : 77th , 81st , 98th Infantry Divisions
Nov 1 . West , 5th Amphibious Corp : 2nd , 3rd , 5th Marine Divisions
Nov 1 . South , 11th Corp : 1st Cav , 43rd Inf , Americal Divisions.
Nov 1 . East , 1st Corp : 25th , 33rd , 41st Infantry divisions
Nov 22. Where needed : 11th Airborn Division.
Nov 23. As needed or SW : 9th Corp : 77th , 81st , 98th Infantry Divisions
Dec - . Build air fields : support troops and air crews from European theator.
Jan - . Attack all military and industrial areas of Japan by air and sea.

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Re: Operation Downfall

#17

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 07 Sep 2010, 04:39

Mil-tech Bard wrote:This is the American military operation time line that American planners had for Operation Olympic as posted on :

http://www.ww2pacific.com/downfall.html


Sep 1 . Honshu, Kyushu, Strategic Air Force (B-29 Okinawa) ; continue strategic targets.
Sep 1 . Shimonoseki Straight / ports, Strategic Air Force ; continue isolation mining.
Sep 18. Hong Kong , British strikes.
Sep 28. Canton , British strikes.
Oct 1 . Ningpo , Chusan, China , Strategic Air Force ; isolation bombing.
Oct 18. Honshu, Inland Sea , 3rd Fleet : TF-38 (US) , TF-37 (UK) ; strategic support
Oct 21. Kyushu , Strategic Air Force ; N-S isolation and anti-buildup
Oct 24. Kyushu , 5th Fleet ; preliminary bombardment, mine clearing, interdict highways.
Oct 27. Outer Islands , 40th Inf Div
Oct 28. Tanega Shima , 158th Reg Combat Team
Oct 30. Shikoku , feint by 9th Corp : 77th , 81st , 98th Infantry Divisions
Nov 1 . West , 5th Amphibious Corp : 2nd , 3rd , 5th Marine Divisions
Nov 1 . South , 11th Corp : 1st Cav , 43rd Inf , Americal Divisions.
Nov 1 . East , 1st Corp : 25th , 33rd , 41st Infantry divisions
Nov 22. Where needed : 11th Airborn Division.
Nov 23. As needed or SW : 9th Corp : 77th , 81st , 98th Infantry Divisions
Dec - . Build air fields : support troops and air crews from European theator.
Jan - . Attack all military and industrial areas of Japan by air and sea.
That adds up to 14 infantry/airbourne divisions. I don thave time to check this evening... memory is a follow on force of ten more divisions was scheduled and an allowance for approx six more if needed.


Mil-tech Bard
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Re: Operation Downfall

#18

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 07 Sep 2010, 20:39

This is an interesting document that has an article byLt. Col Allerton Crushman of the 671st Tank Destroyer Battalion on the role his unit would have played in Operation Olympic supporting IX Corps on pages 70 thru 72 of the document link below:

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/ ... DITION.pdf

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Re: Operation Downfall

#19

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 09 Sep 2010, 23:11

An interesting fact from the 10th Army Ordnance documents at Okinawa -- all Army divisions on Okinawa had their 37mm guns in the Regimental anti-tank gun companies replaced with M-18 Hellcats after the fighting there ended.

There were 50 M-18's issued by Army Ordnance by 30 June 1945.

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Re: Operation Downfall

#20

Post by ZSU-23 » 10 Sep 2010, 12:28

What would have been the Soviet plans in support of this operation? Would they have continued advancing further into China and/or Invade Hokkaido?

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Re: Operation Downfall

#21

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 12 Sep 2010, 18:21

For those who are serious about researching Operation Downfall, the following is a good starting list of primary source documents:


Operation Olympic Documents

AFPAC Staff Study, ‘Olympic Operation in Southern Kyushu’, 28 May 1945, RG 165, NARA

AFPAC Operations Instructions No. 1/9, 3 August 1945, RG 338, Box 193,

Engineer Annex to USAFPAC Operations Instructions No. 1, 20 June 1945, RG 338, Box 193

CINCPAC Staff Study ‘OLYMPIC’, 18 June 1945, RG 218, NARA

CINCPAC Operations Plan, OLYMPIC, USMC Geographic File, Japan, Box 50, Folder B1-1, WNRC

Sixth Army Field Order No. 74, Troop List, 28 July 1945, Records of the Strategic Plans Division, Box 187, NHC

Memo, Colonel Elliott to General Krueger, 28 June 1945, Sub: Command Request for Construction Groups and Construction Battalions for Olympic, RG 338, Box 196

Sixth Army Engineer Section Plans and Operations, 1943 – 1945, WNRC

Troop List of Service Troops to Stage through Luzon, 19 July 1945, RG 338, Box 59, Sixth Army G-4 Decimal File, 1943 – 46, File 4, WNRC

Memo, Sixth Army Engineer to Chief of Staff, 3 June 1945, RG 338, Box 59, Sixth Army G-4 Decimal File, 1943 – 1946

Letters, Allied Air Forces to CINCAFPAC, 3 August 1945 and CINCAFPAC to CGFEAF, RG 338, Box 191, File No. 5

Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet Operations Plan No. A11 – 45, 10 August 1945, NHC

Amphibious Corps Operation Plan, No. 1 – 45, 6 August 1945, USMC Geographic File, Japan, Box 52, WNRC

