Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
User avatar
phylo_roadking
Member
Posts: 17488
Joined: 01 May 2006, 00:31
Location: Belfast

Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#31

Post by phylo_roadking » 17 Jun 2013, 21:45

Had General Walther Wever LIVED, however, past the June 3, 1936 air crash that ended his life prematurely, Heinkel could have gotten his wish for a truly four-engined heavy bomber contract or two, and Heinkel heavy bomber aircraft of designs like both the He 177B, and Amerika Bomber (He 277) designs from Ernst's firm could have spelled real trouble for the future Allies of World War II.
Remembering, B-B, that he would still...and always!...have faced the problem of building and flying enough of them to spell out real danger ;) His "balanced" Luftwaffe ideas would at best only have resulted in a smallish "strategic" force on the outnreak of WWII.

And this force would still be probably only PARTLY effective unless the parallel POD of improved bombsights occured TOO! And you can't really piggyback one historical POD on the back of another.... :wink:
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Heavy Bombers Again - is it "Gruesome Griffin" time???

#32

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 18 Jun 2013, 01:58

A small flurry of activity here.
Bader's Briar wrote:Dear Carl: ...

"1. The dive bomber concept does not take hold, the solution instead thought to be a superior bombsight for level bombers at medium & high altitudes." .... Also, Germany's Lotfenrohr 7 level-bombing sight system seems to allegedly had some sort of commonality in development with 8O the American Norden bombsight, and similar accuracy figures were possible with the "more unitized" German unit, as the Norden had separate optical and stabilization systems, unlike the German unit's completely integrated design.
Was this Lotfenrohr 7 bomb sight so terrible in 1938? Or were there other factors, like a underestimation of the amount of training required? What was the common or median altitude the German AF used level bombing techniques? My take is it was much lower than the USAAF attempted with its heavy bombers. I'm also ignorant of if the German pilots were trained in any extreme low level bombing techniques similar to those the French tried, or the USAAF used in some cases?
Bader's Briar wrote:2. The "bomber will always get through" concept takes hold. That COULD have been true if the "Twin Biff", the Messerschmitt Bf 110, had been actually able to literally bulldoze all opposition before a Luftwaffe heavy bomber formation as intended — the only twin-engined German fighter design that was ever built, that could have realistically shocked the RAF in such a mission would have been the much later Do 335, which had something like only half the combat radius of the Twin Biff, but could easily top the Spit's and Hurricane's top speeds of the era with its twin DB 603 mills in the centre-line thrust format.
I was refering to the idea of the bomber fighting its own way through. A error the Germans could have bought off on as easily as the rest of them. Was the 110 intended as a long range escort from the start? I know nothing about its development.
Bader's Briar wrote:
3. Development Marks are spent on four engine bombers & related items like appropriate engines. Production of light bombers ceases with the early models of the Do 17 & He 111, with small production of a less developed Ju 88 planned. The DB 603, and the "developed" Junkers Jumo 213 were definitely on the way in 1939-40 to being ready to take on the task of being useful heavy bomber powerplants, with the DB 603 set up as a Kraftei unitized powerplant installation for the Heinkel He 219 night fighter. The "Kraftei" version of the DB 603 ended up being QUITE important for the two "real-world built" attempts of the eventual trio of four-engined developments of the Greif, as both the He 177 V101 through V104 prototype series that was intended to lead to the production He 177B four-engined bomber, and the pair of He 274s flown in France post-war, essentially used quartets of re-worked DB 603 Kraftei unitized powerplants to fly them, complete with what sure seem like He 219 annular radiator setups.
So, could this DB 603 engine been available for production in 1938 or 1939?
phylo_roadking wrote: Remembering, B-B, that he would still...and always!...have faced the problem of building and flying enough of them to spell out real danger His "balanced" Luftwaffe ideas would at best only have resulted in a smallish "strategic" force on the outnreak of WWII.
Yes from earlier posts here, and similar discussions One gets the impression that only a couple hundred four engined aircraft could have been on hand in 1940, and with the trade off of latter He 111 or Doiner bomber production, and early Ju88 production.

So, how does that affect the campaigns of 1939-40? Some earlier posts here seen to assume that only dive bombers support the doctrine of 'strike' aviation & ground cooperation the Germans used. Does anyone here really believe this???


