Could The USA/British Empire have won on their own?

[KDF33]

Correct, LWD. Plus the fact that wartime Germany had annexed Austria, the Sudetenland, Bohemia-Moravia and Western Poland. Western Poland, in particular, is incorporated in "Galicia" in the data I provided and accounted, yearly, for tens of millions of tons of additional coal. So the true wartime coal production of Germany hovered slightly below 300 million tons, and not the 180 million tons of prewar Germany's anthracite production. Which still pales in comparison to the United States' average of 550 million tons a year, and isn't that much larger than the UK's average of 200 million tons.

Western Europe (France, Benelux) produced on average 80 million tons a year, but Germany couldn't tap it since Western Europe was a coal-importing region that suffered from a dramatic coal shortage during the war years. Germany tapping the coal would likely have meant sending the French back to the stone age, something the Reich doesn't appear to have contemplated.

[BDV]

That is unproved :if more than 90 % of the U Boats were produced west of Danzig,where they were subject to allied air attacks,the reason is that it was impossible to move the Hamburg shipyards to the east,otherwise,it would have been done .

Or that the effect of Allied bombing on UBoot production was minimal, until such time (late '43- early '44) that Germany could do little beyond rushbuilding a few dozen boats in Konigsberg.

Unless you think that the Germans were stupid .

Germans not so much. Nazis, however, are a different issue. The Nazi mis-management of the European economy and labor was a sight to behold.

[KDF33]

How did the Germans mismanage the European economy and labor force?

[BDV]

"...it is impossible, in a year or two, to replace the Jews, who have everything in their hands, and to replace them with incompetent, unworthy, mostly big-mouthed elements, for we should become bankrupt.

Miklos Horthy"

That's the most glaring one, given the attached mass murder aspect. However there are plenty others (e.g. steel, plane production, handling of occupied teritorries, handling of axis economies, oil production), that we can go over separately.

[KDF33]

"...it is impossible, in a year or two, to replace the Jews, who have everything in their hands, and to replace them with incompetent, unworthy, mostly big-mouthed elements, for we should become bankrupt.

Well, that may or may not have been true, but Hungary was a small country with a large Jewish population and virtually no significant industrial potential, and the quote is just Horthy's subjective opinion about the Hungarian situation - it does not prove that the Holocaust was hampering the German war effort in a significant fashion. Although I do believe the Shoah wasn't primarily driven by practical motives, it did have some practical utility - i.e., like the Hunger Plan, it reduced the number of people to feed in a blockaded Europe.

Mass murder, although horrible, is not, ipso facto, impractical.

Regarding your other points:

1. Steel: The German steel supply, considering Europe's relative coal shortage, was rather plentiful. In fact, at 30-35 million tons a year, it wasn't very far from the 40 million tons maximum that the European Grossraum could produce according to Germany's steel experts (cf. Tooze).

2. Plane production: I tend to agree with you that this particular sector was poorly managed, in particular the production decisions (i.e. bombers over fighters, some wasteful retooling, etc.). But then the all-out drive planned for in early 1941 never occurred since the USSR wasn't defeated, and Germany's aircraft production, with a comparable aluminium supply as Britain, lagged only slightly behind theirs and reached roughly 50% of the American production (in airframe weight) in summer 1944. So I would somewhat temper the claims of dramatic mismanagement in the aircraft industry.

3. Handling of occupied territories: The Germans extracted large resources from the occupied territories. What else would you want them to do?

4. Handling of Axis economies: The Germans only controlled their own economy and, contrary to the myth about "late mobilization", German industry was focusing on war production from the beginning of the war. Besides, you certainly can't blame Italy's poor production record on Germany - the Italians had neither coal nor steel, nor any other industrial resource for the matter, so their inability to produce war material is not a surprise.

5. Oil production: Germany invested colossal sums - both of money and of coal - in ersatz oil production, without which it wouldn't have been able to fight in the first place. The Reich also received oil from Romania. Where's the mismanagement?

