Carl Schwamberger wrote:
Was this Lotfenrohr 7 bomb sight so terrible in 1938? Or were there other factors, like a underestimation of the amount of training required? What was the common or median altitude the German AF used level bombing techniques? My take is it was much lower than the USAAF attempted with its heavy bombers. I'm also ignorant of if the German pilots were trained in any extreme low level bombing techniques similar to those the French tried, or the USAAF used in some cases?
The Lotfernrohr was actually very good by 1939 and by late 1941 was actually better than the Norden bombsight (with a spy having stolen the technology and German engineers improving on it). All level bombers bombed at what would become medium altitudes under 15,000 feet until the Germans started flying over British AAA during the Blitz and started approaching the 20,000 feet limit. AFAIK they bombed between 5,000 and 10,000 feet preferably, especially as the armor piercing bombs only achieved terminal velocity when dropped from 6,000 feet or more. Ground fire was an issue, so I'm sure they wanted to stay over that limit if possible, otherwise rifle fire was going to cause some damage. I imagine that any strategic bomber until 1941 is going to be bombing at under 20,000 feet for accuracy reasons and the lack of range of 1939-41 era Allied AAA. The Germans during the Blitz flew over 13-14,000 feet and were able to completely fly over British AAA (IIRC they flew at 4000 meters).
http://www.alibris.com/search/books/qwo ... 0Luftwaffe
This book is literally entitled "Attack height 4000", so I'd say that's a reasonable assumption of the standard height of operation during the Blitz.
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
I was refering to the idea of the bomber fighting its own way through. A error the Germans could have bought off on as easily as the rest of them. Was the 110 intended as a long range escort from the start? I know nothing about its development.
Yes, it was supposed to be a heavy battering ram that would blast a path for the heavier bombers; Göring literally though of them in naval terms as destroyers smashing us torpedo boats so that the cruisers and battleships could pass through. Obviously Göring did not understand air matters.
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
So, could this DB 603 engine been available for production in 1938 or 1939?
No, late 1940 at the very earliest if it stuck to the original design spec for a 1500+ hp engine, rather than getting delayed by demands for more power and having to spend time in redesigns.
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
Yes from earlier posts here, and similar discussions One gets the impression that only a couple hundred four engined aircraft could have been on hand in 1940, and with the trade off of latter He 111 or Doiner bomber production, and early Ju88 production.
No, there would have been no four engine bombers by 1940; only by 1942 would any have been operational. Wever had rejected the Ural Bombers and opted for the He177, which meant that even if it had been handled properly and Wever had not died, then 1942 is the first operational date. If by some bizarre chance a Ural Bomber had been selected for production, which Wever did not do historically, then the better one, the Ju89, would only be ready by the 3rd quarter of 1940 in less than Geschwader strength. It would have more range, but less payload than the He111 unless it carried bombs externally, which would drop the range and speed; it could have a redesign and carry more once the more powerful Jumos and DBs show up by 1939, but then it wouldn't be ready by 1940 for action.
So on balance Germany is far better off waiting for the He177, which is what Wever decided to do IOTL anyway before his death, than build the Ural Bombers. Also the He111 and Ju88 were much better given the tasks that Germany to accomplish in 1940, so maxing their production is much more useful; historically though they were misused against Britain, but were an adequate weapon if they had the right strategy guiding them.
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
So, how does that affect the campaigns of 1939-40? Some earlier posts here seen to assume that only dive bombers support the doctrine of 'strike' aviation & ground cooperation the Germans used. Does anyone here really believe this???
Given that the Ural Bomber, if selected for production, wouldn't be available for action until after France is defeated, it makes little difference, other than the Ju88 project being scaled down. Given that that project had serious teething issues in 1939, with only some 60+ being manufactured, despite having 50% of all aviation production resources, which were only worked out in early 1940, it wouldn't cut into the number of aircraft available for the invasion of France significantly. It would make a difference after the Fall of France though, as Ju88 production won't be able to ramp up and become as large a component of the LW in the BoB and later. So the effect is more in the long term than short; it still would be less than helpful to have fewer Ju88s in late 1940 and on in favor of the Ju89. Of course the Ju89 becomes more useful with more powerful engines and redesigns, but having the inferior design earlier, rather than a better design later would actually hurt Germany, as their twin engine medium bombers were more useful than the inferior Ju89, which is why Wever killed their production in 1936 before his death and moved on to the Bomber A project.