Whaf if Graf Spee had additional battlecruiser in 1914

[glenn239]

Actually, I think they made a bad decision to send Goeben to the Mediterranean - I would have sent the older and less valuable Blücher there instead, and kept Goeben with the other new battlecruisers in the North Sea.

But if they had done that, Blucher doesn’t outrun Milne on 4 August and that, as they say, would be that. The British wake up to news of their first naval victory of the war on 5 August.

I agree it was a shame he didnt survive the war, but I really think it unlikely he was ever going to get home simply because of the odds against him

Spee’s odds of getting home were not unreasonable. Where he did himself a bad turn was making a risky but unnecessary attack, then he planned and executed it poorly, and then on top of it all discovered his luck was bad.

Howewer initially I was expecting this discussion to be more about how Falklands would play out if heroic Graf Spee had Moltke or Seydlitz at his disposal... I really like the man and feel sorry he didn't make it home. He was such a nice chap.

But nice doesn’t cut it. Spee made two mistakes, both fatal. First, he failed to scout with his fastest cruiser (Dresden) alone with the rest at great distance and prepared to flee. Second, when BC’s were confirmed, he had to split up is armoured cruisers and run individually. Fighting as a squadron simply guaranteed that when the first German AC was knocked out, the second would face two British BC’s. He kept his light cruisers with his heavy cruisers, when at least two should have been sent far ahead to capture coaliers and purchase coal in neutral ports.

The most likely answer is that if Graf Spee's force had been stronger, the British response would also have been proportionally stronger, with a similar end result.

Well, no, that idea is pretty much impossible. Against just 2 AC’s, the Entente could deploy quite a number of AC or BC kill groups – maybe 8 or 10 such groups. But against 2 BC’s, the Entente could deploy 2 hunter groups. Everything else the Entente had was either too slow to catch them, or dead if they did. So 2 BC’s meant the situation was even worse than 10 vs 2 suggests, since the Entente could ill afford to use individual scout ships, as these will perish on contact.

[Terry Duncan]

I really can’t see Churchill fighting Cornell historically with a pair of German BC’s about.

The OP stated a BC, not two. I am sure Spee would have done quite well with half the HSF's BC allotted to him as well as oil fuled ships, excellent supply facilities, and secret bases, but that is not what existed in 1914.

The Battle of the Falkland Islands suggests that overseas raiders should have been the most modern ships available, not the cast-offs.

It shows that isolated squadrons operating without support are doomed, and will eventually encounter superior forces that can be projected anywhere around the globe and supplied too, it is simply a matter of time. The German overseas ships were mostly fairly modern light cruisers, and none were operating a year after the war began. Given the HSF was desperately short of this type of ship, they would have been better deployed at home with the main battle fleet.

Picture if Spee wins a battle with BC’s - the whole mentality of the German high command might have been transformed.

Picture Spee unable to get across the Pacific due to lack of fuel for these heavy units and encountering the entire Japanese navy?

And if accommodations really were an issue, the Germans had plenty of ships in the supply train to ease the burden during routine transits.

Useless if you are found by the enemy unexpectedly. Attempting to transfer crew in the face of the enemy is not going to end well.

Spee’s odds of getting home were not unreasonable. Where he did himself a bad turn was making a risky but unnecessary attack, then he planned and executed it poorly, and then on top of it all discovered his luck was bad.

Not unreasonable? Spee getting home is an extreme outside chance. If you like to bet on odds of 150 - 1 then maybe it is not unreasonable. That he was unlucky at the Falklands is not an issue, he was also quite likely to be caught at the Plate or near the Carribean if he had missed Sturdee. Spee needs coal and so must be near the shipping lanes, and that will be fatal to him sooner or later.

Fighting as a squadron simply guaranteed that when the first German AC was knocked out, the second would face two British BC’s.

Both AC's were dead wether they split up or not. One or two of the light cruisers may have escaped, but given the odds even that is unlikely.

First, he failed to scout with his fastest cruiser (Dresden) alone with the rest at great distance and prepared to flee.

If Spee flees all possible encounters he will never seize any coaliers as runing at the sight of smoke will get him nowhere, he must take risks to achieve much at all.

Everything else the Entente had was either too slow to catch them, or dead if they did. So 2 BC’s meant the situation was even worse than 10 vs 2 suggests, since the Entente could ill afford to use individual scout ships, as these will perish on contact.