To clarify: I'm not arguing that there wasn't mismanagement - there always is. I am, however, challenging the idea that Nazi mismanagement was somehow "exceptional" in nature and worse than in other countries. To a very large extent Germany's production "problems" (and there were problems only in comparison to the United States) can be explained by Europe's relative energy shortage.

[Carl Schwamberger]

How did the Germans mismanage the European economy and labor force?

'Pattern of Conquest' by Hersh is possibly the earliest work on the subject. Published in the spring of 1941 in the US is a collection of essays written for publication in US periodicals. The publisher held off as Hersh had little to say of a positive nature about the the nazi government of Germany or occupied Europe & the essays were published in book form.

One item Hersh described was how the nazis used currency manipulation to make French, Dutch, Belgian, & other nations consumer goods & food cheap for German buyers & expensive for the occupied populations. Various controls on wages in the occupied areas, the shortage of goods, and their price inflation created a strong disincentive for both labor and businessmen to put any effort into many sectors of industrial & agricultural production. In this the short term goal of the nazi government was to satiate the 'good German' population with cheap consumer goods. The long term effect was to actually reduce production across Europe of things like soap, socks, vehicle parts, ect...

Rationing policies, for catagories of popular items as well as food was aimed at again providing for the Geman middle class and loyal party members of any class. The side effect was widesperad hoarding & black marketing. Hersh discusses the probability of corrupt nazi party leaders being important players in the black markets.

In the several essays concerning these economic matters Hersh makes it clear the only long term consideration to nazi policy is rewaring loyal Germans. Creating a stable financial/banking system for occupied Europe, & ensureing long term production of basics for the subjugated population, and Germany for that matter was ignored for a system of haphazard looting of Europes food and consumer goods for the favored loyal Germans.

Extend that sort of thing over several years & it ensures a large majority of marginally fed/clothed, apathetic or hostile, and corrupted in the population of laborers and managers. People with a declining incentive to work at their pre war efficiency or effort.

Leaving aside Hersh I can see significant inefficiencies in artillery production. 'Ego' projects like the 80cm cannon, and a multiplicity of redundant lesser models in over sized calibers sucked away production resources for very small benefits. Consolidation of production from a array of national models to fewer optimal types for the Wehrmacht was slow and logistics ineffciencies aggravated by a excess of models with overlapping capabilites or redundancies. Engineering staff were wasted on overdevelopment of redundant new models that would not be needed.

The effort of managers under Todt or Speer to rationalize industrial production fall short compared to those in the US, or even Britain & the USSR. To the end nazi apparatchiks, economic policies laid on before and after the start of the war, and irrational decisions interfered with wringing optimal efficiency out of the economy.

[Marcelo Jenisch]

Relative to what? Europe's total supply of crude never reached 10 million tons during the war, whereas the Caucasus produced upward of 30 million tons beforehand.

Conditions when captured.

I agree that the Allies can do this, but then the Germans can just convert even more of their war industry for waging a defensive air battle. The Allies' logistical constraints will remain a serious bottleneck during 1942 - 1943.

Regarding the B-29, the USAAF statistical survey only accounts for 348 B-29 aligned against Japan on 31.12.44, a total rising to roughly 1,000 planes at the time of the Empire's capitulation. As for your assertion that the B-29 was "3 times as effective" as a B-17, the B-29 could on average carry 3 times the bomb load, which should not be confused with the rather abstract notion of "effectiveness".

From: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/Sta ... 3.html#t87

Airplanes on Hand in the AAF, August, 1945.
Very Heavy Bombers
1st Line B-29: 2,132
2nd Line & misc.: 733

1000 B-29s can deliver the payload of 3000 B-17s, while being able to fly faster, higher and defend themselfs better than any other bomber in the world at the time.

