The key word is "as". Fuel restriction is relative. Thus, Germany suffered from fuel restrictions if compared with the United States, but beneficed from a large fuel surplus if compared with the USSR. Likewise, the USSR was restricted in comparison with Germany but itself showed a large surplus if compared with Japan. In the absence of the Western Allies, the only comparison that would matter would be that of Germany and the Soviet Union.Point here is the implication, assumption, or statement that the German air efforts will not be as restricted by fuel limits are wrong.
Keep in mind, too, that Germany kept a significant (and growing) part of the Luftwaffe in France, in the Mediterranean and over Germany. In the absence of the Western Allies, Germany would not only gain from the surplus pilots and airplanes, but also from all the fuel that wouldn't be consumed outside of Russia and that could be reallocated to that theater and to the training schools.
The Soviet noncombat losses were even worse. Using Krivosheev's figures on pages 254 and 255, the importance of noncombat losses as a % of total losses for the combat types was:A factor entirely unaddressed thus far in the conversation here is the pilot & aircraft loss rate. Not just from combat but from accident & other noncombat causes. From 1942 the noncombat 'operational' loss rate of the Luftwaffe was bad & it went to horrible by 1944. Once again Ellis, & Price address this. Pilot & aircraft losses are not a obscure subject hidden away, but have been addressed by a wide variety of German and Engliash language historians in the past six decades.
1941: 42%
1942: 36% -> Somewhat surprisingly, the best year.
1943: 50%
1944: 61%
1945: 63% -> The worst year. Looks like the Soviet negative feedback loop was indeed a reality!
And its not because the Germans shot less planes later in the war either. Using my previous figures for combat sorties, here are the Soviet noncombat losses per combat sortie for 1942 and 1944:
1942: 1 noncombat loss per 167 combat sortie
1944: 1 noncombat loss per 60 combat sortie
Certainly the Germans may have been as accident-prone as the Soviets by the middle of 1944, which is not surprising given the crippling losses of the Jagdwaffe and the destruction of the fuel plants... both inflicted by the US!
Well, here is the evidence:It may very well occur the Luftwaffe could defeat the Soviet military aviation forces, but I dont see any support that it would be a given, nor that it would even be easy in any fashion.
1. The Soviet pilots' proficiency as expressed in losses-per-sorties deteriorated both steadily and substantially during the war.
2. Soviet training and sortie generation was significantly hampered by fuel restrictions, much more so than in the case of Germany.
3. The gap between the German and the Soviet avgas supply was growing to the detriment of the Soviets.
4. The vast majority of the German fighters and pilots were destroyed in the West.
5. The Luftwaffe could never focus its efforts on the USSR like the Heer did in 1941-43. Even in 1942, close to half of the Luftwaffe's combat strength was deployed to other theaters than the Eastern front.
My conclusion would be that if you add strength to the Luftwaffe in the East (up to doubling it, as early as 1942), relax its fuel constraints, decrease its total losses, in particular in pilots, all the while significantly increasing the attrition rate of the Soviet VVS, everything points toward the Luftwaffe establishing air dominance over the Eastern front. Would it be easy? Not in absolute terms, and certainly not if you'd be asking a German pilot! Would it be much, much easier than fighting a losing two-front air war? A lot.