300 Ju 89's during the Blitz

[stg 44]

What if the Luftwaffe continued developing the Ju 89 after its first flight in April 1937, so that by April 1939 it enters production? Development gives the Ju 89 a 4 ton internal bombload and a range of 1800 miles with that load. It can haul up to 6 tons with external mounting up to 1200 miles. It would have a top speed of 255 mph with the latest engines as of 1940 and a cruise speed of around 200 mph. Its defensive armaments are a 13mm gun in dorsal and ventral turrets and machine guns in the nose and tail.

I realize of course there was a zero sum game with production, so to pay for it the Do 17 is phased out in 1939 and the He111 will start to be phased out in 1940. The FW 200 is never adopted, therefore not produced. The Do 217 is also not adopted, so tooling for it doesn't start in 1939; Dornier then produces Ju 89s under license.
So this gives us about 300 units in August 1940: 30 in the naval recon role that was historically filled by the FW 200, and 270 in three 90 aircraft Geschwader, with only two combat operational in August and the third ready in October.

Let's say that the first Geschwader is operational during the Battle of France, so it makes up for some of the lost He 111s and Do 17s during that campaign. It will lose some strength there, as it will during the Battle of Britain, which the second Geschwader is operational far. Both will fly out of bases in Northwest Germany, not France.
British fighters would lack cannons to inflict serious harm tot he Ju89s, but RAF two engine heavy fighters would be dangerous...of course these would be vulnerable to German fighters, both the Me 109 and Bf 110.

Let's say for the sake of argument that when the Blitz starts in October that with losses and replacements the total number of Ju89s in their units is about 225, with replacements bringing them up to ration strength by December.

Their range lets them hit any city in Britain and Ireland with 4 tons of bombs and any city in England with 6 tons of bombs (the range from bases in north Germany to Liverpool is about 450 miles).

What would the effect be on the Blitz?

[Kingfish]

The advantage of hitting further targets is offset by the fact such targets would be well beyond the range of single seat fighter escorts, and the Bf 110s are particularly vulnerable to British fighters. Also, I think it is wrong to assume that MG-armed fighters would have a problem downing the Ju 89s. In any event, by August the British were fielding the MK IB Spitfires armed with Hispano cannons.

[stg 44]

The advantage of hitting further targets is offset by the fact such targets would be well beyond the range of single seat fighter escorts, and the Bf110s are particularly vulnerable to British fighters. Also, I think it is wrong to assume that MG-armed fighters would have a problem downing the Ju 89s. In any event, by August the British were fielding the MK IB Spitfires armed with Hispano cannons.

During the Blitz the attacks were at night when fighters couldn't really hit German bombers; historically the loss rate to night fighters in 1940 was less than that of accidents (i.e. less than 1% total for both accidents and combat losses). 4% losses were considered unsustainable, which the RAF couldn't achieve against the Luftwaffe at night until 1942.
During the BoB you are right, but I'm talking about after the BoB when Luftwaffe bombers operated at night bombing cities and ports.

Also there were only 24 cannon armed Spitfires in August 1940.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supermarin ... ype_300.29

Soon after this Supermarine was contracted to convert 30 Spitfires to take the cannon armed wing; 19 Squadron received the first of these in June 1940 and by 16 August, 24 cannon armed Spitfires had been delivered.[42] These were known as the Mk IB: Mk Is armed with eight Brownings were retrospectively called the Mk Ia. With the early cannon installation, jamming was a serious problem. In one engagement, only two of the 12 aircraft had been able to fire off all of their ammunition. Further cannon-armed Spitfires, with improvements to the cannon mounts, were later issued to 92 Squadron, but due to the limited magazine capacity it was eventually decided the best armament mix was two cannon and four machine guns (most of these were later converted to the first Mk VBs).[43]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hispano_HS ... production
It seems during the BoB the cannon armed Spitfires weren't really a major player.

The Hispanos were found to be so unreliable that the squadron requested an exchange of its aircraft with the older Browning-armed aircraft of an operational training unit. By August, Supermarine had perfected a more reliable installation with an improved feed mechanism and four .303s in the outer wing panels. The modified fighters were then delivered to 19 Squadron.

The majority of Mk Is and Mk IIs were armed with eight .303 Browning machine guns. Throughout the battle, Luftwaffe aircraft often returned to base with .303 bullet holes, but no critical damage as they had received armour plating in critical areas and self-sealing fuel tanks became common in bombers.[26] Several Mark Is of 19 Squadron were fitted with two 20-mm Hispano-Suiza cannon in 1940. This early Hispano installation proved to be unreliable, with the cannon frequently firing just a few rounds or failing to fire at all. After numerous complaints from the pilots of 19 Squadron the cannon armed Spitfires were replaced by conventionally-armed aircraft in September 1940.[27] Supermarine and BSA, who manufactured the Hispano under licence, continued work on a reliable cannon installation, with a number of Mk Is armed with two cannon and four .303 machine-guns entering operations by late 1940: this version was referred to as the Mk IB, the machine-gun-armed Spitfires were retrospectively called the Mk IA.[nb 2][28]

[Kingfish]

During the Blitz the attacks were at night when fighters couldn't really hit German bombers; historically the loss rate to night fighters in 1940 was less than that of accidents (i.e. less than 1% total for both accidents and combat losses). 4% losses were considered unsustainable, which the RAF couldn't achieve against the Luftwaffe at night until 1942.
During the BoB you are right, but I'm talking about after the BoB when Luftwaffe bombers operated at night bombing cities and ports.

So the Ju89s will be hitting area (as opposed to point) targets. The problem then is the low number of available bombers. ~250 might seem like a lot, but bear in mind accuracy suffered greatly at night, so while the tonnage per aircraft has increased, the total hitting the designated target would drop.

Also there were only 24 cannon armed Spitfires in August 1940.

How many would there be in October, when your ATL for the blitz kicks off?

[phylo_roadking]

So the Ju 89s will be hitting area (as opposed to point) targets. The problem then is the low number of available bombers. ~250 might seem like a lot, but bear in mind accuracy suffered greatly at night, so while the tonnage per aircraft has increased, the total hitting the designated target would drop.

APART from noting that this is basically a repeat of several other VERY detailed threads ....