Even if we accept the increase to two BC's with Spee - why not half the HSF as it will improve his fighting capability if not his supply situation - there is no need to send ships that can outrun them, all you need to do is secure the shipping lanes and prevent Spee from refueling. No hunting group needs to outnumber Spee, equal odds will be thought reasonable, and indeed are for this task. A single group of 3 of the 13.5" gunned ships is sufficient to hunt with, and there are plenty of old pre-dreadnoughts looking for a role that could be deployed in pairs to protect sea lanes. Spee cannot afford to fight and risk serious damage or running out of ammo, nor can he ensure fuel supplies for his heavy units. The Entente do not have to sink him, they only need to run him out of fuel and ammo, a far easier task.

[glenn239]

It shows that isolated squadrons operating without support are doomed....

It certainly showed that slow, obsolete ships are doomed when they meet faster, bigger ships. Anything conclusions past that might be squinting too closely at the canvas.

... The German overseas ships were mostly fairly modern light cruisers, and none were operating a year after the war began.

Of the overseas light cruisers, only Breslau and Karlsruhe were modern. Neither was caught.

and will eventually encounter superior forces....

That’s a touch on the deterministic side in a universe that is inherently random.

Given the HSF was desperately short of this type of ship, they would have been better deployed at home with the main battle fleet.

Granted, if the purpose is to scuttle the biggest fleet possible at Scapa Flow in 1919.

Both AC's were dead whether they split up or not.

The AC's clearly had a better chance at survival by splitting up.

If Spee flees all possible encounters he will never seize any coaliers as runing at the sight of smoke will get him nowhere, he must take risks to achieve much at all.

A grand statement of principle. Here’s mine; Spee’s chances of reaching Germany were actually quite good provided he avoided taking big risks, or making serious mistakes. For the Falklands Spee’s best option was clearly not to attack the outpost or do it with Dresden alone. His worst option - was pretty much what he did. He took a risk and made an error. That’s the two things I mentioned he couldn’t do.

...The Entente do not have to sink him, they only need to run him out of fuel and ammo, a far easier task.

Maybe. What is true is that if the Entente is relying mainly on a logistics ‘kill’, then by using BC’s the Germans have eliminated the main method by which their overseas raiders were destroyed. One 13.5" squadron for the whole world and some pre-dreadnought teams - this is not going to accomplish much.

[Terry Duncan]

It certainly showed that slow, obsolete ships are doomed when they meet faster, bigger ships. Anything conclusions past that might be squinting too closely at the canvas.

Graf Spee in WWII didnt fare too well when meeting smaller well co-ordinated enemies. A raider interned in a neutral port is just as acceptable as a raider sunk. The ships that worked best at raiding in both wars were the converted merchant ships.

Neither was caught.

Curiously I cannot remember specifying them being caught, maybe you can point out where I said that? All that needs to happen is for them to be out of action and running them out of fuel will do that just as surely as meeting superior forces.

Granted, if the purpose is to scuttle the biggest fleet possible at Scapa Flow in 1919.

There is no reason the German fleet could not be employed in any number of ways, the fleet certainly did not have to end as it did, and having more ships capable of scouting will only help if a combative role is decided upon.

The AC's clearly had a better chance at survival by splitting up.

They had no chance alone or together. They cannot get in range to hit back or manage to run away.

Spee’s chances of reaching Germany were actually quite good provided he avoided taking big risks, or making serious mistakes

Some things will not appear a big risk until they turn out to be a big mistake, so all you are saying is that if everything goes right for him, Spee will reach Germany. Even getting fuel to get that far would be doing well. Getting through the North Sea would be little better than a miracle under the circumstances.

For the Falklands Spee’s best option was clearly not to attack the outpost or do it with Dresden alone.

If Spee destroys the Falklands coaling station he does massive damage to the British hoping to catch him, and could even lead to a large fleet being stranded there until new coaliers arrive.

What is true is that if the Entente is relying mainly on a logistics ‘kill’, then by using BC’s the Germans have eliminated the main method by which their overseas raiders were destroyed.

Even a single BC in Tsingtao will reduce Spee's ability to travel far, having two will make that far worse. Simply preventing them from finding large coal stocks will reduce the squadron.

