Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

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Carl Schwamberger
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Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#1

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 20 Apr 2013, 18:54

I thought I'd ask the German heavy bomber question one more time, from a different angle.

Assuming:

1. The dive bomber concept does not take hold, the solution instead thought to be a superior bombsight for level bombers at medium & high altitudes.

2. The "bomber will always get through" concept takes hold.

3. Development Marks are spent on four engine bombers & related items like appropriate engines. Production of light bombers ceases with the early models of the Do17 & He111, with small production of a less developed Ju88 planned.

So, how many heavy bombers could have been built with production of other types scaled back from 1937? This included some fighter production.

How does this affect British & French prewar calculation, and that through 1939.

How does this affect the Polish and the 1940 campaigns? For simplicity I'll only ask about those two.

My take is this would cripple the Wehrmacht in all three campaigns of 1939-40 leading to worse results for the Germans on the ground. The effect would more likely be in terms of Allied morale if a 'stratigic' bombing campaign is pursued.

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Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#2

Post by stg 44 » 20 Apr 2013, 19:56

Carl Schwamberger wrote:I thought I'd ask the German heavy bomber question one more time, from a different angle.

Assuming:

1. The dive bomber concept does not take hold, the solution instead thought to be a superior bombsight for level bombers at medium & high altitudes.

2. The "bomber will always get through" concept takes hold.

3. Development Marks are spent on four engine bombers & related items like appropriate engines. Production of light bombers ceases with the early models of the Do17 & He111, with small production of a less developed Ju88 planned.

So, how many heavy bombers could have been built with production of other types scaled back from 1937? This included some fighter production.

How does this affect British & French prewar calculation, and that through 1939.

How does this affect the Polish and the 1940 campaigns? For simplicity I'll only ask about those two.

My take is this would cripple the Wehrmacht in all three campaigns of 1939-40 leading to worse results for the Germans on the ground. The effect would more likely be in terms of Allied morale if a 'stratigic' bombing campaign is pursued.
It seems that the advocates of the strategic heavy bomber in Germany were convinced that their first design attempts had failed, so moved beyond the Ural Bomber project to the Bomber A project. So the Bomber A result, the He177, would in the best case scenario not be in service until 1942. As the first successful design even after the 2 years of development required, the first prototype not being delivered until November 1938 to Rechlin without the dive bombing requirement, it would not be out of testing/development until November 1940 at the very earliest. Then it needs at least another 6 months of pre-production series models to test out various versions for various roles, while building up a training program from pilots and ground crews based on experience gained during the testing of the A-0 series (IIRC there were to be 35 He177 A-0's for testing). Then after that there is another 6 months to put together the first Geschwader and get the unit combat active, while getting production online. So that pushes us back into 1942.

So by 1939 Germany could have 0 heavy bombers, because even with the What If of Walter Wever living beyond 1936 and have his heavy bomber clique stay in power in the LW, they were banking on the He177. The problem with this question is that the LW wasn't expecting war until 1942 at the earliest based on Hitler's declarations to that effect. So in 1939 was still working on getting ready for that 1942 date; they were getting the Ju88 online as a replacement for the He111 and Do17, but weren't historically able to get the dive bombing Ju88 working until 1940, so delayed production, as did the administrative chaos caused by the early war in 1939.

So assuming your scenario, the LW would need Walter Wever to live to make it a possibility in any way. Then that would mean there is no dive bombing He177 or Ju88 or Do217 or Me210. The He177 isn't delivered to Rechlin until November 1938, so is nowhere near ready for production by 1939; in fact given is airframe problems it will need the whole two years even with a four engine layout, instead of the two props with welded Db601s.
In the meantime the Do17 is phased out in 1938 for tooling for the Ju88 in early 1939. The He111 has to soldier on when the war starts in 1939, rather than being replaced in 1940/41 as planned.
There then are some Ju88 Geschwader in service in Poland, while the Do17 still is around until 1940 when enough Ju88s are available and there is enough time to train people on the aircraft. Ju88 production peaks earlier then, so there are many more around in 1940 and they begin replacing the He111, which can potentially actually be phased out in 1942 when the He177 comes online, since here it lacks the dive requirement issues and two prop layout.


