So you agree with the historical Kriegsmarine as being risible.Takao wrote:Those were the Kriegsmarine's two strategic missions? Even though it had too few vessels to accomplish either one strategic missions alone, let alone do both at the same time.
Hitler started his war before the Kriegsmarine was in, any way, shape, or form, prepared for a "world" war.
And for that, fleet 1/3 surface, 1/5 submersibles vs. the historical size would have been just fine.At best, the only "strategic" mission the kriegsmarine was capable of was coastal defense.
The Empyr lacked the land-based capabilities required to conduct large scale amphibious operations against targets that would justify the effort in those years. So it's a moot point. Building up the land based capabilities took time.Takao wrote:Laughable...Really...It took the British, what, almost 3 YEARS to conduct their first successful, large scale amphibious operation(Operation Ironclad in July, '42). Now, what if the British had been able to focus their overwhelming naval supremacy somewhat earlier in the war, instead of being forced to dilute their naval forces to cover the many British vulnerable sea areas.
Without a credible naval threat from the German Kriegsmarine, the British, very likely could focus their vast naval effort much earlier in the war.
How easy to dismiss the RN's success in achieving its strategic naval goals, as tasked in 1939, in that Great Britain did keep its own sealanes open and did close those of Germany's. When such momentous strategic achievements are beyond you even mentioning them, instead you're focusing on a secondary task RN was not even remotely expected to accomplish in 1939?!?
IMO, relatively effective, especially in the synthetic oil production, establishing heavy device production facilities(tank, heavy artillery), and after 1941 railway build-up, and in supporting the auxiliaries to establish their own heavy equipment production/repair lines.Takao wrote:The conflict arises as to how effective those "other" purposes are.