~250 might seem like a lot,

Look for example at the number of bombers available ON PAPER to the Luftwaffe for day and night raids during the BoB...and THEN note that "maximum" raid sizes were actually a fraction of that! Resting crews, resting/maintaining aircraft...all cut the number of aircraft available on any given night - and flying those sort of ranges with those bombloads might just soon exhaust the available fuel and ordnance...

It would have a top speed of 255 mph with the latest engines as of 1940 and a cruise speed of around 200 mph.

The latest bomber engines available - by the time war broke out, as discussed before the DB 600 family was being reserved for fighters

By the way...

Development gives the Ju89 a 4 ton internal bombload and a range of 1800 miles with that load. It can haul up to 6 tons with external mounting up to 1200 miles.

...a hell of a LOT of development Remember, the real Ju89, even flying on DB600As, only lofted a ton and a half' payload maximum. And it's no easy matter to simply say..."oh, and an extra two tons on pylons, please"...

As we've discussed before - THAT means wingpsars have to be beefed up...and THAT means extra power is wasted just getting that extra weight in the air and keeping it there I.E. more powerful engines required AND greater fuel load...

Take a look at some contemporary German designs - they got their extra fuel load by using the internal payload space to carry tankage - THAT'S often why they carried their ordnanace on external hardpoints.

Once again - you're trying to squeeze FAR more out of the Ju 89 than engines of the period allowed. It's not a jack of all trades - you can carry extra fuel but it's at the cost of less ordnance. And every bit of strengthening has a weight and thus fuel and power penalty...

[stg 44]

During the Blitz the attacks were at night when fighters couldn't really hit German bombers; historically the loss rate to night fighters in 1940 was less than that of accidents (i.e. less than 1% total for both accidents and combat losses). 4% losses were considered unsustainable, which the RAF couldn't achieve against the Luftwaffe at night until 1942.
During the BoB you are right, but I'm talking about after the BoB when Luftwaffe bombers operated at night bombing cities and ports.

So the Ju89s will be hitting area (as opposed to point) targets. The problem then is the low number of available bombers. ~250 might seem like a lot, but bear in mind accuracy suffered greatly at night, so while the tonnage per aircraft has increased, the total hitting the designated target would drop.

Accuracy:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Beams

X-Gerät was used to great effect in a series of raids known to the Germans as Moonlight Sonata, against Coventry, Wolverhampton and Birmingham. In the raid on Birmingham only KGr 100 was used, and British post-raid analysis showed that the vast majority of the bombs dropped were placed within 100 yards (91 m) of the midline of the Weser beam, spread along it a few hundred yards. This was the sort of accuracy that even daytime bombing could rarely achieve. A similar raid on Coventry with full support from other units dropping on their flares nearly destroyed the city centre.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pathfinder_(RAF)

Faced with exactly the same problems as the RAF, the Luftwaffe had developed radio aids that were widely used during The Blitz of 1940/41. Lacking enough equipment to install in all their aircraft, a single experimental group, Kampfgruppe 100, was given all available receivers and trained extensively on their use. KG 100 would fly over their target using these systems and drop flares, which the following aircraft would then bomb on. On rare occasions KG 100 was used as a pure bombing force, demonstrating the ability to drop bombs within 150 yards of their targets in any weather.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kampfgruppe_100

Kampfgruppe 100 (KGr100) was a specialist unit of the Luftwaffe during the early stages of World War II. It is best known as the first unit to use the "pathfinder" concept, with its aircraft being equipped with the latest radio navigation aids to find their targets and then dropping flares on them to mark the target for the following bombers. The unit first formed out of parts of Luftnachrichten-Abteilung 100 at Köthen on 18 November 1939 with a HQ unit and two squadrons, 1./ and 2./KG r100. In keeping with typical Luftwaffe organization, Kampfgruppe 100 was later expanded to three squadrons, all flying the Heinkel He 111H. On 15 December 1941 the unit was used as the basis for the greatly expanded Kampfgeschwader 100, becoming 1./KG100.

Effect:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blitz

Starting on 7 September 1940, London was bombed by the Luftwaffe for 57 consecutive nights.[7] More than one million London houses were destroyed or damaged, and more than 40,000 civilians were killed, almost half of them in London.[4] Ports and industrial centres outside London were also heavily attacked; the major Atlantic sea port of Liverpool was the most heavily bombed city outside London, suffering nearly 4,000 dead.[8][9] Other ports including Bristol, Cardiff, Hull, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Southampton, and Swansea were also targeted, as were the industrial cities of Birmingham, Belfast, Coventry, Glasgow and Manchester. Birmingham and Coventry were heavily targeted because of the Spitfire and tank factories in Birmingham and the many munitions factories in Coventry; the city centre of Coventry was almost completely destroyed.

Later Blitz:

From the German point of view, March 1941 saw an improvement. The Luftwaffe flew 4,000 sorties that month, including 12 major and three heavy attacks. The electronic war intensified but the Luftwaffe flew major inland missions only on moonlit nights. Ports were easier to find and made better targets. To confuse the British, radio silence was observed until the bombs fell. X- and Y-Gerät beams were placed over false targets and switched only at the last minute. Rapid frequency changes were introduced for X-Gerät, whose wider band of frequencies and greater tactical flexibility ensured it remained effective at a time when British selective jamming was degrading the effectiveness of Y-Gerät.[122]

By now, the imminent threat of invasion had all but passed as Germany had failed to gain the prerequisite air superiority. The aerial bombing was now principally aimed at the destruction of industrial targets, but also continued with the objective of breaking the morale of the civilian population.[37]

The attacks were focused against western ports in March. These attacks produced some breaks in morale, with civil leaders fleeing the cities before the offensive reached its height. But the Luftwaffe's effort eased in the last 10 attacks as seven Kampfgruppen moved to Austria in preparation for the Balkans Campaign in Yugoslavia and Greece. The shortage of bombers caused the OKL to improvise.[122]

