Turkish Railway Capacity supply to caucasus

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BDV
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Re: Turksih Railway Capacity supply to caucasus

#31

Post by BDV » 03 May 2014, 03:10

JAG13 wrote:I'll let you do the research, just point out when and where Metaxas resorted to the massacre+deportation combo in Crete.
Nationalist Greece could exercise intransigent measures to combat irredentist deviationism.
Of course, (shockingly?!?), to fight mountainfolks' brigandism.

PS
Newsflash, the reign of nationalist tyrant Metaxas called by vlachs "a period of real pressure and persecution". Join me in the shocked, shocked, dismay of such allegations levied against a spotless behaviour of this man of unimpeachable character.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: Turksih Railway Capacity supply to caucasus

#32

Post by phylo_roadking » 03 May 2014, 03:20

Lol, not good enough dodge...

So, again, how is it primitive?

And now is not only you saying that is primitive, its the British... do you have a source? Or is it just you claiming that the British thought so you rascal you?

So, again, how is it primitive? Or are we talking with no actual knowledge on the subject? Mmmmhhh...
Try MRD Foot's History of the SOE and how they planned sabotage against industrial and transport targets ;) "Primitive" isn't a comment on the running of the Turkish rail network - it's a statement on its resistance to potential disruption I.E. not much.
Oh! So now we are bombing cities and not the junction itself? I think the pic in your avatar should be a bicycle, such a skill in backpedaling should not go unused!

That my friend, btw, is area bombing, what you do when you cant find or hit a target, but fine, is 1941, and we all know how "good" the RAF was at finding cities at night back then unless on the coast or next to a MAJOR river, let alone targets.

Yet, you want us to believe that a couple RAF squadrons would be an actual threat to the rail system... by night bombing.
Yes - in a country that wouldn't have or be used yet to running an effective blackout system to revent target acquisitions etc. The RAF had trouble locating blacked out targets...as did the Germans ;)

But I DID note that particular wrinkle above - but don't let what someone actually posted get in the way of a good rant, eh? :wink:

And what's wrong with area bombing??? YOU were the one said the British were no good at PRECISION bombing...whereas *I* never used the word "precision" ;) Which I DO believe I've already had to remind you of? Kindly take that on board.

The point is that through 1940 the British WERE indeed carrying out "area" bombing - attacking so-called industrial targets embedded in urban areas that realistically COULDN'T be distinctly separated from the civilians around them. And there's absolutely no reason to think they wouldn't continue doing so....in fact, historically they DID right up until the temporary suspension of bombing ops in 1941...

What the British then turned to was MASSED area bombing specifically on civilian populations - but what they had been doing against targets prior to that was still "area" bombing ;)
The Kurds were fellow muslims and their first uprising was against secularization so no, they were not treated as the armenians and would not expect to be... until 1937, then the Turks just went wild, razed villages, killed most of the people and then deported the survivors.
In other words there was a VERY disaffected minority...
From then on, that is what you can expect, and helping an enemy that is on the run and not helping you would just be a bit suicidal.
And yet - that's EXACTLY what the SOE often did - helped, supported and networked groups like that. One example would be the "proper" Maquis - the French May 1940 Campaign veterans who had gone "into the bush" in the Jura and the French Alps and were surviving on a shoestring - no food, no medical support, rotting uniforms and footwear etc. because it doesn't matter that they couldn't actually DO much stuck up mountains in the back-end of howhere in real terms...what they did was create a potential that the Germans couldn't ignore ;)

Same with the Kurds; the British would support them, network them etc, simply BECAUSE of the potential problem that it COULD create for Ankara ;) That's what covert operations' organisations DO during wartime - create problems for the enemy just as much as actually taking action.
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Re: Turksih Railway Capacity supply to caucasus

#33

Post by JAG13 » 03 May 2014, 20:22

phylo_roadking wrote:
Lol, not good enough dodge...

So, again, how is it primitive?

And now is not only you saying that is primitive, its the British... do you have a source? Or is it just you claiming that the British thought so you rascal you?

So, again, how is it primitive? Or are we talking with no actual knowledge on the subject? Mmmmhhh...
Try MRD Foot's History of the SOE and how they planned sabotage against industrial and transport targets ;) "Primitive" isn't a comment on the running of the Turkish rail network - it's a statement on its resistance to potential disruption I.E. not much.
Lol, as expected... :wink:

But ok, lets see if you are not making stuff up, just quote the passage where it says in the book that the Turkish railroad is primitive, simple right? Page as well while we are at it.

