Lets say Halder develops a Cold and can not attend the 11/13/41 Orsha Conference, thus Hitler listens to AGN and AGS commanders. Thus Hitler who was seriously thinking of shutting down for winter gives the orders to all Army Groups to halt and dig in.
The Soviets get a break, but when they punch back, the Germans would have had roughly two to three weeks to dig in and improve its logistics network and be in prepare defensive positions.
Typhoon shut down on November 15, 1941
Re: Typhoon shut down on November 15, 1941
The situation is much more delicate than presented in the self-serving generals' post-hoc letters, and post-war memoirs.
For example, AFAIK, in his pre-Taifun orders to the AGC, Bock, the AGC honcho, stressed that Moscow is to be taken by November 7! Also shocking Bock obliviousness to problems of re-supplying and reinforcing his units during the drive on Moscow, on top of the unrealistic plans he subscribed to.
Taifun (in its first 4 weeks) was a stupendous success - even when accounting for the costly failure of the opportunistic move towards Kalinin-Torzhok. So yes, on November 1st, with the resupplying issues and the mud in full swing and far from the objectives, it would have been sensible to stop and reconsider. But the initiative for that must arrive from the AGC heads, and that is the weakest point, not the deskjockey duo's (Brauchitsch-Halder's) machinations.
P.S.
BTW, what is the expected time of start of Fall Rasputitsa?
For example, AFAIK, in his pre-Taifun orders to the AGC, Bock, the AGC honcho, stressed that Moscow is to be taken by November 7! Also shocking Bock obliviousness to problems of re-supplying and reinforcing his units during the drive on Moscow, on top of the unrealistic plans he subscribed to.
Taifun (in its first 4 weeks) was a stupendous success - even when accounting for the costly failure of the opportunistic move towards Kalinin-Torzhok. So yes, on November 1st, with the resupplying issues and the mud in full swing and far from the objectives, it would have been sensible to stop and reconsider. But the initiative for that must arrive from the AGC heads, and that is the weakest point, not the deskjockey duo's (Brauchitsch-Halder's) machinations.
P.S.
BTW, what is the expected time of start of Fall Rasputitsa?
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: Typhoon shut down on November 15, 1941
I've been curious about the effects of Siberian troops. What if Stalin did not know of Japan's intentions of later '41? Or if the Japanese decided to attack in Mongolia. Without these troops, what would the possible outcome of Typhoon be?
Re: Typhoon shut down on November 15, 1941
AT
There are many things in your post.
Siberian troops as some form of Soviet Stormtroopers is, as far as I can tell, exagerrated. However, Soviets fought two wars pre-1941, and anecdotically, veteran units did give a better account of themselves compared to green units. But how many veteran units were left in the Siberian Transbaikal and Far East Military Districts by October 1941?
A Japanese attack in Mongolia is a reasonable topic for discussion, but separate, and done many times. Pick one of those threads and re-animate it, if you'd like.
As to the original thread, if "Typhoon shut down on November 15, 1941" is the Adolf blessing the fait accompli of AGC slowing down starting November 1st, on account of logistical difficulties and Soviet resistance, it would make a difference. If it's only the beginning of the haggling process in the AGC leadership - Brauchitsch-Halder deskjockey duo - GROFAZ triangle of fail, the difference compared the historical outcome will be minimal. And my point still stands, the big stumbling block is the dedication of the AGC leadeship (vBock in particular) to the "Soviets for sure will crumble with the next assault" foolishness. How does THAT change?
There are many things in your post.
Siberian troops as some form of Soviet Stormtroopers is, as far as I can tell, exagerrated. However, Soviets fought two wars pre-1941, and anecdotically, veteran units did give a better account of themselves compared to green units. But how many veteran units were left in the Siberian Transbaikal and Far East Military Districts by October 1941?
A Japanese attack in Mongolia is a reasonable topic for discussion, but separate, and done many times. Pick one of those threads and re-animate it, if you'd like.
As to the original thread, if "Typhoon shut down on November 15, 1941" is the Adolf blessing the fait accompli of AGC slowing down starting November 1st, on account of logistical difficulties and Soviet resistance, it would make a difference. If it's only the beginning of the haggling process in the AGC leadership - Brauchitsch-Halder deskjockey duo - GROFAZ triangle of fail, the difference compared the historical outcome will be minimal. And my point still stands, the big stumbling block is the dedication of the AGC leadeship (vBock in particular) to the "Soviets for sure will crumble with the next assault" foolishness. How does THAT change?
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion