June 1940. Italy invades Malta.

[BDV]

If the Italians remove all their air assets and all their inshore naval capacity from everywhere else in the Med to support and protect this operation - exactly WHAT is there to stop the British - on the outbreak of war with the Italians - from rolling up Rhodes and the Dodecanese with three men and a rowing boat???

A Malta operation in 1940 makes the Italians vulnerable in MANY areas...

Well, summer 1940, there is the Meier's Stupendous Fire-and-Water Show going on over the Home Isles. So men will not be dispatched easily. But as soon as this show subsides, British will start pushing back (e.g. Compass). So italians need to make their moves (if any) in June-July 1940.

Getting Rhodes and/or Dodecanese would bring forth the greeks, yielping for them. What're Britons gonna do? If they hand them to the greeks, these will say: "Thank you very much, how about Cyprus, so we can forgive you for 1922?" If they don't, Greeks will get crossed even more (Greeks are still smarting, in 2010 about british "treachery" in 1922).

And these islands are so useful in Italian hands stoking tensions between Greece and Italy, at no cost for Great Britain...

P.S. If Italians bring on overwhelming airpower, why would warning or no-warning even matter?

[phylo_roadking]

Well, summer 1940, there is the Meier's Stupendous Fire-and-Water Show going on over the Home Isles. So men will not be dispatched easily. But as soon as this show subsides, British will start pushing back (e.g. Compass). So italians need to make their moves (if any) in June-July 1940.

Oh dear god. Do you recall that only a few posts ago you were recommended to brush up on your WWII history??? The British DID start the pushing in the Western Desert! AND they did so when the BoB was being fought....and took the decision in Whitehall to ramp up the war in the Med against the Italians in late JULY, with the troops being dispatched to Egypt in AUGUST.

I.E. they did not wait for Goering's Folly to come to an end - they barely waited for it to START before they started pressuring the Italians in Libya with the Western Desert Force's raids into Libya!

[RichTO90]

They would need to, and what would stop them from doing it?

Why nothing at all...for a wargamer moving his counters about on the board. But the real world has some real world limitations. Airfields aren't simply neat little marks in a hex, they're also complex installations that require a certain amount of infrastructure to service a certain number of aircraft. Fuel, ammunition, and spare parts have to be available in the numbers required to service the aircraft and the personnel and facilities have to be in place to do so. You might have twigged to the fact that Sicily's 22 airfields supported something on the order of fewer than ten aircraft each and wondered why that was.

That's the only area where they could create any sizeable advantage.

No, that's the only area where a wargamer can create such an advantage by shuffling counters about...that's rather a difference. For one thing, the Italian Regia Aeronautica was simply not designed or organized to be shuffled willy-nilly about like that. Their air forces were integrated units of fighters and bombers with their own reconnaissance assets and simply weren't conducive to being re-organized a la wargamer style.

Allegedly of the 3000 planes Italians had available in June 1940, only 60% were operational. If they fly 1,000 against Malta that leaves 800 for defense/reserve.

Aircraft that they owned perhaps, but in terms of actual aircraft serving with operational units the most important were 130 Br.65, 172 Br.20, and 612 SM.79 bombers and 118 G.50 and 144 C.200 monoplane fighters.

There should be at least another 27 airfields in Calabria, Tripolitania, and Cyrenaica. Works out to 20 airplanes per airfield. Italian airfields may be small, and ground crews lazy/incompetent but is it too much to expect them to handle 20-30 planes?!

More than that actually. There were 22 in Western Libya and 44 in Eastern Libya, but a lot of those were simply bare spots in the desert. They're also 400 to 800 kilometers from Malta...or more. Considering the effective combat range of both the Italian medium bombers was 800 to 900 kilometers that keeps them in range at least...but none of the fighters.

The bombers had longer ranges (SM79, Fiat BR20 > 2,500 km), can come from Lybia and Calabria, while fighters (CR42 ~750 km, but Macchi200 only ~550 km), which also need to loiter a bit, would fly from the nearest airfields.

Those are ferry ranges and have nothing to do with useful combat range. As a rule of thumb that can be taken as one-third the ferry range, but may be even less.

It's very reasonable to argue that Italians would fail miserably to coordinate 1,000 planes coming from ~30 airfields, but they had the physical means (planes and airfields in range) to do it.

Sigh...yes, very reasonable indeed since with bombers flying from Calabria and Libya and fighters from Sicily the chance of any form of co-operation is exactly nil. Simple timing would be a nightmare and probably would be ignored. Essentially the best that could be hoped for would be a more or less continuous stream of aircraft showing up over Maltese airspace to drop their ordnance somewhere... :roll:

Mind you, just how that is supposed to support a landing is beyond me?