V Marine Amphibious Corps Operations Report, Occupation of Japan, Appendix 3 to Annex C, 30 November 1945, Marine Historical Centre, Washington DC;

I Corps Field Order, 4 August 1945, RG 94, Box 3089, File 201-3.9, WNRC

IX Corps Field Order No. 1, Operation OLYMPIC, 12 August 1945, RG 94, Box 4105, File 209-3.9, WNRC

IX Corps Report of Reconnaissance and Survey of Japanese Dispositions, Southern Kyushu (Operation OLYMPIC-MAJESTIC), 15 December 1945, RG 94, Box 4104, File 209-2.0, WNRC

XI Corps Staff Conferences on OLYMPIC, 6-9 July 1945, RG 94, Box 4159, File 2.11-0.5, WNRC

XI Corps Tentative Plan for AAA Employment for Operation OLYMPIC, 8 July 1945, RG 338, Box 17, Operations Reports and Related Records, 1944 – 46, WNRC

Basic Logistic Plan, OLYMPIC, in Fifth Air Force Logistical Plan for Operation OLYMPIC, US Air Force Historical Center, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington DC



Operation Coronet Documents

Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan, JWPC 46/5, 9 July 1943, RG 218, NARA

Outline Plan for the Invasion of the Kanto Plain, RG 218, CCS Honshu (7-19-44), NARA

AFPAC Staff Study CORONET, 15 August 1945, RG 165, NARA

Eighth Army, CORONET Operation, G-3 Plans (Invasion of Japan), May-June 1945, RG 407, Box 2836, WNRC

AFPAC, DOWNFALL, Strategic Plans for Operations in the Japanese Archipelago, 28 May 1945, RG 15, OPD 350.05, NARA

Staff Study of Cover and Deception Objectives for CORONET, JWPC 190/16, 26 July 1945, RG 218, NARA

Logistical Plan for the Invasion of the Kanto Plain, JLPC 47/10, 8 May 1945, RG 218, NARA

Memo, Marshall to Hull, 28 May 1945, Verifax 1193, Item 2288, Marshall Library;

Message, Hull to MacArthur, 29 May 1945, Verifax 1193, Item 2799, Marshall Library

Defensive Preparations in Japan, 2 August 1945, JIC 311, RG 218, NARA

Japanese Reaction to an Assault on the Kanto Plain (Tokyo) of Honshu, JIC 218/9, 10 July 1945, RG 218, NARA

Operations following Invasion of Kanto Plain (Broad Plans), JCS 1417, 10 July 1945, in CCS 381 POA (4-21-45), RG 218, NARA

‘Operations in Japan Following CORONET’, JWPC 333/1, 26 July 1945, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (microfilm edition)


This is a list of Secondary sources (both books and articles) that provide some very in-depth background on Japanese culture, industrial and military preparedness as applies to Operation Downfall:

Dennis Showalter, “Storm Over the Pacific,” in The Pacific War Companion (Oxford: Osprey Publications, 2005), 15.

Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1991), 44.

Iriye Akira, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War 1941–45 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1981), 66–9.

Peter J. Wooley, Geography & Japan’s Strategic Choices (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 10–11.

John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire (New York: Bantam Books, 1970),

EB Schumpeter, Ed., GC Allen, MS Gordon, The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo 1930–1940: Population, Raw Materials and Industry (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1940), 676–79

Takekoshi Yosoburo, The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilization of Japan Volume 3 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1930), 277.

Takekoshi Yosoburo, The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilization of Japan Volume 1 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1930), 282.

Joseph D’Autremer, The Japanese Empire and Its Economic Conditions (New York: Charles Scribner’s & Sons, 1910), 135.

GE and Denzil Baring Hubbard, Eastern Industrialization and Its Effect on the West (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), 2.

George Forty, Japanese Army Handbook 1939–45 (Sparkford, England: Sutton & Company, 2002), 95–103;

Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Penguin Group, 1999) This is the single book to own on Operation Downfall.

Okumiya Matsake and Horkioshi Jiro with Martin Cadin, Zero! (New York: EP Dutton & Company, 1956). Zero! is an excellent chronology of the deterioration of the Japanese Air Forces that should be taken in toto.

Jim Rearden, “Koga’s Zero,” Invention & Technology 13 (Fall 1997): 61, 63.

David C. Isby, “CA: Tactical Naval Warfare in the Pacific, 1941–43,” Strategy and Tactics Magazine # 38, May 1973,

Robert B. Edgerton, Warriors of the Rising Sum: A History of the Japanese Military (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997),

Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan (New York: The Free Press, 1985),

Walter Boyne, The Influence of Air Power Upon History (New York: Pelican Publishing Company, 2003),

Suzuki Kanji, “A Kamikaze’s Story,” MHQ: Military History Quarterly 7, Number 3 (Spring 1995).

George Feifer, Tennozan (New York: Tichnor & Fields, 1992)

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: Operation Downfall

#22

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 13 Sep 2010, 05:35

>>>Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Penguin Group, 1999) This is the single book to own on Operation Downfall.<<<

Just in case anyone missed it

Mil-tech Bard
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Re: Operation Downfall

#23

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 16 Sep 2010, 04:40

FRank's book is the single best book on the subject, but it should not be the only source.

Like most authors from the diplomatic or military history point of view, he gives short shrift to Mac Arthur's commanders for Olympic and Coronet.

