Roddoss72 wrote:While i agree with your statement, i humbly disagree with your assesment on the timeline of the Luftwaffe, espessially with the strategic bomber programme. If an very infuential man such as General Walther Wever lives on, to whom advocated a strategic bomber programme, and at the time of his death was head to the RLM the very department that issues orders to maunfatures to develop aircraft and to suppliers of aero-engine manufactures, General Walther Wever had the final say in the develpoment of Luftwaffe Policy, but also he was Reichmarschal Hermann Görings deputy.
What i am saying with Wevers death the Luftwaffe changed in a completely new direction, and happened fast, within 24hrs of his death Wevers dream of Germany having a strategic bomber force was effectively cancelled, it was not until 1943 that Göring tried to make up time, but 9 years of inaction cost Germany dearly. Also in the thread i had many time indicated that General Walther Wever knew that the main role of the Luftwaffe would always be a supporting role with a strong tactical bomber force, even he admitted that a strategic bomber force can not interfere in the tactical bomber force, but compliment it, it was never his intention that the Luftwaffe would be saturated with heavy bombers.
Its pretty well documented that before he died Wever cancelled the Ural bomber projected as hopeless and asked that only 6 Do19's were made into trainers, backing the "A" Bomber project, which became the He 177:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177
It wasn't ready for action anyway until 1942. Wever could have backed the project to the hilt, which he probably would have, but that doesn't change the development timetable or design problems of the model that Wever couldn't change, as he was not an aircraft designer.
That said, after his death Göring cancelled the 6 Do19 trainers, which would have provided valuable experience in determining what the Luftwaffe required for a strategic bomber fleet. Wimmer was also dismissed when Wever died, and he could have been very helpful for some technical issues, but not enough to move the development timetables up by more than a few months. Historically Göring also pursued the Heavy Bomber option and wasn't against it at all, but the project was fraught with too many technical troubles stemming from over a decade of enforced halts on German aviation development, NOT from a lack of will or resources. Wever surviving doesn't change enough to have a operational heavy bomber ready before mid-1941, but his survival prevents the command fragmentation that resulted from his death, as well as requirement that all bombers be dive bombing capable, which changes the development for aircraft like the Ju 88 and He177 for the better, but without changing the time line by more than a few months.
While there is a very interesting story to be told about Wever surviving, it does not include He177's over London. Moscow and the Urals maybe, but not very likely. The Luftwaffe would be better run for sure, which has operational effects from 1943 on, but these mean different thing than what you'd think and obviously want.
So if you were that interested in a suitable POD for the heavy bomber, you're better off having the Germans steal the plans for the B17 like they historically took the Norton Bombsight and produce it themselves, but even then the issue of building up decent engine factories is the crucial part, without them the best airframe is useless (Me 262...)