[phylo_roadking]

Getting Rhodes and/or Dodecanese would bring forth the greeks, yielping for them. What're Britons gonna do? If they hand them to the greeks, these will say: "Thank you very much, how about Cyprus, so we can forgive you for 1922?" If they don't, Greeks will get crossed even more (Greeks are still smarting, in 2010 about british "treachery" in 1922).

No - they're going to do what Churchill wanted to do in the autumn of 1940 - forge an tripartite neutrals' pact in the Near East of Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria IIRC....and probably hand back the islands to Greece to sweeten the deal. This came to nothing because the Italians got Neutral Greece embroiled in the war before any real steps could be taken to arrange it. But the important thing in answer to your point is that the expressed intention was there as Churchill's policy.

[RichTO90]

Oh dear god. Do you recall that only a few posts ago you were recommended to brush up on your WWII history??? The British DID start the pushing in the Western Desert! AND they did so when the BoB was being fought....and took the decision in Whitehall to ramp up the war in the Med against the Italians in late JULY, with the troops being dispatched to Egypt in AUGUST.

I.E. they did not wait for Goering's Folly to come to an end - they barely waited for it to START before they started pressuring the Italians in Libya with the Western Desert Force's raids into Libya!

Actually Phylo, no, it was the Tenth Army Lumber Across the Wire that opened the ball in the desert. Some eight divisions in stately phalanxes advancing across the desert, harrassed by an armoured car squadron supported by a tank regiment, a motorized battalion, and a few batteries of Royal Artillery, which inflicted some 800 casualties for almost no loss...except about 200 kilometers of desert. They then settled down for four months to see what Wavell might do...

Of course, if they wait in this "scenario" then good old Mussolini is gonna send off the cream of the Regia Aeronautica to France to show solidarity with his buddy Dolfie.

[The_Enigma]

I've got the exact numbers somewhere, but roughly 200 light and 80 medium tanks were lost by the end of January 1941.

Playfair places medium tank losses at 180; pretty heavy if one recalls the somewhat low output of them![/quote]

[phylo_roadking]

The British DID start the pushing in the Western Desert!

Rich...I know it's only Wiki. but...

On 11 June 1940, the day after Italy declared war on the Allies, the Italian forces stationed in Libya and the British and Commonwealth forces stationed in Egypt began a series of raids on each other. Among the more notable raids was a raid by the 11th Hussars within 24 hours of Italy's declaration of war. The armoured cars crossed the border into Libya and captured Italian prisoners who apparently did not know that war had been declared. On 12 June, another sixty-three Italians were taken prisoner during a raid.

On 14 June, the 11th Hussars, the 7th Hussars, and one company of the 60th Rifles captured Fort Capuzzo and Fort Maddalena and another 220 prisoners were taken. On 16 June, a deep raid into Italian territory resulted in the destruction of 12 Italian tanks. In addition, a convoy was intercepted on the Tobruk-Bardia highway, part of the Via Balbia, and an Italian general was captured.

After 25 June, France had signed an armistice with Italy and Italian divisions and materials from the Fifth Army in Tripolitania could be dispersed to reinforce and strengthen the Tenth Army in Cyrenaica. In time, the Tenth Army had ten divisions and the Fifth Army had four. By mid-July, the Italians were able to reinforce the forces on the Egyptian frontier to a strength of two full infantry divisions and elements of two more.

On 28 June, Marshal of the Air Italo Balbo was killed in a friendly fire incident while landing at Tobruk. His aircraft was shot down by Italian anti-aircraft fire soon after a British air raid. Balbo was replaced as Commander-in-Chief and as Governor-General by Marshal Rodolfo Graziani.

On 5 August, a large but inconclusive action took place between Sidi Azeiz and Fort Capuzzo. Thirty Italian M11/39 medium tanks made contact with the 8th Hussars in an effort to re-establish themselves in the area. General Wavell concluded that he was in no position to deny the Italians.

Wear and tear on the armoured vehicles of the 7th Armoured Division was mounting to crisis proportions and workshops were back-logged. With an average of only one half of his tank strength available for action and realising that his one effective force was being worn out to no strategic purpose, Wavell curtailed further extensive operations and handed over the defence of the frontier to the 7th Support Group under Brigadier William Gott and the 11th Hussars under Lieutenant-Colonel John Combe. These units would provide a screen of outposts to give warning of any Italian approach.

By 13 August, in terms of performance during the initial hostilities, the balance sheet was tilted in favour of the British. They dominated both the desert and the Italians. Early set-backs had left the Italians in a demoralised state and nowhere did they feel safe. They were not safe deep within the static defences of their own territory. And, with the possible exception of a few units like the Auto-Saharan Company (La Compania Auto-Avio-Sahariana), the Italians were not safe in the open desert where they were generally out of their element. In two months of desert warfare, the Italians had lost approximately three thousand men against British losses of little more than one hundred.

