Expanded D-Day Landings?

[Carl Schwamberger]

I supose a look at the larger landing plan, the following waves would help clarify things further. Someday...

Getting back tot the original question here: The most practical expansion of the landings would have been the higher concentration of air and naval fires on or near the planned beach heads. Most of the positions of the German combat units were known& as those were moved closer to the beaches so would the preperatory and post landing air strikes. It also may have forced the navies to squeeze more cruisers and battleships out of the fleet for fire suppport.

Shifting a portion of the Neptune assualt to a less defended sector, or adding other assualts elsewhere is problematic. Between preperation requirements and the amphibious fleet being a finite quantity Making such changes is tough. In Febuary it is tough but possible, in April it is far tougher and probablly delays things another 6-8 weeks.

I have been reminded Monty did consider briefly a July assualt landing on the west coast of the Cotientin. After a bit of thought he dismissed the idea. A vaugely similar idea might have been worked into the Overlord plan early on. The largely forgotten Operation Chasity had been a important part of the Overlord plan. The object of Op Chasity was to place a third prefabricated Mulberry type harbor in Quiberon Bay when that area was captured in mid July. Of course that did not occur and the material/manpower for the Quiberon Bay port was used in Normandy. Were the Overlord planners to recognize a higher concentration of German defenses in Normandy/Calais then the Neptune assualt might have been altered to allow a second & later attack on the Breton pennesula while the bulk of the German army was committed to defending Normandy. That would be uncharacteristic of Montys thinking to some degree, and possiblly delayed Operation Dragoon a few more weeks, but at the time a secondary point of attack might seem attractive.

Another possibility would be to execute Neptune as it was, but reduce the follow on in July a little . This would allow a earlier execution of Op Dragoon. In later July vs mid August. Also part of the reinforcements & material from the US could be sent to support Op Dragoon vs Neptune. That would leave the Germans committed in Normandy while a stronger Allied 6th Army Group advances north into central France.

Probablly other and better ways the Allies could have dealt with a stronger defense of Normandy. While adjusting would not be easy, neither was the actual preperation for Neptune & Overlord, Dragoon, and the other auxillary operations to Overlord. Give a couple months there was a fair ammount of flexibillity.

[stormhawk1]

,,,. According to his Chief of Staff, Speidel, Rommel during May had repeated asked Hitler for the 12SS Panzer Division (Hitler Jugend) and the Panzer Lehr Division to be placed between Caen and Falaise, and intended renew this demand on the fatal 6th June. Had his wishes been met before the invasion, it seems in retrospect that the British on both sides of the Orne (R.) might well have been involved in a holocaust not unlike the shambles on Omaha (Beach), or even ppushed back into the sea."

- perhaps views such as this (there are similar views by several authors) for the reason for the originating question? This clearly states Rommel's intent and evaluates it as having a reasonable likelihood of success.

First this assume the Allies wont adjust their fire plan, air strikes in this case, accordingly. it was no accident the 12SS & Pz Lehr & the other divisions attempting to reach Normandy from the 6th through 8th were hammered by near continual airstrikes. The starting locations of these units were known, their radio comm monitored, their probable route to the beaches reconoitred by the French underground and Allied air. The air strikes on them were deliberate and calculated. If these divisions are repositioned closer thee would become a higher prioirty target for the Allies and the air attacks on them adjusted accordingly.

Rommels opinion might of some use here. In July Rommel wrote the following in one of his reports. This extract/translation is from Ellis in his chapter on the Normandy campaign in 'Brute Force'

Rommel: >'The Allies had time and material enough... It is my belief that even if we had had ... several Panzer divisions, an AA Corps, a Nebelwefer Brigade, and Parachutists... at the scene of the landing, we would have still lost the battle, as our counter attacks would have been smashed by the Allied naval guns and air force, and out artillery and Nebelwerfer positions would have been put out of action after another by the fantastic Allied barrage ... Ultimately ... no compromise of any kind can make up for total enemy air and artillery superiority'<

Wish I could find the full report. Saw it many years ago in some instructional material. My take from it is Rommel decided post battle that his strategy of front loading all the combat units onto the probable landing sites would not have worked, even if he had been allowed to fully implement it. Since Rommel had fairly complete information from his army, corps, and division commanders on the effects of the Allied firepower, the losses of his units and their inability to manuver or counter attack effectively, and personally witnessed some of this I'll trust his judgement.

