What If Hitler Went For the Caucasus in 1941?

[Marcus]

An off-topic opinion post by DoctorVictory was removed together with a now unnecessary reply.

/Marcus

[LWD]

...

The Battle of Britain is hardly a myth. I'd like to see your documentation for only 6 serviceable aircraft.

A single moment in time, remember.

Source: The official RAF history. That this fact is not bandied about more is largely due to the fact that it makes (a) the 'Nazis' look rather better, and (b) the British government look incompetent (the Spitfire program was cancelled by a spiteful government bureaucrat and for the 6 months before it was reinstated, was funded from the designers own pocket).
....

Again this simply doesn't make sense. That's why I'd like to see the exact quote. Look for instance at:
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/ba ... ritain.htm
The RAF starts the BoB with 1,660 "front line" planes and lost 650. Now there would have been more damaged and the losses may not include operational losses but there were also a fair number of replacements delivered during the course of the battle. Indeed one site I looked at mentioned that the RAF actually had more front line fighters at the end of the battle than they had at the start.
This would also bring your 6 aircraft number into quesiton:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/U ... AF-I-7.jpg
Then if we look at:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/U ... F-I-6.html
There are some production numbers and quotes like:

After the battle there was much exaggerated talk about our shortage of fighters. It is therefore worth emphasizing that Fighter Command was at no time reduced to a reserve of half-a-dozen aircraft, or any similar number. The critical period of the battle was the fortnight from 24th August to 6th September, when the enemy's main objective was the airfields of the south-east, and in particular the sector stations of No. 11 Group. not only was there very considerable damage to the ground organization during this period, but the British losses in fighters so greatly exceeded the output from production that in three weeks of activity on the same scale—if the Germans could have stood three more weeks—the fighter reserves would have been completely exhausted. But on 7th September the enemy not only turned against London, but also—so heavy were his own losses—began to drop his main weight of bombs by night. From then on Dowding's forces once more grew numerically stronger. For in the week from 7th September to 14th September the gross wastage of Hurricanes and Spitfires from all causes fell below the gross output, and continued so until the end of the battle. The position in reserve aircraft was thus at its worst about 7th September; and on that date there were still 125 Spitfires and Hurricanes immediately available for issue from reserve, quite apart from what was in the pipe-line from production.

Which does a pretty good job or refuting your position.

[BDV]

The critical period of the battle was the fortnight from 24th August to 6th September, when the enemy's main objective was the airfields of the south-east, and in particular the sector stations of No. 11 Group. not only was there very considerable damage to the ground organization during this period, but the British losses in fighters so greatly exceeded the output from production that in three weeks of activity on the same scale—if the Germans could have stood three more weeks—the fighter reserves would have been completely exhausted.
from Hyperwar

Ergo, LW could only get 2/5 out of the way in exhausting RAF reserves. Approximating reserves as half of combat strength, to "destroy" Fighter Command LW would have had to go (about) three times as far?

So LW was ONE SEVENTH of the way done (and that's disregarding LW's own attrition)? By September 6th?

P.S. Edited for clarity

[LWD]

I should point out that the quote above is not mine but from the hyperwar link posted above.

[victor82]

Uh, back to the actual point of the thread, which involves bypassing the Crimea to go to the Caucasus.

1. TYPHOON would have, of course, have to be completely abandoned in order for North and Center to be put into Winter Quarters and put into a defensive line just east of the Smolensk to Moscow Road. It would have been favorable for North to have taken Leningrad, but that ship had sailed.

2. German occupation policy was barbaric. If they wanted to have the cooperation of the Ukrainians in defeating the Great Russians in Moscow, they needed to give the locals skin in the game. They didn't. A change in this policy would have been needed prior to the commencement of BARBAROSSA.

3. Someone other than von Rundstedt needed to be in charge of South in the fall of 1941. Manstein was only in charge of the 11th Army. Even at that time, the rest of the Heer understood that the was the brightest bulb in the room. He was probably the only guy who could have pulled it off,

4. Logistics was awful for the Wehrmacht. Everyone is aware that they had a range of perhaps the Border-to-Smolensk. How are they supposed to get past Rostov-on-Don into the Caucasus to, say, Grozny?

5. If you are going to put all your cards in the hands of Rundstedt and Manstein, which means doing Blue in 1941, who is pulling flank security for South? Von Bock? How? How is a stripped Army Group Center going to cover South's flank from Zhukov's inevitable massed T-34 attack into South's exposed Left? What about the forces left behind in the bottled-up Crimea? Ukranian units could be used, of course, but they'd have to be trained up to German standard and supplied out of Wehrmacht stores.

6. How do you keep Hitler busy and out of the way? Convince Eva to ply him with chocolates and steamed vegetables?

[BDV]

1. TYPHOON would have, of course, have to be completely abandoned in order for North and Center to be put into Winter Quarters and put into a defensive line just east of the Smolensk to Moscow Road. It would have been favorable for North to have taken Leningrad, but that ship had sailed.

