Mussolini Dies, May 1st, 1940 in a Bizarre Pretzel Incident

[BDV]

LWD:Why? Given all the other tasks that the RN had what makes this so important.

Because preventing the enemy from improving it's strategic position is one of the most vitally important objective of any nation locked in a war. Germany's capture of Norway negated the British strategy of bottling up the KM in the Baltic, while at the same time safeguarded her northern flank. Also look at the effect it had on the Arctic convoys, or how it facilitated the breakout by Bismark and PE.

What is this but a proof that Britain prioritised the defense of North Africa? Yes, there were those in WWII who defended everything (Schicklgruber) or more than they could defend (Djugashvill), but this is strongly advised against in warfare by sages both ancient (Sun Tzu) and modern (Der Alte Fritz).

And pray tell, what major inconvenience did Kriegsmarine put Britain and Commonwealth in compared to e.g. getting a hold of MidEast oilfields?

The LW did not demonstrate the ability in this time frame to stop the RN from acomplishing just about any mission it undertook.

I'm not sure how you come to that conclusion. Look at the reason(s) for the cancellation of Op Hammer, or the fiasco of the allied landings at Namsos and Ornes beach. These were operations that were severely effected by Luftwaffe intervention.

And Dieppe. So LW got some licks in, in a few particular situations where it had the upper hand. So what? It never stopped an action of the British-Commonwealth armed forces cold in its tracks.

[Kingfish]

What is this but a proof that Britain prioritised the defense of North Africa?

What do you mean by "prioritized the defense of North Africa"?
Do you have any proof that the allies reinforced the NA theater (which in April 1940 wasn't a theater at all - Italy's DoW didn't come until June, and she didn't cross the Egyptian border until September) at the expense of Norway?

And pray tell, what major inconvenience did Kriegsmarine put Britain and Commonwealth in compared to e.g. getting a hold of MidEast oilfields?

Again, why the reference to the Middle East?

And Dieppe. So LW got some licks in, in a few particular situations where it had the upper hand. So what? It never stopped an action of the British-Commonwealth armed forces cold in its tracks.

The feasibility of the Navy's share in this operation was much canvassed at the time. It may therefore be of interest to record the discussions between the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet, on whose shoulders the immediate responsibility would rest. Sir Charles Forbes[31] was informed of Operation Hammer in the early hours of 14th April, while he was still at sea off the Lofotens in the Rodney , with a request for his opinion as to the possibility of destroying or dominating the shore batteries so that transports could enter, and for particulars of the ships required. In his answer, at midday on the 14th, he said that the operation was not feasible unless the Government was prepared to face very heavy losses in troops and transports, because German bombers would have sufficient warning to provide continuous air attack. The Admiral also pointed out that no ships of the Home Fleet had on board the high explosive bombardment shells which would be needed for their main armament. But the Admiralty answered, 'Pray consider this important project further':[32] large troopships would have to be brought into the danger zone

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somewhere, and for this operation we should be in a position to put both Stavanger and Trondheim airfields out of action—the former by RAF bombing followed up by bombardment from the cruiser Suffolk , the latter by the attacks of naval aircraft and Fleet bombardment. The Admiralty also said that high explosive shell for 15 inch guns had been ordered to Rosyth and that the aircraft carrier Furious and the 1st Cruiser Squadron would be employed.

Sir Charles Forbes, having received particulars of the defences and confirmation of the fact that the Germans had seized the batteries at the entrance of the fjord, replied to the Admiralty on the 15th, deprecating the withdrawal of the 1st Cruiser Squadron from Kirkenes and that of the Furious from Narvik, and proposing a force to consist of the aircraft carrier Glorious ; the three capital ships Valiant , Renown and Warspite , of which the last named was to carry out shore bombardments; at least four anti-aircraft cruisers; about twenty destroyers; and 'numerous landing craft.' The Admiral added that his previous reply had been misunderstood: he did not 'anticipate any great difficulty from the naval side', provided the troops were conveyed in men of war instead of transports.[33] The Admiralty went ahead with its preparations, and on the 19th the Valiant sailed for Rosyth to ship the special shell for the bombardment. Meanwhile the plan had been received by the Commander-in-Chief on his arrival with the Home Fleet at Scapa, and arrangements were made for the whole of the military assault force to be embarked according to his wishes in cruisers, destroyers, and sloops, which would also carry the stores, howitzer battery, and six landing craft. Embarkation was fixed for the 21st at Rosyth, whence the expedition would proceed to Scapa to pick up the reserve brigade and rendezvous with the aircraft carriers Ark Royal and Glorious . These last were not available until the 23rd, so the attack was in effect put back to 26 April at earliest.

