1942: Mediterranean-Black Sea connection

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1942: Mediterranean-Black Sea connection

#1

Post by andalusian » 18 Apr 2012, 18:34

January 1942. Hitler decides, after the Moscow defeat and the entry of the USA in the war, to connect the North African front with the Russian front in order to create only one continental defensive bloc, according to the memorandum of 14 th December 1941.

A memorandum of 14 December 1941 on the significance of the entry into the war of the United
States and Japan prepared by the Operations Staff of the Supreme Command of the German
Anned Forces (Oberkommando der WehrmachtlWehrmachtftihrungsstab [OKW/WFStD

"predominantly based on four assumptions, none of which turned out to be correct a year later": first, that before America could fully mobilize, "Germany would reach its military objectives in the east, in the Mediterranean, and in the Atlantic"; second, "Germany would succeed ... in securing the periphery by bringing ... Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden into the continental defensive bloc"; third, "the Japanese offensive ... would ... tie down a substantial part of the Anglo-American potential in the Pacific for a considerable time"; and fourth, "the United States would not be able to conduct an offensive two-ocean war in the foreseeable future.


http://www.k-state.edu/history/institut ... 202002.pdf


Three mobile divisions being built or resting in France would go to Lybia and not to Russia (let´s say 22 and 23 PzD, and 28 Light Division). With them the Panzer Armee Afrika must seize the Suez Canal not later than June 1942. Then, Spain (joining the Axis) would close the Gibraltar Straits and Turkey (not necessarily joining the Axis) would open the Dardanelles Straits to the Italian fleet getting into the Black Sea.

So, as Eastern offensive Fall Blau start, in June 1942, Axis would have an enormous strategical adventage in the southern USSR. Crimea will be unexpensively gain, orographic obstacle of Caucasus mountains could be outflanked, and Ostheer in Caucasus and Stalingrad area could use the Eastern Black Sea ports and railroads. Also the Black Sea-Mediterranean connection would allow, in the coming months, an easier exploit of the economical resources of the Black Sea lands (oil, coal, wheat).

There will be three mobile divisions less for the Fall Blau offensive due to the sending of these as reinforcement for the Rommel´s army in North Africa, but in exchange of that
-the Crimea battle will be very easy and unexpensive (at least one whole german division of the 11 army saved by not suffering so many casualties),
-two Romanian divisions could be saved from Western Black Sea coastal defense duties and soviets would be forced to deploy coastal defense in Eastern Black Sea.
-Moreover, with the Italian Fleet will come into the Eastern Front an amphibious italo-german corps (the same forces that were prepared for the not implemented invasion to Malta).
-Axis armies to invade Caucasus will count with the big logistical adventage of using maritime transport for getting supplies (and saving fuel with it too).

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Re: 1942: Mediterranean-Black Sea connection

#2

Post by andalusian » 18 Apr 2012, 18:44

The former post what-if scenario was already exposed by me in other two topics in AHF. One of them had not the better title, being a little confusing. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 1&t=170512


The other, about strategy, http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 6&t=152069
was turned into a what-if story by others interveners asking about details that are not ussualy part of a debate about strategy.

Anyway, I find that the core of the story is the Mediterranean-Black Sea connection, showing it was unnecessary to keep two different fronts (North Africa and Ostfront) as it was perfectly possible to unite them and to take adventage of it. Only because of this mistake, I guess, Hitler lost his war. So no historical determinist explanation is appropiate…


In "Into Egypt" pag 3

Jon G. on 01 Apr 2011 wrote:There are the first 20 open threads about this subject; you've raised nothing which hasn't been touched upon in other threads.
This claim is wrong. After reviewing all what-if topics in this forum (ten years...), I just found this


“Just turn left in Suez”
Brian Ross on 19 Apr 2006 wrote:Its interesting that everybody has only considered the land implications of such a victory for the Axis forces. Once the Royal Navy had been expelled from the Mediterranean, the Axis would have had basically a pretty much free reign there. The result would have been Turkey either joining the Axis or at least openning the Dardanelles to Axis shipping with the result that they would have had a much easier supply. This would have influenced the thrust into the Cacauses, even if they had not attempted an attack through Northern Iraq. If the Italian Navy had been allowed through the Dardanelles, then a thrust along the Black Sea coast to Georgia and from there to Azerbajan would have perhaps eventuated.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=99576




What if the Suez Canal was reached…?


