What If Hitler Went For the Caucasus in 1941?

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DoctorViktory
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What If Hitler Went For the Caucasus in 1941?

#1

Post by DoctorViktory » 23 Feb 2014, 20:23

Hello All,

This is my first post, and I don't intend to match the knowledge and expertise of many of the writers on this wonderful forum, but I have been obsessed over the last year with an idea that seems to be largely unaddressed in the literature of German strategy on the Eastern Front. And if this issue has been addressed in a previous topic, I apologize for the redundancy.

In my opinion, Operation Blue, as an initial concept, was not a strategic blunder in itself. Instead, Hitler's decision to strip the flanks of Army Group B, particularly German formations of Sixth Army, in order to invest a city with ZERO strategic significance is what set the stage for Operation Uranus and further Soviet offensives that nearly destroyed the southern wing of the German army in the East.

But the fact remains that Germany's economic resources to continue fighting this drawn-out war against both the Soviet Union and the United States were completely inadequate. No matter how many brilliant operational victories they managed to secure around Kharkov, the Crimea or the Don Steppes, they would NEVER have been able to handle the almost laughable material disadvantage they suffered from, even by 1941. With Lend-lease sending billions to Russia through Iran and Archangel by July 1941, the tide had turned against Germany even while their armies were conquering Smolensk and the Baltics.

I believe the only thing Germany could have done to win the war is to have continued the offensive South after the capture of Kiev in September of 1941. After what was perhaps the greatest battle in history, the Soviet army in the South was entirely crushed and had very few forces positioned in the Don Bend, the steppes leading into the Caucasus or pretty much anywhere west of the Volga, south of Voronezh. The resources available in these areas would have sufficiently supplied Germany with the means to fight this war against both the Soviets and the US, especially given their operational and tactical superiority. WHY DIVERT GUDERIAN'S SECOND PANZER GROUP BACK TO MOSCOW WITH WINTER APPROACHING IN 1941? Why not keep him in the South and take the goodies: the grain of Ukraine, the mineral wealth of the Don region and the oil from the Caucasus? This would have allowed Germany to make tens of thousands of Tigers, Panthers and ME-262s. But instead, for two years straight, they get bled down in front of two cities that had little to no economic importance. By 1942, I believe the war was already lost. Even if Army Group B wasn't stripped of strong forces on the flanks, the Soviet winter offensive was just a display of how much goddamn might they could muster. On the other hand, the Germans had no reserves after Operation Blue, which clearly showed itself to be a disaster during Citadel when Manstein had nothing to exploit the breakthrough in the South.

Thoughts? Apologies for the length of the post, I just wanted to sufficiently present the thought.

toque
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Re: What If Hitler Went For the Caucasus in 1941?

#2

Post by toque » 23 Feb 2014, 21:43

It takes years to get destroyed oil wells functioning. Similarly, the mineral wealth of the South would have been unavailable for years to come (railways torn up, mines flooded, and so on). They managed one grain train from the Ukraine, and no more. In any event, how are they supposed to plant and harvest whilst the war is still going on? Who is actually going to do this?

It is worth reflecting on the vast quantities of captured foreign equipment in use by the German army, without which Barbarossa would have been literally impossible.

That they used so much foreign equipment (much of which is finite, due to obsolescence and parts problems), says that where resources were concerned, they were on a knife edge from the very beginning. The state of the German forces before Moscow in late 1941 says it all - utterly played out. Unless they managed to knock the Russian army out very quickly, Germany was doomed to slow strangulation.

I often wonder too, about what they proposed to do afterwards. So you've won - the regular Russian army is destroyed. It's now minus 40 and you have no supplies, no suitable lubricants, no winter clothes. The partisan war goes on (does anyone seriously believe that it wouldn't?), and has now cut the supply lines completely.

The army is going to perish in Russia, just the same. German officers private papers have entries from 1941 saying, quite literally, 'It's 1812, all over again'. The reality of the situation was obvious to some at least, very early on.

