Could The USA/British Empire have won on their own?

[KDF33]

I'm not sure I follow. What are the 1.1 million tons of steel for? And where are those couple million tons of additional crude oil coming from?

Regards,

KDF

[ljadw]

According to the Oxford companion to WW-II the German supply of oil was ....
1939= 10.4 million tons
1940= 8.8 million tons
1941 = 11.7 million tons
1942 = 11.3 million tons
1943 = 12.8 million tons
1944 = 7.5 million tons

These figures are to high

[KDF33]

The figures I have give:

1939: 8.4 million tons
1940: 6.9 million tons
1941: 8.5 million tons
1942: 9.0 million tons
1943: 10.5 million tons
1944: 6.5 million tons

Regards,

KDF

[ljadw]

These are more reliable .
The part of the imports was

1940 : 30 %

1941 33 %

1942 : 28 %

1943 : 27 %

1944 : 16 %

[Marcelo Jenisch]

Given the USA's eventual development of nuclear weapons, an eventual German defeat is most likely. I do, however, feel that before that occurs, the Germans can hold their own against the Western allies.

KDF, do you evaluate the same would have occured had the US not fought with the Japanese? I won't underestimate the posture of the US government towards the Japanese in 1941 (i.e. the reasons they adopted their conduct towards Japan), but curious enough, unlike Stalin with Germany and the MR-Pact, it appears that the Americans were not intimidated by the Japanese despite the Soviet fate was still undecided. Thus I was wondering if the effort on the Pacific would not be as important to Europe as to compel the Americans to avoid a war with the Japanese in order to employ resources and manpower that woud be used to fight it against Hitler instead. Indeed the Americans tried to avoid a war with the Japanese, but I was wondering if they did all they could for this end. And if they not did all they could, if this was because they considerate that avoid a war with the Japanese would not have change the military situation against Germany appreciably .

PS: I know about the "Europe first policy", but despite that it seems to me the Pacific War consumed precious naval and aerial assets that could have been used against Germany. For instance, IIRC by 1945 the Americans had more than 1000 B-29 bombers being employed against Japan.

[KDF33]

Japan had a significant impact in diverting American resources away from Europe. Looking at US deployments at the end of 1943, the U.S. had 1,810,367 men and 8,807 aircraft allocated to theaters against Germany, whereas they had 1,878,152 men and 7,857 aircraft allocated to theaters against Japan. In other words, at least until 1944 each theater absorbed roughly 50% of America's expeditionary forces.

In terms of shipping capacity, it was divided roughly 55% / 45% between the Atlantic and the Pacific areas, although this is just for Army and WSA capacity. Including the Navy shipping capacity, it's probably 50/50.

However you cut it, Japan was diverting roughly 50% of America's resources for the 1942-3 period, and still a big chunk of it during 1944. Looking at the numbers I would argue that, absent war with Japan, the United States' timetable in the ETO/MTO would be sped up by one year, i.e. the U.S. could have a 1943-level deployment in 1942, and a 1944-level deployment in 1943.

As for the U.S. avoiding war with Japan, I don't think much would change absent Barbarossa. The decisions that led to armed conflict in the Pacific were taken during the summer of 1941, at a time when it looked like the Soviet Union would be quickly defeated and the Anglo-Americans would have to face the Axis alone anyway. Which, when you think about it, is a pretty damning indictment of American policy in the lead-up to Pearl Harbor.

Regards,

KDF

[Marcelo Jenisch]

Yeah, it's curious for one to realize that apparentely the Americans were not intimidated by the threat of a war in the Pacific that would consume considerable resources that could have been used against Germany DESPITE the fact the Soviet destiny was still undecided in 1941. Apparentely for me the more rational decision would be to reach a sort of neutrality pact with the Japanese (de jure or not) while the Soviet destiny was uncertain.

But as I said in my previous post, I suppose the Americans had good reasons to have acted in the way they did with the Japanese. Maybe because the Roosevelt administration wasn't sure the US would enter in a war with Germany? Or maybe the Americans were not afraid to engage the Japanese, but were expecting a more honorable war (i.e. no Pearl Harbor) in which they would give the Japanese a bloody nose and compel them to act in the direction of American interests by the means of a negociated end of the war with Japan? (maybe already in 1942).

[KDF33]

But as I said in my previous post, I suppose the Americans had good reasons to have acted in the way they did with the Japanese.

I suspect the explanation is simpler than that: the US miscalculated. We often focus on the glaring strategic deficiencies of the Axis, seldom on those of the Allies. But ultimately, they too made their fair share of mistakes.

Regards,

KDF

[Marcelo Jenisch]

You mean they considerated the Japanese might not have attacked?

Anyway, on this video here:



One of the speakers (don't remember in which momment of the video now), says that the US tried to negotiate with the Japanese in order to show them that the Germans may not defeat the USSR. And had they waited more one month to attack PH, they may not have initiated the Pacific War at all.