Germany was aware of the fantastic American industrial potential. The idea of conquer the USSR was to give tools to the country obtain a chance to confront the US and Britain in attrition warfare. The Nazis were not thinking it would be a foregone conclusion. It would depends of many things, including Anglo-American motivation to fight. Some people think that a Soviet defeat would necessarily meant that the Anglo-Americans would recognize their "hopeless" situation and give up. This is a serious fault with history lessons from the same time: Britain did not surrender when France was defeated, and the US did not signed peace after PH. Again to let clear: I'm not ruling out the possibility of some peace between the Allies and Germany. I'm just saying that this scenario is flexible, overall history is flexible.

[BDV]

For the impact of jewish oppression on economy, we have the size of the Kristallnacht fine, 1 billion RM, which represented AFAIK 20% of the value o jewish properties in the Reich at the time (1938). Applying some reasonable estimates on accumulation rate (4% per annum) and profit/plusvalue fraction retained by the jewish economic agents (20%), one gets a net loss for the Germany on the order of 1 billion RM per annum.

As to the other things I allege: One Example

[KDF33]

Hello Jenisch,

Conditions when captured.

Oil wells can be repaired. I've frequently heard it mentioned that it takes a tremendous amount of time, but the Japanese got the NEI back up to 80% of prewar production in roughly a year, so I'm not altogether convinced that this is true.

About the B-29s:

In your previous post, you mentioned B-29s "in the Pacific". The 2,132 first-line B-29s is the total in the AAF, not the total deployed against Japan. It includes aircraft in depots, under repair, in units in the U.S. and in units deployed against Japan.

About their combat effectiveness: certainly, they were better than the B-17s. They could still be shot down, tho. I see no reason to believe they were a silver bullet, especially considering that by the time they would be getting deployed in a significant number, the Germans would likely (in the sense that I'm assuming that Germany wouldn't be in a complete state of collapse) field large numbers of late-war fighters like the Ta 152, the Do 335 and the Me 262, with good pilots and a large supply of avgas.

Germany was aware of the fantastic American industrial potential. The idea of conquer the USSR was to give tools to the country obtain a chance to confront the US and Britain in attrition warfare. The Nazis were not thinking it would be a foregone conclusion. It would depends of many things, including Anglo-American motivation to fight. Some people think that a Soviet defeat would necessarily meant that the Anglo-Americans would recognize their "hopeless" situation and give up. This is a serious fault with history lessons from the same time: Britain did not surrender when France was defeated, and the US did not signed peace after PH. Again to let clear: I'm not ruling out the possibility of some peace between the Allies and Germany. I'm just saying that this scenario is flexible, overall history is flexible.

I'm in total agreement with this. In fact, I am absolutely certain that Germany couldn't "win" the war in the sense that it couldn't defeat the U.S., and in all likelihood neither the U.K. as long as the former backed the latter. The point I'm making, however, is precisely that, assuming that the Germans can access the resources of the Western USSR, the outcome becomes quite uncertain (at least until the U.S. nukes Berlin); although the Allies will in the short-term keep their production advantage, they will be constrained by shipping constraints at least until late 1943 - early 1944, which means that in the meantime they will do virtually no damage to Germany. Meanwhile, the mobilization of the energy resources of the USSR, coupled with an abundant supply of slave labor and Germany's already significant resources, will give the Germans a good shot to consolidate their gains in Europe and make a succesful defensive (in the sense that it leads to a negotiated peace where Germany keeps it's gains) war a realistic possibility.

[Marcelo Jenisch]

entioned that it takes a tremendous amount of time, but the Japanese got the NEI back up to 80% of prewar production in roughly a year, so I'm not altogether convinced that this is true.

Seems to make sense. The Germans would not implement such an advance if the oil production could be easily destroyed, but this is not my area.

As for the B-29: it's most interesting feature was higher bomb-load.

[KDF33]

It had a higher bomb load but it also was twice as large as a B-17/B-24, and thus cost a lot more in man hours / raw materials to build. In terms of size-to-bomb load ratio, it only carried 50% more than a B-17/B-24. So the end result would likely be better bombers with higher bomb loads, but less of them, so there would be a real gain but not nearly as much as 3-to-1.