Regardless, the Luftwaffe could inflict huge damage. With the German occupation of Western Europe, the intensification of submarine and air attack on Britain's sea communications was feared by the British. Such an event would have serious consequences on the future course of the war, should the Germans succeed. Liverpool and its port became an important destination for convoys heading through the Western Approaches from North America, bringing supplies and materials. The considerable rail network distributed to the rest of the country.[130] Operations against Liverpool were successful. Around 75% of the ports capacity was reduced at one point, and it lost 39,126 long tons (39,754 t) of shipping to air attacks, with another 111,601 long tons (113,392 t) damaged. Minister of Home Security Herbert Morrison was also worried morale was breaking, noting the defeatism expressed by civilians.[129] Other sources point to half of the 144 berths rendered unusable, while cargo unloading capability was reduced by 75%. Roads and railways were blocked and ships could not leave harbour. On 8 May 1941, 57 ships were destroyed, sunk or damaged amounting to 80,000 long tons (81,000 t). Around 66,000 houses were destroyed, 77,000 people made homeless, and 1,900 people killed and 1,450 seriously hurt on one night.[131] Operations against London up until May 1941 could also have a severe impact on morale. The populace of the port of Hull became 'trekkers', people who underwent a mass exodus from cities before, during, and after attacks.[129] However, the attacks failed to knock out or damage railways, or port facilities for long, even in the Port of London, a target of many attacks.[39] Port of London in particular was an important target, bringing in one-third of overseas trade.[132]

On 13 March, Clydebank port near Glasgow was bombed. All but seven of its 12,000 houses were damaged. Many more ports were attacked. Plymouth was attacked five times before the end of the month while Belfast, Hull, and Cardiff were hit. Cardiff was bombed on three nights, Portsmouth centre was devastated by five raids. The rate of civilian housing lost was averaging 40,000 per week in September 1940. In March 1941, two raids on Plymouth and London accounted for 148,000.[133] Still, while heavily damaged, British ports continued to support war industry and supplies from North America continued to pass through them while the Royal Navy continued to operate in Plymouth, Southampton, and Portsmouth.[10][134] Plymouth in particular, because of its vulnerable position on the south coast and close proximity to German air bases, was subjected to the heaviest attacks. On 10/11 March 240 bombers dropped 193 tons of high explosives and 46,000 incendiaries. Many houses and commercial centres were heavily damaged, the electrical supply was knocked out and five oil tanks and two magazines exploded. Nine days later, two waves of 125 and 170 bombers dropped heavy bombs, including 160 tons of high explosive and 32,000 incendiaries. Much of the city centre was destroyed. Damage was inflicted on the port installations, but many bombs fell on the city itself. On 17 April 346 tons of explosives and 46,000 incendiaries were dropped from 250 bombers led by Kampfgeschwader 26. The damage was considerable, and the Germans also used aerial mines. Over 2,000 AAA shells were fired, destroying just two Ju 88s.[135] By the end of the air campaign over Britain, only eight per cent of the German effort against British ports was made using mines.[136]

In the north, substantial efforts were made against Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Sunderland, which were large ports on the English east coast. On 9 April 1941 Luftflotte 2 dropped 150 tons of high explosives and 50,000 incendiaries from 120 bombers in a five-hour attack. Sewer, rail, docklands, and electric installations were damaged. In Sunderland on 25 April, Luftflotte 2 sent 60 bombers which dropped 80 tons of high explosive and 9,000 incendiaries. Much damage was done. However, as with the attacks in the south, the Germans failed to prevent maritime movements or cripple industry in the regions.[137]

The last major attack on London was on 10/11 May 1941, on which the Luftwaffe flew 571 sorties and dropped 800 tonnes of bombs. This caused more than 2,000 fires which affected morale badly. Another raid was carried out on 11/12 May 1941.[129] Still, 1,436 people were killed and 1,792 seriously injured.[133] Westminster Abbey and the Law Courts were damaged while a chamber of the House of Commons was destroyed. One-third of London's streets were impassable. All but one railway station line was blocked for several weeks.[133]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coventry_Blitz

The raid that began on the evening of 14 November 1940 was the most severe to hit Coventry during the war. It was carried out by 515 German bombers, from Luftflotte 3 and from the pathfinders of Kampfgruppe 100. The attack, code-named Operation Mondscheinsonate (Moonlight Sonata), was intended to destroy Coventry's factories and industrial infrastructure, although it was clear that damage to the rest of the city, including monuments and residential areas, would be considerable. The initial wave of 13 specially modified Heinkel He 111 aircraft of Kampfgruppe 100, were equipped with X-Gerät navigational devices, accurately dropped marker flares at 19:20.[5] The British and the Germans were fighting the Battle of the Beams and on this night the British failed to disrupt the X-Gerät signals.

The first wave of follow-up bombers dropped high explosive bombs, knocking out the utilities (the water supply, electricity network, telephones and gas mains) and cratering the roads, making it difficult for the fire engines to reach fires started by the follow-up waves of bombers. The follow-up waves dropped a combination of high explosive and incendiary bombs. There were two types of incendiary bomb: those made of magnesium and those made of petroleum. The high explosive bombs and the larger air-mines were not only designed to hamper the Coventry fire brigade, they were also intended to damage roofs, making it easier for the incendiary bombs to fall into buildings and ignite them.

In one night, more than 4,300 homes in Coventry were destroyed and around two-thirds of the city's buildings were damaged. The raid was heavily concentrated on the city centre, most of which was destroyed. Two hospitals, two churches and a police station were also among the damaged buildings.[8][9]The local police force lost no less than nine constables or messengers in the blitz.[10]Around one third of the city's factories were completely destroyed or severely damaged, another third were badly damaged, and the rest suffered slight damage. Among the destroyed factories were the main Daimler factory, the Humber Hillman factory, the Alfred Herbert Ltd machine tool works, nine aircraft factories, and two naval ordnance stores.[11]

An estimated 568 people were killed in the raid (the exact figure was never precisely confirmed) with another 863 badly injured and 393 sustaining lesser injuries. Given the intensity of the raid, casualties were limited by the fact that a large number of Coventrians "trekked" out of the city at night to sleep in nearby towns or villages following the earlier air raids. Also people who took to air raid shelters suffered very little death or injury. Out of 79 public air raid shelters holding 33,000 people, very few had been destroyed.[12]

The raid reached such a new level of destruction that Joseph Goebbels later used the term coventriert ("coventried") when describing similar levels of destruction of other enemy towns. During the raid, the Germans dropped about 500 tonnes of high explosives, including 50 parachute air-mines, of which 20 were incendiary petroleum mines, and 36,000 incendiary bombs.[13]

The raid of 14 November combined several innovations which influenced all future strategic bomber raids during the war.[14] These were:

-The use of pathfinder aircraft with electronic aids to navigate, to mark the targets before the main bomber raid.
-The use of high explosive bombs and air-mines (blockbuster bombs) coupled with thousands of incendiary bombs intended to set the city ablaze in a firestorm.