General Kenney and his Far Eastern Air Forces were the key to suppressing the Kamikaze threat, but were only mentioned in passing as a part of the transportation attack plan. Kenney's people had spent three and a half years perfecting the destruction of air fields and had a suite of weapons and tactics that would make any sort of large scale organized, coordinated and concentrated mass Kamikaze strikes impossible.

The whole issue of the non-lethal chemical weapons -- particularly how the SWPA used and 6th Army intended to use large scale smoke screens -- is also absent. The 6th Army smoke plans for Olympic landing beaches were looking much like that for Salerno and Anzio with the Navy planning to cover naval anchorages and many radar pickets with smoke screens for twilight and high levels of moon light.

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Re: Operation Downfall

#24

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 16 Sep 2010, 04:44

'The Invasion of Japan. Alternative to the Bomb' by John R Skates was a interesting if difficult read. Any opinion of it?

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Re: Operation Downfall

#25

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 16 Sep 2010, 17:46

Carl Schwamberger wrote:'The Invasion of Japan. Alternative to the Bomb' by John R Skates was a interesting if difficult read. Any opinion of it?
1) Skates has done a great deal of original and first rate research on the American military plans for Downfall.

2) He has done some of the best cuts at the American lethal chemical warfare plans, AKA he paid attention to them.

3) He has a huge ax to grind over the A-bomb being unncessary and the casualties from Downfall being much less than post war estimates. He is very much of the "Diplomatic historian school" on the use of the a-bomb.

4) He did not pay attention to the Chemical Warfare Service non-lethal chemical weapon contributions to the war effort. (This is a systemic defect in the historical field, not just Skates.) He has throw away passages on flame throwing tanks and no mention at all of invasion landing, large scale smoke screen, plans.

5) IIRC, He also missed the whole US Army "R-table" infantry division reorganization that was going to show up for some of the Olympic divisions and particularly for all Operation Coronet infantry divisions. (Franks touched on some of this research on the US Army trying to give infantry replacements a 50% chance to survive the Japanese home island campaign, but also missed the full R-table reorganization.)

Number three shows up in his chapters on Japanese defenses, particularly Kamikaze plane numbers, and possible American casualties.

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Re: Operation Downfall

#26

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 18 Sep 2010, 00:05

Mil-tech Bard wrote:
Carl Schwamberger wrote:'The Invasion of Japan. Alternative to the Bomb' by John R Skates was a interesting if difficult read. Any opinion of it?
......

4) He did not pay attention to the Chemical Warfare Service non-lethal chemical weapon contributions to the war effort. (This is a systemic defect in the historical field, not just Skates.) He has throw away passages on flame throwing tanks and no mention at all of invasion landing, large scale smoke screen, plans.
My take was he left out most of the fine details of amphibious ops & the operations ashore. Just hit a very few of them as examples.
Mil-tech Bard wrote:5) IIRC, He also missed the whole US Army "R-table" infantry division reorganization that was going to show up for some of the Olympic divisions and particularly for all Operation Coronet infantry divisions. (Franks touched on some of this research on the US Army trying to give infantry replacements a 50% chance to survive the Japanese home island campaign, but also missed the full R-table reorganization.)
The R Division thing is fairly obscure. Tho one would expect it in a study of this subject.

I'm glad to see there is little heartburn over the fundamentals of his book. It could have been easily botched in a major way.

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Re: Operation Downfall

#27

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 18 Sep 2010, 07:56

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
Mil-tech Bard wrote:
Carl Schwamberger wrote:'The Invasion of Japan. Alternative to the Bomb' by John R Skates was a interesting if difficult read. Any opinion of it?
......

4) He did not pay attention to the Chemical Warfare Service non-lethal chemical weapon contributions to the war effort. (This is a systemic defect in the historical field, not just Skates.) He has throw away passages on flame throwing tanks and no mention at all of invasion landing, large scale smoke screen, plans.
My take was he left out most of the fine details of amphibious ops & the operations ashore. Just hit a very few of them as examples.
Mil-tech Bard wrote:5) IIRC, He also missed the whole US Army "R-table" infantry division reorganization that was going to show up for some of the Olympic divisions and particularly for all Operation Coronet infantry divisions. (Franks touched on some of this research on the US Army trying to give infantry replacements a 50% chance to survive the Japanese home island campaign, but also missed the full R-table reorganization.)
The R Division thing is fairly obscure. Tho one would expect it in a study of this subject.

I'm glad to see there is little heartburn over the fundamentals of his book. It could have been easily botched in a major way.

Carl,

Neither Franks nor Skates did a good job on "invasion details" because they both left out the most important detail.

The three US Army Engineer Special/Amphibious Brigades of the SWPA.

The 6th Army was going to land the three US Army Corps of Operation Olympic with the EAB's and keep their LCVP & LCM's for operations in and around Kyushu.

The example of the 8th Army's Southern Philippines campaign using the EAB's comes to mind here, as does the amphibious end around operations of the 6th Army at Leyte.