....a holocaust not unlike the shambles on Omaha (Beach)

The early morning problem on Omaha beach was due to failures in fire support just before & during the initial assualt. The additional soldiers of the German 352d Division were a lesser secondary factor. As soon as the fire support coordination was restored the situation reversed. At 08:30 the German regimental commander responsible for that sector reported to the division HQ that he was losing communications with his companies and resistance nests, that a counter attack was no longer possible, and the enemy fire was severe.

[stormhawk1]

I thought Rommel intended to keep the above mentioned resources just outside the range of navel guns and dispersed so as to bring them up during the allied assault. I say during because as soon as these resources are close enough to the allied resources navel and air power would just as likely hit one as the other.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I thought Rommel intended to keep the above mentioned resources just outside the range of navel guns and dispersed so as to bring them up during the allied assault. I say during because as soon as these resources are close enough to the allied resources navel and air power would just as likely hit one as the other.

His action had been to put the combat units on or as close to the beaches as possible. ie: the 352 Infantry Div was moved in Late May from a non beach position on the west side of the Cotientin to the east side & its battalions of atillery & infantry distributed in the beach fortifications or just inland a few kilometers.

Prior to Rommels command only beaches directly adjacent to the ports were defended in strength. Those at any distance were not yet fortified and had only company and platoon size outposts. ie: The Utah beach area had only a single company in 1942 and a battalion for most of 1943. The previous strategy had been to concentrate the static defense around the ports and counter attack a invasion with mobile reserves posted well inland. The reinforcement sent to France from late 1943 allowed Rommel to thicken the defense of all the beaches. As for the position of the mobile reserves, my take is Rommel wanted them placed less than a days march from their primary sector. While many of those battalions would have been out of NGF range others would have been inside it.

Also, Rommel underestimated the NGF effect in this battle. He had read the reports of the NGF used in the Scillian, Salerno, and Anzio assualts, but the volume of guns and ammunition used on the Normandy coast was more than double the per corps allotment of the earlier battles. Also the requirement from Hitler to stand fast and fight it out at the beachead meant that for some eight weeks the battle zone was in range of the heavy NGF. Something that had only occured at Anzio before. Rommel had expected the volume of NGF to be perhaps a third of what was actually used and he had thought it would fade off in a few days or a week.

I dont usually recommend a game as a historical refrence, but the many tactical D Day games illustrate fairly well how Rommels attempt to deploy a coastal defense put the bulk of the defense directly under the naval guns.

[Von Schadewald]

If as in "The Eye of the Needle" or "24 Hours" the Germans had really got wind with a week to spare that the landing was 100% going to be at Normandy, is there anything they could realistically have done to stymie D-Day before a soldier even set foot on the beaches eg sending out every u boat, mini u-boat, fighter, bomber, stuka, e boat, s boat, destroyer, flak ship that they could lay their hands on to harry/harass/preempt/spoof/scare, plus suicidal Brandenberg missions on the British Isles, bringing forward the June 12 V1 launches to hit Portsmouth and Southampton, even bombarding Dover from Calais to rattle the British, redoubling of the open laying of coastal minefields off Normandy, openly moving armoured divisions and anti-paratroop defences into Normandy etc.

Would any of this have been enough for Eisenhower to say "We Don't Go on June 5/6th!"?

Was there a COSSAC Plan B in such an eventuality?

Or was the momentum just too great? "This time the party's on and no one's going to stop it!" (General Boy Browning just before the Arnhem disaster!)

Would the Allies hold off invading at this time altogether?

Or still attack but much more delayed, limited and cautiously?

Or still launch an attack on Normandy, but with double the naval, air, airborne, artillery and land power?

Or land elsewhere altogether?