Roddoss72 on 20 Apr 2010 wrote:Then again thinking about it the Germans could entrain a large contingeant of troops, and via the Bosphorus transport German and Italian troops into the Black Sea and land troops in the Crimea and let the Italian Navy to run riot over the Soviet Black Sea Fleet.

Not bad
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=45415




In these only cases it is touched very slightly the possibility of using the Mediterranean to change completely the strategical situation in southern USSR. But not as the core of a change of Axis strategy after the failure in front of Moscow, in December 1941 and the entry of the USA in the war. And, of course, not in relationship with the OKW memorandum of 14th December 1941, and the necessity of creating an european defensive bloc, from Spain to the Persian Gulf.

I think it is worth to deep in this question, because, for example, Axis defeat in Stalingrad would have been impossible if the germans would have counted with the ports and railroads of Novorossisk and Tuapse to supply their armies in the area.


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Re: 1942: Mediterranean-Black Sea connection

#3

Post by Kingfish » 18 Apr 2012, 19:01

Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't the Italian navy suffer from a shortage of fuel?
How then could they operate in the black sea?

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Re: 1942: Mediterranean-Black Sea connection

#4

Post by LWD » 18 Apr 2012, 20:32

That's one of the questions never satisfactoraly addressed in the previous "what-if"s.

There's also a question about how Turkey would react to the Italians attempting to do so.

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Re: 1942: Mediterranean-Black Sea connection

#5

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 19 Apr 2012, 19:38

I suspect were this to happen then British or US air dropped torpedos and related equipment would be included in the Lend Lease cargo to the USSR. Another eighty or ninety fast and medium range bombers like the US B25 or any equivalent would give the Italians a lot of trouble with torpedo and bombing attacks, The Italians had problems coordinating air cover for their fleet, and adding extra aircraft to support the Italian Black Sea naval squadrons means reducing air power on some other battlefield. The same were the Germans to provide any aircover.

This would certainly simplify things in the Med for the British during those same months. For several months in 1941 the British were able to reduce the cargo delivered to Lybia by some 40%. Absent a significant portion of the Italian Navy and Axis air power sent to the Black Sea Italian military cargo arriving in Lybia could fall to a catastrophic level.

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Re: 1942: Mediterranean-Black Sea connection

#6

Post by waldzee » 19 Apr 2012, 20:26

Carl Schwamberger wrote:I suspect were this to happen then British or US air dropped torpedos and related equipment would be included in the Lend Lease cargo to the USSR. Another eighty or ninety fast and medium range bombers like the US B25 or any equivalent would give the Italians a lot of trouble with torpedo and bombing attacks, The Italians had problems coordinating air cover for their fleet, and adding extra aircraft to support the Italian Black Sea naval squadrons means reducing air power on some other battlefield. The same were the Germans to provide any aircover.

This would certainly simplify things in the Med for the British during those same months. For several months in 1941 the British were able to reduce the cargo delivered to Lybia by some 40%. Absent a significant portion of the Italian Navy and Axis air power sent to the Black Sea Italian military cargo arriving in Lybia could fall to a catastrophic level.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Strongly agreed.
Modern campaigns require sustained application of force & logistics- not a series of mobile warbands 'roaming the seas'.
Logistics doomed the Japanese war empire- lightning victories count for little if your overstretched , unescorted convoys are torpedoed at will.
@andalusian
in securing the periphery by bringing ... Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden into the continental defensive bloc"; third, "the Japanese offensive ... would ... tie down a substantial part of the Anglo-American potential in the Pacific for a considerable

Why would they want to join a Nazi led continental bloc? Hungary & Romania , for examples....

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Re: 1942: Mediterranean-Black Sea connection

#7

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 20 Apr 2012, 04:55

waldzee wrote: @andalusian
in securing the periphery by bringing ... Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden into the continental defensive bloc"; third, "the Japanese offensive ... would ... tie down a substantial part of the Anglo-American potential in the Pacific for a considerable

Why would they want to join a Nazi led continental bloc? Hungary & Romania , for examples....
Romania more or less had a gun at its head, two guns if you included the Red Army. Any nation that considered crossing Germany had the example of the Yugoslavian state to ponder. Franco saw clearly Hitler had the gun pointed east and and being a cold tough SoB sent Der Fuher on his way. Other like the Hungarians were not so fortunate.