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Re: Operation Downfall

#28

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 25 Sep 2010, 16:35

Carl,

This is something Franks, Skates, and Polmar et al all missed about the R-table infantry divisions:
============================
MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER
THE EVOLUTION OF DIVISIONS AND SEPARATE BRIGADES


by
John B. Wilson


CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C., 1998

http://www.history.army.mil/books/linea ... apter7.htm

Chapter VII:

The Crucible -- Combat


In January 1945, recognizing these organizational problems, the War Department began to revise the infantry division structure for units planned for redeployment from Europe, after the defeat of Germany, to the Pacific theater to aid in the conquest of Japan. The War Department cast aside its policy of rejecting changes in units because of personnel considerations and directed staff agencies to prepare tables for sound fighting teams. It ordered the elimination of dual assignments for personnel, the addition of any equipment listed earlier as special but that had been used routinely, provisions for more adequate communications in all components, and an expansion of military police resources. The infantry regiment was to receive more mobile, self-propelled howitzers and better antitank weapons. Later the War Department instructions indicated that the revised structure would not be limited to use in the war against Japan.56

On 1 March 1945 Army Ground Forces submitted three proposals for reorganizing the infantry division. Each specified different manning levels, but the planners recommended the one that maximized the division's size and firepower. An enlarged infantry regiment with 700 additional men provided more punch. The weapons platoon in each rifle company had two new sections, one with six 2.36-inch rocket launchers and the other with three 57-mm. recoilless rifles.57 In the battalion's weapons company a new platoon of six 75-mm. recoilless rifles augmented the two platoons equipped with light and heavy machine guns. Because the regiment's 105-mm. howitzers lacked cross-country mobility for close support, commanders had tied the cannon company to the field artillery fire direction center to serve as an additional indirect fire battery. Army Ground Forces thus replaced the cannon company with a tank company comprising nine tanks. The tanks also replaced the 57-mm. towed guns in the antitank company, which were too lightly armored and judged to be too road-
[198]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

bound. The number of truck drivers, communications and postal personnel, and ammunition bearers was increased. The military police force grew from a platoon to a company and a signal battalion replaced the signal company. A tank battalion was added to the division and a fourth company to the division engineer battalion. To expand the "eyes and ears" of the division, the reconnaissance troop was increased in size and authorized two light aircraft. These changes together resulted in a proposed divisional strength of 18,285 personnel, an increase of 4,248 men over the January 1945 figure.58

On 5 April the Army Staff informed Army Ground Forces that because of expected personnel shortages divisions could not be reorganized according to any of the proposed changes. Instead, the staff directed the command to prepare another set of tables that would increase personnel for communications, replace the military police platoon with a company, enlarge each 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzer battery from four to six pieces, and restructure the infantry regiment along the lines of the March proposal. Shortly after issuing these instructions, the staff told Army Ground Forces that about fifty more men could be added to the division for various service duties.59

On 1 June the War Department published tables for the infantry division calling for 15,838 officers and enlisted men. The division met most of the Army Staff's guidance, except for the proposed increases in the artillery batteries. The planners believed that the new organization gave the division more mobility, flexibility, and firepower, in particular for tank warfare. No unit, however, adopted the structure until October 1945.60

[199]
The average R-table infantry regiment in the Invasion of Japan would have,
1) An additional 7-man flame thrower/Bazooka squad per infantry platoon,
2) 27x57mm in the infantry company weapons platoons,
3) 18x75mm in the battalion anti-tank sections,
4) Nine M4(105mm) or M7 SPM to replace six towed 105mm infantry guns, and
5) Nine M26 Pershings or M4(76mm) tanks replacing the six 57mm towed guns

The Okinawa combat test of the recoilless rifles saw two 57mm silence 24 cave positions in one day of combat before they ran out of ammo with the following results
1) 10 of the 24 cave openings were buried,
2) Three more positions were opened so other weapons could kill people inside,
3) One engagement saw a heavy machine gun confirmed destroyed, and
4) The remaining 10 positions had 57mm shells burst inside the aperture opening.

The average engagement was five shells per position engaged with hits starting on the third shell fired with 3.1 hits per position.

The important thing was that the ranges these positions were engaged at were between 750 to 1050 yards!

The amount of direct fire HE firepower of an R-table infantry regiment was equal to a non R-Table in US Army infantry regiment supported by a US Army independent tank battalion.

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Re: Operation Downfall

#29

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 26 Sep 2010, 17:33

A Duffer's guide to researching Operation Downfall On-line

The following is a list of on-line resources for non-academics researching materials related to Operation Downfall with in some cases notes I pulled from the source documents.

This list is continually being updated as URL change/fail and not all materials listed have URL associated with them as they were books or resources that were pulled from those on-line documents for later research.

Feel free to use the list in your research.

==================
Operation Downfall: The Planned Assault on Japan
This is the single best on-line resource for Downfall I have found.

The maps alone are very much worth that endorsement.
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wa ... fall1.html

World War II in the Pacific
Operation Downfall : Olympic and Coronet
The Invasion of Japan
http://www.ww2pacific.com/downfall.html

Operation Downfall, The Planned Invasion of Japan on November 1st. 1945
Ahoy - Mac's Web Log
Naval, Maritime, Australian History and more
Mackenzie J Gregory
http://ahoy.tk-jk.net/macslog/Operation ... Plann.html

Operation Downfall
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall


------------------------------------
United States Army in World War II
The War in the Pacific
Triumph in the Philippines
by
Robert Ross Smith

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA ... index.html

Reports
of
General MacArthur

THE CAMPAIGNS OF
MACARTHUR IN THE PACIFIC
VOLUME I

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... m#contents

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey
Japan's Struggle to End the War
Chairman's Office
1 July 1946
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USS ... index.html


The Amphibians
Came to Conquer
THE STORY OF
ADMIRAL
RICHMOND KELLY TURNER

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ACTC/index.html


"Planning for Use of PT Boats at Okinawa
Before relating the story of the Okinawa assault, the reason for the absence of PT boats in the assault forces will be mentioned.