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Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#3

Post by stg 44 » 20 Apr 2013, 20:00

Now taking your idea at face value, to get the Ural Bomber project in production would require one of the two types to be developed; the Ju89 had far more potential there, so it enters testing, as it historically did, in 1937 at Rechlin. Assuming the normal two years development, that means it is ready for its A-0 series in May 1939. Its not yet production ready yet. At the earliest it would first enter production in late 1939 and the first Geschwader would be ready some time prior to the French campaign. So even then the medium bombers are necessary, because the Ju89 is not going to be around before May 1940 for combat.

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Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#4

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 20 Apr 2013, 21:15

stg 44 wrote:.. to get the Ural Bomber project in production would require one of the two types to be developed; the Ju89 had far more potential there, so it enters testing, as it historically did, in 1937 at Rechlin. Assuming the normal two years development, that means it is ready for its A-0 series in May 1939. Its not yet production ready yet. At the earliest it would first enter production in late 1939 and the first Geschwader would be ready some time prior to the French campaign.
So, you see this as the earliest practical PoD? Nothing occuring from 1934 could produce a significantly larger result? ...excluding Alien Space Bats. I am mainly thinking engine development here.

I keep seeing in these GHB discussions remarks about problems in the frames of the large German aircraft, retarding development. I am I following those remarks correctly. I've had a difficult time understanding how German aircraft engineering would let something like that slow development :?

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Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#5

Post by stg 44 » 21 Apr 2013, 00:59

I don't see anything earlier. Historically Germany started developing a new technology in 1934 and needed years to develop it, so it was very hard to move forward. Engine power was certainly part of this, but not exclusively. Even the medium bomber Ju288 had landing gear issues in 1942/43, which one would have thought would have been a relatively easy part of the development process. This also plagued the Ju88 early on.

Its not just issues with the development and design process either, as there were practical mechanical engineering issues with the new technology of the heavy bomber; factories didn't have experience making them, so were trying to figure out how to tackle the advanced technical challenge that they presented at the time.

But as you said the lack of engine power really compromised the early attempts a heavy bombers, as the Do19 and Ju89 had to have ridiculously large wings to generate enough lift with the lower power engines. This is what seriously hurt the early strategic bomber designs...you can't design and test an aircraft with engines that leave it underpowered, that only compromises the design, so that when sufficient hp engines come online, then the airframe design has too small bomb bays and too little fuel tanks. For instance that meant the Do19 could barely travel the same distance as a 1940 He111 and with a smaller bomb load. Once the more mature DB engines started appearing in 1941 could a design like the He177 even be possible. Had the DB603 continued development from 1936 instead of being cancelled in 1937 by Udet, it would have been ready by 1941 for mass production and usage and would have generated sufficient power to make the HE177 or any other bomber it was attached to live up to expectations. The dive bombing requirement didn't help of course, but even without that the He177 would have been underpowered with 4 DB601s in 1940-41. It was ultimately the DB603 in 1943 that historically made the HE177 viable, which the B-series 4 prop version turned out to be, but far too late.

So keep Wever around, have Udet not rise in the technical department and the HE177 not slowed down by the dive bombing requirement enters combat in Geschwader strength on all fronts in 1942; the DB603 probably would be fully functional by then, as Udet wouldn't be in a position to cancel it, so the LW has a fully functional heavy strategic bomber living up to expectations in the 1942 instead of in prototype form in 1943 as what historically happened. Of course then there are other PODs that would pop up with Wever living, such as what no dive bombing would mean for the Ju88, Do217, and Me210, especially when an operational DB603 is available in numbers in 1941 as a mature engine design (not with the overheating issues that historically plagued it until Autumn 1943...a result of canceling development from 1937-40 only to restart in 1940 with minimal private work being done).

