German waste of resources??

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stg 44
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Re: German waste of resources??

#166

Post by stg 44 » 08 Mar 2013, 01:51

KDF33 wrote:
There was slack capacity available because inefficiencies were ironed out of the system and bureaucracy was finally centralized. Labor and raw materials were badly allocated, orders were conflicting (there was at least one Henschel factory that produced 0 airplanes from 1940-44 because it was constantly ordered to retool for different aircraft before starting production on the previous type), and factories were wasteful of resources while hoarding raw materials.
Or maybe it was because... Germany started reallocating steel to the production of armaments early in 1942? I.e., my previous post:
(...) the steel allocation for Army armaments production fell continously after the conclusion of the BoF, going from 2,361,000 tons (1-6.40) to 1,965,000 tons (7-12.40), then to 1,680,000 tons (1-6.41) and, finally, reaching it's wartime low of 1,221,000 tons during Barbarossa. It ramped up dramatically in early 1942, reaching 2,097,000 tons from January to June of that year, and then kept increasing until industrial collapse set in during 1944. (All numbers are from Tooze.)
Instead of wasteful capital projects that were never completed? Sure. But then Germany also was building the Atlantic Wall, several V3s, several FLAK towers, some 1000 Uboats, etc. after 1940/41 which all consumed major amounts of steel, yet armaments production went up exponentially during this period.

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Re: German waste of resources??

#167

Post by KDF33 » 08 Mar 2013, 02:55

But the catalyst was the death of Udet, which suggests that labor was improperly allocated within the industry prior to Milch's resumption of control over aircraft manufacturing.
It's not clear that the catalyst was the death of Udet. The strategic failure of Barbarossa, the entry of the United States into the war and the increase in avgas production are all factors that could have encouraged an upward revision in aircraft production.
No one is contesting that Avgas was a bottleneck. What this discussion is about is aircraft output, which was unaffected by Avgas production.
That's not necessarily true. The point of my previous post was that Germany's aircraft output in the first years of the war wasn't constrained by a lack of production capacity but by a lack of demand on the part of the authorities, as reflected in the low production targets of programs 19, 21/1 and 211/1. Why was demand so low in the early war years? I'd argue that it was at least partly because the German planners understood that, until avgas supply could be increased, the Luftwaffe's fleet of 1941 - 1942 couldn't effectively be augmented. Thus production was limited to replacing losses and roughly maintaining the existent strength of the air fleets.

To illustrate my point, here are strength figures for operational units of the Luftwaffe on June 24 1941 and July 27 1942:

1-engine bombers: 386 / 389
2-engine bombers: 1,355 / 1,421
4-engine bombers: 21 / 50
1-engine fighters: 1,218 / 1,304
2-engine fighters: 369 / 440

As you can see, despite small gains, the Luftwaffe's operational strength in mid-1942 is effectively the same as that of mid-1941. We can also look at avgas consumption and supply:

1941: 1,274k (c) / 910k (s), or (c) = 1.4 (s)
1942: 1,426k (c) / 1,472k (s), or (c) = 0.97 (s)

These figures indicate that the Luftwaffe could hardly generate more sorties without a larger fuel supply, and thus that Germany's air contingent was roughly at it's optimal strength. If Germany's planners fixed aircraft production at a rate sufficient to maintain the fuel-efficient force level, we can explain both why the RLM procured so few aircraft early in the war (when it suffered low losses) and why and when it increased production.

Thus, aircraft production increases correspond to critical junctures in terms of loss rates: first, when it was recognised that Barbarossa had failed and that intense air combat would continue in the East for the foreseeable future; second, when the Torch landings and the increased tempo of fighting in the Mediterranean led for the first time to significant air losses outside of Russia; third and last, after "Big Week" and the terrible fighter losses suffered defending the Reich led to the formation of the "Fighter Staff". In all three cases, aircraft production was increased not to enlarge the Luftwaffe but to sustain it's force level in the face of increasing commitments and losses.
Last edited by KDF33 on 08 Mar 2013, 03:17, edited 1 time in total.


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stg 44
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Re: German waste of resources??

#168

Post by stg 44 » 08 Mar 2013, 03:05

Nevertheless Hitler and Göring were both constantly outraged that aircraft production wasn't increasing during the 1939-1941 period.

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Re: German waste of resources??