Vice Admiral Turner, and many other naval officers who had witnessed the PT boat operations in the Guadalcanal and New Georgia operations, thought that the PT boats were anywhere from somewhat to vastly overrated by the public and the press.

Admiral Hall tells the story that prior to the Okinawa operation the overall commander of the PT boats, who had participated in the South Pacific operations, reported to him in Leyte for duty in connection with training for the upcoming Okinawa landings. Admiral Hall asked Admiral Turner by despatch what part the PT boats would play in the operations so he could arrange appropriate training for them. Vice Admiral Turner informed Admiral Hall that the PT boats would not even be allowed to enter the Okinawa area until D plus 4 or later. Admiral Hall explained:

He evidently had no use for them, and I had no use for them. When I was doing my part of the Normandy landing, (OMAHA Beach) they were of no use whatsoever.32"

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ACTC/actc-24.html

At Close Quarters: PT Boats in the United States Navy
by
Captain Robert J. Bulkley, Jr.
USNR (Retired)
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/CloseQu ... index.html

Transport Doctrine
Amphibious Forces U.S. Pacific Fleet
September 1944
A16-3/P11

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref ... index.html

Chapter XXX Use of Smoke in Amphibious Operations.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref ... rt-30.html

Chapter XXVII Gunfire Support
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref ... rt-27.html


Across the Reef: The Amphibious Tracked Vehicle at War By Victor J. Croizat

http://books.google.com/books?id=2vRYgv ... on&f=false

Rising Sun Victorious: An Alternate History of the Pacific War By Peter G. Tsouras

http://books.google.com/books?id=MY6WwV ... &q&f=false


Beans, Bullets and Black Oil: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific During World War II,
by Rear Adm. Worrall Reed Carter, USN (Retired)

http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/BBBO/index.html


Gray Steel and Black Oil: Fast Tankers and Replenishment at Sea in the U.S. Navy, 1912-1992, by Thomas Wildenberg
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/GSBO/index.html


The Final Months of the War With Japan: Signals Intelligence, U.S. Invasion Planning, and the A-Bomb Decision

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- ... 10001.html


Reports of General MacArthur
CHAPTER XIV
JAPAN'S SURRENDER
PLATE NO. 130
Aerial Bombardment of Japan
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... /p_130.jpg

US Army in WW2
Campaign in the Marianas
Part Three
Tinian
CHAPTER XIII
American and Japanese Plans
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA ... as-13.html

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN: Marines in the Victory on Okinawa
by Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret)
http://www.nps.gov/archive/wapa/indepth ... 0/sec1.htm


History of U.S. Marine Corps
Operations in World War II
Volume III:
Central Pacific Drive
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar////USMC ... html#index


History of the USMC Operations in World War II
PART IV
Saipan: The Decisive Battle

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar////USMC ... -IV-1.html


History of U.S. Marine Corps
Operations in World War II
Volume V:
Victory and Occupation

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/V/index.html#index


History of U.S. Marine Corps
Operations in World War II
Volume V:
Victory and Occupation
Appendix J
Comparison of Equipment--Marine Division1

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/V/USMC-V-J.html

COMINCH P-009
Antiaircraft Action Summary
Suicide Attacks
April 1945

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep ... index.html


SECRET INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 24

Battle Experience
Radar Pickets and Methods of Combating
Suicide Attacks Off Okinawa
March-May 1945
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Kam ... index.html


"SMOKE, USE OF

CO USS Purdy comments:

This vessel used smoke only as ordered when at anchor in HAGUSHI BEACH area or at KERAMA RETTO. When in the HAGUSHI BEACH area, smoke coverage was excellent. In the KERAMA RETTO area the Purdy was stationed to windward where smoke coverage was relatively ineffective. It is believed that too few smoke boats are stationed to adequately cover ships in that direction.

ComPhibPac comments:

The determining factor of whether or not to use smoke as a protective measure against suicide attacks, as well as against orthodox enemy air attacks, is whether or not the concealment of ships from enemy planes is sufficient to warrant the reduced efficiency of our AA fire. If ships are only partially covered with smoke or if only some of the ships are covered, the use of smoke is not warranted. The following principles are based on the above:

Do not use smoke at sea, day or night.

Use smoke to cover an anchorage or transport area during low visibility, morning or evening twilight, should be governed by whether or not the ships can be effectively hidden from view of enemy planes. If planes can see the ships or make out their outlines through the smoke, smoke should not be used.

The decision to use smoke to cover an anchorage or transport area during low visibility, morning or evening twilight, should be governed by whether or not the ships can be effectively hidden from view of enemy planes. If planes can see the ships or make out their outlines through the smoke, smoke should not be used."

and

"CHAPTER 81
RADAR PICKETS AND METHODS OF COMBATING SUICIDE ATTACKS OFF OKINAWA
MARCH - MAY 1945
PREFACE
Radar Picket duty on isolated stations 350 miles from the coast


F. Use of Fog Oil Smoke by Small Craft Picket Supports: The fog oil smoke screen provided in the Hagushi transport area at night was most effective. In the event small craft are detailed to give close support to radar pickets, it is suggested that for use in night attacks the small craft be equipped with suitable supply of fog oil and necessary generators. A formation employing the small craft making smoke to windward might then provide considerable protection for the radar picket vessel unless, of course, wind conditions were too unfavorable. Since high speed and maneuverability are not attributes of these craft anyway (assuming the picket is also a small or medium type), nothing would be lost by slowing to speeds most suitable for taking advantage of the smoke by maneuvering beneath it."



