Could the Soviet Union have won by itself?

[waldzee]

You fail to prove that the german field army lacked sufficient heavy artillery so there is no case for putting into use french guns.

I was talking about the romanian army. The finns also had severe problems dealing with the soviet resistance, it took them 2 months to retake Viipuri.

And you know, some take the problems germans themselves had with the Soviet infantry resistance as evidence that the amount of firepower used by Wehrmacht was insufficient. In which case ones mind wanders back to the high power, long range, french guns rusting in depots. The counter is the logistical limitations - which is reasonable for the deep thrusting Wehrmacht. However, logistics is not an acceptable excuse for either the Finnish Army in Karelia, or Romanian Army at Odessa as they were relatively close to their jumpoff points.

And ultimately it is not an acceptable excuse for the Wehrmacht, either.

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One of the limitations on the Wehrmacht was the continous shortage of munitions on the Eastern Front, due largely to the administrative mess Ukraine sunk into form 1941-44.
Your analysis is correct, BDV,- heavy artillery is the first to be delayed when production screws up. Unfortunately, you appear to have acquired a' lil Camp follower' sniffing at your heels in this thread...

You seem to have an obsession about the Ukraine as there is no link between ammunition shortages and the Ukraine.
Actually there was not even a continuous ammunition shortage on the eastern front.

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Nice try, but I've given up hand feeding the obtuse

[apollo144]

You only succeed in further showing your tunnelvision about heavy artillery to the exclusion of all other weapons.

Oh, heavy artillery was not the only available firepower that the Axis failed to deploy against RKKA. The trophy 75 mm french guns (thousands of them!) weren't upgraded to PAK 97/38 and distributed to frontline troops until AFTER the Saturn/Uranus debacle.

Which is factually incorrect as the delivery of this gun started in early summer 1942 and 1600 were distributed by the autumn of 1942( Die deutsche Panzerjägertruppe 1935-1945, Fleischer Podzun Pallas 2003 p. 37).

[apollo144]

But of course you are correct. Not "only". But heavy artillery is a key ingredient of that mix, as it was for UN forces, non-German Axis forces, and finally for Germans themselves during Wacht Am Rhein. Without heavy artillery, you're looking at 3:1 casualties against the defender (Romanians at Odessa), or months of outflanking maneuvers, as the Finns did in Karelia.

Completely incorrect as the heavy artillery is only a smaller part of the mix and has a specific function . You are showing your tunnelvision again

[apollo144]

Should I trust you or the historical record on the fall of Odessa and the survival of Leningrad?

The historical record does not say that french guns were needed to take Odessa and Leningrad. That is your pet theory.
As stated before, there was no intent to take Leningrad and if it would have been tried, the germans would have had all the means to do so.

[apollo144]

You fail to prove that the german field army lacked sufficient heavy artillery so there is no case for putting into use french guns.

I was talking about the romanian army. The finns also had severe problems dealing with the soviet resistance, it took them 2 months to retake Viipuri.

And you know, some take the problems germans themselves had with the Soviet infantry resistance as evidence that the amount of firepower used by Wehrmacht was insufficient. In which case ones mind wanders back to the high power, long range, french guns rusting in depots. The counter is the logistical limitations - which is reasonable for the deep thrusting Wehrmacht. However, logistics is not an acceptable excuse for either the Finnish Army in Karelia, or Romanian Army at Odessa as they were relatively close to their jumpoff points.

And ultimately it is not an acceptable excuse for the Wehrmacht, either.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
One of the limitations on the Wehrmacht was the continous shortage of munitions on the Eastern Front, due largely to the administrative mess Ukraine sunk into form 1941-44.
Your analysis is correct, BDV,- heavy artillery is the first to be delayed when production screws up. Unfortunately, you appear to have acquired a' lil Camp follower' sniffing at your heels in this thread...

You seem to have an obsession about the Ukraine as there is no link between ammunition shortages and the Ukraine.
Actually there was not even a continuous ammunition shortage on the eastern front.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Nice try, but I've given up hand feeding the obtuse

I am not surprised that no attempt is made to rationally explain your assertion.

[BDV]

Which is factually incorrect as the delivery of this gun started in early summer 1942 and 1600 were distributed by the autumn of 1942( Die deutsche Panzerjägertruppe 1935-1945, Fleischer Podzun Pallas 2003 p. 37).