One 13.5" squadron for the whole world and some pre-dreadnought teams - this is not going to accomplish much.

Spee cannot be everywhere, and it is not going to be easy to hide a fleet that leaves a trail of missing merchant shipping in its wake. Deplying any hunting squadron is a luxury, the prime job is to keep the HSF pinned in the North Sea, anything else is secondary and can be treated as such. Any hunting ships of the dreadnought type can certainly be held in place until the location and direction of travel of Spee becomes clear, and all it needs to achieve is to neutralize Spee.

[glenn239]

Graf Spee in WWII didn’t fare too well when meeting smaller well co-ordinated enemies...

But even in the era of airpower and radar the raider was still favoured to return. In 1914 the British had neither.

There is no reason the German fleet could not be employed in any number of ways...

...none of them particularly useful. If Scharnhorst and co had been based in the North Sea in 1914, then most likely about one would have been sunk by mine or submarine, one would have been plugged by the Grand Fleet, and the rest would have ‘mothballed’ in 1916-1917.

They had no chance alone or together.

That was the only claim to make which would not stand you in defiance of basic probability - 0% is the only outcome in which splitting up does not matter. Whether you offer the estimate in sincerity, or whether you offer it while even you don't believe it, we all can decide for ourselves. In the meantime, individual posters can make up their own mind whether Sturdee’s shooting rated Spee’s cruisers “no chance” of surviving the day. I personally suspect each cruiser had a minority chance to survival if alone.

Some things will not appear a big risk until they turn out to be a big mistake, so all you are saying is that if everything goes right for him, Spee will reach Germany. Even getting fuel to get that far would be doing well. Getting through the North Sea would be little better than a miracle under the circumstances.

You gather Spee’s odds were 1 against 150 of returning. I’m thinking more along the lines of 1 in 2. So what point is there to further discussion on the matter? Our estimates are too far apart for meaningful discussion.

If Spee destroys the Falklands coaling station he does massive damage to the British hoping to catch him

You exaggerate. The British simply purchase more coal and send new coaliers to the Falklands. Since Spee cannot sink the island nor block the entrance, he can not interfere with coaliers transfering material to warships in the outer harbor, wrecked docks or no wrecked docks. Therefore, Spee's best move was to send the Dresden in alone.

Generally, I'm saying that Spee fell between two stools. If he wanted to play raider, then he shouldn't have sailed across the entire Pacific Ocean before doing so. If he wants to return to Germany, then he doesn't reach the Atlantic and then start playing at raider in more dangerous conditions. One or the other.

Even a single BC in Tsingtao will reduce Spee's ability to travel far, having two will make that far worse.

We’ve already gone over the pre-war logistics requirement to a beefier Far East squadron. If the premise is that the Germans cannot beef up their support in the colonies in the peacetime period, then obviously no stronger squadron would be advisable.

Spee cannot be everywhere, and it is not going to be easy to hide a fleet that leaves a trail of missing merchant shipping in its wake. Deplying any hunting squadron is a luxury, the prime job is to keep the HSF pinned in the North Sea, anything else is secondary and can be treated as such. Any hunting ships of the dreadnought type can certainly be held in place until the location and direction of travel of Spee becomes clear, and all it needs to achieve is to neutralize Spee.

This is just a fancy way of saying that Spee with 2 BC’s is harder to catch and kill than Spee with two AC’s. Which is my point; overseas work required the most modern ship types, not the obsolete ones. By November 1914 the overseas performance was such that the HSF was internally considering an active raiding strategy with BC's. Spee ends this in December 1914 by being caught and killed. It was the decisive strategic moment in the surface naval war, by ending for all time an alternative to the Sitzkrieg in the North Sea.

[Baltasar]

Graf Spee in WWII didn’t fare too well when meeting smaller well co-ordinated enemies...

But even in the era of airpower and radar the raider was still favoured to return. In 1914 the British had neither.

We're talking about surface raiders here. Which surface raiders did return to Germany during WW2? How many of those send away returned?

There is no reason the German fleet could not be employed in any number of ways...

...none of them particularly useful. If Scharnhorst and co had been based in the North Sea in 1914, then most likely about one would have been sunk by mine or submarine, one would have been plugged by the Grand Fleet, and the rest would have ‘mothballed’ in 1916-1917.