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Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#6

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 21 Apr 2013, 01:10

stg 44 wrote:.... Of course then there are other PODs that would pop up with Wever living, such as what no dive bombing would mean for the Ju88, Do217, and Me210, especially when an operational DB603 is available in numbers in 1941 as a mature engine design (not with the overheating issues that historically plagued it until Autumn 1943...a result of canceling development from 1937-40 only to restart in 1940 with minimal private work being done).

Ok, so where would that take it, with the dive bombing requirement eliminated & a reach for load/range with the airframe & engine designs from 1937? That is aiming for stratigic strike vs operational strike, but with the existing twin engine designs to build on and four engine for maybe 1942. I'm not trying to build a better GAF here, just examining the consequences of such a choice.

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Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#7

Post by stg 44 » 21 Apr 2013, 01:29

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
stg 44 wrote:.... Of course then there are other PODs that would pop up with Wever living, such as what no dive bombing would mean for the Ju88, Do217, and Me210, especially when an operational DB603 is available in numbers in 1941 as a mature engine design (not with the overheating issues that historically plagued it until Autumn 1943...a result of canceling development from 1937-40 only to restart in 1940 with minimal private work being done).

Ok, so where would that take it, with the dive bombing requirement eliminated & a reach for load/range with the airframe & engine designs from 1937? That is aiming for stratigic strike vs operational strike, but with the existing twin engine designs to build on and four engine for maybe 1942. I'm not trying to build a better GAF here, just examining the consequences of such a choice.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_H ... el_He_177B
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_H ... uration.29
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_H ... _274_V1.29
General characteristics

Crew: 4 (pilot, second-pilot/navigator/bomb-aimer, and two gunners)
Length: 23.80 m (78 ft 1¼ in)
Wingspan: 44.19 m (145 ft 0 in)
Height: 5.50 m (18 ft 0½ in)
Wing area: 170.00 m² (1,829.86 ft²)
Empty weight: 21,300 kg (46,958 lb)
Max takeoff weight: 38,000 kg (83,776 lb)
Powerplant: 4× Daimler-Benz DB 603A 12-cylinder inverted-vee engine, 1,750 PS (1,726 hp; 1,287 kW) each
Performance

Maximum speed: 580 km/h (360 mph) at 11,000 m (36,090 ft)
Range: 3,440 km (2,137 mi)
Service ceiling: 14,300 m (46,920 ft)
Rate of climb: 237 m/min (780 ft/min)
Armament

Guns: 5 x 13mm MG 131 machine guns, one in nose, and twin guns in single dorsal and ventral Fernbedienbare Drehlafette FDL 131Z remotely operated gun turrets
Bombs: up to 4,000 kg (8,818 lb) of disposable stores in two internal bomb bays
The bombload and crew number would be bigger in the He177B, but the range would be about the same with greater fuel load and overall weight. The lower required operating height would mean significant shorter wings. If the Jumo 222 or DB604 comes online in 1942/3 then all this would improve.

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Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#8

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 21 Apr 2013, 03:13

Reading through those Wiki articles leads back to the development friction preventing any new designs from entering production before 1941 or 42. Since the question here revolves around effects on the 1939-40 campaigns it brings me back to thinking about any changes to the designs in production. Would the latter models of the Do17 & He111, built 1938-40 be an different absent a dive bomber/tactical strike requirement? Also would the Ju88 develop any differently before it enters production?

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Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#9