In the Allied raids later in the war, 500 or more heavy four-engine bombers all delivered their 3,000–6,000 pound bomb loads in a concentrated wave lasting only a few minutes. But at Coventry, the German twin-engined bombers carried smaller bomb loads (2,000–4,000 lb), and attacked in smaller multiple waves. Each bomber flew several sorties over the target, returning to base in France to rearm. Thus the attack was spread over several hours, and there were lulls in the raid when fire fighters and rescuers could reorganise and evacuate civilians.[15] As Arthur Harris, commander of RAF Bomber Command, wrote after the war "Coventry was adequately concentrated in point of space [to start a firestorm], but all the same there was little concentration in point of time".[16]

Heavier bombers carrying a heavier load could have created that concentration in time and space.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firestorm#Firebombing

As Sir Arthur Harris, the officer commanding RAF Bomber Command from 1942 through to the end of the war in Europe, pointed out in his post-war analysis, although many attempts were made to create deliberate man made firestorms during World War II, few attempts succeeded:

"The Germans again and again missed their chance, ...of setting our cities ablaze by a concentrated attack. Coventry was adequately concentrated in point of space, but all the same there was little concentration in point of time, and nothing like the fire tornadoes of Hamburg or Dresden ever occurred in this country. But they did do us enough damage to teach us the principle of concentration, the principle of starting so many fires at the same time that no fire fighting services, however efficiently and quickly they were reinforced by the fire brigades of other towns could get them under control."
—Arthur Harris, [8]

Heavy bomb loads with hundreds of heavy bombers carrying a heavier load at shorter ranges than the RAF had to operate at could create that concentration the Harris is talking about; mini-firestorms were created during the Blitz, but the lack of sufficient numbers of bombers carrying sufficient loads prevented them from turning into Hamburg or Dresden style firestorms. A heavy bomber carrying six tons of bombs added on existing force that could carry at most two tons to hit targets in Britain would seriously improve the potential of creating something worse.

Similar events happened to Bristol:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bristol_Blitz

Between 24 November 1940 and 11 April 1941 there were six major bombing raids. In total Bristol received 548 air raid alerts and 77 air raids with:

919 tons of high-explosive bombs and myriad incendiary bombs
1299 people killed, 1303 seriously injured, 697 rescued from debris
89,080 buildings damaged including 81,830 houses destroyed and over 3000 later demolished.[2]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liverpool_Blitz

Liverpool, Bootle, and the Wirral were the most heavily bombed areas of the country outside of London,[1] due to their importance to the British war effort. The government was desperate to hide from the Germans just how much damage had been inflicted upon the docks, so reports on the bombing were kept low-key. Around 4,000 people were killed in the Merseyside area during the Blitz.[1] This death toll was second only to London, which suffered 30,000 deaths by the end of the war.

Liverpool, Bootle, and the Wallasey Pool were strategically very important locations during the Second World War. The large port on the River Mersey, on the North West coast of England, had for many years been the United Kingdom's main link with North America, and this would prove to be a key part in the British participation in the Battle of the Atlantic. As well as providing anchorage for naval ships from many nations, the Mersey's ports and dockers would handle over 90 per cent of all the war material brought into Britain from abroad with some 75 million tons passing through its 11 miles (18 km) of quays. Liverpool was the eastern end of a Transatlantic chain of supplies from North America, without which Britain could not have pursued the war.

The first major air raid on Liverpool took place in August 1940 when 160 bombers attacked the city on the night of 28 August. This assault continued over the next three nights, then regularly for the rest of the year. There were 50 raids on the city during this three month period. Some of these were minor, comprising a few aircraft, and lasting a few minutes, with others comprising up to 300 aircraft and lasting over ten hours.

28 November saw a heavy raid on the city, and the most serious single incident, when a hit on an air-raid shelter in Durning Road caused 166 fatalities.[1]

The air assault in 1940 came to a peak with the Christmas blitz, a three-night bombardment towards the end of December.

A series of heavy raids took place in December 1940, referred to as the Christmas blitz. 365 people were killed between 20 – 22 December.[2] The raids saw several instances of direct hits on air raid shelters; on 20 December 42 people died when a shelter was hit, while another 40 died when a bomb struck railway arches on Bentinck Street, where local people were sheltering.[2] On 21 December another hit on a shelter killed 74 people.[2]

May 1941 saw a renewal of the air assault on the region; a seven night bombardment that devastated the city.[3] The first bomb landed upon Wallasey, Wirral, at 22:15 on 1 May.[4] The peak of the bombing occurred from 1 – 7 May 1941. It involved 681 Luftwaffe bombers; 2,315 high explosive bombs and 119 other explosives such as incendiaries were dropped. The raids put 69 out of 144 cargo berths out of action and inflicted 2,895 casualties[nb 1] and left many more homeless.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Gre ... _of_London

The "Second Great Fire of London" is a name used at the time to refer to one of the most destructive air raids of the London Blitz, over the night of 29/30 December 1940. Between 6 pm and 6 am the next day, more than 24,000 high explosive bombs and 100,000 incendiary bombs were dropped.[1] The raid and the subsequent fire destroyed many Livery Halls and gutted the medieval Great Hall of the City's Guildhall.

The largest continuous area of Blitz destruction anywhere in Britain occurred on this night, stretching south from Islington to the very edge of St Paul's Churchyard. The area destroyed was greater than that of the Great Fire of London in 1666. The raid was timed to coincide with a particularly low tide on the River Thames, making water difficult to obtain for fire fighting. Over 1500 fires were started, with many joining up to form three major conflagrations which in turn caused a firestorm that spread the flames further, towards St Paul's Cathedral.

http://iconicphotos.wordpress.com/2010/ ... mber-1940/
http://news.bbc.co.uk/local/london/hi/p ... 306779.stm

Other cities:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belfast_Blitz
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cardiff_Blitz
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hull_Blitz
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portsmouth ... th_century
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plymouth_Blitz
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southampton_Blitz
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swansea_Blitz
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glasgow_Blitz
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manchester_Blitz
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birmingham_Blitz

Also there were only 24 cannon armed Spitfires in August 1940.

