Luftwaffe only has to fight the VVS

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KDF33
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Re: Luftwaffe only has to fight the VVS

#46

Post by KDF33 » 20 Nov 2012, 08:44

Hi Carl!
Point here is the implication, assumption, or statement that the German air efforts will not be as restricted by fuel limits are wrong.
The key word is "as". Fuel restriction is relative. Thus, Germany suffered from fuel restrictions if compared with the United States, but beneficed from a large fuel surplus if compared with the USSR. Likewise, the USSR was restricted in comparison with Germany but itself showed a large surplus if compared with Japan. In the absence of the Western Allies, the only comparison that would matter would be that of Germany and the Soviet Union.

Keep in mind, too, that Germany kept a significant (and growing) part of the Luftwaffe in France, in the Mediterranean and over Germany. In the absence of the Western Allies, Germany would not only gain from the surplus pilots and airplanes, but also from all the fuel that wouldn't be consumed outside of Russia and that could be reallocated to that theater and to the training schools.

A factor entirely unaddressed thus far in the conversation here is the pilot & aircraft loss rate. Not just from combat but from accident & other noncombat causes. From 1942 the noncombat 'operational' loss rate of the Luftwaffe was bad & it went to horrible by 1944. Once again Ellis, & Price address this. Pilot & aircraft losses are not a obscure subject hidden away, but have been addressed by a wide variety of German and Engliash language historians in the past six decades.
The Soviet noncombat losses were even worse. Using Krivosheev's figures on pages 254 and 255, the importance of noncombat losses as a % of total losses for the combat types was:

1941: 42%
1942: 36% -> Somewhat surprisingly, the best year.
1943: 50%
1944: 61%
1945: 63% -> The worst year. Looks like the Soviet negative feedback loop was indeed a reality!

And its not because the Germans shot less planes later in the war either. Using my previous figures for combat sorties, here are the Soviet noncombat losses per combat sortie for 1942 and 1944:

1942: 1 noncombat loss per 167 combat sortie
1944: 1 noncombat loss per 60 combat sortie

Certainly the Germans may have been as accident-prone as the Soviets by the middle of 1944, which is not surprising given the crippling losses of the Jagdwaffe and the destruction of the fuel plants... both inflicted by the US!

It may very well occur the Luftwaffe could defeat the Soviet military aviation forces, but I dont see any support that it would be a given, nor that it would even be easy in any fashion.
Well, here is the evidence:

1. The Soviet pilots' proficiency as expressed in losses-per-sorties deteriorated both steadily and substantially during the war.

2. Soviet training and sortie generation was significantly hampered by fuel restrictions, much more so than in the case of Germany.

3. The gap between the German and the Soviet avgas supply was growing to the detriment of the Soviets.

4. The vast majority of the German fighters and pilots were destroyed in the West.

5. The Luftwaffe could never focus its efforts on the USSR like the Heer did in 1941-43. Even in 1942, close to half of the Luftwaffe's combat strength was deployed to other theaters than the Eastern front.

My conclusion would be that if you add strength to the Luftwaffe in the East (up to doubling it, as early as 1942), relax its fuel constraints, decrease its total losses, in particular in pilots, all the while significantly increasing the attrition rate of the Soviet VVS, everything points toward the Luftwaffe establishing air dominance over the Eastern front. Would it be easy? Not in absolute terms, and certainly not if you'd be asking a German pilot! Would it be much, much easier than fighting a losing two-front air war? A lot.

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Re: Luftwaffe only has to fight the VVS

#47

Post by KDF33 » 20 Nov 2012, 09:10

Some more stats:

According to Williamson Murray, between january and october 1942, the Jagdwaffe suffered 866 noncombat losses. The comparable figure for the Soviets, again from Krivosheev, is 2600. Assuming that Germany's fighter force made a similar number of sorties as the VVS, this would indicate that the average Soviet pilot was anywhere from 2.5 to 3 times more accident-prone as the German, and this when the Soviet pilots appear to have been at their peak. A residual question would be to know which air force deteriorated faster. This last question wouldn't really be useful to this topic, however, since the attrition of the Jagdwaffe was mostly the work of the Americans.