The whole thing appears to me to have been a colossal gamble.


ljadw
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Re: What If Hitler Went For the Caucasus in 1941?

#3

Post by ljadw » 23 Feb 2014, 22:09

We also can write off the possibility for the Germans to arrive at the Turkish border in 1941:afaics,the distance Rostov-Baku is 1117 km .

thaddeus_c
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Re: What If Hitler Went For the Caucasus in 1941?

#4

Post by thaddeus_c » 23 Feb 2014, 22:43

a "cheap" way to bleed the USSR would have been to arm Ukraine with the previously mentioned captured weapons.

attempt a deal with Vichy France to use Syrian bases to bomb Baku (Operation Pike.)

make a push in the north where they had capable ally in Finland and could have declared the Baltic states independent?

ChrisDR68
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Re: What If Hitler Went For the Caucasus in 1941?

#5

Post by ChrisDR68 » 24 Feb 2014, 05:04

This is exactly the scenario Bryan Fugate put forward in his Operation Barbarossa book from 1984. His opinion was that once Hitler allowed himself to be persuaded to launch Operation Typhoon against Moscow in October 1941 instead of continuing the offensive in the Ukraine he removed Germany's chance of a strategic victory that year and with it Germany's best chance of a favourable outcome of the war in the east.

Before I read his book this alternative strategy hadn't even occurred to me before but it does make sense. Given the terrain of the Caucasus the furthest the Germans would likely have advanced to was the northern Caucasus mountain range and they would have been in an awkward position by the end of the campaigning season in 1941 but it's likely to have been better than in the original timeline.

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BDV
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Re: What If Hitler Went For the Caucasus in 1941?

#6

Post by BDV » 24 Feb 2014, 15:18

Barbarossa plan really is summed up as "kick the door in and the rotting shack shall come tumbling down."

So there's need to be some significant changes. Logistics impossibility is as always rearing its ugly head when discussing an attack on Caucasus in 1941. VKleist did not scamper outta Rostov just because his flanks were solidly held by deployed infantry armies backed by plenty of medium and heavy artillery.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

DoctorViktory
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Re: What If Hitler Went For the Caucasus in 1941?

#7

Post by DoctorViktory » 24 Feb 2014, 18:42

You guys make some good points..

I did read a little about the difficulty of reviving destroyed oil fields, and it does appear to be a pretty monumental task. But I believe this would not have been an impossible task. If it takes two years to get the oil fields back up, then by September of 1943, when Panther and Tiger designs were rolling off the production lines, they would have had considerable resources by then to make these ground-breaking weapons available in sufficient numbers to AT LEAST hold a stalemate on the Russian front.

I think to say that the state of German forces BEFORE Moscow in late 1941 were utterly played out is a bit of an exaggeration. Their stunning ability to hold significant corridors in the dead of a brutal Russian winter of 1941, their ability to regroup in the Spring of 42 and deliver some of the greatest blows against any army in history in the Crimea and the Russian steppes, and their ability to advance deep into the Caucasus, even to Maikop with a half-depleted army from the Winter before, is hardly evidence of a played-out army. However, I do agree that the long-range material situation was certainly played-out by this point. This is precisely what Hitler realized, even before Barbarossa, when he tried urgently to convince his generals that the economic exploits of the Ukraine and southern Russia were significantly more important than taking Moscow or Leningrad.

What I believe won World War II for the Allies was a combination of three things, in order of importance: (1) American production capacity, (2) Stalin's ruthless willingness to throw millions of troops into the German meat-grinder and last-but-not-least, (3) Georgi Zhukov. But I believe none of these factors would have mattered if only Germany was able to take those rich regions that would enable her to fight a prolonged war against the two largest militaries in the world. No nation in the world could compare to the ruthless efficiency of the Wehrmacht. Plain and simple.

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Re: What If Hitler Went For the Caucasus in 1941?

