Italians successfully defend Tobruk during Operation Compass

[Old_Fossil]

Never could understand how that was supposed to work with virtually the whole fortress in range of 25-pdrs.

Actually not. You can't measure the coverage by artillery by assuming the guns are right up against the mines and wire of the fortification. Like all artillery they would be back several kilometers from the front.

[Gooner1]

Actually not. You can't measure the coverage by artillery by assuming the guns are right up against the mines and wire of the fortification. Like all artillery they would be back several kilometers from the front.

The maximum range of the 25-pdr on supercharge is 13,400 yards/12250 metres/7.61 miles. Even positioned several kilometres back from the wire they still have the range to hit most of Tobruk including the airfield.
For targets outside their range there was a regiment (64th Medium) with sixteeen 4.5" guns with a max range of 20,500 yards.

[Kingfish]

Actually not. You can't measure the coverage by artillery by assuming the guns are right up against the mines and wire of the fortification. Like all artillery they would be back several kilometers from the front.

The maximum range of the 25-pdr on supercharge is 13,400 yards/12250 metres/7.61 miles. Even positioned several kilometres back from the wire they still have the range to hit most of Tobruk including the airfield.
For targets outside their range there was a regiment (64th Medium) with sixteeen 4.5" guns with a max range of 20,500 yards.

And lets not forget the impact a barrage from a couple of QE-class BBs would have on the airfield.

The bombardment from Kongo and Haruna on Henderson field would serve as a good example, and the distance from Alexandria/Tobruk (310 nm) is less than a third of Truk/Guadacanal (1137 nm)

[Urmel]

If Tobruk kept Rommel from pushing eastward why wouldn't the reverse be true?

It did?

D.A.K. war diary entry 13 April 1941 at http://rommelsriposte.com/2016/04/24/d- ... april-1941

The intent of the Afrikakorps was therefore to continue for the moment with the accelerated advance eastward with forward detachments, to defeat all rapidly brought up English reserves in succession, before the enemy[2] was able to pull stronger forces out of Abyssinia or Greece. The mass of the troops should follow after supply had been secured. The precondition for this was the taking of Tobruk, which had to be pursued by all means.

Does that settle it?

[BDV]

If Tobruk kept Rommel from pushing eastward why wouldn't the reverse be true?

It did?

D.A.K. war diary entry 13 April 1941 at http://rommelsriposte.com/2016/04/24/d- ... april-1941

The intent of the Afrikakorps was therefore to continue for the moment with the accelerated advance eastward with forward detachments, to defeat all rapidly brought up English reserves in succession, before the enemy[2] was able to pull stronger forces out of Abyssinia or Greece. The mass of the troops should follow after supply had been secured. The precondition for this was the taking of Tobruk, which had to be pursued by all means.

Does that settle it?

Not quite, my read of that is that the standard panzerjockey MO of pulling a fast one on the opponents failed somewhere on the road to Mersa Matruh, and the Axis forces had to settle for a more standard approach (i.e., trying to get Tobruk).

[Urmel]

I am at a loss now what you are looking for. I thought the question was whether Tobruk holding out was a block on the way to Egypt, or not? You know, the 19km detour you claimed being insignificant.

[Kingfish]

Not quite, my read of that is that the standard panzerjockey MO of pulling a fast one on the opponents failed somewhere on the road to Mersa Matruh, and the Axis forces had to settle for a more standard approach (i.e., trying to get Tobruk).

The quote clearly states the capture of Tobruk as a precondition for the eastward advance by the bulk of the Axis forces, so your read of it as some form of "Plan B" is incorrect. It is actually part of "Plan A".

[BDV]

I am at a loss now what you are looking for. I thought the question was whether Tobruk holding out was a block on the way to Egypt, or not? You know, the 19km detour you claimed being insignificant.

No, that is your interpretation.

The question of whether Tobruk was to be taken because its port, its position on the highway, and water wells is still very much unsettled. In my interpretation, the taking Tobruk would significantly help Axis logistics mainly through its port. The highway shortening/detour is likely less important even than the Tobruk water wells.

In any case, on a watermelon thread, we're arguing apples and oranges, because the logistics of the Commonwealth forces, based of Mersa Matruh railhead is significantly different from the logistics of the Axis, based of Tripoli.

[Urmel]

You brought it up. And I would propose that it 'is still very much unsettled' is only in your head, and besides, it makes no difference, for the Germans it was a question of supplies/supply base - without Tobruk no further advance in strength could be considered. That's a fact, demonstrated by the KTB entry.

I also note that you never acknowledged your error of the 19km detour (it was 75km, in the real world).

[BDV]

You brought it up. And I would propose that it 'is still very much unsettled' is only in your head, and besides, it makes no difference, for the Germans it was a question of supplies/supply base - without Tobruk no further advance in strength could be considered. That's a fact, demonstrated by the KTB entry.

Axis forces were in a completely different logistical situation compared to the Commonwealth.

Not having the Tobruk port was much less of a inconvenience for those in possession of Mersa Matruh rail terminal than those that would have to truck stuff all the way from Tripoli.


However, the proposition that the Tobruk -in-enemy-hands DETOUR was in any way a factor in Italian/German decision making is still unsubstantiated.

I also note that you never acknowledged your error of the 19km detour (it was 75km, in the real world).

75 km it is. Thank you for clarifying that.

[Kingfish]

However, the proposition that the Tobruk -in-enemy-hands DETOUR was in any way a factor in Italian/German decision making is still unsubstantiated.

That detour required a substantial amount of resources to contain, and anything devoted to that endevour would subtract from Rommel's already shoestring budget for the drive east.

[Urmel]

However, the proposition that the Tobruk -in-enemy-hands DETOUR was in any way a factor in Italian/German decision making is still unsubstantiated.

It was 75km through non-tracked terrain. Compare that to what? 30km on the outside on a tarmacced road. Furthermore, most of the Axis transport was all-terrain, and there were severe issues with the useability.

In any case, nobody argues that the detour itself was the main issue. It's a combo in my view of not being able to use the port and facilities, and the detour, and having an enemy force sat on your supply line that needed to be locked down. So altogether, as the KTB documents, not taking Tobruk made it impossible to project significant forces east of the border.