Post by stg 44 » 21 Apr 2013, 03:30

Carl Schwamberger wrote:Reading through those Wiki articles leads back to the development friction preventing any new designs from entering production before 1941 or 42. Since the question here revolves around effects on the 1939-40 campaigns it brings me back to thinking about any changes to the designs in production. Would the latter models of the Do17 & He111, built 1938-40 be an different absent a dive bomber/tactical strike requirement? Also would the Ju88 develop any differently before it enters production?
The Do17 and He111 were unaffected by dive bombing requirements. So no change there. The Ju88 is something else entirely. I would stay closer to the V3 prototype version, but probably still pick up the ventral gondola. Its mostly just lighter and has less complicated landing gear, which was the major thing holding up production in 1939. So it enters mass production around March 1939, with the pre-production series being delivered starting some time in September 1938. Without the extra weight and landing gear issues, it doesn't have the major issues with production in 1939, so several hundred are delivered prior to the invasion of Poland, unlike the historical 0 number, as the pre-production aircraft were delivered in September 1939 historically. Throughout the remainder of 1939 only a few dozen were delivered historically, while IMHO there would be over 1000 delivered in 1939 if production started in March. Also then the A-5 model would appear sooner when the wing stability issue in maneuvering becomes clear sooner thanks to the aircraft being around longer. So by the time May 1940 rolls around, then the LW has totally phased out the Do17 except for flight training schools, while the He111 maintains its production numbers. The Ju88 ramps up production rapidly, ultimately the goal being 300 units per month, which I think is doable by August 1940 mainly thanks to being easier and cheaper to make than the historical version. Its also faster, thanks to weighing less than the historical model, which needed structural strengthening to dive, something that weighed it down throughout its existence (AFAIK), even as the dive requirement was deleted later in the war.

The big change here is that there are many more Ju88s and LW overall production is higher while waiting for the functional HE177 to replace the He111 and add extra range and hitting power to the LW bomber force.

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Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#10

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 21 Apr 2013, 03:42

That implies a higher demand on the pilot training. Would the school output be ramped up to meet the maximum possible production of the Ju88. Or would other factors prevent the max possible? Since this ATL waves away the Ju87 we might assume those pilots are available for the other aircraft.

Were the Ju88 crew of OTL all that proficient in dive bombing, & was the technique used much in the 1940 campaigns with the Ju88?

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Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#11

Post by stg 44 » 21 Apr 2013, 04:08

Carl Schwamberger wrote:That implies a higher demand on the pilot training. Would the school output be ramped up to meet the maximum possible production of the Ju88. Or would other factors prevent the max possible? Since this ATL waves away the Ju87 we might assume those pilots are available for the other aircraft.

Were the Ju88 crew of OTL all that proficient in dive bombing, & was the technique used much in the 1940 campaigns with the Ju88?
Does it mean the Ju87 isn't developed? It was still wanted by the LW under Wever, they just thought it had its limits and didn't require other aircraft adapt to it. So I think the Ju87 would still be around.
The German pilots would be less well trained to keep up output, plus expansion of facilities. This would eat deeper into fuel reserves, so Germany could spend more of their limit foreign exchange on oil prior to the war with Poland.
Fuel will be an issue deeper into the war, but given the issues with serviceability I think the extra production would just create an aircraft reserve that Germany lacked IOTL, plus be used for some limited expansion of frontline strength. So when the fighting in May 1940 picks up Germany had better bombers on the line, plus a better serviceability rate thanks to rotating out aircraft that aren't operational for reserve bombers, keeping more aircraft in the sky with front line units, rather than men and machines idle due to lack of serviceability. This will really matter more in 1941/2 in the USSR than in the west, but it will change the Blitz, as the Germans will be bombing more thanks to having more men and machines ready to go at any one time, plus a deeper reserve structure, which the LW historically lacked.

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Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#12

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 21 Apr 2013, 04:58

stg 44 wrote: Does it mean the Ju87 isn't developed? It was still wanted by the LW under Wever, they just thought it had its limits and didn't require other aircraft adapt to it. So I think the Ju87 would still be around.
My OP considered the whole dive bomber thing a nonstarter.
stg 44 wrote:The German pilots would be less well trained to keep up output, plus expansion of facilities. This would eat deeper into fuel reserves, so Germany could spend more of their limit foreign exchange on oil prior to the war with Poland.
Reducing pilot training has implications for the accident loss rates. My limited knowledge of the German AF suggests they would attempt to stick with quality over quantity. If my notes are accurate the rookies of 1941 were susposed to have 220 hours in their A through C level before reporting to a Geschwader. The US and Brits managed to get their accident rates significantly reduced in part by increasing the school training from 200 hours to 340/360.