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Re: 1942: Mediterranean-Black Sea connection

#8

Post by andalusian » 21 Apr 2012, 10:52

Kingfish wrote:Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't the Italian navy suffer from a shortage of fuel?
How then could they operate in the black sea?
LWD wrote:That's one of the questions never satisfactoraly addressed in the previous "what-if"s.
Of course, the question was already answered, I think satisfactoraly
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... &start=210 In Page 15

But it is good to reiterate it here.
Black Sea Axis Fleet Raid should be previous to Fall Blau offensive, that is June 1942. That means the Italian Fleet not doing the battle of mid-June against the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, saving 15,000 tons bunker oil. Then, the Axis Fleet would have at their disposal the Kriegsmarine reserves

Kriegsmarine fuel and oil reserves
fuel oil/ diesel oil
4/42 115 142
7/42 135 73
viewtopic.php?f=61&t=177684

I remarked that, if necessities of the Fleet could be seen as a problem for the KM reserves, some other operations could be saved previously. For example, some sorties of the Fleet in Norway. The operations in the Black Sea would have always the priority, not only because of the strategical value (if compared with Norway and the Athlantic U boot campaign) but because they would imply inmediate fuel savings in the coming months.

Anyway, maybe I got short, and I forgot that in that summer of 1942, italians were spending around 60,000 tons fuel monthly for the convoys (escorts specially). Finishing the battle in the desert, getting most of the Royal Navy off the Mediterranean and the PAA in the Delta would have meant an important saving of convoys fuel. Maybe 30,000 monthly.

The Black Sea campaign would be limited to the landing of the amphibious corps, in Taman peninsula (June 1942), to block the Crimean russian armies, to protect next supplies to the beachhead forces (transferring also more 11 Armee divisions from the Kherson port to the Taman peninsula port, probably Anapa), protecting those forces too with naval artillery and rejecting and destroying of the Soviet fleet that would try to interfere, all that done with the support of the Luftwaffe and submarines (germans and italians).

Maybe some time later, if necessary (two months later, maybe), it would be carried out another landing in the Novorossisk-Gelendzhik-Tuapse area, in case of the 17 Armee forces could not break through the soviet defences in the Caucasus mountain passes, as it happens in OTL.

Once the Black Sea cleared, it would come huge savings in fuel, and reserves would be increased again.
LWD wrote:There's also a question about how Turkey would react to the Italians attempting to do so.
As Hitler decided to invade Greece, there was no certainty either about how would react countries like Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, which cooperation would be needed.

In this ATL situation, chances would be more favorable for the Axis, as the Axis Fleet would come in front to the Dardanelles next to the british disaster in Egypt, the Russian defeat in Ukrania (Friderikus, May 1942) and the spectacular closing of the Mediterranean. If Sweden let the nazi troops to use their railroads in 1940, I can´t imagine the turks blocking the Italian Fleet under these circumstances.

They would put in risk the very city of Istanbul, that could suffer the same fate of Belgrad in 1941. Axis forces could use next the very amphibious corps (which would be based in the Aegean) and the four infantry german divisions in the Balcans (plus italians). It is unbelievable that the turk government would assume such a risk, counting with no one to help them... and all to protect the Soviet Fleet in the Black Sea... whose submarines were sinking turk merchant ships too...
Carl Schwamberger wrote:I suspect were this to happen then British or US air dropped torpedos and related equipment would be included in the Lend Lease cargo to the USSR. Another eighty or ninety fast and medium range bombers like the US B25 or any equivalent would give the Italians a lot of trouble with torpedo and bombing attacks,
The Black Sea campaign would be short, taking place only in the north-eastern corner of the not so big sea and considering that it would be unleashead the Fall Blau offensive at the same time. And the non-soviet Allies would have plenty of problems in logistics after the fall of Egypt and the closing of the Mediterranean. Anyway, the anti-ship weapons were not that effective against the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean at that time.
The Italians had problems coordinating air cover for their fleet, and adding extra aircraft to support the Italian Black Sea naval squadrons means reducing air power on some other battlefield. The same were the Germans to provide any aircover.
Luftwaffe had superiority anyway in the Black Sea in summer 1942 in OTL anyway. They inflicted severe losses to the soviet fleet, and now, with the addition of the italian big warships and more submarines (germans and italians) the Fleet would be destroyed in a short time.