How many would there be in October, when your ATL for the blitz kicks off?

It won't matter because they won't be of any use at night. The Spitfire was not used during the Blitz against German night bombing.

[phylo_roadking]

X-Gerät was used to great effect in a series of raids known to the Germans as Moonlight Sonata, against Coventry, Wolverhampton and Birmingham. In the raid on Birmingham only KGr 100 was used, and British post-raid analysis showed that the vast majority of the bombs dropped were placed within 100 yards (91 m) of the midline of the Weser beam, spread along it a few hundred yards.

NOT of course forgetting that by then the British COULD "divert" X-gerat beams. They didn't do so at Coventry because they were set up around LONDON to do it. They misidentified the Coventry raid as one on London.

Starting on 7 September 1940, London was bombed by the Luftwaffe for 57 consecutive nights.[7] More than one million London houses were destroyed or damaged, and more than 40,000 civilians were killed, almost half of them in London.[4] Ports and industrial centres outside London were also heavily attacked; the major Atlantic sea port of Liverpool was the most heavily bombed city outside London, suffering nearly 4,000 dead.[8][9] Other ports including Bristol, Cardiff, Hull, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Southampton, and Swansea were also targeted, as were the industrial cities of Birmingham, Belfast, Coventry, Glasgow and Manchester. Birmingham and Coventry were heavily targeted because of the Spitfire and tank factories in Birmingham and the many munitions factories in Coventry; the city centre of Coventry was almost completely destroyed.

Ports are relatively easy to find in good weather conditions....because they sit in the sea-land boundary for excellent VISUAL navigation.

Heavy bomb loads with hundreds of heavy bombers carrying a heavier load at shorter ranges than the RAF had to operate at could create that concentration the Harris is talking about; mini-firestorms were created during the Blitz, but the lack of sufficient numbers of bombers carrying sufficient loads prevented them from turning into Hamburg or Dresden style firestorms. A heavy bomber carrying six tons of bombs added on existing force that could carry at most two tons to hit targets in Britain would seriously improve the potential of creating something worse.

There's a lot of debate over whether the London example and others were actually self-sustaining firestorms, or whether the term has been mis-used

And the secrets ALSO involve weather - the right speed of wind blowing steadily...that's something the Germans had a LOT of trouble telling over England - the weather...

And the right mix of the right ordnance - not just sizes of blast bombs, but large devices like BC's "HC cookies", then incediaries, then more blast bombs to suppress firefighting etc., etc...

And part of the reason the Luftwaffe used "land mines"...big naval sea mines with their magnetic exploders replaced with timers then dropped on parachutes...was they didn't have much of anything larger than a 500lb bomb during the Blitz IIRC; it was a "panic development" BECAUSE of the patent lack. In other words - they didn't have the ordnance - and couldn't necessarily guarantee to drop it in the right order and in the right place - the "land mines" might on paper have done the same job as "HC Cookies" but couldn't....para-dropped they were at the vagaries of the winds too! They couldn't be guaranteed to drop mixed in with other ordnance or in the right place.

[stg 44]

So the Ju 89s will be hitting area (as opposed to point) targets. The problem then is the low number of available bombers. ~250 might seem like a lot, but bear in mind accuracy suffered greatly at night, so while the tonnage per aircraft has increased, the total hitting the designated target would drop.

APART from noting that this is basically a repeat of several other VERY detailed threads ....

Lacking the detail I'm looking for.

~250 might seem like a lot,

Look for example at the number of bombers available ON PAPER to the Luftwaffe for day and night raids during the BoB...and THEN note that "maximum" raid sizes were actually a fraction of that! Resting crews, resting/maintaining aircraft...all cut the number of aircraft available on any given night - and flying those sort of ranges with those bombloads might just soon exhaust the available fuel and ordnance...

Of course, but even 1 Geschwader bombing per night would equal the bomb load of two or more Ju88s or even He 111s.

It would have a top speed of 255 mph with the latest engines as of 1940 and a cruise speed of around 200 mph.

The latest bomber engines available - by the time war broke out, as discussed before the DB 600 family was being reserved for fighters

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Jumo_211
This put out 1200hp in 1940, which was competitive with the DB601 the fighters used. By 1941 both the DB601 and Jumo 211F put about nearly 1400hp.

The Ju89 was tested with a 750hp DB600 and had 240mph.

By the way...

Development gives the Ju89 a 4 ton internal bombload and a range of 1800 miles with that load. It can haul up to 6 tons with external mounting up to 1200 miles.

...a hell of a LOT of development Remember, the real Ju 89, even flying on DB600As, only lofted a ton and a half' payload maximum. And it's no easy matter to simply say..."oh, and an extra two tons on pylons, please"...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_89

On 4 June 1938, Junkers achieved a new Payload/Altitude World Record with the second prototype D-ALAT with 5,000 kg (11,000 lb) payload at an altitude of 9,312 m (30,500 ft). (4,000 m/13,120 ft more than a Short Stirling with the same payload) On 8 June 1938, D-ALAT reached an altitude of 7,242 m (23,750 ft) with 10,000 kg (22,000 lb).

Part of the reason the Ju89 officially carried 1600kg was that the bomb bay held the bombs vertically, rather than horizontally, to improve accuracy. This reduced the load that could be carried significantly, so changing the layout would seriously improve the internal capacity. Still the fuselage would need to be increased in size to add some room for that 4000kg load and some more fuel tanks.

As we've discussed before - THAT means wingpsars have to be beefed up...and THAT means extra power is wasted just getting that extra weight in the air and keeping it there I.E. more powerful engines required AND greater fuel load...

To a degree yes, but considering that with the historical engines (750hp) and frame it managed to lift up to 10000kg I think the frame wouldn't need to be strengthened all that much to hold a bigger internal payload and more fuel tanks. The engines of 1940 were 1200hp instead of the 750hp DB600s it tested with in 1937. 450hp extra per engine means quite a lot.