User avatar
phylo_roadking
Member
Posts: 17488
Joined: 01 May 2006, 00:31
Location: Belfast

Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#33

Post by phylo_roadking » 18 Jun 2013, 02:10

Bader's Briar wrote:
2. The "bomber will always get through" concept takes hold.
I missed this earlier....the Germans DO seem to have firmy taken this on board for a time 8O They flew unescorted level bomber missions in Poland, in France....and for a time during the BoB over England...
So, how does that affect the campaigns of 1939-40? Some earlier posts here seen to assume that only dive bombers support the doctrine of 'strike' aviation & ground cooperation the Germans used. Does anyone here really believe this???
I don't think until expediency forced the conversion of 109E-7s into bomb-carriers in late September 1940, and ErprobungsKommando 210 proved that the 110 could make an effective bomber...anyone seems to have thought that "level" bombers of any size could provide the flexibility and accuracy that Close Air Support required! I.E. delivering ordnance sometimes within yards/metres of your OWN troops :P I mean....you need a delivery system that delivers within several metres of a target at least...if your own troops are just several tens of metres away 8O And there are plenty of instances from the BoB of LW level bombing, even at lowish levels, overshooting targets by great distances.

After all - in the end WE discovered pretty much the same - that converted fighters made the best ground support! :P

EDIT: IIRC, E.R. Hooton spends a couple of pages discussing how the WWI experience drove what made a good CAS or Army Co-op aircraft...by way of the Spanish Civil War that would have reinforced those opinions.

(In a way the same process affected the RAF IIRC...our light bomber force on the outbreak of WWII was the evolution of the WWI Bristol Fighter idea of a single-engined light level bomber with a two-man crew that could supposedly fly anf fight like a fighter too...through many and various two-man, single-engined light bombers between the wars...into the three-man, heavy but still single-engined Fairey Battle :P Unfortunately we DIDN'T fight any wars in the interwar period to discover how useless that concept had become! {bombing various native tribes on the fringes of Empire didn't really count...})
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#34

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 18 Jun 2013, 04:01

phylo_roadking wrote:.... Air Support required! I.E. delivering ordnance sometimes within yards/metres of your OWN troops :P I mean....you need a delivery system that delivers within several metres of a target at least...if your own troops are just several tens of metres away 8O And there are plenty of instances from the BoB of LW level bombing, even at lowish levels, overshooting targets by great distances.
How often was this sort of close Air Support performed by the German AF in 1939/40? Within several tens of meters of their own troops? Any specific examples? Was this sort of extreme close in attack the common sort in those years?

User avatar
stg 44
Member
Posts: 3376
Joined: 03 Dec 2002, 02:42
Location: illinois

Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#35

Post by stg 44 » 18 Jun 2013, 15:52

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
phylo_roadking wrote:.... Air Support required! I.E. delivering ordnance sometimes within yards/metres of your OWN troops :P I mean....you need a delivery system that delivers within several metres of a target at least...if your own troops are just several tens of metres away 8O And there are plenty of instances from the BoB of LW level bombing, even at lowish levels, overshooting targets by great distances.
How often was this sort of close Air Support performed by the German AF in 1939/40? Within several tens of meters of their own troops? Any specific examples? Was this sort of extreme close in attack the common sort in those years?
Pretty often, so much so that Panzers took to using Nazi flags on the back of the tank to avoid getting hit by Stukas.
Image

CAS was integral to the German victories of 1939-41. It became the mission of the Stuka, though it was initially designed as a precision operational bomber (targeting bridges and factories), rather than a tactical one.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_J ... _World_War
The Sturzkampfgeschwader were also instrumental in achieving the breakthrough at the Battle of Sedan. The Stukawaffe flew 300 sorties against French positions, with StG 77 alone flying 201 individual missions.[93]

The Luftwaffe benefited from excellent ground-to-air communications throughout the campaign. Radio equipped forward liaison officers could call upon the Stukas and direct them to attack enemy positions along the axis of advance. In some cases the Stukas responded in 10–20 minutes. Oberstleutnant Hans Seidemann (Richthofen's Chief of Staff) said that "never again was such a smoothly functioning system for discussing and planning joint operations achieved".[96]
http://www.germanhistory.net/frombartobear/ch05.htm
From the company’s headquarters, communication groups of one officer and six to eight men with a communications van were dispatched to army command posts. The officer was officially called “Flivo” (Flieger Verbindungs Officer), an acronym meaning Air Force Liaison Officer. Our communication groups could be stationed from 1/2 mile behind the front lines at Division headquarters, to 15 miles back at Army Corps headquarters. The liaison group’s prime task was to inform the tactical air force units where our front lines were, and to inform the army what air force units were available for supportive action. Another task was to interpret aerial reconnaissance photographs for the Army’s tactical and information officers. At times we also performed weather observation functions for the flying units.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of ... fe_assault
Luftflotte 3 (commanded by Hugo Sperrle), supported by Luftflotte 2 (commanded by Albert Kesselring), executed the heaviest air bombardment the world had yet witnessed and the most intense by the Luftwaffe during the war.[44] The Luftwaffe committed two Sturzkampfgeschwader (dive bomber wings) to the assault, flying 300 sorties against French positions, with Sturzkampfgeschwader 77 alone flying 201 individual missions.[45] A total of 3,940 sorties were flown by nine Kampfgeschwader (Bomber Wing) units often in Gruppe strength.[46]