This would certainly simplify things in the Med for the British during those same months. For several months in 1941 the British were able to reduce the cargo delivered to Lybia by some 40%. Absent a significant portion of the Italian Navy and Axis air power sent to the Black Sea Italian military cargo arriving in Lybia could fall to a catastrophic level
The Raid in the Black Sea would be next to the closing of the Mediterranean, so, apart from the little trouble it could be done by some small ships from the Eastern Mediterranean ports (Haifa, Beirut), the Royal Navy would have no many chances to intercept Axis shipping anymore. As a matter of fact, after Rommel arrived to the Delta, the PAA would need no much supplies. And for Malta (30,000 british saylors and soldiers...) would be time to surrender...
waldzee wrote:in securing the periphery by bringing ... Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden into the continental defensive bloc"; third, "the Japanese offensive ... would ... tie down a substantial part of the Anglo-American potential in the Pacific for a considerable Why would they want to join a Nazi led continental bloc? Hungary & Romania , for examples....
As a matter of fact, those countries already joined the Axis bloc, but after Mediterranean closing more countries would come into, like Spain, Egypt and probably France and Turkey. Germans would rule militarily, economically and strategically. In every of those countries Hitler would find active political agents willing to take adventage of the change by supporting nazis. Even in countries like Turkey and France. Not to forget the political impact of such a new situation.
Carl Schwamberger wrote:Franco saw clearly Hitler had the gun pointed east and and being a cold tough SoB sent Der Fuher on his way. Other like the Hungarians were not so fortunate.
But the problem would come as Franco realizing that Mediterranean and east focusing were related now. But that would not be a problem for Franco personally: Franco himself suggested Hitler to take Suez and Gibraltar simultaneously, and Franco´s military advisors pointed to Franco that the only way to replace the Atlantic comercial maritime routes was using new Mediterranean maritime routes.

And Franco wanted to be bought. Simply, in December 1940 Hitler did not want to pay the price... because he never thought that he could need Spain in order to win in the East.

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Re: 1942: Mediterranean-Black Sea connection

#9

Post by Ironmachine » 21 Apr 2012, 11:22

andalusian wrote:But that would not be a problem for Franco personally: Franco himself suggested Hitler to take Suez and Gibraltar simultaneously
But Franco never suggested doing that while at the same time fighting the Soviet Union...
andalusian wrote:Franco´s military advisors pointed to Franco that the only way to replace the Atlantic comercial maritime routes was using new Mediterranean maritime routes.
Which is not exactly the same as saying that the goods provided by the Allies through the Atlantic could be replaced by the goods provided by the Axis through the Mediterranean...

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Re: 1942: Mediterranean-Black Sea connection

#10

Post by waldzee » 21 Apr 2012, 14:34

@Exchange:
waldzee wrote:
in securing the periphery by bringing ... Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden into the continental defensive bloc"; third, "the Japanese offensive ... would ... tie down a substantial part of the Anglo-American potential in the Pacific for a considerable Why would they want to join a Nazi led continental bloc? Hungary & Romania , for examples....

As a matter of fact, those countries already joined the Axis bloc, but after Mediterranean closing more countries would come into, like Spain, Egypt and probably France and Turkey. Germans would rule militarily, economically and strategically. In every of those countries Hitler would find active political agents willing to take adventage of the change by supporting nazis. Even in countries like Turkey and France. Not to forget the political impact of such a new situation.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Interesting senario- However, Portugal was more firmly tied to Britan, if only to protect its colonial empire. Sweden's interest was protecting Finland's survival.( German arms to Finland in exchange for Swedish production & minerals).
I woudd suggest that you re-calculate how much fuel the Italian battle fleet would need. Bismarck needed 5,000 tonnes of Fuel oil for each excursion into the Atlantic.

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Re: 1942: Mediterranean-Black Sea connection

#11

Post by waldzee » 21 Apr 2012, 18:25

Kingfish wrote:Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't the Italian navy suffer from a shortage of fuel?
How then could they operate in the black sea?
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
From the prev. Threads 'calculations', I believe miles of austrian pine masts, canvas & hemp rope were assumed... :)
plus favorable sirocco wind patterns.