#8

Post by LWD » 24 Feb 2014, 21:39

If they get the oil fields up in 43 how do they move the oil back to Germany? Note that it pretty much has to go back at least as far as Poland and perhaps further to then get distributed back to most of the units in the USSR. There are a couple of active threads on the German railroad system currently active. It doesn't look to me like it has the capacity and trucks are certainly out. How else are you going to move it?

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Re: What If Hitler Went For the Caucasus in 1941?

#9

Post by ljadw » 24 Feb 2014, 23:18

DoctorViktory wrote:

No nation in the world could compare to the ruthless efficiency of the Wehrmacht. Plain and simple.
:P :lol:

The allied armies could compare to the WM were as efficient as the WM (and in most cases more efficient) and defeated the WM .

About Zhukov : if he died in 1942,the result still would be the same : it is very easy to replace a general :you only have to pick an other one .

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Re: What If Hitler Went For the Caucasus in 1941?

#10

Post by BDV » 25 Feb 2014, 00:03

ljadw wrote:"DoctorViktory" :
No nation in the world could compare to the ruthless efficiency of the Wehrmacht. Plain and simple.


The allied armies could compare to the WM were as efficient as the WM (and in most cases more efficient) and defeated the WM .

About Zhukov : if he died in 1942,the result still would be the same : it is very easy to replace a general :you only have to pick an other one .

Sure, Fall Weiss, Fall Gelb, and Fall Rot will stand the test of time as brilliant military operations. Unternehmen Wesrubung and Merkur will also shine as examples of tactical brilliance. However Nazi foreign "diplomacy" landed Germany in situations where the Wehrmacht just could not bail it out.
.
Probably the most "opportune" time for Georgy Konstantinovich to have a deadly plane crash is after he is recalled from Leningrad. Rokossovski criticized Zhukov harshly for some of the more wasteful moves (e.g. the 1942 part of Moscow counterattack). Keeping in mind Operatsyia Mars and the attack on Berlin, likely Konstantin Ksawerowich was mostly right. All major directions of attack Klin, Mozhaisk, and Orel appear to have been defended by armies led by competent generals in November-December 1941, so the result could even be a net positive on the butcher bill footed by the Soviet populace.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: What If Hitler Went For the Caucasus in 1941?

#11

Post by thaddeus_c » 28 Feb 2014, 15:06

LWD wrote:If they get the oil fields up in 43 how do they move the oil back to Germany? Note that it pretty much has to go back at least as far as Poland and perhaps further to then get distributed back to most of the units in the USSR. There are a couple of active threads on the German railroad system currently active. It doesn't look to me like it has the capacity and trucks are certainly out. How else are you going to move it?
sneak a few more subs into Black Sea and a few more E-boats overland? once they had total superiority they could ship oil across the Black Sea to Romania and it would move through the same channels as OTL?

if they had made oil their target, maybe advance as far as Belarus in the center, Leningrad in the north but increase the forces in the south?

forego N.Africa and send forces to Iraq, not an air squadron but divisions. play both sides and release tens of thousands of Jews to fight with the Stern Gang in Palestine.

Iraq and Caucasus( from Mosul to Baku) would have been only place in the world they could fight BOTH Brits and Russians with same force.

maybe this whole scenario doesn't work at least they would be in a position to DENY oil to Russia and Britain.

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Re: What If Hitler Went For the Caucasus in 1941?

#12

Post by pugsville » 01 Mar 2014, 06:12

Shipping across the black sea in what? The axis had very few tankers, and a shortage of shipping generally, but more importantly almost no shipping in the black sea, and no feasible axis to the black sea to transfer shipping there.

Middle Eat OIl. Almost no effect on Britain, once the war started to was all shipped to Britain from the Americas (much cheaper in shipping terms) the middle east oil contribution to the British war effort was pretty close to zero.

Caucasus massively unfavourable terrain to attack through, a large Russian garrison, and the feeble turkish railways simply could not support a viable force to attack Russia this way. Complete dead end for attacking Russia,

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Re: What If Hitler Went For the Caucasus in 1941?