[Orwell1984]

If as in "The Eye of the Needle" or "24 Hours" the Germans had really got wind with a week to spare that the landing was 100% going to be at Normandy, is there anything they could realistically have done to stymie D-Day before a soldier even set foot on the beaches eg sending out every u boat, mini u-boat, fighter, bomber, stuka, e boat, s boat, destroyer, flak ship that they could lay their hands on to harry/harass/preempt/spoof/scare, plus suicidal Brandenberg missions on the British Isles, bringing forward the June 12 V1 launches to hit Portsmouth and Southampton, even bombarding Dover from Calais to rattle the British, redoubling of the open laying of coastal minefields off Normandy, openly moving armoured divisions and anti-paratroop defences into Normandy etc.

You forgot to include the parachuting attack dogs that shoot bees from their mouths .....

[Carl Schwamberger]

If as in "The Eye of the Needle" or "24 Hours" the Germans had really got wind with a week to spare that the landing was 100% going to be at Normandy, is there anything they could realistically have done to stymie D-Day before a soldier even set foot on the beaches eg sending out every u boat, mini u-boat, fighter, bomber, stuka, e boat, s boat, destroyer, flak ship that they could lay their hands on to harry/harass/preempt/spoof/scare, plus suicidal Brandenberg missions on the British Isles,

The capability of all those items by May 1944 was to weak. The Allies had been carefully monitoring for such actions and had plans for dealing with such things. ie: After the assualt kicked off the surge of German aircraft to the battle barely brought the air strength to 10% of the Allied operational strength based in the UK.

bringing forward the June 12 V1 launches to hit Portsmouth and Southampton, even bombarding Dover from Calais to rattle the British, redoubling of the open laying of coastal minefields off Normandy, openly moving armoured divisions and anti-paratroop defences into Normandy etc.

Could the V1 lauch date be set forward in any significant way? Allied airstrikes on the launch sites and transportation had already set back the V1 effort some weeks.

Would any of this have been enough for Eisenhower to say "We Don't Go on June 5/6th!"?

Was there a COSSAC Plan B in such an eventuality?

COSSAC had been disolved six months earlier when Ike was appointed commander & SHAEF establsihed.

Or was the momentum just too great? "This time the party's on and no one's going to stop it!" (General Boy Browning just before the Arnhem disaster!)

Well, the execution was delayed 24 hours due to the storm of 5 June. So there was flexibility in that regard. The assualt plan was fairly inflexible. It had been officially 'locked' a few weeks earlier & serious changes would lead to serious delays. The repositioning of the 352 ID is a example of inflexibility here. Its presence on the east coast was 'discovered' at the SHAEF/1st Army level at least 12 hours before the actuall assualt. The information was passed down to the corps HQ of the Omaha Beach assualt. they were at a loss to see any practical actions that could be taken and did not see the point to passing it to either the 1st or 29th ID HQ. Neither commander or staff could change anything of importance that night.

Given a week the principle changes would be in redirection of supporting fires, particualry air attacks. After that the airborne assualt might be the next most flexible component

Would the Allies hold off invading at this time altogether?

Perhaps, depends on how much they know or think they know of the changes in the defense.

Or still attack but much more delayed, limited and cautiously?

Too many changes for that on short notice. Over the long haul the reaction would be to pile on yet more firepower. The reactions of the previous six months to improvments in the German defense had been increased concentration of effort, firepower, and assualt units.

Or still launch an attack on Normandy, but with double the naval, air, airborne, artillery and land power?

Or land elsewhere altogether?

Attacking elsewhere would either be hasty corps size attacks, perhaps based on one of the old Roundup plans, or something delayed at least a month, perhaps two months

[pacifritz]

Expansion is all very well in hindsight---but was it feasible at the time it mattered?


Perhaps THAT is the crux of these writings....

[Carl Schwamberger]

Lost me there. What sort of expansion do you refer to? Size of assualt? Supporting fires? Landing sites?

[Trackhead M2]

"navel guns" "navel and air power"

Dear sh1,
You must be able to get your belly button to do a lot more than the rest of us. Do you need an innnie or an outie to use a navel gun?
Strike Swiftly,
TH-M2
P.S. No harm intended,you have won the humorous typo of the week award. Thanks for the laugh.