The planned aerial assault would last for eight hours, from 08:00 to 16:00 hours.[47] Loerzer and Richthofen committed two Stuka units to the attack. Loerzer's Ju 87s flew some 180 missions against Sedan's bunkers whilst Richthofen's managed 90. The nine Kampfgruppen (bomber wings) of Bruno Loerzer's II. Fliegerkorps flew 900 missions against the 360 of Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's VIII. Fliegerkorps. VIII. Fliegerkorps's total mission count on the Meuse front was 910 compared to II. Fliegerkorps 1,770 missions.[48]

The Luftwaffe's target was the Marfee heights which lay behind Sedan to the south east. They contained the fortified artillery positions and dominated the approaches to the strategic and operational depths beyond Sedan and the Meuse.[41] The Luftwaffe was two hours late in appearing but the effort made was considerable. The attacks were made in Gruppe (group) strength and against the line of maximum resistance along the enemy gun line. To restrict enemy movements and communications, German fighters swept the area to cut land-lines and strafe fortifications, with some shooting of radio antennae off command posts. The attacks isolated the forward defence lines.[46] Sturzkampfgeschwader 77 struck first in the morning of the 13 May. In just five hours, 500 Ju 87 sorties had been flown.[49]

The Luftwaffe cowed the defenders, breaking them psychologically. The gunners, the backbone of the defences, had abandoned their positions by the time the German ground assault had begun. The cost to the Luftwaffe was just six aircraft, three of which were Ju 87s.[46]

The French 55th Infantry Division was not prepared for such an attack. French soldiers had commented on the massive psychological effect of the bombardment, in particular the siren of the Ju 87. However, after the war, it was discovered that none of the bunkers had been destroyed by direct hits.[50] Moreover, just 56 French casualties were suffered.[50] It was the indirect effect that did the damage. The telecommunication cables were destroyed (most had been laid out in the open) through bombing, paralysing the division's communications, and the psychological damage crippled its defensive capacity.[50]
Last edited by stg 44 on 18 Jun 2013, 16:32, edited 4 times in total.

User avatar
stg 44
Member
Posts: 3376
Joined: 03 Dec 2002, 02:42
Location: illinois

Re: Heavy Bombers Again - is it "Gruesome Griffin" time???

#36

Post by stg 44 » 18 Jun 2013, 16:22

Carl Schwamberger wrote: Was this Lotfenrohr 7 bomb sight so terrible in 1938? Or were there other factors, like a underestimation of the amount of training required? What was the common or median altitude the German AF used level bombing techniques? My take is it was much lower than the USAAF attempted with its heavy bombers. I'm also ignorant of if the German pilots were trained in any extreme low level bombing techniques similar to those the French tried, or the USAAF used in some cases?
The Lotfernrohr was actually very good by 1939 and by late 1941 was actually better than the Norden bombsight (with a spy having stolen the technology and German engineers improving on it). All level bombers bombed at what would become medium altitudes under 15,000 feet until the Germans started flying over British AAA during the Blitz and started approaching the 20,000 feet limit. AFAIK they bombed between 5,000 and 10,000 feet preferably, especially as the armor piercing bombs only achieved terminal velocity when dropped from 6,000 feet or more. Ground fire was an issue, so I'm sure they wanted to stay over that limit if possible, otherwise rifle fire was going to cause some damage. I imagine that any strategic bomber until 1941 is going to be bombing at under 20,000 feet for accuracy reasons and the lack of range of 1939-41 era Allied AAA. The Germans during the Blitz flew over 13-14,000 feet and were able to completely fly over British AAA (IIRC they flew at 4000 meters).

http://www.alibris.com/search/books/qwo ... 0Luftwaffe
This book is literally entitled "Attack height 4000", so I'd say that's a reasonable assumption of the standard height of operation during the Blitz.