Ah, and another factor interesting to mention is that had the Germans defeated the USSR, the Japanese would have probably occupied the Soviet Far East, as the Imperial Conference of July 2, 1941 stated:

Our attitude with reference to the German-Soviet War will be based on the spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact. However, we will not enter the conflict for some time but will steadily proceed with military preparations against the Soviet and decide our final attitude independently. At the same time, we will continue carefully correlated activities in the diplomatic field.
... In case the German-Soviet War should develop to our advantage, we will make use of our military strength, settle the Soviet question and guarantee the safety of our northern borders...

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Dip/IR-410702.html

I'm wondering if the removal of the Soviet threat would have resulted in the Japanese been able to use the extra strength of the Kwantung Army for operations in China and the Pacific to good effect. If this would be the case, then we can add another significative factor of Soviet influence in WWII.

[KDF33]

You mean they considerated the Japanese might not have attacked?

No, more that the U.S. sanctions didn't fit in any well-conceived overall strategy.

Ah, and another factor interesting to mention is that had the Germans defeated the USSR, the Japanese would have probably occupied the Soviet Far East, as the Imperial Conference of July 2, 1941 stated:

What I find the most striking is that the Imperial Conference established that the Japanese would honor the Tripartite Pact if the U.S. entered the European war!

I'm wondering if the removal of the Soviet threat would have resulted in the Japanese been able to use the extra strength of the Kwantung Army for operations in China and the Pacific to good effect. If this would be the case, then we can add another significative factor of Soviet influence in WWII.

I don't see how it could have made a difference in the Pacific, but with regards to China it could, IMO, have had an impact - although I wouldn't risk trying to quantify it.

Regards,

KDF

[ljadw]

Japan had a significant impact in diverting American resources away from Europe. Looking at US deployments at the end of 1943, the U.S. had 1,810,367 men and 8,807 aircraft allocated to theaters against Germany, whereas they had 1,878,152 men and 7,857 aircraft allocated to theaters against Japan. In other words, at least until 1944 each theater absorbed roughly 50% of America's expeditionary forces.

In terms of shipping capacity, it was divided roughly 55% / 45% between the Atlantic and the Pacific areas, although this is just for Army and WSA capacity. Including the Navy shipping capacity, it's probably 50/50.

However you cut it, Japan was diverting roughly 50% of America's resources for the 1942-3 period, and still a big chunk of it during 1944. Looking at the numbers I would argue that, absent war with Japan, the United States' timetable in the ETO/MTO would be sped up by one year, i.e. the U.S. could have a 1943-level deployment in 1942, and a 1944-level deployment in 1943.

As for the U.S. avoiding war with Japan, I don't think much would change absent Barbarossa. The decisions that led to armed conflict in the Pacific were taken during the summer of 1941, at a time when it looked like the Soviet Union would be quickly defeated and the Anglo-Americans would have to face the Axis alone anyway. Which, when you think about it, is a pretty damning indictment of American policy in the lead-up to Pearl Harbor.

Regards,

KDF

You are making the elementary mistake of assuming that if these 1.8 million men were were not in the Pacific, they would be allocated to theaters against Germany .Which is not proved. The same for the aircraft .

[KDF33]

You are making the elementary mistake of assuming that if these 1.8 million men were were not in the Pacific, they would be allocated to theaters against Germany .Which is not proved. The same for the aircraft .

Do you see any reason why the U.S. wouldn't allocate those forces against Germany?

Regards,

KDF

[ljadw]

Do you see any possibility that the US could have doubled their manpower in the theatres against Germany ?

Besides : a very big part of these forces would remain in the Pacific,even without war with Japan: there were US forces in the Pacific prior PH and there would US forces in the Pacific without PH .

And,do you see the possibility for Overlord to start sooner if there was no war with Japan ?

[KDF33]

Do you see any possibility that the US could have doubled their manpower in the theatres against Germany ?

Obviously. There were 1.8 million men in the ETO/MTO/Atlantic area on 31.12.43. There were 2.7 million men just in the ETO on 31.12.44, and 3.1 million on 30.4.45.

Besides : a very big part of these forces would remain in the Pacific,even without war with Japan: there were US forces in the Pacific prior PH and there would US forces in the Pacific without PH .

A part, yes. But nothing like the 1.8 million men deployed on 31.12.43. Among Army troops, for instance, there was an increase from 464,000 to 913,000 between 31.12.42 and 31.12.43. Note that the figure for 31.12.42 was already an increase from 7.12.41.

And,do you see the possibility for Overlord to start sooner if there was no war with Japan ?

Yes.

Regards,

KDF

[ljadw]

NO : it was impossible for Overlord to start earlier than in june 1944,even without PH : Overlord could only happen during 4 months : may,june, july,august .It was impossible for Overlord to happen in may,june, july,august 1943 ,because

a) there were not enough trained US forces available (most of the Pacific forces were non combat forces for which there was no use in Europe)

b) because the U Boat danger was still real in that period .for Overlord in june 1943 , there had to be already in april at least considerable US forces in Britain,which was out of the question .


The only possibility for Overlord in 1943 was a German /US war in 1940 (at last) ; PH had no influence on Overlord .