Take a look at some contemporary German designs - they got their extra fuel load by using the internal payload space to carry tankage - THAT'S often why they carried their ordnanace on external hardpoints.

I assume you mean the Ju88, which only had an internal capacity for 1400kg of bombs. It was designed for speed, not payload, so that is the major reason there. The He 111, a two engine 'strategic' bomber is a more apt comparison and could take and internal load of 2000kg of bombs about 1500 miles with internal fuel in the H2/3, which KG 100 used according to:
http://www.amazon.com/First-Pathfinders ... 822&sr=1-3

Once again - you're trying to squeeze FAR more out of the Ju 89 than engines of the period allowed. It's not a jack of all trades - you can carry extra fuel but it's at the cost of less ordnance. And every bit of strengthening has a weight and thus fuel and power penalty...

That also depends on the armament and armor. Most of the German problems with their bomber aircraft was the weight added to allow for dive bombing; the Ju 88, He 177, and Do 217 all had that problem. They added extra weight to strengthen their frame to allow for diving, which the Ju 89 wouldn't have. Yes, an increase in fuselage would create extra weight, as would the increased bomb load and fuel, which would be offset to a greater or lesser degree by the addition of 450hp with the Jumo 211D engines of 1940, instead of the DB600A engine of 1937.

Edit:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daimler-Benz_DB_600
Damn wikipedia entry is wrong for the Ju89 V2; they say the Db600 is 750hp, when the wiki-entry for the DB600 says 1000hp at sea level. I know that these early engines were actually less at altitude, as they couldn't maintain that maximum HP beyond takeoff, so the actually HP is probably around 850-900 for the DB600, not 750.
That changes my calculations somewhat of course.
Range would probably be then around 1600 with four thousand kilos and 1000 with six metric tons.

[phylo_roadking]

The Ju 89 was tested with a 750hp DB600 and had 240mph.

Was tested at 240...sans guns, sans armour, sans redundant crew, sans bombload....

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Jumo_211
This put out 1200hp in 1940, which was competitive with the DB601 the fighters used. By 1941 both the DB601 and Jumo 211F put about nearly 1400hp.

Put out 1200bhp on the bench. The more powerful f-onwards types weren't operational by 1940.

Part of the reason the Ju 89 officially carried 1600kg was that the bomb bay held the bombs vertically, rather than horizontally, to improve accuracy. This reduced the load that could be carried significantly, so changing the layout would seriously improve the internal capacity. Still the fuselage would need to be increased in size to add some room for that 4000kg load and some more fuel tanks.

To a degree yes, but considering that with the historical engines (750hp) and frame it managed to lift up to 10000kg I think the frame wouldn't need to be strengthened all that much to hold a bigger internal payload and more fuel tanks.

Of course it needs strengthened considerably! Extra weight from BOTH bombload AND tankage? Extra space for both...meaning lengthened or widened??? At the very least - FAR different balance and stress factors to be dealt with...

Part of the reason the Ju 89 officially carried 1600kg was that the bomb bay held the bombs vertically, rather than horizontally, to improve accuracy.

Really???

That also depends on the armament and armor. Most of the German problems with their bomber aircraft was the weight added to allow for dive bombing; the Ju 88, He 177, and Do 217 all had that problem. They added extra weight to strengthen their frame to allow for diving, which the Ju 89 wouldn't have. Yes, an increase in fuselage would create extra weight, as would the increased bomb load and fuel, which would be offset to a greater or lesser degree by the addition of 450hp with the Jumo 211D engines of 1940, instead of the DB600A engine of 1937.

You're forgetting the parable of the Condor; that when the engine change DID make much more power available - it was soaked up rapidly by extra weight of ordnance, guns, and tankage...with only a fraction available for airframe strengthening.

[Kingfish]

Accuracy:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Beams

Read the section dealing with countermeasures.

It won't matter because they won't be of any use at night. The Spitfire was not used during the Blitz against German night bombing.

Night also deprives the Ju89s of their own fighter escorts, and thus leaves them open to British night fighters.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Night_figh ... d_War_II_2

[stg 44]

The Ju 89 was tested with a 750hp DB600 and had 240mph.

Was tested at 240...sans guns, sans armour, sans redundant crew, sans bombload....

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Jumo_211
This put out 1200hp in 1940, which was competitive with the DB601 the fighters used. By 1941 both the DB601 and Jumo 211F put about nearly 1400hp.

Put out 1200bhp on the bench. The more powerful f-onwards types weren't operational by 1940.

1200hp Jumo 211Ds were in service in 1940, the 1400hp Jumo 211Fs were still being worked out and were available from January 1941 on, which is when the Ju 88A4 appeared.

Part of the reason the Ju 89 officially carried 1600kg was that the bomb bay held the bombs vertically, rather than horizontally, to improve accuracy. This reduced the load that could be carried significantly, so changing the layout would seriously improve the internal capacity. Still the fuselage would need to be increased in size to add some room for that 4000kg load and some more fuel tanks.

To a degree yes, but considering that with the historical engines (750hp) and frame it managed to lift up to 10000kg I think the frame wouldn't need to be strengthened all that much to hold a bigger internal payload and more fuel tanks.

Of course it needs strengthened considerably! Extra weight from BOTH bombload AND tankage? Extra space for both...meaning lengthened or widened??? At the very least - FAR different balance and stress factors to be dealt with...

The Ju89 V2 was able to handle up 7800kg more than its normal loaded weight during testing, so that suggests its designed structure was heavier than necessary for the loaded weight it was expected to carry; its wing area alone was shockingly high compared to other heavy bombers even in 1944. It had 200 square feet more than the B29!
Your point about balance and stress are taken though, especially if the fuselage is enlarged. The normal loaded weight would probably look more like the maximum takeoff weight in the final version, even if they saved some by reducing the huge wing area, as they did with later developments of the Ju 90 and 290.

Part of the reason the Ju89 officially carried 1600kg was that the bomb bay held the bombs vertically, rather than horizontally, to improve accuracy.

Really???

From what I've read, yes.