Carl Schwamberger wrote: I was refering to the idea of the bomber fighting its own way through. A error the Germans could have bought off on as easily as the rest of them. Was the 110 intended as a long range escort from the start? I know nothing about its development.
Yes, it was supposed to be a heavy battering ram that would blast a path for the heavier bombers; Göring literally though of them in naval terms as destroyers smashing us torpedo boats so that the cruisers and battleships could pass through. Obviously Göring did not understand air matters.

Carl Schwamberger wrote: So, could this DB 603 engine been available for production in 1938 or 1939?
No, late 1940 at the very earliest if it stuck to the original design spec for a 1500+ hp engine, rather than getting delayed by demands for more power and having to spend time in redesigns.

Carl Schwamberger wrote: Yes from earlier posts here, and similar discussions One gets the impression that only a couple hundred four engined aircraft could have been on hand in 1940, and with the trade off of latter He 111 or Doiner bomber production, and early Ju88 production.
No, there would have been no four engine bombers by 1940; only by 1942 would any have been operational. Wever had rejected the Ural Bombers and opted for the He177, which meant that even if it had been handled properly and Wever had not died, then 1942 is the first operational date. If by some bizarre chance a Ural Bomber had been selected for production, which Wever did not do historically, then the better one, the Ju89, would only be ready by the 3rd quarter of 1940 in less than Geschwader strength. It would have more range, but less payload than the He111 unless it carried bombs externally, which would drop the range and speed; it could have a redesign and carry more once the more powerful Jumos and DBs show up by 1939, but then it wouldn't be ready by 1940 for action.

So on balance Germany is far better off waiting for the He177, which is what Wever decided to do IOTL anyway before his death, than build the Ural Bombers. Also the He111 and Ju88 were much better given the tasks that Germany to accomplish in 1940, so maxing their production is much more useful; historically though they were misused against Britain, but were an adequate weapon if they had the right strategy guiding them.
Carl Schwamberger wrote: So, how does that affect the campaigns of 1939-40? Some earlier posts here seen to assume that only dive bombers support the doctrine of 'strike' aviation & ground cooperation the Germans used. Does anyone here really believe this???
Given that the Ural Bomber, if selected for production, wouldn't be available for action until after France is defeated, it makes little difference, other than the Ju88 project being scaled down. Given that that project had serious teething issues in 1939, with only some 60+ being manufactured, despite having 50% of all aviation production resources, which were only worked out in early 1940, it wouldn't cut into the number of aircraft available for the invasion of France significantly. It would make a difference after the Fall of France though, as Ju88 production won't be able to ramp up and become as large a component of the LW in the BoB and later. So the effect is more in the long term than short; it still would be less than helpful to have fewer Ju88s in late 1940 and on in favor of the Ju89. Of course the Ju89 becomes more useful with more powerful engines and redesigns, but having the inferior design earlier, rather than a better design later would actually hurt Germany, as their twin engine medium bombers were more useful than the inferior Ju89, which is why Wever killed their production in 1936 before his death and moved on to the Bomber A project.

User avatar
phylo_roadking
Member
Posts: 17488
Joined: 01 May 2006, 00:31
Location: Belfast

Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#37

Post by phylo_roadking » 18 Jun 2013, 21:38

Pretty often, so much so that Panzers took to using Nazi flags on the back of the tank to avoid getting hit by Stukas.
..as those dinky white crosses used in Poland didn't turn out to be that effective...or safe! 8O
All level bombers bombed at what would become medium altitudes under 15,000 feet until the Germans started flying over British AAA during the Blitz and started approaching the 20,000 feet limit. AFAIK they bombed between 5,000 and 10,000 feet preferably, especially as the armor piercing bombs only achieved terminal velocity when dropped from 6,000 feet or more. Ground fire was an issue, so I'm sure they wanted to stay over that limit if possible, otherwise rifle fire was going to cause some damage
Also...getting peppered with your own shrapnel didn't help! 8O In the period, the British 500lb GP bomb could loft fragments to 5,000 feet! :P
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

User avatar
phylo_roadking
Member
Posts: 17488
Joined: 01 May 2006, 00:31
Location: Belfast

Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#38

Post by phylo_roadking » 18 Jun 2013, 21:42

Yes, it was supposed to be a heavy battering ram that would blast a path for the heavier bombers; Göring literally though of them in naval terms as destroyers smashing us torpedo boats so that the cruisers and battleships could pass through. Obviously Göring did not understand air matters.
To be fair - the tactic might have worked if a given enemy had chosen to match a broad-front aerial onslaught on a given day with a similar massed defence of their own...but the RAF inconveniently didn't :P For most of the BoB, it vectored at most one or two squadrons...but more usually one or two flights...of fighters against specific raids. Really massed defensive actions only bagen in September to match the massed raids on a single target - London...by which time the deficiencies of the 110 were already recognised...by BOTH sides! :P
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

User avatar
stg 44
Member
Posts: 3376
Joined: 03 Dec 2002, 02:42
Location: illinois

Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#39

Post by stg 44 » 18 Jun 2013, 22:20

phylo_roadking wrote:
Yes, it was supposed to be a heavy battering ram that would blast a path for the heavier bombers; öering literally though of them in naval terms as destroyers smashing us torpedo boats so that the cruisers and battleships could pass through. Obviously Göring did not understand air matters.
To be fair - the tactic might have worked if a given enemy had chosen to match a broad-front aerial onslaught on a given day with a similar massed defence of their own...but the RAF inconveniently didn't :P For most of the BoB, it vectored at most one or two squadrons...but more usually one or two flights...of fighters against specific raids. Really massed defensive actions only bagen in September to match the massed raids on a single target - London...by which time the deficiencies of the 110 were already recognised...by BOTH sides! :P
It also didn't help that the Bf110 was only maneuverable within 20 mph of its top speed in 1940, which left it a sitting duck otherwise.

User avatar
phylo_roadking
Member
Posts: 17488
Joined: 01 May 2006, 00:31
Location: Belfast

Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#40

Post by phylo_roadking » 18 Jun 2013, 22:56

It also didn't help that the Bf110 was only maneuverable within 20 mph of its top speed in 1940, which left it a sitting duck otherwise.
To be fair - only manouverable against single-engined monoplane fighters right up there at the top of its performance envelope...

What really left it a sitting duck was that its mechanical fuel injectors were slow to accelerate from best economy cruise when tied to bombers as escorts :P
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Heavy Bombers Again - is it "Gruesome Griffin" time???

#41

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 19 Jun 2013, 03:46

stg 44 wrote:
Carl Schwamberger wrote: Was this Lotfenrohr 7 bomb sight so terrible in 1938? Or were there other factors, like a underestimation of the amount of training required? What was the common or median altitude the German AF used level bombing techniques? My take is it was much lower than the USAAF attempted with its heavy bombers. I'm also ignorant of if the German pilots were trained in any extreme low level bombing techniques similar to those the French tried, or the USAAF used in some cases?
The Lotfernrohr was actually very good by 1939 and by late 1941 was actually better than the Norden bombsight (with a spy having stolen the technology and German engineers improving on it). All level bombers bombed at what would become medium altitudes under 15,000 feet until the Germans started flying over British AAA during the Blitz and started approaching the 20,000 feet limit. AFAIK they bombed between 5,000 and 10,000 feet preferably, especially as the armor piercing bombs only achieved terminal velocity when dropped from 6,000 feet or more. Ground fire was an issue, so I'm sure they wanted to stay over that limit if possible, otherwise rifle fire was going to cause some damage. I imagine that any strategic bomber until 1941 is going to be bombing at under 20,000 feet for accuracy reasons and the lack of range of 1939-41 era Allied AAA. The Germans during the Blitz flew over 13-14,000 feet and were able to completely fly over British AAA (IIRC they flew at 4000 meters).
I noticed when reading up on the US 5th & 9th AF missions that the twin engined bombers tended to attack well below 20,000 feet. Without going on at length; the commanders of the mediums found that at altitudes of 15,000 feet & less they were able to eventual make precision attacks on small targets like bridges, docked ships, V1 launch sites. I did not find any statisitcal data, but from looking at photos of bomb patterns during and after attacks it is clear there was a huge difference in accuracy when the attack altitude was ten or fifteen thousand feet below the usual altitude of the B17 & B24.
stg 44 wrote:http://www.alibris.com/search/books/qwo ... 0Luftwaffe
This book is literally entitled "Attack height 4000", so I'd say that's a reasonable assumption of the standard height of operation during the Blitz.
Have that one on the shelf. It was also published in English under the title 'Luftwaffe War Diaries'. A interesting book, tho it lacked details I was searching for and some time dropped the ball on source citations.
Carl Schwamberger wrote: So, could this DB 603 engine been available for production in 1938 or 1939?
stg 44 wrote:No, late 1940 at the very earliest if it stuck to the original design spec for a 1500+ hp engine, rather than getting delayed by demands for more power and having to spend time in redesigns.
Carl Schwamberger wrote: Yes from earlier posts here, and similar discussions One gets the impression that only a couple hundred four engined aircraft could have been on hand in 1940, and with the trade off of latter He 111 or Doiner bomber production, and early Ju88 production.
stg 44 wrote:No, there would have been no four engine bombers by 1940; only by 1942 would any have been operational. Wever had rejected the Ural Bombers and opted for the He177, which meant that even if it had been handled properly and Wever had not died, then 1942 is the first operational date. If by some bizarre chance a Ural Bomber had been selected for production, which Wever did not do historically, then the better one, the Ju89, would only be ready by the 3rd quarter of 1940 in less than Geschwader strength. It would have more range, but less payload than the He111 unless it carried bombs externally, which would drop the range and speed; it could have a redesign and carry more once the more powerful Jumos and DBs show up by 1939, but then it wouldn't be ready by 1940 for action.