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Re: 1942: Mediterranean-Black Sea connection

#12

Post by LWD » 21 Apr 2012, 18:44

andalusian wrote:
Kingfish wrote:Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't the Italian navy suffer from a shortage of fuel?
How then could they operate in the black sea?
LWD wrote:That's one of the questions never satisfactoraly addressed in the previous "what-if"s.
Of course, the question was already answered, I think satisfactoraly
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... &start=210 In Page 15
You seem to be the only one and you have to make a whole series of counter historical assumptions to do so. Then there are still serious questions of whether or not it was even logistically possible.
.... Once the Black Sea cleared, it would come huge savings in fuel, and reserves would be increased again.
Another very questionable assumption on your part.
LWD wrote:There's also a question about how Turkey would react to the Italians attempting to do so.
As Hitler decided to invade Greece, there was no certainty either about how would react countries like Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, which cooperation would be needed. [/quote]
In this ATL situation, chances would be more favorable for the Axis, as the Axis Fleet would come in front to the Dardanelles next to the british disaster in Egypt, the Russian defeat in Ukrania (Friderikus, May 1942) and the spectacular closing of the Mediterranean. If Sweden let the nazi troops to use their railroads in 1940, I can´t imagine the turks blocking the Italian Fleet under these circumstances.
First you generate a whole bunch of one sided PODs then claim its obvious that the rest will fall the way you like it. Not really the way things are done around here. For one thing if the Turks saw this coming they would simply mine the Dardanelles.
They would put in risk the very city of Istanbul, that could suffer the same fate of Belgrad in 1941. Axis forces could use next the very amphibious corps (which would be based in the Aegean) and the four infantry german divisions in the Balcans (plus italians). ...
Now we have a massive German amphibious landing near Istanbul. That means it facing the Turkish mines and shore batteries. How long do you think it would take to plan this by the way? And move the requisite shipping into place? And how much oil would that alone take?
Carl Schwamberger wrote:I suspect were this to happen then British or US air dropped torpedos and related equipment would be included in the Lend Lease cargo to the USSR. Another eighty or ninety fast and medium range bombers like the US B25 or any equivalent would give the Italians a lot of trouble with torpedo and bombing attacks,
The Black Sea campaign would be short, taking place only in the north-eastern corner of the not so big sea and considering that it would be unleashead the Fall Blau offensive at the same time.
Isn't that what the Germans thought about Barbarossa in the first place.

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Re: 1942: Mediterranean-Black Sea connection

#13

Post by andalusian » 23 Apr 2012, 17:59

Andalusian wrote: But that would not be a problem for Franco personally: Franco himself suggested Hitler to take Suez and Gibraltar simultaneously
Ironmachine wrote:But Franco never suggested doing that while at the same time fighting the Soviet Union...
I don´t see the relevance of this remark. In Spring 1942 Spain was more involved in the fight on the side of the germans and against the USSR, due to the Blue Division presence in the Ostfront. And in December 1941 it was again pondered by the Franco´s spanish military advisors the possibility of Spain getting supplies via Mediterranean routes.

"Germany has prefered up to now that we stayed off the conflict because, on their side, as long as the Mediterranean not being an inner sea so that we could get supplies, we would be more a liability than a help"

“Alemania ha preferido hasta ahora que sigamos al margen del conflicto, porque a su lado, en tanto el Mediterráneo no sea un mar interior y por él nos podamos abastecer, más que una ayuda representaríamos una complicación”
12 December 1941

Enrique Moradiellos “Franco y Churchill”
Ironmachine wrote:Which is not exactly the same as saying that the goods provided by the Allies through the Atlantic could be replaced by the goods provided by the Axis through the Mediterranean...
It is not the same: it is another question. But considering how basic spanish necessities were (oil, wheat...) I don´t see why this would be an insurmountable problem.