#169

Post by KDF33 » 08 Mar 2013, 03:11

Instead of wasteful capital projects that were never completed? Sure. But then Germany also was building the Atlantic Wall, several V3s, several FLAK towers, some 1000 Uboats, etc. after 1940/41 which all consumed major amounts of steel, yet armaments production went up exponentially during this period.
Germany produced many things other than Army armaments after 1940-1, yet it is also true that it's share of steel allocation in proportion to the total military-industrial allocation grew. From a nadir of 19% during Barbarossa, it reached 40% in the 3rd quarter of 1942, which certainly wasn't the peak. The main capital investment drive occurred between summer 1940 and the end of 1941, despite the presence of residual projects after that.
Last edited by KDF33 on 08 Mar 2013, 03:19, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: German waste of resources??

#170

Post by KDF33 » 08 Mar 2013, 03:14

Nevertheless Hitler and Göring were both constantly outraged that aircraft production wasn't increasing during the 1939-1941 period.
Were they? Certainly Hitler was raging in 1944, but as early as 1941?

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Re: German waste of resources??

#171

Post by stg 44 » 08 Mar 2013, 03:22

KDF33 wrote:
Nevertheless Hitler and Göring were both constantly outraged that aircraft production wasn't increasing during the 1939-1941 period.
Were they? Certainly Hitler was raging in 1944, but as early as 1941?
Yes, he expected production in the 20k range in 1939-40.

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Re: German waste of resources??

#172

Post by KDF33 » 08 Mar 2013, 03:25

Not that I put that in doubt, but do you have a source? I'd be interested in reading more about Hitler's own ideas regarding aircraft production.

In any case, had Germany produced 20,000 aircraft in 1940, it would have had a glut of thousands of unused, and soon obsolescent, planes parked around Germany. Much like the Soviets had in the USSR during the war, in fact - they never translated their superior numbers into a superior number of sorties.

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Re: German waste of resources??

#173

Post by stg 44 » 08 Mar 2013, 03:41

KDF33 wrote:Not that I put that in doubt, but do you have a source? I'd be interested in reading more about Hitler's own ideas regarding aircraft production.

In any case, had Germany produced 20,000 aircraft in 1940, it would have had a glut of thousands of unused, and soon obsolescent, planes parked around Germany. Much like the Soviets had in the USSR during the war, in fact - they never translated their superior numbers into a superior number of sorties.
Overy: "Göring: Hitler's Iron Knight"
Overy: "Airwar: 1939-1945"
Homze: "Arming the Luftwaffe"
Uziel: "Arming the Luftwaffe" (different book)

The Germans could have traded their aircraft for more oil from Romania, which cut production pre-war because they weren't being offered what they wanted by Germany: modern weapons. So more production means more weapons to trade, which in turn results in greater oil output and fuel for the extra aircraft Germany produces.
There are threads about Romania and oil on this forum that you can find info on.

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Re: German waste of resources??

#174

Post by KDF33 » 08 Mar 2013, 05:23

I just found the relevant passage in "Hitler's Iron Knight", on page 177. It does indicate that mobilisation plans laid out in 1938 foresaw the production of 21,000 military aircraft in the first year of an hypothetical war, as well as that Hitler "ordered" in the same year to build-up the Luftwaffe air strength (presumably frontline?) to 12,000 planes by 1942. Finally, Hitler also set annual production targets of 20,000 to 30,000 aircraft.

The problem I have with using this information as the basis for judging Germany's wartime aircraft production is that, 1) They were general planning documents or statements and not actual production programs, 2) They were about an hypothetical conflict that could have started a couple of years later than 1939, 3) They are contradicted by the actual, immediate aircraft production programs laid out during the war years.

Take Aircraft Production Program 19, set on 15 March 1941. It foresaw the total combat aircraft production for 1941 as reaching roughly (this is a very rough calculation, I didn't compile all the entries one by one) 800 dive bombers, over 4,000 medium bombers, 100 heavy bombers, 3,500 single-engined fighters and 1,200 twin-engined and night fighters.

The actual production in 1941 amounted to 476 dive bombers, 3,816 medium bombers, 58 heavy bombers, 2,852 single-engined fighters and 880 twin-engined and night fighters, i.e. about 85% of the production targets. Moreover, this underperformance wasn't evenly distributed, but concentrated in the 2nd half of 1941, the nadir being November 1941 when only 563 combat aircraft were produced (compared to a peak of 831 in April, when the Luftwaffe was being reequipped for Barbarossa).