That's your opinion and you're free to come up with hard facts to tell us why you think they would. In my opinion, the ships would have been used in the HSF, as they simply could not afford not to use them, one way or the other.

They had no chance alone or together.

That was the only claim to make which would not stand you in defiance of basic probability - 0% is the only outcome in which splitting up does not matter. Whether you offer the estimate in sincerity, or whether you offer it while even you don't believe it, we all can decide for ourselves. In the meantime, individual posters can make up their own mind whether Sturdee’s shooting rated Spee’s cruisers “no chance” of surviving the day. I personally suspect each cruiser had a minority chance to survival if alone.

Survival as in... returning to Germany? They'd run out of ammo and spares soon. Coal wouldn't even be that much of a problem, but they had to keep their ships running. I do not know if you have any experience in seamanship, but keeping a ship running isn't a trivial task these days, much less back then.

[Tim Smith]

Actually, I think they made a bad decision to send Goeben to the Mediterranean - I would have sent the older and less valuable Blücher there instead, and kept Goeben with the other new battlecruisers in the North Sea.

But if they had done that, Blucher doesn’t outrun Milne on 4 August and that, as they say, would be that. The British wake up to news of their first naval victory of the war on 5 August.

No, because Milne was not allowed to open fire on 4 August - the British ultimatum to Germany would not expire until midnight, so Britain was not yet at war. Churchill wanted to start early, but the Cabinet in London wouldn't let him. Adm. Milne did not receive instructions to begin hostilites until 1:15 am on 5 August, and by that time it was too late - the German ships had escaped into the darkness of night, and reached a neutral port in Italy by dawn on 5 August. And Milne was expressly forbidden to come within six miles of the Italian coast - the Foreign Office was desperate to keep Italy from honouring her pledge to join the Central Powers.

But Blucher (in Goeben's place) would still probably have been sunk on August 7 - not by Milne and the British battlecruisers, who were caught out of position defending the west when the Germans moved eastwards, but by Adm. Troubridge's armoured cruiser squadron (Defence, Warrior, Duke of Edinburgh and Black Prince). Historically Troubridge avoided contact with Goeben, outranged by her 11" guns (and unfairly was made to face a Court of Inquiry and a court martial for this decision later) but he would not have hesitated to engage Blucher's 8.3" battery. Blucher was a superior ship to any of the British armoured cruisers, but they would be four to her one - and light cruiser Breslau would not have been much help.

[Uncle Fritz]

We're talking about surface raiders here. Which surface raiders did return to Germany during WW2? How many of those send away returned?

"Admiral Scheer" under Admiral Krancke made a brilliant raid in november 1940 going well into the Indian Ocean - and then safely made it to Wilhelmshafen. It was said that it was the luckiest ship in the Kriegsmarine!

And yes I agree that Bluecher wouldn't make it to Constantinople - and arrival of the Mittelmeerdivision was a decisive reason for Ottoman warhawks to join the war. Churchill later wrote that never so much misery was born from a compass of a ship (he probably thought of the Brits for sure and his career screwed becouse of Gallipoli hehe). So Germans made a good exchange: one less battlecruiser in the North Sea for one ally more.

[Terry Duncan]

But even in the era of airpower and radar the raider was still favoured to return. In 1914 the British had neither.

Raiders that had the fuel may have had a chance of returning home, ships without fuel and needing to refuel several times just to be able to do so did not.

...none of them particularly useful.

The addition to the HSF can only increase the options open to it, and without the Kaiser's order restricting its use it may have played a very significant role.

That was the only claim to make which would not stand you in defiance of basic probability - 0% is the only outcome in which splitting up does not matter.

It is the realistic assessment of the chances. Any other result involves skewing the odds to get a result you want that is not reflected by the reality of the situation.

Whether you offer the estimate in sincerity, or whether you offer it while even you don't believe it, we all can decide for ourselves.

I dont post here to play games, I have no need to do so, especially on this subject matter. The result I noted is a considered evaluation of the situation based upon the combat abilities of the ships involved. People can believe anything they want, the facts speak for themselves and a brief examination of the statistics should be enough for most people.

individual posters can make up their own mind whether Sturdee’s shooting rated Spee’s cruisers “no chance” of surviving the day.