So on balance Germany is far better off waiting for the He177, which is what Wever decided to do IOTL anyway before his death, than build the Ural Bombers. Also the He111 and Ju88 were much better given the tasks that Germany to accomplish in 1940, so maxing their production is much more useful; historically though they were misused against Britain, but were an adequate weapon if they had the right strategy guiding them.
Hmm yes, I see the effort is a potiential negative.

User avatar
JAG13
Member
Posts: 689
Joined: 23 Mar 2013, 02:50

Re: Heavy Bombers Again - is it "Gruesome Griffin" time???

#42

Post by JAG13 » 20 Jun 2013, 05:48

stg 44 wrote:
Carl Schwamberger wrote: I was refering to the idea of the bomber fighting its own way through. A error the Germans could have bought off on as easily as the rest of them. Was the 110 intended as a long range escort from the start? I know nothing about its development.
Yes, it was supposed to be a heavy battering ram that would blast a path for the heavier bombers; Göring literally though of them in naval terms as destroyers smashing us torpedo boats so that the cruisers and battleships could pass through. Obviously Göring did not understand air matters.
Sorry to intrude but, are you sure? IIRC the Bf-110 started as a Kampfzerstorer, basically a CAS aircraft similar to the Battle which is why it had a crew of 3 including a bombardier, only later was the CAS requirement dropped and the aircraft evolved into its actual form and role.
Carl Schwamberger wrote: Yes from earlier posts here, and similar discussions One gets the impression that only a couple hundred four engined aircraft could have been on hand in 1940, and with the trade off of latter He 111 or Doiner bomber production, and early Ju88 production.
No, there would have been no four engine bombers by 1940; only by 1942 would any have been operational. Wever had rejected the Ural Bombers and opted for the He177, which meant that even if it had been handled properly and Wever had not died, then 1942 is the first operational date. If by some bizarre chance a Ural Bomber had been selected for production, which Wever did not do historically, then the better one, the Ju89, would only be ready by the 3rd quarter of 1940 in less than Geschwader strength. It would have more range, but less payload than the He111 unless it carried bombs externally, which would drop the range and speed; it could have a redesign and carry more once the more powerful Jumos and DBs show up by 1939, but then it wouldn't be ready by 1940 for action.
Since there is no DB requirement and having flown for the first time in Nov. 1939 as a 4 engined bomber (ITTL) shouldnt the Greif be available for production late 1940-early 1941 at the latest? Most of its problems (not all certainly) derived from the DB requirement and associated strengthening and drag demands.

As deeply troubled as this program was, it had its first A-0s completed late in 1941 with the A1s in Jan 1941, a much cleaner and less problematic development process should be able to at least advance the production table by a year.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Heavy Bomber. Yet Again