What is wrong with destroying something like 20% of Soviet Frontline strength at a cost of 15K casualties and moving the line 150-200 km closer to Moscow, while simultaneously and at the same time capturing the strategic Rzhev-Bryansk North-South raliway?

It is the mindless exposure and the hurried forcing "worwarts" of armor units to keep advancing (without the support of infantry forces) that landed the Wehrmacht in their historical predicament.

2. German occupation policy was barbaric. If they wanted to have the cooperation of the Ukrainians in defeating the Great Russians in Moscow, they needed to give the locals skin in the game. They didn't. A change in this policy would have been needed prior to the commencement of BARBAROSSA.

How to do it is difficult. Something Machiavellian using jews left/abandoned by Stalin and ex-russian jewish emigres to Poland can, however be concocted.

3. Someone other than von Rundstedt needed to be in charge of South in the fall of 1941. Manstein was only in charge of the 11th Army. Even at that time, the rest of the Heer understood that the was the brightest bulb in the room. He was probably the only guy who could have pulled it off,

I have a clue for you. Runstedt was recalled to active duty, unlike Lewinski.

4. Logistics was awful for the Wehrmacht. Everyone is aware that they had a range of perhaps the Border-to-Smolensk. How are they supposed to get past Rostov-on-Don into the Caucasus to, say, Grozny?

Rusophile/sovietophile poster have put forth a reasonable explanation, namely Adolf, his two deskjockeys, and his band of Field-Exterminators banking on no significant Soviet forces behind the Dvina-Dniepr...

5. If you are going to put all your cards in the hands of Rundstedt and Manstein, which means doing Blue in 1941, who is pulling flank security for South? Von Bock? How? How is a stripped Army Group Center going to cover South's flank from Zhukov's inevitable massed T-34 attack into South's exposed Left? What about the forces left behind in the bottled-up Crimea? Ukranian units could be used, of course, but they'd have to be trained up to German standard and supplied out of Wehrmacht stores.

I'm condfused at the putative situation described. Details, pls. AGN, for example did quite well when it withdrew to defensible positions BEFORE exhausting its supplies and facing annihilation.

6. How do you keep Hitler busy and out of the way? Convince Eva to ply him with chocolates and steamed vegetables?

Live by the sword, die by the sword. Winter 1941-42 could have turned into an even more monstrous failure for Germany if not for GROFAZ. Picture Zhukov with 10 extra armies (Kiev, Typhoon) to hit the Axis line on December 5.

P.S.
From Narva to Kharkiv it's about 1400 km of front. Something that (2nd), 4th, 9th, 16th, 17th, and 18th Armies should have had little trouble defending, with the (2nd?), 6th, 11th and the mobile Romanian, Hungarian, and Italian forces joining 1st, 2nd, and 3rd panzer for the East then South drive.

[thaddeus_c]

back to the original post. the pre-invasion oil production from Maykop field (the smallest of the three) was GREATER than amount of oil Germany received from Romania. it's also the closest and the only field Germans captured.

What if they had targeted just Maykop, Crimea, and the mining region Donitz Basin? all areas they actually captured.

Soviets were forced to move oil via the Caspian Sea from Grozny and Baku, since the Germans had air superiority they could have just targeted the shipping, if the Soviets wanted to sabotage the oil fields in anticipation of further German advances all the better.

(IIRC the Soviets had only 27 tankers in their whole fleet, not sure if all were in the Caspian or if some were in the Black Sea, either way not a tremendous amount of targets for LW to have to destroy)

[BDV]

Soviets were forced to move oil via the Caspian Sea from Grozny and Baku, since the Germans had air superiority they could have just targeted the shipping

This assumes germans were dedicated to a strategic air campaign against Soviet Russia ... something that (per Speer) they started mulling in 1943!

[thaddeus_c]

Soviets were forced to move oil via the Caspian Sea from Grozny and Baku, since the Germans had air superiority they could have just targeted the shipping

This assumes germans were dedicated to a strategic air campaign against Soviet Russia ... something that (per Speer) they started mulling in 1943!

believe they DID make (a half hearted?) attempt to bomb the oilfields at Grozny and Baku 1942 but had already lost so many aircraft at Stalingrad the attempt was considered a failure.

my speculation was that they simply try to hold the Maykop field (least of the three but produced more than they imported from Romania.) instead of advancing further (including the ill fated siege of Stalingrad) dig in and bomb the Soviet oil production, tanker ships being the easiest. if they had not degraded their bomber force so much possible it would have worked.

(also would not have lost army at Stalingrad, more forces available to hold Crimea.)

[redcoat]

Operational British aircraft and crews in the Battle of Britain: Fighters with crew: 10 july : 656;8 august : 720:31 october : 684

I say again, the source was the official RAF history. And again, I stress that the figure represents a single point in time.
As to the figures you quote, 'aircraft' means very little. What were they, exactly? No doubt transport aircraft, obsolete types and those under repair are included.