Lies, damn lies and statistics. "Distributed" like in a warehouse in Breslau*, or like on the frontline, with crews trained with live fire, and ammply supplied with ammunition ready for the for the incoming mass-attack?!?

________________________________________________________________________________________________
*Or worse, "distributed" in the producer's warehouse, with a nice ticket hanging from the barrel "ausschließlich für Hilfs-rumänischen"?

[apollo144]

Which is factually incorrect as the delivery of this gun started in early summer 1942 and 1600 were distributed by the autumn of 1942( Die deutsche Panzerjägertruppe 1935-1945, Fleischer Podzun Pallas 2003 p. 37).

Lies, damn lies and statistics. "Distributed" like in a warehouse in Breslau*, or like on the frontline, with crews trained with live fire, and ammply supplied with ammunition ready for the for the incoming mass-attack?!?

________________________________________________________________________________________________
*Or worse, "distributed" in the producer's warehouse, with a nice ticket hanging from the barrel "ausschließlich für Hilfs-rumänischen"?

Facts which you do not like. Anyway,contrary to your statement, equipping german Panzerjäger units with heavier antitankguns was not a reaction to Uranus but simply to the experiences of 1941.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Not having a dog in this artillery fight, but I do have a interest in artillery matters. Could either or both of you share your sources on the deployment of the 75 mm french guns upgraded to PAK 97/38? Aside from the already mentioned ( Die deutsche Panzerjägertruppe 1935-1945, Fleischer Podzun Pallas 2003 p. 37).

Beside tracking the use of this weapon I'm hoping to find some info on the ammunition actually used, so as to compare with the same type AP ammo the US Army provided for the same cannon.

Thanks

[BDV]

Carl,

I think that the Wikipedia page can point you in some good directions, e.g. US Catalog of Enemy Ordnance.

I usually get my factoids from the internet, history as I learned and experienced (infer the truth from the Socialist speech), some direct discussions with surviving veterans of WWII - including one that had experience at Uman/Stalingrad, and one with Bagration/Siege of Budapest, and factoids as they percolate in the historical-based entertainment (e.g. History Channel).

For example Wikipedia has the line "Five or six guns each were supplied to the infantry divisions of the Romanian Third and Fourth Armies in October 1942.". OTOH, an interview with the Discovery Channel a person identified as german supply officer, reports seeing the guns in a warehouse, awaiting shipment to the frontline, at the start of Operatsiya Uran. And then, you have THIS - please note date. So then it stands to reason that a "sind sie hier" on October 31st 1942 in Breslau, or Bucharest, or even Rostov-na-Donu, is not the same thing as these guns being ready for action facing Kletskaya and Serafimovich, crews trained, ammo delivered, on November 18 1942.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Thanks. Some useful clues there. If anyone has any other info on these, or other French ordnance used by Germany please let me know

[BDV]

A144
If you have info on when did the pak 97/38 guns made it to the frontline, as opposed to a nebulous "delivered", please do share.

Wiki list the "usage" of HEAT shells as being ten times larger in 1943 than in 1942, although even with this disparity the 1942 "usage" might simply ureflect the "priming of the pump" so to speak.

Any light you could shed on the issue?

[Andy H]

Temp lock for emotions to cool and for me to do some spring cleaning

Regards

Andy H

[Guaporense]

No. Without Allied help the USSR could at most hold the Germans out of Moscow. But they couldn't defeat the Wehrmacht without any external help. In fact, large proportions of the raw material resources used by the USSR were supplied by the Allies (http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/SovLendLease.html). For instance, 55% of the aluminium used in the USSR was supplied by the Allies.

There is also this quote of mine which compares the British and Soviet economies:

Actually, even UK had greater material resources than the Soviet Union. Even though in 1942, the USSR produced much more ground related equipment, such as tanks and guns, the actual war related production of the UK surpassed those of the USSR. The difference was that the quality of British equipment was higher and also that the USSR managed to produce equipment at a smaller cost and focused on low cost equipment, such as small arms, tanks and guns. But ammunition, aircraft and naval production were the focus of the British war production effort.