Therefore, if Hitler and Göring had been dissastified with aircraft production numbers, I'd expect that it would show up in the form of a significant gap between planned and actual production. It doesn't, however, show up in any significant fashion until November 1943, when aircraft deliveries fall short of their target by 675 airframes. Therefore it appears that Germany was attaining it's aircraft production targets for most of the war, which undermines the idea of a systemic failure in the production process.

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Re: German waste of resources??

#175

Post by 1st Cavalry » 08 Mar 2013, 09:32

KDF33 wrote: That's not necessarily true. The point of my previous post was that Germany's aircraft output in the first years of the war wasn't constrained by a lack of production capacity but by a lack of demand on the part of the authorities, as reflected in the low production targets of programs 19, 21/1 and 211/1. Why was demand so low in the early war years? I'd argue that it was at least partly because the German planners understood that, until avgas supply could be increased, the Luftwaffe's fleet of 1941 - 1942 couldn't effectively be augmented. Thus production was limited to replacing losses and roughly maintaining the existent strength of the air fleets.
In that case it is a strategy for defeat .
in case of a war of attrition it better to have 10,000 aircraft performing 500,000 sorties than 5,000 doing the same .
the number of combat missions each crew has to take is halved , increasing their chances of survival on the long run.
also the individual air-frames themselves are subjected to less stress and wear.

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Re: German waste of resources??

#176

Post by ljadw » 08 Mar 2013, 10:06

From :
Demystifying German "armament miracle" during WWII Abstract

"Speer is usually credited with causing the boom in German marmament production after 1941.......We questioned the received view by showing that in the German aircraft industry the crucial changes that triggered the upswing in aircraft production already occurred before WWII "

My comment : I am questioning the tradional view that before 1942 everything was going badly,and that this was caused by the coruption of Göring and the incompetence of Udet

From the same source :

5)Conclusions:In the period before 1942(where everything was going badly :wink: ljadw)the growth rate of labour productivity was considerably higher than under Speer's reign:
1938: 17.3 %
1939:idem
1940:9.2
1941:6
1942:3.5
1943:3.7

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Re: German waste of resources??

#177

Post by ljadw » 08 Mar 2013, 10:12

stg 44 wrote:
KDF33 wrote:Not that I put that in doubt, but do you have a source? I'd be interested in reading more about Hitler's own ideas regarding aircraft production.

In any case, had Germany produced 20,000 aircraft in 1940, it would have had a glut of thousands of unused, and soon obsolescent, planes parked around Germany. Much like the Soviets had in the USSR during the war, in fact - they never translated their superior numbers into a superior number of sorties.
Overy: "Göring: Hitler's Iron Knight"
Overy: "Airwar: 1939-1945"
Homze: "Arming the Luftwaffe"
Uziel: "Arming the Luftwaffe" (different book)

The Germans could have traded their aircraft for more oil from Romania, which cut production pre-war because they weren't being offered what they wanted by Germany: modern weapons. So more production means more weapons to trade, which in turn results in greater oil output and fuel for the extra aircraft Germany produces.
There are threads about Romania and oil on this forum that you can find info on.
Afaics,the low préwar Romanian oil production(which was not going mainly to Germany) was caused by structural insoluble problems.

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Re: German waste of resources??

#178

Post by ljadw » 08 Mar 2013, 10:43

Total German oil imports:(in millions of tons)

1933:2.755
1934:3.237
1935:3.888
1936:4.250
1937:4.530
1938:5.030
1939:5.160
1940:2.075
1941:2.800
1942:2.760
1943:2.760
1944:0.960

Imports from Romania(same years)

O.186
0.254
0.680
0.900
0.532
0.450
1.270
1.180
2.960
2.200
2.400
1.040

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Re: German waste of resources??

#179

Post by 1st Cavalry » 08 Mar 2013, 17:25

two things :
German aviation fuel in vast majority was coming from synthetic not crude .
More exports to Germany is basically a robbing Peter to pay for Paul affair.

A interesting what if would be if Germany decided to relocate her synthetic plants underground, starting in early 1943.

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Re: German waste of resources??

#180

Post by gurn » 08 Mar 2013, 18:08

"In that case it is a strategy for defeat .
in case of a war of attrition it better to have 10,000 aircraft performing 500,000 sorties than 5,000 doing the same .
the number of combat missions each crew has to take is halved , increasing their chances of survival on the long run.
also the individual air-frames themselves are subjected to less stress and wear."

More planes do not neccessarily mean more air crew. For more crew, changes must be made to the pilot/crew training regime.

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