That also depends on the armament and armor. Most of the German problems with their bomber aircraft was the weight added to allow for dive bombing; the Ju 88, He 177, and Do 217 all had that problem. They added extra weight to strengthen their frame to allow for diving, which the Ju89 wouldn't have. Yes, an increase in fuselage would create extra weight, as would the increased bomb load and fuel, which would be offset to a greater or lesser degree by the addition of 450hp with the Jumo 211D engines of 1940, instead of the DB600A engine of 1937.

You're forgetting the parable of the Condor; that when the engine change DID make much more power available - it was soaked up rapidly by extra weight of ordnance, guns, and tankage...with only a fraction available for airframe strengthening.

So the speed would be lower than I initially suggested and the range would not be as large as the Condor. That is soaked up by the increased bomb load and defensive armament, which might be reduced once the Blitz starts, along with the extra crew to man that armament, as they won't be needed for the types of missions being flown at night, which the British did with the Lancaster.

[stg 44]

Accuracy:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Beams

Read the section dealing with countermeasures.

I have and it is significantly overstated in postwar British memoirs. Kenneth Wakefield has done a large amount of research into the Luftwaffe guided bombing missions, thanks to working on Pathfinder operations, and has debunked a fair bit of the claims about the effectiveness of countermeasures. As it was the Luftwaffe was able to make precision bombing raids well into 1941-2 despite British attempts to stop them. The Liverpool Blitz in May for instance is a prime example; despite all the jamming and 'beam bending' it was hit for a month without successfully diverting any of the bombers. And this was even at the end of the Blitz when British jamming supposedly was at it most successful and the target known thanks to repetition and 'Ultra'.

It won't matter because they won't be of any use at night. The Spitfire was not used during the Blitz against German night bombing.

Night also deprives the Ju89s of their own fighter escorts, and thus leaves them open to British night fighters.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Night_figh ... d_War_II_2

Again, look at the losses to night fighters:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blitz#British_ports
Scan down further to the table about sortees and losses it show May had 3800 sortees with 55 losses, a loss rate of 1.4%. That also includes losses due to accidents! Even assuming the RAF rule of 4% losses being cost prohibitive, that's still far below replacement levels.

I'll do the percentages for you of losses to ALL CAUSES (not just night fighters)
October 1940: .38%
November: .78%
December: 1.2%
January: 1%
February: 1.2%
March: 1%
April: 1.1%
May: 1.4%
After February losses were increasing due to accidents because of the transfer of aircraft away to other theaters, forcing fewer crews to run more missions to generate sufficient sortees, so even there the increases in losses aren't necessarily due to increased night fighter effectiveness. Either way, especially in 1940 the night fighter was at best a nuisance.

Beyond that the loss rate was infinitely sustainable through 1941 and into 1942 for the first half of the year, as it was below the replacement rate by such a margin that bombers were actually added to strength, rather than being knocked off.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blitz# ... t_fighters

In November and December 1940, the Luftwaffe flew 9,000 sorties against British targets and RAF night fighters claimed only six shot down. In January 1941, Fighter Command flew 486 sorties against 1,965 made by the Germans. Just three and 12 were claimed by the RAF and AAA defences respectively.[143] In the bad weather of February 1941, Fighter Command flew 568 sorties to counter the Luftwaffe which flew 1,644 individual sorties. Night fighters could claim only four bombers, and lost four themselves.[144]

By April and May 1941, the Luftwaffe was still getting through to their targets, taking no more than one to two percent losses on any given mission.[145] On 19/20 April 1941, in honour of Hitler's 52nd birthday, 712 bombers hit Plymouth with a record 1,000 tons of bombs.[145][145] Losses were minimal. In the following month, 22 German bombers were lost with 13 confirmed to have been shot down by night fighters.[145] On 3/4 May, nine were shot down in one night.[145] On 10/11 May, London suffered severe damage, but 10 German bombers were downed.[145] In May 1941, RAF night fighters shot down 38 German bombers.[146]

By the end of May, Kesselring's Luftflotte 2 had been withdrawn, leaving Hugo Sperrle's Luftflotte 3 as a token force to maintain the illusion of strategic bombing.[129] Hitler now had his sights set on Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union in June. The Blitz came to end.

None of that includes the losses the British night fighters experienced either, which were significant, especially when they tried to use Hurricane fighters for night fighting, like the Germans did in 1943 for their Wildesau tactics. Losses were terrible compared to the numbers committed, though they kept trying use them, because the two engine heavy fighters were not effective enough against German night bombing.

[phylo_roadking]

1200hp Jumo 211Ds were in service in 1940,

Development of the 211 continued with the 211B being released in 1938, with a slightly increased maximum RPM of 2,400 which boosted power to 1,200 PS. The later 211C and 211D differed primarily in the propeller gear ratios and other features.

And 1200ps....not hp.

The Ju 89 V2 was able to handle up 7800kg more than its normal loaded weight during testing, so that suggests its designed structure was heavier than necessary for the loaded weight it was expected to carry

But what did it carry where...and what was the impact on fuel consumption? Remember, the 89's poor fuel consumption was on record - on record ENOUGH for it to be used as the excuse to kill it off

From what I've read, yes.

The bomber version of the Ju52 for example did the same...but only because of the limited space available in the airframe to drop them They had to drop vertically through existing spaces in the frame

So the speed would be lower than I initially suggested and the range would not be as large as the Condor. That is soaked up by the increased bomb load and defensive armament, which might be reduced once the Blitz starts, along with the extra crew to man that armament, as they won't be needed for the types of missions being flown at night,

Not as long as there were British nightfighters about. Remember, they worked on a different system than the Kammhuber Line, and would more likely not have to chase a bomber down before going onto onboard radar.

which the British did with the Lancaster.

Only after some years of study proved the rule regarding thre ability of night fighters to catch and overhaul their prey not leaving them enough power/speed in hand to manouver for anything other than a stern attack!

because the two engine heavy fighters were not effective enough against German night bombing.

After just posting up a link about them bringing down 38 bombers in a month, more than one a night? What they weren't was effective in comparison to the numbers of bombers fielded...

But of course THAT changes with BARBAROSSA...because after all the Germans now have nothing much else to use for tactical support....