Sturdee stood off at a range the German ships could not reply, and were unable to get within their own guns range to reply, the visibility remained excellent throughout the time needed to sink both German ships. The German ships are too slow to get into their own range or out of their enemies range, they have nowhere to run to hide, the weight of broadside even if they do get within range is staggeringly one sided, and in the battle they did manage to hit many times all to no effect whilst every hit from the British ships did great harm. Sturdee sank both ships, did not run out of ammo - though it was getting very low - and both German ships were wrecks that were beyond hope long before they sank. If you cannot see how one sided this battle was, it can only be from deliberately ignoring facts.

You exaggerate. The British simply purchase more coal and send new coaliers to the Falklands.

You have a large squadron of warships stranded in the South Atlantic waiting for coaliers to arrive, whilst Spee can steam off to any destination he desires knowing he will have probably at least a weeks head start and many unprotects shipping lanes ahead of him.

This is just a fancy way of saying that Spee with 2 BC’s is harder to catch and kill than Spee with two AC’s.

No it isnt. Read what I wrote. It lays out the British method of dealing with this situation in all circumstances as a measured response is all that is needed. Prevent fuel supplies to this bloated fleet and it does little long term harm and will intern itself somewhere.

[glenn239]

No, because Milne was not allowed to open fire on 4 August - the British ultimatum to Germany would not expire until midnight, so Britain was not yet at war. Churchill wanted to start early, but the Cabinet in London wouldn't let him. Adm. Milne did not receive instructions to begin hostilites until 1:15 am on 5 August, and by that time it was too late - the German ships had escaped into the darkness of night

A mechanically worn down Blucher outruns a pair of British BC’s? Quite a feat.

Which surface raiders did return to Germany during WW2? How many of those send away returned?

Bismarck and Graf Spee were caught and sunk (Bismarck would have survived if not for radar and air power). All the others escaped. That is, Lutzow, Admiral Scheer, Admiral Hipper, Prinz Eugen, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau.

Survival as in... returning to Germany?

Yes, as in return to Germany. IMO, Spee’s chances of reaching the North Sea if he does not make dashing raids on the way is very high – we’re talking over 9 chances in 10 high. However, getting through the North Sea to Germany is where it drops to maybe 50/50 – the German codes were broken hence the chances of a successful intercept by Beatty’s BC’s were good.

Spee’s other option was to do what Hipper intended – raid around in the Caribbean / South American area until his ships were disposed of or finally returned to Germany (as Karlsruhe would have).

[glenn239]

It is the realistic assessment of the chances. Any other result involves skewing the odds to get a result you want that is not reflected by the reality of the situation.

We’ve reviewed (and rejected) each others’ estimate on the matter, so there is no need for follow up. You think the odds of an AC not making nightfall in individual combat with a BC after splitting up upon identification of tripod masts to be 0.00%. I reject that and suspect the actual odds were somewhere in the 10%-15% range. Since there is no advantage in either case to sticking together, splitting up was the only way to go.

You have a large squadron of warships stranded in the South Atlantic waiting for coaliers to arrive,

Worst case, Sturdee just docks in a couple of neutral port and uses his once-per-3 months coaling opportunity. Best case, he catches Spee attacking the Falklands.

It lays out the British method of dealing with this situation in all circumstances as a measured response is all that is needed. Prevent fuel supplies to this bloated fleet and it does little long term harm and will intern itself somewhere.

We agree that a logistics kill is the only strategy that has a good chance of success against BC’s. Sinking BC's by catching them with a superior squadron – highly unlikely on the fact that only a handful of ships existed that were qualified to be in such a squadron.

[Tim Smith]

No, because Milne was not allowed to open fire on 4 August - the British ultimatum to Germany would not expire until midnight, so Britain was not yet at war. Churchill wanted to start early, but the Cabinet in London wouldn't let him. Adm. Milne did not receive instructions to begin hostilites until 1:15 am on 5 August, and by that time it was too late - the German ships had escaped into the darkness of night

A mechanically worn down Blucher outruns a pair of British BC’s? Quite a feat.

The British battlecruisers Indomitable and Indefatigable had been on long overseas cruisers immediately before the war, and were just as mechanically worn down and their hulls fouled with marine growth as the German ships. Plus the British ships had only their peacetime crew complement - they lacked the extra stokers that the ships needed in wartime, which reduced the maximum length of time the ships could spend at flank speed.