Throughout the rest of August and the early days of September, an uneasy calm settled upon the desert. The calm was broken only by sharp contact between patrols and sporadic air fighting as both sides sought knowledge of the other side's intention. While a formidable spy network in Egypt kept the Italians informed, the British chose other ways to obtain information on the Italians. The Long Range Desert Group was formed under Major Ralph A. Bagnold and soon Italian movements far behind the lines were being reported by sky-wave radio links.

War is not fought by offensives alone. Perhaps I should have said "goading" rather than pushing - but the initiative was NOT with the Italians, despite their huge superiority in-theatre through the summer as they prepared for September. The British, despite the titchy size of the Western Desert Force and its outmoded equipment, were prepared from Day One (literally!) to attack rather than wait and be attacked.

Meanwhile - the first of four large troop convoys for the Delta and the far East departed the UK on the 20-somethingth of August IIRC...not yet halfway through the BoB, which was my point in answer to BDV's assertion that the British would wait until AFTER the BoB was over...

[David Thompson]

JonS – You asked (at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9#p1517199):

Can we presume that the rule about insults will be applied with equal vigour, and all the insultingly stupid posts removed?

You are confusing insults and ignorance. The first is prohibited here; the second is not. Since we run the forum for our readers, and we have many knowledgeable members, one poster's ignorance is easily offset by an intelligent and civil answer.

[JonS]

I find the same question being asked over and over again - by the same poster, in the same thread, no less - insulting, not an example of rank ignorance. Furthermore, BDV has repeatedly posted insulting and inflamatory national slurs.

BDV is undoubtedly ignorant, but he is also insulting. The result is a simple case of cause and effect.

However, I take it from your response that the answer to my question is "no", and that the 'rules' will continue to be selectively applied. Fair enough. Reap what ye sow, and all that.

[JonS]

Rich...I know it's only Wiki. but...

Barrie Pitt makes the same point.

[BDV]

Sigh...yes, very reasonable indeed since with bombers flying from Calabria and Libya and fighters from Sicily the chance of any form of co-operation is exactly nil. Simple timing would be a nightmare and probably would be ignored. Essentially the best that could be hoped for would be a more or less continuous stream of aircraft showing up over Maltese airspace to drop their ordnance somewhere... :roll:

Mind you, just how that is supposed to support a landing is beyond me?

Well, many of the Malta's key targets were in known position (e.g. the forts), and the fighter component in the initial attack should have had the strength to dramatically reduced the opposing fighter force, in the first day.

Navy-wise, after Taranto, Italians were in no better shape that Cunningham's most optimistic expectations would have them after a Malta-battle. And Italians were able keep their North Africa campaign limping along even with that level of naval losses, would expect them to be able to do in case of utter disaster at Malta, too, especially when they don't have to support an offensive.

And british bombed german targets aplenty during BoB, no one questions who was attacking whom, though.

But, what's the worth of insisting with "but what if the Italian pulled it together, one time", if the opposing opinion is "Italian organizational weaknesses were so big they could not pull this one off".

They can't, they can't, and that's the end of that from my end.

[David Thompson]

JonS -- You wrote (at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4#p1517224):

Furthermore, BDV has repeatedly posted insulting and inflamatory national slurs.

You can bring these to the attention of the staff by PM or by using the forum report function, rather than letting them pass, only to complain about them later.

[John T]

my main point is that IF RN will seriously affect the outcome of an Italian landing at Malta, RN must operate in the waters between Malta and Sicily. And has to that before Italian ground force build up at Malta will reach a level where the Italians are unstoppable.

John - did you actually READ the earlier pages of this thread? That's a serious question.

I have, and I am sorry if I fail to make my point clear. Becasue it is the next sentence you fail to quote that could have added some information .

So Royal navy will have her Initiative heavily curtailed in both space and time relative the way RN did operate.

I tries to say is that RN will have to react to Italian within an area well defined as within artillery range of the Beach head and the routes between the beach head and Italian harbours.
That Defines the Area RN has to be in to direct influence an Italian Landing (ok?)
The Time is then reduced to a point in time that is within the time window before Italians set sail, if RN would be able to pre-emt and the window will close when enough Italians and supplies will have been landed at Malta.
So Italians sets the boundaries and RN would have to act within those boundaries.
Whether we say RN reacts to Italian action or are Limited in their options to show own Initiative and at the same time affect the outcome of the Landing at Malta is just to play with words.

Royal Navy will be close to Malta in a way that can be predicted by the Italians and Planned for in advance.
That never happened in real life, with enough time to plan a coordinated Italian Response.