So - we have a nightfighter force that can down 10% of the available German heavy bomber force per month - and that force has from October 1940 to late May 1941 to achieve its aims...with its numbers constantly diminishing...

[stg 44]

And 1200ps....not hp.

So 1185 hp.

The bomber version of the Ju 52 for example did the same...but only because of the limited space available in the airframe to drop them They had to drop vertically through existing spaces in the frame

And we're talking about a redesigned fuselage with bigger bomb bay...and I haven't read that the Ju89 had that same problem, which would be rectified anyway with a redesigned bomb bay during development.

So the speed would be lower than I initially suggested and the range would not be as large as the Condor. That is soaked up by the increased bomb load and defensive armament, which might be reduced once the Blitz starts, along with the extra crew to man that armament, as they won't be needed for the types of missions being flown at night,

Not as long as there were British nightfighters about. Remember, they worked on a different system than the Kammhuber Line, and would more likely not have to chase a bomber down before going onto onboard radar.

They were still very ineffective until May 1941 and then attacked exclusively from behind, especially when the slower Blenheim that couldn't catch up to German bombers was phased out.

which the British did with the Lancaster.

Only after some years of study proved the rule regarding thre ability of night fighters to catch and overhaul their prey not leaving them enough power/speed in hand to manouver for anything other than a stern attack!

Look at the He111 for how the LW responded to the night fighter threat: they didn't use as many men for defensive armament as they did in the day 3-4 total crew instead of the 5 during daylight operations. So for whatever reason the Germans recognized that fewer defensive crew and arms were necessary relatively quickly.

because the two engine heavy fighters were not effective enough against German night bombing.

After just posting up a link about them bringing down 38 bombers in a month, more than one a night? What they weren't was effective in comparison to the numbers of bombers fielded...

At the very end of the Blitz, May 1941. Which was exactly 1% of the sortees launched. Given the saturation of bombers over Britain, it would make sense that it was easier for the British to find a needle in the haystack when there were several hundred over a target at once. Also British ground radar was not very accurate at the time, so the British night fighters had to range in with their relatively short ranged AI radar at different heights to try and find the German bombers; fewer bombers over the target means it is harder to find them.

But of course THAT changes with BARBAROSSA...because after all the Germans now have nothing much else to use for tactical support....

The Ju89 is going to be used in the East for Barbarossa, no question, so by June the Blitz is over no matter what, but seeing as we are talking about the effect of having a specified number of bombers DURING the Blitz, it would make sense to talk about what would happen from October 1940- May 1941 rather than after.

So - we have a nightfighter force that can down 10% of the available German heavy bomber force per month - and that force has from October 1940 to late May 1941 to achieve its aims...with its numbers constantly diminishing...

That's based on the assumption that they can find them without as many German aircraft in the sky; saturation over a target increases interception chances. Fewer aircraft then makes it more difficult, especially as British ground radar inland had a hard time judging height. Also that 10% number, where is that coming from??? 38 was out of 3800 sortees in May 1941; the Ju 89 is operating from October 1940- May 1941, prior to April even losing 10 bombers a month to night fighters was just not happening.


Also I realize I deleted your point about the fuel consumption in my reply, so I'll answer that here:
fuel consumption might have been the reason given for the cancellation, but it could well have just been an excuse. Also at the time fuel consumption for the lighter bombers of 1937 were smaller than that of the larger 4 engine bombers using experimental engines. So it might have seemed large by comparison to the pre-Ju88 and He 111 H-series bombers, but by 1940 it wasn't exponentially more than the Jumo 211 powered two engine Ju88 and He 111H bombers. Also using one Ju89 will replace the need to use two He 111s or 3 Ju 88A1s for targets like Liverpool. Even shorter ranged missions with extra external bombs would do as much as two or more two engine bombers. So we need to consider fuel consumption in that context. Also with fewer aircraft over the target it makes it harder for night fighters to contact a bomber, which is more important in April and May 1941. Still even in April a 700+ bomber raid didn't lose a single bomber, so night fighters are not that much of a concern until May, even then the fewer bombers over a target the harder to find one to shoot down.

[phylo_roadking]

And we're talking about a redesigned fuselage with bigger bomb bay...and I haven't read that the Ju 89 had that same problem, which would be rectified anyway with a redesigned bomb bay during development.

..except that's a pretty huge redesign. Question is - would the RLM/Luftwaffe take the time for that....

...or...ahem....just issue an new spec?

They were still very ineffective until May 1941 and then attacked exclusively from behind, especially when the slower Blenheim that couldn't catch up to German bombers was phased out.

Yes - aircraft like the Ju 88 with a ~315mph top speed, the He111 with its 273mph top speed...NOT the Ju 89 with its 240mph top speed The Blenheim will be competitive against them from the off...

Not forgetting that the Beaufighter was entering service in September 1940...

Look at the He 111 for how the LW responded to the night fighter threat: they didn't use as many men for defensive armament as they did in the day 3-4 total crew instead of the 5 during daylight operations. So for whatever reason the Germans recognized that fewer defensive crew and arms were necessary relatively quickly.

...or because they were having to make some very pragmatic decisions about all-up weight vs. tankage/range...

Given the saturation of bombers over Britain, it would make sense that it was easier for the British to find a needle in the haystack when there were several hundred over a target at once.

I don't think you got the point I was making earlier about numbers available vs. numbers used on any night; if you have a TOTAL of 300 (only) then you're looking practically at maybe 100 max per night.

The Ju89 is going to be used in the East for Barbarossa, no question, so by June the Blitz is over no matter what, but seeing as we are talking about the effect of having a specified number of bombers DURING the Blitz, it would make sense to talk about what would happen from October 1940- May 1941 rather than after.

My point was they've only nine months. Mostly over winter; there was a reason why the Blitz ended and didn't restart until the early Spring of 1941...

Also using one Ju89 will replace the need to use two He 111s or 3 Ju 88A1s for targets like Liverpool. Even shorter ranged missions with extra external bombs would do as much as two or more two engine bombers.

Only if they do hit the target.

Also with fewer aircraft over the target it makes it harder for night fighters to contact a bomber, which is more important in April and May 1941.

Remembering of course that flip side of that is more nightfighters in the air per number of bomber per night.