COMINCH P-0011
Anti-Suicide Action Summary
August 1945
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Kam ... index.html



Information Bulletin · No. 29
Antiaircraft Action Summary · World War II
October 1945
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
UNITED STATES FLEET
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Kam ... index.html


Hyperwar US Navy in World War II
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/index.html


Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal
by Vice Admiral Homer N. Wallin, USN (Ret.)
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/Wallin/index.html

Naval Operations in the Pacific from March 1944 to October 1945
"Anchors Aweigh"
[Excerpted from Admiral Earnest J. King, Second Report to the Secretary of the Navy: Covering Combat Operations from 1 March 1944 to 1 March, 1945. March 1945, pp. 103-133 and Second Report to the Secretary of the Navy: Covering the period 1 March 1945 to 1 October 1945. December 1945, pp. 173-204]
http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/Compac45.html


Olympic vs. Ketsu-Go

Marine Corps Gazette, August 1965, Vol. 49, No. 8.
Dr. K. Jack Bauer describes the United States' plans to assault Kyushu in the fall of 1945, a preliminary to the more massive invasion of Honshu.

http://www.warbirdforum.com/olympic.htm


American war plans, 1941-1945: the test of battle By Steven T. Ross

http://books.google.com/books?id=cdExF8 ... an&f=false



GUIDE TO JAPANESE MONOGRAPHS AND JAPANESE STUDIES ON MANCHURIA 1945-1960

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/guide.html


Hyperwar Japanese Monographs
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/Monos/index.html


Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's war in the Pacific, 1942-1945 By Robert L. Eichelberger, Emma Gudger Eichelberger, Jay Luvaas

http://books.google.com/books?id=XpKHdg ... va&f=false


General Kenney reports: a personal history of the Pacific War By George Churchill Kenney, United States. Air Force. Office of Air Force
http://books.google.com/books?id=tWdbng ... am&f=false


Huber, Thomas M.
Japan's battle of Okinawa, April to June 1945 / by Thomas M.
Huber.
p. em.- (Leavenworth papers 18, ISSN 01953451 ; no. IS)

http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/ ... ber.asp#81


Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific
by
Major Chas. S. Nichols, Jr., USMC
Henry I. Shaw, Jr.
Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
1955

http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-M ... index.html

History of U.S. Marine Corps
Operations in World War II
Volume V: Victory and Occupation
by
Benis M. Frank and Henry I. Saw, Jr.
Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
1968
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/V/index.html


Project SPHINX: The question of the use of gas in the planned invasion of Japan
Author: John Ellis van Courtland Moona
Affiliation: a Professor of history, Fitchburg State College,
DOI: 10.1080/01402398908437381
Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year
Published in: Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 12, Issue 3 September 1989 , pages 303 - 323
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/conten ... a789934815

2nd Engineer Special Brigade
http://www.2esb.org/04_History/04_History.htm

3rd Engineer Special Brigade
http://ebsr.net/3rdESB2.htm

533rd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment
http://ebsr.net/Chronology.htm

Operation Zipper: The Invasion of Malaya, August 1945
v. 1.0 May 6, 2001
This historical order of battle is the work of Dr. Graham Watson.

http://www.orbat.com/site/history/histo ... ipper.html


HMS TRUMPETER
Escort Carrier
Ex USS Bastian ACV/AVG-47/CVE-37
Became USS Bastion 1946
Alblasserdijk 1948, Irene Valmas 1966.

"Operation Zipper, the recapture of Malaya, was put into effect, but without a previously arranged air and sea bombardment. Over 100,000 troops landed at various points escorted by HMS Nelson, Richelieu, Nigeria, Cleopatra, Royalist and Ceylon, with the escort carriers Hunter, Stalker, Archer, Khedive, Emperor, Pursuer and Trumpeter with 15 destroyers."

http://www.fleetairarmarchive.net/Ships/TRUMPETER.html


Royal Navy: Fleet Air Army , August 1945
v.1.0 April 7, 2002
Graham Watson
BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET

http://www.orbat.com/site/history/histo ... a1945.html


ALLIED LAND FORCES SOUTH EAST ASIA, September 1945
v.1.0 May 6, 2001
This historical orbat is the work of Dr. Graham Watson.

http://www.orbat.com/site/history/histo ... a1945.html


AUSTRALIAN ARMY AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
IN THE SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC: 1942-45
THE MILITARY STRATEGY AND COMMAND ASPECTS OF THE
AUSTRALIAN ARMY'S AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA
David Horner

http://www.defence.gov.au/army/ahu/docs ... Horner.pdf


Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 1 – Army - Volume Vol7
Volume VII – The Final Campaigns (1st edition, 1963)
Author: Gavin Long

http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/second_ ... elID=67909


Japanese Naval Ground Forces
CINCPAC Bulletin 11-45

http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref/KYE ... index.html



Reports Control Symbol
CSCAP (OT) 87
Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II
* * *
Final Report
7 December 1941 -- 31 December 1946

http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/Cas ... index.html



The Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee
Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses
During World War II by All Causes
February 1947
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/J ... index.html