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Re: Luftwaffe only has to fight the VVS

#48

Post by 1st Cavalry » 20 Nov 2012, 09:39

KDF33 wrote: As you can see, it is during 1942 that the Soviet Air Force made the most sorties per aircraft of the war. This is because the limiting factor was not airframes, but fuel (and also, perhaps, spare parts) or, more precisely, that the supply of fuel could not keep up with the supply of airframes.
this is not necessary a good thing .
Asking a pilot to do a lot of combat sorties is not the best strategy when fighting a war of attrition.

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Re: Luftwaffe only has to fight the VVS

#49

Post by Marcelo Jenisch » 20 Nov 2012, 22:05

If the VVS was so defficient in fuel, then Germany really would never won the war if they had captured the Caucaus historically. :P
Last edited by Marcelo Jenisch on 20 Nov 2012, 23:50, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Luftwaffe only has to fight the VVS

#50

Post by KDF33 » 20 Nov 2012, 22:26

If the VVS was so defficient in fuel, then Germany really would never won the war historically. :P
What does this mean? Are some words missing? Germany did not, historically, win the war.

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Re: Luftwaffe only has to fight the VVS

#51

Post by Marcelo Jenisch » 20 Nov 2012, 23:48

If the Soviet fuel supply was so short, considerating that Germany had captured the Caucasus wells intact, and considerating all the difficulties to transport the oil to Germany, it would be hard for the Luftwaffe grow strong enough to defeat the USAAF and RAF. And I'm not considerating the possibility of sabotage by the Soviets. However, it's stupid to belive that the Germans did not considerate this, I just do not know what considerations they had.

If someone is interested in discuss the subject above, come here: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4&t=194301

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Re: Luftwaffe only has to fight the VVS

#52

Post by KDF33 » 21 Nov 2012, 00:39

If the Soviet fuel supply was so short, considerating that Germany had captured the Caucasus wells intact
I think the problem for the Soviets was processing capacity more than raw materials availability.
it would be hard for the Luftwaffe grow strong enough to defeat the USAAF and RAF
Well, I don't see how the Germans could ever have defeated the USAAF, even if you give them the Soviet avgas supply unhindered.

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Re: Luftwaffe only has to fight the VVS

#53

Post by Kingfish » 21 Nov 2012, 00:54

Jenisch wrote:If the Soviet fuel supply was so short, considerating that Germany had captured the Caucasus wells intact
IIRC, the Germans were stopped outside of Grozny and well short of Baku, so I'm not sure what you mean by capturing the wells intact.

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Re: Luftwaffe only has to fight the VVS

#54

Post by stg 44 » 21 Nov 2012, 02:08

KDF33 wrote:
If the Soviet fuel supply was so short, considerating that Germany had captured the Caucasus wells intact
I think the problem for the Soviets was processing capacity more than raw materials availability.
it would be hard for the Luftwaffe grow strong enough to defeat the USAAF and RAF
Well, I don't see how the Germans could ever have defeated the USAAF, even if you give them the Soviet avgas supply unhindered.
Soviet Avgas was only about 73 octane. The German minimum was 86. The Soviet refining capacity was the bottleneck IIRC, while the Germans has spare capacity, but shortages on oil. Of course if Germany had access to world oil markets without the Brits in the war then there would be no problem. If somehow they got Soviet oil back to Germany, like if Maykop (the only oil well captured historically AND was tied into rail nets that could be transported back to Germany) wasn't sabotaged before Germany got there, it would seriously help the Luftwaffe and general German war effort.


Maykop was about 10% of Soviet oil production IIRC, which was much more than the Romanians produced.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=55&t=32840
http://www.stalingrad.net/german-hq/the ... part2.html
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Re: Luftwaffe only has to fight the VVS

#55

Post by Marcelo Jenisch » 21 Nov 2012, 02:56

While Germany has access to world markets, she can pay for importations?

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Re: Luftwaffe only has to fight the VVS

#56

Post by stg 44 » 21 Nov 2012, 03:37

Jenisch wrote:While Germany has access to world markets, she can pay for importations?
Depending on whether Germany has conquered France and the Lowlands, I'd say yes. Germany has a fair amount of exports that the world wants, which can then be turned into some foreign exchange, even without France raising that exchange with her luxury goods and then passing it on to Germany because of war reparations.
Japan for instance needs German electronics and ball bearings. Germany has a fair amount of trade with Mexico and South America pre-war, which she will likely pick up again even with a war with the USSR on.