Because if you had you'd have seen that Cunningham is only 36 hours away - while his carrier air group can attack the RM off Malta in only 24 hours.

There's no way - landing by ships' boats etc., and climbing up coastal or cliff paths - that the Italians can reinforce AND supply the bridgehead ENOUGH in that short a time.

And I did never claim that either.

RN did Raid Rhodes "one week", Bengazi the "second" and then sent four cruisers up the Ionina sea as a feint during Taranto night. And that kind of "Nelsonian" freedom to choose where to show Initiative would not be given if you had to support Malta.

John - Cunningham doesn't NEED "Nelsonian freedom"....for the RM gathered off Malta gifts him with the ability to engage the RM in the decisive gun action of the Mediterranean war. After that - the RM has no "fleet in being" presence to cast, the RN is even freer to operate than it was historically.

1. I wrote

This is one of the few times where the Italian Navy could have a set piece battle. And for once be able to get her light forces to bear on RN.

So if RN intends to go into a gun battle against submarines and MTB I think the most probable outcome would be something like Pedestal.

2. Italian Navy did only have two out of six BB's operational in June - July 1940 so you would have to make a Taranto with HMS Eagle alone, or would you just "Walz into Tranato" and sink them all?
Otherwise Italy just gets one refurbished and two Brand New BB's in August.

3. Is there any reason why the Italians would immobilize their BB's by keeping them glued to the beach head?


Cheers
/John

[The_Enigma]

phylo_roadking: my understanding for the British force taking it to the Italians was due to superior training and desert experience. Iirc the Italians, while a massive duh on the first bit, completely lacked the confidence is for the latter. A tad strange for a shed load of guys hanging around the desert :S

[phylo_roadking]

I tries to say is that RN will have to react to Italian within an area well defined as within artillery range of the Beach head and the routes between the beach head and Italian harbours.
That Defines the Area RN has to be in to direct influence an Italian Landing (ok?)

If the RM ties themselves to supporting the landings even when the RN approaches, and denies themselves sea room - then they've almost certainly lost the action before it has begun. The RN doesn't need to shell the Italians onshore to influence the outcome of the landings - just driving off the RM is enough. The RM can pick which direction it goes - towards home at top speed or out to meet Cunningham - but either affects the landings.

The Time is then reduced to a point in time that is within the time window before Italians set sail, if RN would be able to pre-emt and the window will close when enough Italians and supplies will have been landed at Malta.

No - the window to support the landings closes when the RN gets within range - NOT when the Italians land "enough". Aas I said before - how many days/ weeks will it take to land "enough" via ships boats and manhaul it up cliffs?

So Italians sets the boundaries and RN would have to act within those boundaries.

No. The Italians can set up various sets of circumstances and how they can and will react...to whichever one happens - but they cannot force the RN to act within those boundaries. They can only prepare for every set of circumstances they can conceive - (tho' 95% of the resolution actions will probably state" run away!" )

Royal Navy will be close to Malta in a way that can be predicted by the Italians and Planned for in advance.
That never happened in real life, with enough time to plan a coordinated Italian Response.

O didn't it? Time for you to look again...

1. I wrote

This is one of the few times where the Italian Navy could have a set piece battle. And for once be able to get her light forces to bear on RN.

So if RN intends to go into a gun battle against submarines and MTB I think the most probable outcome would be something like Pedestal.

Ahem - the RN didn't actually get into a gun action against submarines or MTBs in PEDESTAL.

Meanwhile - as noted previously - the KM didn't manage too well off Norway, did they? 8 submarines lost for how many Allied naval units? And as noted before, submarines engaging naval units tends to be problematic in an action where one side is prepared for the other like a fleet engagement Something like PEDESTAL, where the RN was tied to close escort of slow moving freigthers, is NOT what the RM will enounter off Malta...

2. Italian Navy did only have two out of six BB's operational in June - July 1940 so you would have to make a Taranto with HMS Eagle alone, or would you just "Walz into Tranato" and sink them all?
Otherwise Italy just gets one refurbished and two Brand New BB's in August.

The RN had a considerable history in 1940 and 1941 of shelling Italian coastal targets/entering Italian ports and shelling shore targets...after the defeat of the RM off Malta, what's to stop Cunningham doing same at Taranto? Apart from Mussolini being so weakened at sea by the losses that he sues for peace, that is...

3. Is there any reason why the Italians would immobilize their BB's by keeping them glued to the beach head?

None at all; right through this thread I've said that the RM has a range of options -

1/ Continue to support the beachead with the RN bearing down
2/ Run for home;
3/ Advance to meet the RN.

How many of those leads to EITHER an engagement with the RN OR the removal of RM support for the beachead?

Oh that's right - all of them