#43

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 20 Jun 2013, 12:16

phylo_roadking wrote:.... Air Support required! I.E. delivering ordnance sometimes within yards/metres of your OWN troops :P I mean....you need a delivery system that delivers within several metres of a target at least...if your own troops are just several tens of metres away 8O And there are plenty of instances from the BoB of LW level bombing, even at lowish levels, overshooting targets by great distances.
Carl wrote:How often was this sort of close Air Support performed by the German AF in 1939/40? Within several tens of meters of their own troops? Any specific examples? Was this sort of extreme close in attack the common sort in those years?
I read many of the documents reproduced below & others back when I was paid to study such things. My question there was to see if Phylo had any evidence I'd not seen concerning CAS in 1939-40. Let me digress a moment to define things. In my service we defined Close Air Support as that controled by spotters on the ground & in or very near the killing zone of the infantry. Kind of vague, but close in to the ground fight if not the tens of meters Phylo refered to.
Pretty often, so much so that Panzers took to using Nazi flags on the back of the tank to avoid getting hit by Stukas.
Image
That occured at a distance as well. I cant begain to count the number of incidents where a ground unit was hit by airstrikes from its own side which I found. It happened to us in training. In the last exercise I was present at the occurance (1996) a bomb pickled off a A10 hit a pair of Army officers three kilometers from the target. Incidents where the bombers hit 10-20 kilometers from the target are not uncommon.
CAS was integral to the German victories of 1939-41. It became the mission of the Stuka, th
ough it was initially designed as a precision operational bomber (targeting bridges and factories), rather than a tactical one.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_J ... _World_War
The Sturzkampfgeschwader were also instrumental in achieving the breakthrough at the Battle of Sedan. The Stukawaffe flew 300 sorties against French positions, with StG 77 alone flying 201 individual missions.[93]

The Luftwaffe benefited from excellent ground-to-air communications throughout the campaign. Radio equipped forward liaison officers could call upon the Stukas and direct them to attack enemy positions along the axis of advance. In some cases the Stukas responded in 10–20 minutes. Oberstleutnant Hans Seidemann (Richthofen's Chief of Staff) said that "never again was such a smoothly functioning system for discussing and planning joint operations achieved".[96]
http://www.germanhistory.net/frombartobear/ch05.htm
From the company’s headquarters, communication groups of one officer and six to eight men with a communications van were dispatched to army command posts. The officer was officially called “Flivo” (Flieger Verbindungs Officer), an acronym meaning Air Force Liaison Officer. Our communication groups could be stationed from 1/2 mile behind the front lines at Division headquarters, to 15 miles back at Army Corps headquarters. The liaison group’s prime task was to inform the tactical air force units where our front lines were, and to inform the army what air force units were available for supportive action. Another task was to interpret aerial reconnaissance photographs for the Army’s tactical and information officers. At times we also performed weather observation functions for the flying units.
What is described there is a HQ liasion unit. I could not find a formal practice of actual spotting teams used at the forward edge of the battle zone, other than a ad hoc or experimental basis. Again that is why I asked, specific evidence of forward spotting teams would be usefull.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of ... fe_assault
Luftflotte 3 (commanded by Hugo Sperrle), supported by Luftflotte 2 (commanded by Albert Kesselring), executed the heaviest air bombardment the world had yet witnessed and the most intense by the Luftwaffe during the war.[44] The Luftwaffe committed two Sturzkampfgeschwader (dive bomber wings) to the assault, flying 300 sorties against French positions, with Sturzkampfgeschwader 77 alone flying 201 individual missions.[45] A total of 3,940 sorties were flown by nine Kampfgeschwader (Bomber Wing) units often in Gruppe strength.[46]

The planned aerial assault would last for eight hours, from 08:00 to 16:00 hours.[47] Loerzer and Richthofen committed two Stuka units to the attack. Loerzer's Ju 87s flew some 180 missions against Sedan's bunkers whilst Richthofen's managed 90. The nine Kampfgruppen (bomber wings) of Bruno Loerzer's II. Fliegerkorps flew 900 missions against the 360 of Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's VIII. Fliegerkorps. VIII. Fliegerkorps's total mission count on the Meuse front was 910 compared to II. Fliegerkorps 1,770 missions.[48]

The Luftwaffe's target was the Marfee heights which lay behind Sedan to the south east. They contained the fortified artillery positions and dominated the approaches to the strategic and operational depths beyond Sedan and the Meuse.[41] The Luftwaffe was two hours late in appearing but the effort made was considerable. The attacks were made in Gruppe (group) strength and against the line of maximum resistance along the enemy gun line. To restrict enemy movements and communications, German fighters swept the area to cut land-lines and strafe fortifications, with some shooting of radio antennae off command posts. The attacks isolated the forward defence lines.[46] Sturzkampfgeschwader 77 struck first in the morning of the 13 May. In just five hours, 500 Ju 87 sorties had been flown.[49]
This attack of 13 May occured across the Meuse River, with the Marfee Heights/Woods some 2-4 kilometers from the nearest German outposts along the river. The targets were distributed in depth in the French position, with very few along the river bank. None the "tens of meters" Phylo specified. From other descriptions it appears commanders in the air were directing the aircraft onto the specific targets when the attacks were executed & not the liasion teams on the ground. The ground liasion team with Guderian HQ seems to have had the sole role of planning the strike the previous day, or possiblly several weeks earlier. Another point not mentioned in the text quoted is the Luftwaffe commanders did not want to execute the attack as Guderians HQ planned it and attempted (unsucessfully) a very different sequence of schedule. In other words the concept of a CAS tightly controled from the ground was not being followed in this attack.