Obviously the B-29 had other advantages, like superior speed, higher service ceiling and superior defensive armaments, but then again Ta 152s and Me 262s are much better than Bf 109Gs. In the end, every combatant was fighting an arms race as well as a shooting war, so I don't think we should make too much of the technological developments of either side: there would be answers, and ultimately factors like population, production, resources and logistical constraints would prove decisive or, as I believe is possible in this case, would cancel each other out and lead to a stalemate.

[KDF33]

BDV,

For the impact of jewish oppression on economy, we have the size of the Kristallnacht fine, 1 billion RM, which represented AFAIK 20% of the value o jewish properties in the Reich at the time (1938). Applying some reasonable estimates on accumulation rate (4% per annum) and profit/plusvalue fraction retained by the jewish economic agents (20%), one gets a net loss for the Germany on the order of 1 billion RM per annum.

As to the other things I allege: One Example

The Kristallnacht was certainly bad for the economy, but then it happened just once, not even in wartime, and certainly didn't have the scope anyway to be even a small factor in the eventual German defeat.

Regarding the thread about German and Soviet industrial production, the simple truth is that Germany significantly outproduced the USSR during the war. The Soviets did make more with their limited resources than the Germans did with their much larger ones, but then this is also true if one compares the Soviet war effort to those of the United States or Britain. The Soviets were the most mobilized country during the war, with a civilian economy that was virtually down to subsistence level and that still saw 3-4 million Soviet citizens die of hunger in the unoccupied regions of the USSR. Such complete mobilization was simply out of the question for the Western powers, be they democracies or the Nazi dictatorship.

To illustrate my point about the German-vs-Soviet production debate, I'll give the example of the ground vehicle industry (I include motor vehicles, AFVs and rolling stock). You might object that I'm mixing apples and oranges, and that trucks and trains have little to do with tanks, but this would be a mistake: the big jump in Soviet AFV production between 1941 and 1942 is almost entirely explained by the conversion of the Soviet truck and train industry. Thus, the Dzherzhinski Railroad Car Factory, which together with KhPZ formed Uralvagonzavod, and the No. 112 Factory, which manufactured locomotives, were together responsible for the production of 30,759 of the 43,019 T-34s (including 85's) produced during 1942-1944. The GAZ factory, which used to build trucks and cars, produced virtually all the T-70 light tanks and 7,523 out of 12,054 SU-76 assault guns built during the war.

So, what do consolidated figures for German/Soviet ground vehicle production tell us? That the German industry dwarfed that of the Soviets: (Source: calculations taken from various sources - I'll post them in detail if my numbers are challenged)

Year: German / Soviet production (weight, million tons)

1942: 1.3 / 0.6
1943: 1.8 / 0.7
1944: 1.7 / 0.9

This gives ratios of 2.17-to-1 ('42), 2.57-to-1 ('43) and 1.89-to-1 ('44), all in favor of Germany. Comparable ratios are obtained if one compares German and Soviet ammunition production (if one includes naval munitions). The Soviets tie roughly even with the Germans in airframe weight, and are obviously dwarfed by an order of magnitude in naval vessels production. All in all, Germany comprehensively outproduces the USSR in military items, even in 1942. The impression that the Soviets outproduced Germany springs from two considerations: 1. They produced a lot of tanks; 2. They produced (especially in 1942) more airplanes.

In the first case, the explanation is simply that the Soviets gutted the automobile and train industry to single-handedly churn out tanks, something the Germans never did. You might criticize the Germans for not having followed the Soviet model, but then the German war effort was entirely different from that of the USSR, and Germany controlled the entire European rail system whereas the Soviets were down to that of Russia proper, which incidentally meant that all the rolling stock evacuated from the Western regions added to their rolling stock density.

In the case of aircraft, the illusion is created because the USSR focused on producing single-engine planes, whereas Germany's production was dominated (until 1944) by the production of twin-engined bombers and bomber destroyers. In terms of airframe weight, Germany is slighly behind the Soviets in 1942, roughly equal in 1943 and outproduces the USSR in 1944.