But before the Admiral, busy examining the general requirements of the Home Fleet at Scapa, had become wholly committed to the proposed operation, which he regarded as a gamble, a more cautious policy, of limiting the risks to which we exposed our very slender resources, came suddenly to prevail in London. The forts might not prove a serious obstacle, but the German air force, knowing that we were bound to proceed up the fjord to Trondheim, might take a heavy toll of our ships. We may notice that the Suffolk reached Scapa Flow on the morning of 18th April with the sea 'lapping over the quarterdeck':[34] she had bombarded Sola airfield, Stavanger, and so far from putting it out of action had suffered nearly seven hours of counter attack from the air. Sent on northwards from Stavanger with additional orders to pursue some alleged enemy destroyers, the cruiser could not be found by her intended RAF fighter escort (which

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expected her to be closer inshore), and although the Commander-in-Chief despatched naval aircraft from Hatston as well as both his battlecruisers to the rescue, it was too late to prevent a direct hit from a 1000 lb bomb. There were even four more air attacks after nine fighters had arrived to protect the cruiser. Similar, if less dramatic, reminders of the incalculable (or at least uncalculated) menace of air power had come in from our ships now operating in the Namsos area. There were also fears that, even if ships could be successfully defended by their own anti-aircraft armament and the Fleet Air Arm, the troops would be badly bombed as they went ashore to capture Trondheim and the Vaernes airfield. By the morning of the 19th, the Chiefs of Staff had drawn up a paper in this sense, which seemed to confront the Prime Minister with the alternatives of accepting their advice, backed as it was by the newly appointed Vice-Chiefs of Staff, or making (as Mr Churchill tells us)19 at least one change among his principal Service Advisers. The First Lord supported the more prudent course, and the decision became known at a late night meeting of the Military Coordination Committee on the 19th.[35] The order for General Paget to go north had already been withdrawn by the War Office, about one hour after it was issued. An Admiralty telegram to the Commander-in-Chief formally announced the cancellation of 'Hammer' at 11:40 AM next day.

Source:http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/U ... tml#page74

[LWD]

Most of those point to the vulnerability of the troops and troop transports not the naval units. The one that does mentions actions in a fjord which would constrain maneuver.

[BDV]

Re: Kingfish

And how do those findings focused on the particulars of the British actions in April 1940, which occurred within the context of already significant Continental involvement of Great Britain imply the impossibility of a British attack on Norway, Channel Islands, or France proper, in 1941 or 1942, under the dramatically different from historical circumstance of Italian neutrality, and the ATL German invasion of Soviet Russia.

[Kingfish]

Most of those point to the vulnerability of the troops and troop transports not the naval units.

Correct, and what was the primary mission of the RN during the Norwegian campaign if not to protect and support a series of amphibious landings?

[Kingfish]

Re: Kingfish

And how do those findings focused on the particulars of the British actions in April 1940, which occurred within the context of already significant Continental involvement of Great Britain imply the impossibility of a British attack on Norway, Channel Islands, or France proper, in 1941 or 1942, under the dramatically different from historical circumstance of Italian neutrality, and the ATL German invasion of Soviet Russia.

I don't mean to imply anything apart from the effect the Luftwaffe had on the RN during Weserubung.

However, one can draw some interesting conclusions if one considers how favorable the allied situation was after the first week, and then compare it to the results obtained.

[BDV]

I don't mean to imply anything apart from the effect the Luftwaffe had on the RN during Weserubung.

Allright.

However, one can draw some interesting conclusions if one considers how favorable the allied situation was after the first week, and then compare it to the results obtained.

Which conclusions are, as pertinent to the hypothetical issue at hand?


(Are we all in agreement that should Mussolini die in a fiery airplane crash while simultaneously and at the same time chocking on a pretzel, means a neutral Italy in WWII)?


P.S. Of course, quiet Med theater opens another can of WHIF worms