I suspect there are cases 1939-40 where the German ground liasion teams did execute such precisely controled attacks close in to the forward troops, a kilometer or less. I'm still hoping Phylo had something specific on this, even if it just a ad hoc incident. There are examples of CAS as I described it from earlier eras, and later in WWII. There are some detailed descriptions of the Germans doing it in 1942. With spotting teams accompanying the battle group commander, having their own tactical vehicle, and directing air strikes on specific targets from a equivalent of the a "Cab Rank" overhead. But, I've not yet found useful evidence of the practice earlier by the Germans.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Heavy Bombers Again - is it "Gruesome Griffin" time???

#44

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 20 Jun 2013, 12:20

JAG13 wrote:
Since there is no DB requirement and having flown for the first time in Nov. 1939 as a 4 engined bomber (ITTL) shouldnt the Greif be available for production late 1940-early 1941 at the latest? Most of its problems (not all certainly) derived from the DB requirement and associated strengthening and drag demands.

As deeply troubled as this program was, it had its first A-0s completed late in 1941 with the A1s in Jan 1941, a much cleaner and less problematic development process should be able to at least advance the production table by a year.
That still does not change much in terms of my OP. While the heavy bombers may not be there in significant number the whole thing implies differences in doctrine and tactics. Even if the Germans are trying to attack the same targets as in 1939-40 the techniques and outcome may be different.

User avatar
stg 44
Member
Posts: 3376
Joined: 03 Dec 2002, 02:42
Location: illinois

Re: Heavy Bombers Again - is it "Gruesome Griffin" time???

#45

Post by stg 44 » 20 Jun 2013, 15:20

JAG13 wrote: Sorry to intrude but, are you sure? IIRC the Bf-110 started as a Kampfzerstorer, basically a CAS aircraft similar to the Battle which is why it had a crew of 3 including a bombardier, only later was the CAS requirement dropped and the aircraft evolved into its actual form and role.
AFAIK it never served as a CAS aircraft until 1941; its first foray into bombing was with Erprobungsgruppe 210 in 1940 against the radar stations during the BoB. It may initially have had the task of bomber, but was never used as such until much later. Until then it was just a bomber destroyer, straffer against airfields, and long range escort fighter.

http://www.aviation-history.com/messers ... bf110.html
Designed to a 1934 requirement for a long range escort fighter, the first prototype Bf 110 made its initial flight on May 12, 1936.
JAG13 wrote: Since there is no DB requirement and having flown for the first time in Nov. 1939 as a 4 engined bomber (ITTL) shouldnt the Greif be available for production late 1940-early 1941 at the latest? Most of its problems (not all certainly) derived from the DB requirement and associated strengthening and drag demands.

As deeply troubled as this program was, it had its first A-0s completed late in 1941 with the A1s in Jan 1941, a much cleaner and less problematic development process should be able to at least advance the production table by a year.
No. The testing period would be two years from the first delivery of the prototype, which would have been November 1938 assuming of course the couple DBs aren't used. So testing of the prototypes ends in November 1940 assuming all goes well. Then the pre-production series need to be tested for various roles before the production series would enter production, which for an entirely new class of aircraft would take at a minimum 6 months. Then after that they need to build up a training unit and build a Geschwader, which means at least another 6 months. Initially production of the new type was slow so even assuming it starts in mid-1941, which is not a guarantee, then in the first year of production just over 200 were produced historically; that means it gets diverted to various tasks, so in the first year there is only enough for an understrength Geschwader, plus training units, reserves, and a small units for naval purposes. That gets us to mid-1942. After that production and training will pick up tremendously, but until then the process will take time to get the necessary processes grooved.
Last edited by stg 44 on 20 Jun 2013, 16:21, edited 1 time in total.

Post Reply

Return to “What if”