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Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#13

Post by phylo_roadking » 21 Apr 2013, 16:06

Carl, to go back to your OP, there's a few factors I'd like to point up...
1. The dive bomber concept does not take hold, the solution instead thought to be a superior bombsight for level bombers at medium & high altitudes.
Production of light bombers ceases


Who or what provides CAS??? There's a couple of interesting pages in Hooton that discuss the whole CAS issue as it was created by WWI and carried on through the interwar era...
2. The "bomber will always get through" concept takes hold.
It did! And Poland for instance didn't do much to dissuade the Germans on that...nor France...

Remember - right until the middle of August 1940, the Luftwaffe was a flying unescorted raids - not just WHOLLY unescorted as we know them...the RAF particularly feared the Do 17 in box formation and ordered fighter pilots not to enter the "box" - several did to their fatal cost...but also with Bf109s "freehunting" - basically just along for the ride waiting for RAF fighters to come up to play! Not actually protecting the bombers - waiting to fight the fighters in a separate action! Two diffferent things...

The Bf110 is often called a heavy escort fighter...but not as often as its referred to as a zerstoerer - a "destroyer", a battering ram for getting bomber formations through any defence ;) This was how the Luftwaffe was going to do the Douhet thing...
How does this affect British & French prewar calculation, and that through 1939.
The French seem to have wholly given into the Duhet-ist fallacy ;) John Ray recounts "Stuffy "Dowding travelling to France to for a liaison meeting...and the French equivalent of "The Hole" at Bentley Priory, and the whole Fighter Command Ground Controlled inteception scheme was two guys with a single telephone and a blackboard at the bottom of a stairwell in a chateau! He was..."not impressed"...

On the contrary - the whole RAF defence scheme was both planned to prevent "The bomber always getting through"...and at the same time that it would do so! 8O How dop these two gel?

The British noted that without decent early warning AND tracking OVERLAND of raids once they'd passed through any early warning line...bombers could only reliably be attacked ONCE; on the way home FROM a target...when you had at least one reliable trackpoint on the map - the burning town/airfield/factory in England...

The RAF scheme was intended to ensure raids could be attacked AT LEAST TWICE - on the way to a target as well as on the way home ;) Therefore - it was a force multiplier - Fighter Command do literally do TWICE as much damage than if they could only reliably intercept once.

Also - the RAF plan wasn't to defend against divebombers and/or light bombers and/or heavy bombers - it was designed to defend against ANY attacker on the UK Home Base that supplied/housed the RAF. Remember - the RAF planned from the very beginning...right from 1933 if you read John James - to fight a strategic counterforce war ;) It wanted to defend ITS "UK Home Base" in order to provide for a strategic bombing campaign against Germany.

It literally didn't matter WHAT the Germans sent against the UK - large, small or indifferent - the scheme was designed to protect the UK against it ;) The RAF started from the other end of the equation - not what the Germans would send, but how to protect from it. Thus it wouldn't change the RAF's calculations. If anything - they'd be happier...because the Germans would be only able to THEN fight the sort of air war against the UK that the RAF was intending to fight against Germany! They'd be far more evenly matched - but with RDF and GCI giving the RAF's defensive capacity an even greater advantage...

(France was always going to have to come up with some sort of "in depth" early warning/ground control solution given their direct land border with Germany...did they even try? Or did they just decide to rely fully on standing patrols?)
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Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#14

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 21 Apr 2013, 19:35

phylo_roadking wrote:Carl, to go back to your OP, there's a few factors I'd like to point up...
The question in my OP concerns consequences :wink: . I sure you had a great deal to say about that :D , but I'm unable to make heads or tails of your text :?

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Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#15

Post by stg 44 » 21 Apr 2013, 20:37

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
phylo_roadking wrote:Carl, to go back to your OP, there's a few factors I'd like to point up...
The question in my OP concerns consequences :wink: . I sure you had a great deal to say about that :D , but I'm unable to make heads or tails of your text :?
From what I can tell, its that Britain expected Germany to fight a strategic bomber war, so if Germany shows up with heavy strategic bombers during the day, they are going to get handled the way the 8th AF was in 1942/3, expect Germany didn't have the resources or the time to have the resources that the USAAF and RAF had at the time. So slaughter is the answer during the BoB.

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