[nebelwerferXXX]

From "Normandy Bridgehead", Maj. Gen. H Essame, (New York, Ballantine Books), p. 29:

"The Fuhrer had settled the controversy in a typical Hitlerian manner - neither Rundstedt or Rommel should have complete control of the reserves. Of the six panzer divisions in the north Rommel was left in control of three - the 2nd, 21st and 116th as Army Group B reserve. The remainder, namely the 1st and 12th SS Panzer and the Panzer Lehr divisions were constituted as a reserve only to be used on orders from Hitler himself. Thus no one was satisfied. According to his Chief of Staff, Speidel, Rommel during May had repeated asked Hitler for the 12th SS Panzer Division (Hitlerjugend) and the Panzer Lehr Division to be placed between Caen and Falaise, and intended to renew this demand on the fatal 6th June. Had his wishes been met before the invasion, it seems in retrospect that the British on both sides of the Orne (R.) might well have been involved in a holocaust not unlike the shambles on Omaha (Beach), or even pushed back into the sea."

Yes, your right. I've read this one also.

[Von Schadewald]

Had his wishes
been met before the invasion, it seems in retrospect that the British on both sides of the Orne (R.) might well have been
involved in a holocaust not unlike the shambles on Omaha (Beach), or even ppushed back into the sea."

6 June itself cost the Allies 4000 dead.

Could they have sustained 8-12,000 dead and still have won?

[Carl Schwamberger]

Hard to say, there are several other variables. What would be the German losses, how far comparablly does either side hold or advance? Does this situation leave the Germans with few local reserves, or reinforcements the next day?

How many Allied soldiers crossed the beach by the end of the 6th? I dont remember exactly but it was well over 100,000. Neither do I know what the anticipated losses were. The advance of the US 4th ID across Utah Beach was considered a striking sucess because they took fewer than anticipated. The US AB Div took fewer losses than expected (Not the 75% Leigh-Mallory claimed but far more than actually suffered.)

The infantry battalions of the US 1st and 29th Div took far more losses than anticipated but still fought their way off the beach that morning, & did so with multiple failures in fire support & their tank battalions largely destroyed. I cant really say what other units might have done with their losses doubled but the arguments that the Neptune operation assualt was "overinsured" have some weight.

Certainly there would be a breaking point for the assualt forces that day, but one wonders how much effort from the defense that would require, and if the defense could hold up and not reach a breaking point first.

[Carl Schwamberger]

From "Normandy Bridgehead", Maj. Gen. H Essame, (New York, Ballantine Books), p. 29:
.... Had his wishes been met before the invasion, it seems in retrospect that the British on both sides of the Orne (R.) might well have been involved in a holocaust not unlike the shambles on Omaha (Beach), or even pushed back into the sea."

Wish I time to game this one out. There are probablly a dozen other WI to work out with a map ex. for this battle as well.

[Von Schadewald]

"Going out from the United States, with its enormous reserves of wealth, its massive productive capacity, and its manpower, this effort, great as it was, helps to reveal something of the nature of Britain's war effort as she embarked on the last phase of the desperate struggle against time. For four years she had been at full stretch, fighting in theatres of war embracing the Atlantic, the Arctic and Indian Oceans, the Mediterranean and many lesser seas. Her armies had toiled and fought through North Africa and large parts of the Middle East, achieving victories little short of miraculous under Wavell and Auchinleck, and at last the reward of Alamein under Montgomery, but in the dark months between suffering agonies of defeat and frustration on the fringes of many lands. Her troops had fought up through Sicily and Italy, and were crawling through the steaming jungles of South-East Asia. Now, impoverished, her manpower divindling fast, compelled perhaps to barter her autonomy, she knew only that victory in 1944 might save her. Steadily the 'terms of war' had moved against her, placing her more at the mercy of her friends than of her enemies, and she had come doggedly, even bravely, to the eve of her 'last throw'. "("D Day" p43, RW Thompson)

"her manpower dwindling fast"? Just how many reserves, if any, did Britain have for D Day & the invasion?

How much worse would the fighting & casualties have had to have been for British forces in the West to be depleted of combat troops men sufficiently to have become ineffective as a fighting army, though not necessarily defeated?