Saving fuel in the Mediterranean to supply Spain (in order to keep the Mediterranean closed... in order to save fuel) was affordable (between 30,000 and 50,000 tons monthly). Getting the necessary 40,000 wheat tons monthly was also possible, even if that would have meant a further cut of the german rationing. Food situation in Germany during summer 1942 was bad, but better than during the last war. The real food problem in Germany at that time had to do with morale, and morale would be increased by getting more spectacular victories thanks to the closing of the Mediterranean. German people would believe that rationing recovery would come soon.
waldzee wrote:Interesting senario- However, Portugal was more firmly tied to Britan, if only to protect its colonial empire. Sweden's interest was protecting Finland's survival.( German arms to Finland in exchange for Swedish production & minerals).
In this ATL Portugal situation would be critical. As a matter of fact, "Operation Felix", scheduled for early 1941, included the deployment of three german divisions in the Portugal border, in case of Hitler deciding to invade Portugal. But I´d rather think that the first to act against Portugal would be the british (a little like in Norway or the action against the french navy in 1940). The british contingency plan for Spain joining the Axis and destroying (or seizing) the base of Gibraltar was the "Pilgrim operation", the seizure of Canaries Islands. But now I realized that operation was very difficult to succed: germans planned to defend these islands with the Luftwaffe, and without aerial superiority no amphibious operation can succed. So, the only british alternative would be seizing the Portuguese islands instead: Azores, due to the extreme importance of these islands in the Middle of the North Atlantic maritime routes, and Madeira, which could be a base for attacking Canaries later (a little like in the Pacific).

About Sweden, I am sure that they wanted to protect Finland´s survival, but also the swedish survival, so they could not refuse the germans to use the swedish territory for their strategic necessities. They got to be the only scandinavian country not invaded. The same situation for the rest of european countries. Practically everybody wanted to remain neutral, but only some of them made it.
LWD wrote:For one thing if the Turks saw this coming they would simply mine the Dardanelles.
That´s why this kind of assumptions are ridiculous. Mining the Dardanelles would not save Istanbul to be destroyed by the Luftwaffe... And mines can be later cleared out...
waldzee wrote:I woudd suggest that you re-calculate how much fuel the Italian battle fleet would need. Bismarck needed 5,000 tonnes of Fuel oil for each excursion into the Atlantic.


It´s not a question I should do. The right calculation would be done by the germans as planning this operation in January February 1942, previously to carry it out in June 1942. They would specify how much they would need, and if they would suffice with reserves, or with the italian allocation, or if they would need to shorten other Kriegsmarine fuel allocations...

And, of course, battling in the Athlantic against the powerful Royal Navy, would not be the same as a kind of police action in order to clear out the Black Sea from the weak Soviet fleet.

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Re: 1942: Mediterranean-Black Sea connection

#14

Post by Kingfish » 23 Apr 2012, 19:23

andalusian wrote:
Andalusian wrote:
LWD wrote:For one thing if the Turks saw this coming they would simply mine the Dardanelles.
That´s why this kind of assumptions are ridiculous. Mining the Dardanelles would not save Istanbul to be destroyed by the Luftwaffe... And mines can be later cleared out...
Clearing the mines in the Dardanelles would be the least of the Axis's problems. Relatively speaking, the Dardanelles is a 6-lane highway compared to the footpath that is the Bosphorus. Both areas, as well as adjoining shorelines at each exit, would need to cleared beyond Turkish artillery range. This would require a major commitment of Axis forces before the Italian ships could even begin thinking of making the passage. The city of Istanbul alone would require at least a division, perhaps two (one per side of strait).

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Re: 1942: Mediterranean-Black Sea connection

#15

Post by pugsville » 23 Apr 2012, 20:00

problems.

(1) 3 extra divisions does not mean teh Germans win North Africa. They were had pressed to supply their existing forces. The truck supply line from Benghazi to the delta is pretty thin funnel. The British had other forces they could easily have committed to the struggle.

(2) Reaching the Suez does not mean the end of North Africa, the British could always attack via the Sudan, Invade from India. Serious Garrison required, and the conflict would be expected to continue.

(3) Italians had virtually no amphibious experience.A poor record at sea and on land. A shortage of fuel and transport capacity. Supplying via the black sea would be a strain. The invasion of 2-3 Italian Divisions achieves what? The Russians have plenty of forces that could bog these forces down. What strategic target could such a small force take and hold? Too far ahead of German forces and it's just a pow camp waiting to fall. To near and it's just another couple of divisions and hardly significant forces in the eastern front context.

(4) Success would mean great strain on Axis supply, 4-5 divisions in the Delta, 2-3 divisions in Turkey, 3 divisions on the black sea coast, shortage of transport tonnage, long exposed supply routes. These forces would eat up the naval transport supply so nothing would really be added to the German supply into the eastern front.

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