Germany probably can export weapons too. Especially without the bombings, German industry can really ramp up, she can leverage Spain and Turkey for more minerals too, probably keep trade with Iran going (regardless of whether Germany ever fought the West, as Hitler idealized Iran (think Aryan), plus Germany was contracted to develop Iranian infrastructure pre-Allied invasion), which will result in a fair amount of oil, plus there is Dutch oil if Germany occupies the Netherlands, which probably helps prevent Japan from invading Indonesia, as Germany can work out a deal with her ally about oil sharing.

Without Allied bombing, Germany doesn't have to invest nearly as much in FLAK, FLAK shells (which were heavy users of copper), repairing damaged factories/cities, won't need to disperse industry and see the resulting heavy inefficiencies in production (think underground factories), won't see her domestic infrastructure and oil production disrupted, nor her electric infrastructure disrupted, nor the unnecessary investments in the V1/2/3 projects or Atlantic wall, all of which heavily depleted resources which could have been better spent elsewhere, not to mention avoiding the 500,000 civilians killed historically, which included a number of workers.
German cities without the bombing will be much more productive and won't require resources to house the de-housed workers, nor will they have the drop off in production caused by trekking to avoid the bombings.
Overall the German economy would perform much much better, meaning there will be more things to export.

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Re: Luftwaffe only has to fight the VVS

#57

Post by 1st Cavalry » 21 Nov 2012, 08:51

phylo_roadking wrote:
Or the 230 Tomahawk IIs and 15 P-40Es received in 1941? The Tomahawk-equiped 126th IAP flew 666 combat sorties to cover the Kalinin and West Fronts and 318 combat sorties for the defense of Moscow in the period from 25th October 1941 to 25th April 1942....twelve pilots from 126th IAP became aces and 31 pilots of the regiment were awarded orders and medals for the Battle for Moscow.
I think you answered your own question . At full strength a fighter regiment has 42 aircraft , 984 combat sorties / 42 fighters = 23.4 sorties per plane . That is one combat sortie per week / plane , or one sortie every 7.8 days to be exact.

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Re: Luftwaffe only has to fight the VVS

#58

Post by 1st Cavalry » 21 Nov 2012, 10:10

stg 44 wrote:[
Maykop was about 10% of Soviet oil production IIRC, which was much more than the Romanians produced.
probably more than Romanian exports to Germany ( the majority already refined ) but not more than Romanian production. Romanian oil production in 1942 was 5.6 million tons , maikop produced some 2.2 milion tons .

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Re: Luftwaffe only has to fight the VVS

#59

Post by LWD » 21 Nov 2012, 17:01

stg 44 wrote:
Jenisch wrote:While Germany has access to world markets, she can pay for importations?
Depending on whether Germany has conquered France and the Lowlands, I'd say yes. Germany has a fair amount of exports that the world wants, which can then be turned into some foreign exchange, even without France raising that exchange with her luxury goods and then passing it on to Germany because of war reparations.
That's certainly debateable. The Germans going into the war suffered a severe shortage of foreign exchange and had a considerable amount in loans coming due. Even with the resources of France, Austria, etc it's not clear how well off they would be in this regard.

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Re: Luftwaffe only has to fight the VVS

#60

Post by stg 44 » 21 Nov 2012, 17:16

1st Cavalry wrote:
stg 44 wrote:[
Maykop was about 10% of Soviet oil production IIRC, which was much more than the Romanians produced.
probably more than Romanian exports to Germany ( the majority already refined ) but not more than Romanian production. Romanian oil production in 1942 was 5.6 million tons , maikop produced some 2.2 milion tons .
You're right, I couldn't find a source about yearly production and didn't have time to dig through my papers for it.

I was prompted to make a comment about German panzer divisions based on the fact that an unblockaded Germany would have had access to world markets, the lack of a western enemy would avoid the need for certain defenses, and the lack of bombing would open more production. The extra oil alone would mean little for the panzer divisions on its own, though it would enable Germany to field significantly more panzers with higher production. Part of Germany's problem was its bad habit of raiding training establishments for instructors to throw in the field in specialized units like Panzer Lehr or in the case of the Luftwaffe just to pad out their pilot numbers.