Chapter IV-2
Kyushu Deployment to December 1945
KYUSHU OCCUPATION1
Original plans for the occupation of Japan
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/V/USMC-V-IV-2.html

27. In late November, in order to determine whether the VAC plan for OLYMPIC was valid and feasible, Brigadier General William W. Rogers, VAC chief of staff, called into Sasebo for a three-day war games session the commanders, chiefs of staff, and principal staff officers of the Japanese forces which were to have defended Kyushu. In the course of these sessions, the play of the games was based on the VAC plan and the defense orders and plans which the Japanese participants brought with them, after some initial reluctance to do so on their part. Questions were asked at random, capabilities and reaction times were measured, and all conceivable factors were taken into consideration. The Japanese were asked how long it would have taken them to move one division. Instead of the 36 hours that the Marines had expected, the answer was 9 days. The reason was that the former enemy commanders could only move their troops at night, and by foot, because of the complete American air superiority over the target by day. At the completion of the war games, it was decisively proven that U.S. air superiority had in fact guaranteed success to the VAC plan. In addition, although the strength of Japanese forces in the south of Kyushu was great, many soldiers were armed with spears only. The more than 2,000 aircraft on Kyushu posed a threat to the American landing, but these planes were held back to be employed in a mass Kamikaze attack which was never ordered. The entire three days of sessions were conducted on a thoroughly professional basis with attention paid to mutual courtesy and respect. In the end, General Rogers was satisfied that the VAC plan would have been valid, if OLYMPIC had been consummated. Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., comments to HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 19Aug66.

---------------------
All of the following will need Adobe PDF file format readers in your web browsers:


CARDL search link with "Intelligence report on Japanese chemical warfare" as the search term:

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/results.ph ... SOROOT=all



Intelligence report on Japanese chemical warfare, Volume I; general organization, policies and intentions, tactics.

Contains a comprehensive description and evaluation of the Japanese capacity to wage chemical warfare. Comparisons of knowledge, techniques, materiel and procedures to those of the United States on the...

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewe ... X=1&REC=18


Intelligence report on Japanese chemical warfare.


Volume II
THE CHEMICAL WArFARE RESEARCH AND
Development WORK OF THE JAPANESE
1 March 1946
Office of the Chief Chemical Officer
General Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific
Tokyo, Japan

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.p ... 1568&REC=8


Intelligence report on Japanese chemical warfare. Volume V, part G; Japanese chemical warfare equipment and materiel.

This report covers and describes the variety of Japanese chemical warfare items found in Japan and Korea by the intelligence teams assigned to collect this material. The information is generally non-technical...

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.p ... 646&REC=15


Intelligence report on Japanese chemical warfare. Volume V, part H; Japanese chemical warfare equipment and materiel.

This report covers and describes the variety of Japanese chemical warfare items found in Japan and Korea by the intelligence teams assigned to collect this material. The information is generally non-technical...

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.p ... 838&REC=18



Kamikaze special attack force.

An explanation of the Kamikaze Special Attack Force written for the Japanese people. From a translation of an article in the Weekly Report of 8 November 1944 issued by the Cabinet Information Board.

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewe ... OX=1&REC=9

Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command record, Mid-1941 - August 1945.

The basic material contained in this monograph was compiled and written in Japanese by former officers on duty in command and staff units within major units during periods of operations during World War...

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.p ... 2409&REC=3


Defense installations on Iwo Jima.

Contains a photographic survey of the different Japanese defense installations on Iwo Jima as well as mapping of the mines, blockhouses, anti-aircraft, covered artillery, coastal defense, and enemy installations....

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.p ... =669&REC=7


Report of capture, occupation, and defense of Iwo Jima.

This is the commanding general's report of the capture, occupation, development, and defense of Iwo Jima, representing an important step in the prosecution of the war against Japan. The enclosures for...

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewe ... X=1&REC=20

Participation in the Okinawa Operation, volume I.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.p ... =439&REC=7

Participation in the Okinawa Operation, volume II.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.p ... 430&REC=20

U.S. Army transportation in the Southwest Pacific area, 1941-1947.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.p ... =903&REC=1


Tenth Army: Action report: Ryukyus: 26 March to 30 June 1945. Volume I.

Vol. I of II. Volume I begins with roster of officers HQ, Tenth Army. Report of the Tenth Army mission in the Okinawa and Ryukyus campaign. Includes task force organization, planning, training, embarkation,...

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.p ... =599&REC=2

Tenth Army: Action report: Ryukyus: 26 March to 30 June 1945. Volume II.

Vol. II of II. Report of the Tenth Army mission in the Okinawa and Ryukyus campaign. Includes task force organization, planning, training, embarkation, movement, military operations summary, enemy tactics,...

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.p ... =610&REC=3


Antiaircraft artillery activities in the Pacific war.

This report is a summary of the operations of antiaircraft artillery from December 1941 until August 1945 against the enemy in the Pacific theater. Engagements with aircraft, protection to airfields, supply...

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.p ... 997&REC=16


Collection World War II Operational Documents

Title Occupation of Japan.

Abstract Report of the part played by the 98th Infantry Division in the Occupation of Japan. It covers the transition of the Division from preparation for combat to planning for occupation; the rapid planning and execution of an overseas movement and amphibious land; and finally, the establishment of control over the Osaka Area of Honshu, Japan.