So, all in all, the example of the USSR is a poor one to argue that the Germans significantly under-performed: they consistently outproduced the USSR across a wide range of weapon systems, often 2-to-1.

[Marcelo Jenisch]

Talking about the USSR, I will say that the main reason for my participation in this topic is understand the potential of this state in the war's context. I say that because many historians today point out the Soviet resistance as the factor that made the difference in the Allied victory. I cannot find logic in that. Frankly, we can discuss the Anglo-American capability to defeat Germany or not. But we can only analyze part or parts of the equation, because this subject is extremely complex, and if not impossible, it's certainly very difficult to analyze all the factors, many of which most here (including myself) do not even imaginate. As for the Soviets making the difference in the Allied victory, this is only reasonable for the majority of Russians and the majority of Communists (brainwashed individuals). Soviet resistance, IMHO, perhaps could have been a decisive factor in the war's outcome of total defeat of Germany. But perhaps would not necessarily be the case in every circunstance. For example, if the Soviets denied the Germans their oil, or if they were defeated in 1942, when the Anglo-Americans were much stronger, the things could have changed IMHO. Anyway, the so called "Soviet resistance" was definately very important. However, using the same logic, the "British resistance" was also equally important. The British did not inflicted as much casualities as the Soviets in Germany, but neverthless they could have made the difference for the Soviet SURVIVAL, which is more important in the general context than the Soviet effort the Anglo-Americans. I doubt that Germany, even if defeated the USSR, would be able to wage offensive war against the British Islands and the United Stated. It was more easy Germany be totally defeated by them then vice versa. Of course, the belief that Germay could have invade the USA is simply Schizophrenia. Now the posssibility of Germany, if not at war with the West, defeat the USSR, was more plausible. But in general I would say that all the major Allied nations (will even include China) were very important, and I don't like those comparisons of relative contributions due to the impracticability to analyze them.

Anyway, there's a tendency today to put the spot on the USSR. This makes me remember of affirmative action, which in my opinion only creates another problem trying to adress the former (i.e recognition in the West of the Soviet contribution).

[KDF33]

I believe this tendency to focus on the Soviet contribution comes both from a feeling that it was generally unfairly ignored during the Cold War, and from some out-of-context (and often wrong) statistics such as "the Soviets inflicted 80% of the German losses". As you mention, each of the three major Allied nations, and to a smaller extent China, contributed decisively to the final outcome. The Soviets suffered the worst, and certainly inflicted the most casualties on Germany, but human casualty / human casualty infliction is not the only currency in war and, in any case, a proportionally smaller (at least until 1944) Allied contribution to the European theater doesn't mean that it wasn't decisive on the results of the Eastern campaign, nor that the absence of the Soviets automatically meant Allied defeat.

I believe we can, however, reach a certain number of conclusions about the Soviet role in the war, and thus further our understanding of the conflict:

1. The German Grossraum was far from constituting a self-sufficient entity that could rival Anglo-American industrial power, and the Reich could only hope to prosecute a long war against American power if it could harness the significant resources of the western USSR. Thus, what is often seen as Hitler's greatest blunder (Barbarossa) was in fact, barring the discovery of a quick way to subdue Britain before American material / direct military assistance could make itself decisively felt, his most promising option.

2. A quick defeat of the USSR would have rendered any Allied hope of a medium-term large-scale landing operation on the European continent a virtual impossibility, and would thus have led to a switch of emphasis toward a scaled-up air war. The success of this campaign would depend on the speed at which the Allies could effectively overwhelm the Reich's reinforced air defenses and deny it the resources of the USSR, before the Germans could effectively integrate their European industrial base with the energy and manpower resources of the newly-acquired Lebensraum.

[Marcelo Jenisch]

The popular emphasis in the Soviet role is due to the Western historians already be counting with Western resistance. But unless the Soviets are also show with the same perspective for the West, it is a partial analyzes. Even if this balance is respected, I'm not convinced that the Anglo-Americans were necessarily dependent of Soviet participation and vice versa. It's also needed to specificy for what one side needed the other: survival or total German defeat?