In 1942, this was the respective relation of resources between UK and the USSR:

--------------------------------------------------- UK ------- USSR ----- USSR/UK ratio
GDP (billions 1939 dollars) ------------------- 33.81 ---- 17.57 ---- 0.52
Military outlays (billions 1939 dollars) ------ 18.26 ---- 10.68 ---- 0.59
Energy supply (MT of coal equivalent)* ----- 208.2 ----- 94.55 --- 0.46
Steel (thousands of metric tons) ------------ 12,968 --- 8,070 ---- 0.62
Iron (thousands of metric tons) ------------- 7,726 ----- 4,779 ---- 0.62
Electricity (thousands of KW/hour) --------- 36,903 ---- 29,068 --- 0.79

*derived from Coal, Lignite, Oil production converted at 29 MJ = Coal, 15 MJ = Lignite, 42 MJ = Oil. I don't have oil imports for the UK in 1942, but considering oil reserves were 5.2 million tons they cannot have been greater than 10-15 million tons, so over 90% of UK's energy supply came from coal mined domestically.

It appears that the USSR had around 50-60% of the resources of UK in 1942. Energy supply was less than half, and that without counting the oil imports of the UK, only domestic coal production. The difference was only less than 60% in the case of electricity, but that reflected the fact that the USSR had developed a younger industry than the UK and hence used more electricity in proportion to it's size (another example is Italy, whose electricity supply was 19.6 billion KW/hour, more than half UK's supply and it's GDP was 1/4 of the size).

Note, in the critical years of 1942-1943, even the British economy alone was greater than the Soviet economy. It was roughly twice the size, by measuring the consumption of energy and GDP. Germany had much greater resources:


--------------------------------------------------- Germany ---- UK ------- USSR ----- USSR/UK ratio ---- USSR/Germany ratio
GDP (billions 1939 dollars) ---------------------- 54.40 ----- 33.81 ---- 17.57 ---- 0.52 ---------------- 0.32
Military outlays (billions 1939 dollars) --------- 36.42 ----- 18.26 ---- 10.68 ---- 0.59 ---------------- 0.29
Energy supply (MT of coal equivalent)* ------- 404.84 ---- 208.2 ----- 94.55 --- 0.46 ---------------- 0.23
Steel (thousands of metric tons) -------------- 28,700 ---- 12,968 --- 8,070 ---- 0.62 ---------------- 0.28
Iron (thousands of metric tons) --------------- 22,200 ----- 7,726 ----- 4,779 --- 0.62 ---------------- 0.22
Electricity (thousands of KW/hour) ------------------------ 36,903 ---- 29,068 --- 0.79

* In 1942, Germany produced 264.5 million tons of coal, 248.9 million tons of lignite and consumed 8 million tons of oil. Equivalent in terms of energy to 404.84 million tons of coal, over 4 times Soviet energy resources.

I don't have data on electricity but some sources indirectly suggests a level of consumption around 75 billion KW/hours in Germany. Much larger than British and Soviet levels.

Overall, the USSR lacked the economic resources to defeat Germany alone. In fact, 85-90% of the economic resources available to the Allies were in the hands of UK and the USA.

[Marcelo Jenisch]

If someone was to beat the Germans alone, considerating the historical conditions the war started, I think the Western Allies were the most capable. Just by comparing the air power - the Soviets would be in a serious situation with the Luftwaffe fully envolved in the East, which would be aggravated by the lack of Lend-Lease planes (BTW, the Western Allies would have these planes if fought alone), and petroleum componentes, which were significant, as can be seen here: http://www.oilru.com/or/47/1006/

With air supremacy over Europe, the Allies could have invaded. They could have invaded in several places, not only in France. The Germans would have the railway system of Europe destroyed by the Allied air attacks, and it's simply lack of understading of modern warfare belive they would be able to move large troop contingents, and hence "win"in such manner - Guaporense, ask the Red Army of 1941 what they think of the LW!. Also, the German logistics of horses and trucks would be impossible to maintein due to the constant air attacks.

Conclusion: before one can talk about the Germans defeating an invasion of Europe, it's necessary to talk about the Germans defeating the Anglo-American aviation. If the key to defeat an amphibious assault was just to have an Army of millions at your disposal, then Japan would be unconquerable, it would be just question of it not retreat from the conquered islands and from China, but rather than that directly to the Home Islands, and wait to send the invaders back to the sea. Needless to say, the things don't work in that way.

[LWD]

No. Without Allied help the USSR could at most hold the Germans out of Moscow. But they couldn't defeat the Wehrmacht without any external help. ....

That doesn't really square with the fact that the Soviets did indeed defeat the Wehrmact in 1941 and into 1942 with almost no external help. Whether they could "win" the war is another question dependent to a great extent on how you define "won".