Keyword World War, 1939-1945; World War Two; WWII; Post-World War II; Japanese occupation; Allied occupation; Japanese constitution; Stability and reconstruction operations (SRO); Japan; Japanese history; Japanese culture; Pacific Theater of Operations
Publisher Osaka, Japan : Headquarters 98th Infantry Division,

Date, Original 1945
Date, Digital 2008-07-21
Resource Type Textual; Maps
Format PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 76 p.; 7.41 MB.
Call number N12834-A
Language eng
Release statement Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Repository Combined Arms Research Library
Library Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created 2009-06-02

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewe ... X=1&REC=20


Basic outline plan for Blacklist operations to occupy Japan proper and Korea after surrender or collapse: Annexes.

Plans for how the allies were going to occupy Japan and Korea after their defeat.

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.p ... 230&REC=14


Basic outline plan for Blacklist operations to occupy Japan proper and Korea after surrender or collapse.

The attached basic outline plan covers operations to occupy Japan Proper and Korea after surrender or collapse of the Japanese Government and Imperial High Command.

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewe ... OX=1&REC=6


Tentative troop list by type units for Blacklist operations.

The attached troop list by type unit, "BLACKLIST" Operations, contains an allocation of type units, adjusted to availability in the Western Pacific for the months of August and September 1945 for use as...

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewe ... OX=1&REC=3


Japanese plans for the defense of Kyushu.

This report discusses the defensive plans of Kyushu, Japan, based on Sixth Army's estimates and intelligence. The information was compiled for Operation Olympic, the invasion of Japan. The report is dated...

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewe ... X=1&REC=15

===================
Research without links:

Robert Amory Jr, Surf and Sand: The Saga of the 533d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment and 1461st Engineer Maintenance Company 1942- 1945.

Barbey, Daniel D. MacArthur's Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Operations, 1943-45, Annapolis MD, US Naval Institute Press, 1969

James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: Soldier of Freedom (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1970).

M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: Return to the Philippines, vol. IV, The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954).

Stanley L. Falk, Decision at Leyte (New York: Norton, 1966).

James A. Field, The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: The Sho Operation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947).

Frazier Hunt, The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur (New York: Delvin-Adair, 1954).

D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, vol. II, 1941-45 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1975). 0395204461

Eric Larrabee, Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and their War (New York: Harper & Row, 1987).

William D. Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (London: Victor Gollancz, 1950).

Gavin Long, MacArthur as Military Commander (London: B. T. Batsford, Ltd., 1969).

Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).

William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964 (New York: Little, Brown & Co., 1978).

Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two Ocean War (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1963).

Samuel Eliot Morison, Leyte, vol. XII, History of United Sates Naval Operations in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1958).

Samuel Eliot Morison, monograph, Strategy and Compromise (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1958).

E.B. Potter, Nimitz (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976).

Ronald H. Spector, Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan (New York: The Free Press, 1985).

Adrian Stewart, The Battle of Leyte Gulf (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1980).

John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire (New York: Random House, 1970).

Dan Van Der Vat, The Pacific Campaign: World War II, The U.S.-Japanese Naval War, 1941-45 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981).

C. Vann Woodward, The Battle of Leyte Gulf (New York: MacMillan, 1947).



=================

Mil-tech Bard
Member
Posts: 678
Joined: 06 Jan 2010, 16:50

Re: Operation Downfall

#30

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 02 Oct 2010, 17:17

I have been researching the TO&E of the Operation Olympic infantry divisions and found evidence that the lessons learned written up by 10th Army were being implemented for the 40th infantry Division training in Panay for its landing on Koshike Retto.

The 10th Army lessons learned called for about 140 M29C Weasel tracked carriers to displace 140 jeeps in an infantry regiment, called for lots of tank-infantry training before combat, for replacing towed guns in the regimental cannon companies with 105mm M7 SPM on a one-for one basis, for replacing 2&1/2 ton truck prime movers for division artillery with M-5 fast tracted carriers and replacing the 37mm AT-gun in the anti-tank companies with M-18 Hellcat 76mm tank destroyers on a one for one basis.

This passage comes from the 49th ID history titled 40TH INFANTRY DIVISION: THE YEARS OF WORLD WAR 2, 7 DEC 1941 - 7 APR 1946, page 144:

In addition to planning for the OLYMPIC Operation, the Division was from 1 July until the Japanese surrender on 16 August, concerned with the relief and return to PANAY of supporting service units still concluding missions of NEGROS, the reception and screening of replacements, the re-equipping of the Division, and, finally a detailed program of combat refresher training. Troops attended Division schools on the M-7 self-propelled Howitzer, combined tank-infantry tactics, chemical warfare, operations of the Weasel supply vehicle, graves registration, and signal training


It looks likely that all the US Army Pacific theater infantry divisions involved in the Olympic Operation were going to be rearming their regimental towed gun cannon companies with M-7 105mm SPM (the 96th ID had them at Okinawa), M-8 75mm SPM (7th ID had them in Leyte and Okinawa) or M4(105mm).

As there were three tank destroyer battalions in Luzon (two M-18 and one M-10) all being re-armed with M-36 90mm tank destroyers. So there were enough M-18 on-hand (72) in Luzon to rearm 12 regimental cannon companies. This covers the XI Corps and the 158th RCT on Luzon, but leaves out the 11th Airborne Division.

Right off hand, I don't know if the Airborne Division TO&E has a regimental cannon company. I do know the 11th AD was going to have an attached tank battalion for Olympic.

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