It's not just the German ships who were a knot or two below their documented top speed - the British ships were too.

Plus it's easy for even large ships to escape at night - Blucher has at least three hours of complete darkness before the British receive permission to open fire.

Source: Castles of Steel, p35.

[Terry Duncan]

You think the odds of an AC not making nightfall in individual combat with a BC after splitting up upon identification of tripod masts to be 0.00%.

That was not the scenario you outlined when making the claim. At the time you simply said the two AC's stood a better chance fighting seperately and not together. You are now altering this to scattering from the moment tripod masts were identified - Dreadnoughts carried them too, the claim in certain books that they were the identifying feature of battlecruisers is complete rubbish - and trying to run until night, whilst the initial scenario was one where it was dependant upon the time the decision was made to fight as a pair (or indeed fleet) which was a long time later.

Worst case, Sturdee just docks in a couple of neutral port and uses his once-per-3 months coaling opportunity. Best case, he catches Spee attacking the Falklands.

There needs to be the coal there to supply him, so this could take week or so to actually get the entire squadron ready to look for Spee again, it will take over a day just to get to the nearest ports for the fleet itself and there is no requirement on any nation to dock the entire fleet at once. Spee has many miles head start and little between him and the Caribbean. So catch Spee he simply needs to stay close to the shipping lanes anyhow, especially if Spee now has no coal in the southern hemisphere he can reliably get at.

We agree that a logistics kill is the only strategy that has a good chance of success against BC’s.

Not quite. It is not a local strategy for dealing with BC's, it is a global long term conduct of the war strategic backdrop against which any other campaign must be fought. The British effectively limit the amount of coal at sea for Spee to steal - unless he wants to rob random neutral nations - forcing Spee to hunt the shipping lanes where the hunters await.

Sinking BC's by catching them with a superior squadron – highly unlikely on the fact that only a handful of ships existed that were qualified to be in such a squadron.

I am not sure why this needs to be said so often, but you do not need to sink a ship to end its threat. Damage in an important area will force it to intern or scuttle, a lack of ammo will reduce it to a large metal barge roaming the seas or interns itself. Spee used 50% of his ammo at Coronel, a one sided battle where he sank two old ships quite efficiently, he considered the ammo situation critical after that. It doesnt matter how big the German ships are once they have little ammo for heavy guns. You simply force the raiders to fight on your terms.

[Uncle Fritz]

I am not sure why this needs to be said so often, but you do not need to sink a ship to end its threat. Damage in an important area will force it to intern or scuttle, a lack of ammo will reduce it to a large metal barge roaming the seas or interns itself. Spee used 50% of his ammo at Coronel, a one sided battle where he sank two old ships quite efficiently, he considered the ammo situation critical after that. It doesnt matter how big the German ships are once they have little ammo for heavy guns. You simply force the raiders to fight on your terms.

Indeed this is the most effective way of ending the wandering battlecruiser threat. Howewer, in the prewar period the Germans surely would organize some additional etappen to supply the monster with coal - or oil if we assume that it would be oil-burning vessel specially designed for long-range commerce warfare. I wonder how such etappen would look like: it certainly would require a supply network along South America with five or six small tankers or coaliers... Chile and Argentina were friendly toward Berlin so concealed tankers can wait for Spee in summer of 1914.

[Terry Duncan]

Howewer, in the prewar period the Germans surely would organize some additional etappen to supply the monster with coal

They stationed a small fleet a short distance from a likely hostile nation's ally that would love some new colonies and made no attempt to provide much at all allowing it to be useful in a war, so whilst it would be sensible it was something that was not done at the time. It could be done, but hiding such facilites might be harder.

or oil if we assume that it would be oil-burning vessel specially designed for long-range commerce warfare.

You could but this is getting into the entire German fleet - and therefore British responses - moves towards oil fired capital ships about 1908/9. After that its anyones guess quite what would have been designed and built.

I wonder how such etappen would look like: it certainly would require a supply network along South America with five or six small tankers or coaliers... Chile and Argentina were friendly toward Berlin so concealed tankers can wait for Spee in summer of 1914.

Quite possible given the preparation pre-war, though these sort of vessels are exactly what ships such as Otranto are meant to deal with, and Britain has plenty of small elderly warships good for little else!