However in this scenario Germany wouldn't have the pressures to do this that existed historically. The losses in the West coupled with having to fight on multiple fronts without a break to rebuild her forces pretty much prevented the Panzerwaffe or Luftwaffe from rebuilding their numbers and due to the false perception that major operations would be over quickly, like before the BoB or Barbarossa, led them to think they could simply throw their instructors into combat without long term penalty.
Here the pressure to do so would be significantly less.

Although the scenario hasn't really be laid out as to how the West is out of the conflict, assuming that Britain makes peace (for some reason) after France falls and the losses in France still occur, but the BoB does not, then the Luftwaffe will have time to recover and boost pilot numbers before the invasion of the USSR, which means they are far less likely to throw their instructors into combat and just leave them in training.
As it was the invasion of France cost Germany about a third of its aircraft and over a thousand pilots (probably more), though according to van Crevald the Luftwaffe retained a 10,000 pilot reserve. The BoB and Blitz significantly ate into this reserve, while new graduates were no where near replacements needed.
However with 10,000 pilots in reserve and 1 year to gear up for the invasion of the USSR would probably replace the invasion of France losses easily and would result in an increase overall in pilots and aircraft.

The Panzerwaffe is a different animal though. It wasn't as badly affected as the Luftwaffe IIRC, so wasn't yet drawing on its instructors, especially as the training program was significantly shorter than pilot training.
So it probably wouldn't enter into the cycle of drawing down its instructors to plug gaps in the front line. It would be interesting to see if the Heer would start rotating its best tankers back into training centers to rest them and boost training quality. I doubt it, but without the same pressures that historically existed who knows.

Production would be higher now with more raw materials and being able to incorporate captured industries in France and the Lowlands into Germany, while Yugoslavia might not need to be invaded without Britain in the war and the need to force Yugoslavia into the Axis. Greece certainly wouldn't need to be invaded, which would save the Fallschirmjäger for combat drops in Russia; IIRC they were slated for AGN and capturing bridges in the Baltic states.

Plus there would be no Afrika Korps, so an additional mobile corps would be available to an army group during Barbarossa. I figure Rommel would end up as just another war criminal in the East.
Higher production thanks to unlimited imports, lack of bombing, and the lack of a need to disperse factories would result in greater efficiency and more centralized production facilities would boost weapons outputs, which would make a significant difference from 1942 on, but would still be felt in 1941, though most of that would just be avoiding the losses that happened after the fall of France, in the Balkans, and North Africa historically.

Barbarossa would probably start around May 22nd, as that was the earliest date the weather would allow for the invasion and without other combat commitments the Wehrmacht to focus on being ready for that date. The extra time, improved numbers/supply situation, and singular focus would help make Barbarossa more painful for the Soviets, but I doubt they would be knocked out in 1941 even if Moscow somehow fell.
From 1942 on, probably jumping in 1943-4, German industry would seriously outperform its historic numbers and with less commitments in other areas the Wehrmacht would be fielding a much stronger force in the East. The Soviets would be weaker and would likely not be able to push the Germans much West of the Don river.

There would be serious changes to strategy too if Germany wasn't worried about her oil. Historically Hitler decided to gamble on capturing Soviet oil because of the perceived desperate need for it, though he fully realized that there wasn't a way to get it to Germany; he seemed to figure that a way would be found once they had the oil fields. Here Hitler is more likely to listen to logistic concerns and avoid advancing into the Caucasus, instead pushing to the Don river and bombing Soviet oil production, while also securing the Donets Basin and avoiding Stalingrad (though bombing it). From a 'Don Line' position and bombing Soviet oil production (IIRC some 80% being in the Caucasus), the Wehrmacht is going to be very difficult to budge and won't have Stalingrad moment where the Soviets can simply destroy major portions of German combat power, permanently seizing the initiative in the East. Instead AGS will have a powerful defensive position, airbases to attack Soviet oil, and the ability to give AGC the bulk of the mobile combat elements for another operation in 1943 against Moscow or AGN against Leningrad.
This changes the dynamic on the Eastern Front dramatically without Stalingrad.

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