#13

Post by Alixanther » 01 Mar 2014, 15:47

ChrisDR68 wrote:This is exactly the scenario Bryan Fugate put forward in his Operation Barbarossa book from 1984. His opinion was that once Hitler allowed himself to be persuaded to launch Operation Typhoon against Moscow in October 1941 instead of continuing the offensive in the Ukraine he removed Germany's chance of a strategic victory that year and with it Germany's best chance of a favourable outcome of the war in the east.

Before I read his book this alternative strategy hadn't even occurred to me before but it does make sense. Given the terrain of the Caucasus the furthest the Germans would likely have advanced to was the northern Caucasus mountain range and they would have been in an awkward position by the end of the campaigning season in 1941 but it's likely to have been better than in the original timeline.
There are claims that Hitler never intended to give a go to Operation Typhoon and while he allowed the staff to work on such scenarios (this was a general trend in OKW-Hitler relationship - remember the Sealion and invasion of Malta plans - which were ultimately put off by Hitler himself), he envisioned a large pincer movement, allowing the North and South Army Groups to advance well beyond the position of AGC in order to create a large pocket containing Moscow.
While AGN never got the strength to fulfill its objectives, it would not have been impossible for AGS to get in such a position. After capturing Rostov the gates of Caucasus were (supposedly) open. The forces used in Operation Typhoon could have been poured into Caucasus during the winter of '41 and judging from the position of the Soviet Forces, they were unable to fulfill the "scorched Earth" policy because at that time there were not enough people to both keep fighting and at the same time destroy piecemeal each and every strategic objective the Germans could have used.

Why then Hitler did not canceled Typhoon, just like he did with Sealion or Malta? Because prior to Typhoon Hitler got sick in such a way that he was unable to supervise the operations of the OKH on Eastern Front. OKW did nothing to stop them and Typhoon rolled in.

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Re: What If Hitler Went For the Caucasus in 1941?

#14

Post by thaddeus_c » 01 Mar 2014, 23:09

pugsville wrote:Shipping across the black sea in what? The axis had very few tankers, and a shortage of shipping generally, but more importantly almost no shipping in the black sea, and no feasible axis to the black sea to transfer shipping there.

Middle Eat OIl. Almost no effect on Britain, once the war started to was all shipped to Britain from the Americas (much cheaper in shipping terms) the middle east oil contribution to the British war effort was pretty close to zero.

Caucasus massively unfavourable terrain to attack through, a large Russian garrison, and the feeble turkish railways simply could not support a viable force to attack Russia this way. Complete dead end for attacking Russia,
how did they move oil on the Danube? how did they get fuel to u-boats? would have been easier to move oil across Black Sea than build any other transportation route, once it arrives in Romania it goes into the existing system.

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Re: What If Hitler Went For the Caucasus in 1941?

#15

Post by BDV » 02 Mar 2014, 01:29

pugsville wrote:Shipping across the black sea in what?
Romanian, bulgarian, italian, greek, spanish, and Mediteraneean Vichy french tankers? 40 small tankers, at 2500 tons each, doing 20 round trips Galati/Constanta - Novorossyisk could net 2 million tons, a small, but not insignificant amount.

The axis had very few tankers, and a shortage of shipping generally, but more importantly almost no shipping in the black sea, and no feasible axis to the black sea to transfer shipping there.
I think that Italian forces in North Africa and the supporting AfrikaKorps would complain not of lack of oil tankers, but the british propensity to sink them... which would also be the problem here, mutatis mutandis - see the thread on UBoats in the Black Sea.

Once again, what we come back to is the general lack of breadth and of multi-dimensionality in the Axis actions against the Soviet Union. IIRC, the hypothetical of targetting the Soviet economic infrastructure was raised in 1943!?!!

P.S.
A treasure trove of info on oil tankers,from (where else) AHF!
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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