Americans fight at El Alamein

[Carl Schwamberger]

Duh! it Just occured to me the US Army did send a major formation to Egypt in 1942. Commanded by a Maj General with a HQ, support units, and combat formations. It operated a unified US military unit under British command and fought alongside the British in Egypt and Lybia from July 1942 on into 1943 when in early 1943 it separated.

Anyone guess which unit this was?

[Orwell1984]

Duh! it Just occured to me the US Army did send a major formation to Egypt in 1942. Commanded by a Maj General with a HQ, support units, and combat formations. It operated a unified US military unit under British command and fought alongside the British in Egypt and Lybia from July 1942 on into 1943 when in early 1943 it separated.

Anyone guess which unit this was?

That would be the U.S. Army Middle East Air Force (USAMEAF) and its assorted squadrons and detachments under Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton.

[Carl Schwamberger]

HyperWar has a bit of detail on that. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-C-Egypt/ The US ME Air Force peaked out at about three bomber groups. Substantial forces ordered to join it in the summer of 1942 did not arrive until after October 1942.

In terms of armored forces; two US Army officers were sent by the Ordnance Dept in the spring of 1942. Along with some British they spent weeks picking over abandoned and destroyed tanks littering Egypt and Lybia. Looking in detail on how the tanks were damaged and what worked on the battlefield in terms of tank design. Returning to the US they helped work out the concept and specifications for a new medium tank that would reflect the information they had gathered. Those specs led to the T20 prototype that served as the starting point for US tanks designs from the M26 on into the the 1970s. Not much influence on WWII but the long term effect was broad.

[Baltasar]

Indeed? They won the war a few years later, surely finding plenty of German / Italian armor plus whatever they could get from the Russians, by the Germans potentially? Was the information gathered in the sands of Africa really that important considering that they had much more information later on?

[LWD]

If you look at the timeing of the development cycles possibly. A year or two later and it would have little influence on the T20 series. Now it's possible that the US would have started with a blank slate based on latter information some time in the 50s or 60s but the T20 series would still have been a significant influence atleast IMO.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Carl,

I had already mentioned the US air presence in my original post:

"Besides, there was already a considerable US presence at El Alamein - in the air."

Cheers,

Sid.

[Carl Schwamberger]

& that 'presence' has something to offer on several of the points raised here. As would the experience of th US forces that were in Australia & New Guinea from the middle of 1942.

[Von Schadewald]

The division would have been commanded by Patton. How would Patton have been under Montgomery in October 1942: obedient or striking out on his own?

[ChristopherPerrien]

The division would have been commanded by Patton. How would Patton have been under Montgomery in October 1942: obedient or striking out on his own?

, Are you just asking a loaded question? Patton vs a plodding Infantry company commander ? Excuse me if you do not know the vast differences of POV between two such men.(maligned as heroic in their time)

No-one in high command, would have been so stupid as to make such a confrontation happen so directly.

[LWD]

???
Wasn't Patton under Monty's command in Sicily? In the situation proposed I can't see that he wouldn't have been. He (Patton) might have pushed the immediate persuit a bit harder than Monty would have preferred but Monty haveing control of the suppies would have had the last say.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I think with more US leaders in contact with the 8th Army & Monty, there were more than just Patton with the 2d Armored Div or I Armored Corps, a different view of Monty would have developed. I used to give Monty a pass on the whole pursuit thing, but last year after reading about how the RAF established a forward air base - ahead of the 8th Armys advance guards, I am having new thoughts on the subject. As a Corps commander I could see Patton, or several other US generals of that year, becoming frustrated and organizing some sort of TF to chase off a few hundred kilometers for a photo op. with Rommels rear guard. There is a danger in this of getting bit by the retreating Axis army, but if they get away with it the shouting will still not have died down over the "Stunt".

[ChristopherPerrien]

???
Wasn't Patton under Monty's command in Sicily? In the situation proposed I can't see that he wouldn't have been. He (Patton) might have pushed the immediate persuit a bit harder than Monty would have preferred but Monty haveing control of the suppies would have had the last say.

Before North Africa was finished or earlier at El Alamein, neither of the two countries or their leadership could afford publically what happened in Sicily between Monty and Georgie.
Patton didn't get canned because of slapping a soldier in Sicily , he got canned because he "showed up" Monty in Sicily at Palermo and Messina. Either way, his "demotion" was very synergistic toward the success of Operation Fortitude. But if such a similar "row/incident " had started at El Alamein, it would have been detrimental to the Allied cause and , possibly altered some 42 election outcomes.

The real issue was keeping morale up of the British Army/armed forces, British high command , and the UK public in general for supporting an invasion of Europe proper. The Allied powers needed a "common Brit" soldier like Monty around and "leading", otherwise Normandy would have been an all American show, with the Brits just standing around.

[LWD]

... I used to give Monty a pass on the whole pursuit thing, but last year after reading about how the RAF established a forward air base - ahead of the 8th Armys advance guards, I am having new thoughts on the subject. ...

I on the other hand used to be quite critical of him in that regard but have come to think that he very likely had very good reasons for it. Looking at the resources at hand he could be pretty sure he would win. On the other hand Britain didn't need any more sharp reverses and indeed by that point needed to avoid excess casualties. I think in this case (as well as others) Monty took a course that he thought best for both the British Army and Britain as a whole and likely for the allies in general and while I'm not 100% convinced he was right I think there is a very strong case. But this is wandering a bit off topic.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Christopher Perrien,

You write; "Patton didn't get canned because of slapping a soldier in Sicily, he got canned because he "showed up" Monty in Sicily at Palermo and Messina."

I will believe anything if the evidence is there. What is the evidence for this?

It strikes me that assaulting subordinates is a pretty good reason in its own right for dismissal.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Carl Schwamberger]

The whole 'Patton Canned' discussion usually passes lightly over the lack of any role for him in the Med at the moment, and his likely employment in the invasion of NW Europe. Op Overlord was already a given, well along in planning and Marshal had his preferences for senior commanders in Op Overlord and beyond. Relieving from command for a disciplinary infraction both boosts morale and is a useful temporary cover for the probable transfer of a well know commander to a important future project.