BUY READING GLASSES: FIGHTERS WITH CREW,and FIGHTERS ARE NOT TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

The figures he quoted you are the numbers of operational Spitfires and Hurricanes in Fighter Command at the periods in question.
On the 7th September which is the date of the change from the Luftwaffe bombing the RAF airfields to bombing London, and is considered the period when the RAF was under it's greatest pressure, Fighter Command had 750 operational Spitfires and Hurricanes.

The claim that the RAF had at one point only 6 serviceable fighters is false, as is the claim that it's in the official records, it isn't.

[LWD]

...
The claim that the RAF had at one point only 6 serviceable fighters is false, as is the claim that it's in the official records, it isn't.

If you look at the quote I supplied above there is the line:

After the battle there was much exaggerated talk about our shortage of fighters. It is therefore worth emphasizing that Fighter Command was at no time reduced to a reserve of half-a-dozen aircraft, or any similar number.

This does imply that there was a report othat Fighter Command was reduced to 6 reserve aircraft at one time while of course indicating said report was false. Now that's a lot different from the RAF being reduced to 6 aircraft it does illustrte why it's nice to get clear referances and actual quotes rather than the handwaving we got when a source was requested.

[BDV]

believe they DID make (a half hearted?) attempt to bomb the oilfields at Grozny and Baku 1942 but had already lost so many aircraft at Stalingrad the attempt was considered a failure.

Sure, if germans would have planned for such, prepared for it, and their bomber fleet would not have been busy bombing old British buildings and doing tactical support of the ever-weakening Axis ground forces.

my speculation was that they simply try to hold the Maykop field (least of the three but produced more than they imported from Romania.) instead of advancing further (including the ill fated siege of Stalingrad) dig in and bomb the Soviet oil production, tanker ships being the easiest. if they had not degraded their bomber force so much possible it would have worked.

Obviously doable in the "proper" setting. That is hard working Wehrmachtführungsstab preparing detailed plans, including a vast array of contingencies*. Which would have seen KM act in force against the Soviet Baltic Fleet, and significant antinaval assets transferred to the Black Sea to corral the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. But such hard work was not needed, as the Soviet armed forces were going to be wiped out west of the Dniepr-Dvina line, the Soviet state was going to collapse, and the Wehrmacht was going to stroll leisurely to the Archangelsk-Astrakhan line.


__________________________________________________________________________
*E.g Finninsh backstab. Romanian backstab. Italian backstab. Successful Soviet withdrawal. Successful Soviet mobilization. Severe rainy seasons, rainy summer. Large scale soviet railway sabotage. USofA DOW. British attack against Western Europe. Failure of the Atlantic UBoot campaign.

[redcoat]

The Ju88, He111, and He115 for instance, were all torpedo capable.

In 1940 only the He 59 and He 115 had the capability to fly slow enough to drop the German airborne torpedo without it breaking up, and even then failures were common. It was only in 1941 with improvements to the German torpedo design that the Ju 88 and He 111 become torpedo capable.

[thaddeus_c]

Obviously doable in the "proper" setting. That is hard working Wehrmachtführungsstab preparing detailed plans, including a vast array of contingencies*. Which would have seen KM act in force against the Soviet Baltic Fleet, and significant antinaval assets transferred to the Black Sea to corral the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. But such hard work was not needed, as the Soviet armed forces were going to be wiped out west of the Dniepr-Dvina line, the Soviet state was going to collapse, and the Wehrmacht was going to stroll leisurely to the Archangelsk-Astrakhan line.

"A gambler never stops til they lose"

didn't the Germans pretty much control the Black Sea though? in general the point was that although the oilfield seized (Maykop) was small in SOVIET terms it was equal to the supply Germany received from Romania.

IMO they should have struck a deal with Turkey giving them (present day) Azerbaijan and keeping up to (present day) Georgia, more generous than they were prepared to be 1941? yes, but they would have been glad to make that deal 1943. had something like 400k captured/volunteer Turkish speaking troops that could have been sent to help Turkey along with weapons. if they did nothing more than start assembling to threaten Baku it would have harmed the Soviet efforts as they would divert troops there.

a long term plan for Caucasus would best include Turkey.

[BDV]

didn't the Germans pretty much control the Black Sea though? in general the point was that although the oilfield seized (Maykop) was small in SOVIET terms it was equal to the supply Germany received from Romania.

Depends on what the meaning of "pretty much control" is. When a lot of LW assets were dedicated to antishipping duties germans were in control. When not, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was in control.

a long term plan for Caucasus would best include Turkey.

Obviously, as Turkey would be the major local player in both Caucasus and Levant matters. For the invasion of Soviet Russia, Turkey would have been of some help, but Turks were content to sit this one out, and they were not indispensable for success if the Axis implements a proper invasion plan.