And just for kick, this is what you said at first:
Might it be worth considering that by mid 1941, the really rather primitive....and filled with multiple points of failure...
You are clearly separating the two, which is why when challenged this was your response:
Remind us again WHAT percentage of the Turkish network you said was single track? And HOW many different gauges?
See? You immediately went into questioning the composition of the railroad out of sheer ignorance... then we evolved into this "primitive doesnt mean primitive, means vulnerable" gymnastics of yours, that altough it is quite entertaining it is just a means to obscure your earlier display of ignorance. :thumbsup:

And now you called the British in you support! :lol: So, again, where it was qualified as primitive?
Oh! So now we are bombing cities and not the junction itself? I think the pic in your avatar should be a bicycle, such a skill in backpedaling should not go unused!

That my friend, btw, is area bombing, what you do when you cant find or hit a target, but fine, is 1941, and we all know how "good" the RAF was at finding cities at night back then unless on the coast or next to a MAJOR river, let alone targets.

Yet, you want us to believe that a couple RAF squadrons would be an actual threat to the rail system... by night bombing.
Yes - in a country that wouldn't have or be used yet to running an effective blackout system to revent target acquisitions etc. The RAF had trouble locating blacked out targets...as did the Germans ;)
Are the Germans going to bomb the Turks now? :lol:

Yeah, I guess it was very hard to figure out after 2 years of war and actually carrying out black out exercises that blaking out was a very effective and easy way to deny assistance to the enemy... and just to point out the sheer stupidity of such an argument, even if they dont black-out right away... they would after the first bombing, wouldnt they?

So, whats your argument?
But I DID note that particular wrinkle above - but don't let what someone actually posted get in the way of a good rant, eh? :wink:
Said Mr. smoke screen... :lol:
And what's wrong with area bombing??? YOU were the one said the British were no good at PRECISION bombing...whereas *I* never used the word "precision" ;) Which I DO believe I've already had to remind you of? Kindly take that on board.

The point is that through 1940 the British WERE indeed carrying out "area" bombing - attacking so-called industrial targets embedded in urban areas that realistically COULDN'T be distinctly separated from the civilians around them. And there's absolutely no reason to think they wouldn't continue doing so....in fact, historically they DID right up until the temporary suspension of bombing ops in 1941...

What the British then turned to was MASSED area bombing specifically on civilian populations - but what they had been doing against targets prior to that was still "area" bombing ;)
The point is that you very casually claimed the railroad junctions would be vulnerable to the RAF in 1941 AT NIGHT! :lol:

Such a laughable statement has been desperately covered by then indicating city bombardment as a means to get at what was at first indicated as a pretty specific target, junctions, without mentioning cities and we all now junctions and cities do not mean the same thing. That when is well known the RAF could barely target cities and in the end just dropped the bombs in the hope of hiting something within it, that is when they were lucky enough to actually find the city.

So your first statement of vulnerability has turned into: the RAF would bomb towns, with a few Wellingtons, if they can find them, in the hope of causing some damage to railroad tracks, which btw happen to be quite resilient to bombs anyways...

...and we are supposed to see that as a threat! :lol:

You cheeky bugger! :wink:

And no, you didnt use the word precision, you just claimed the 1941 RAF able to target junctions at night... which is precisely claiming that the 1941 RAF was capable of precision bombing! :P

"No sir, I never said I murdered her, I just shot her in the head and then she stopped breathing, you are twisting my words!" :thumbsup:
The Kurds were fellow muslims and their first uprising was against secularization so no, they were not treated as the armenians and would not expect to be... until 1937, then the Turks just went wild, razed villages, killed most of the people and then deported the survivors.
In other words there was a VERY disaffected minority...
...that knows what is at stake.
From then on, that is what you can expect, and helping an enemy that is on the run and not helping you would just be a bit suicidal.
And yet - that's EXACTLY what the SOE often did - helped, supported and networked groups like that. One example would be the "proper" Maquis - the French May 1940 Campaign veterans who had gone "into the bush" in the Jura and the French Alps and were surviving on a shoestring - no food, no medical support, rotting uniforms and footwear etc. because it doesn't matter that they couldn't actually DO much stuck up mountains in the back-end of howhere in real terms...what they did was create a potential that the Germans couldn't ignore ;)

Same with the Kurds; the British would support them, network them etc, simply BECAUSE of the potential problem that it COULD create for Ankara ;) That's what covert operations' organisations DO during wartime - create problems for the enemy just as much as actually taking action.
Yeah, the mighty SOE the one the British ambassador in Ankara did not think very highly of, already caught redhanded by the Turks and under surveillance, so after rounding up the known ones already identified you just put up posters:

"Have you seen suspicious white people about your village?

Call 1800 WE-WILL-BURN-YOUR-VILLAGE-AND-MASSACRE-EVERYONE-IF-YOU-DONT-REWARD-OFFERED-MAYBE"

There may be some willing, but after the first couple massacres things would settle and SOE agents turned in, if any scaped the Turks that is. You see, one thing is killing random people as retaliation, a good directed Turkish-style genocide is a whole different thing specially when the guys offering "help" are the ones on the run themselves and putting your people at risk...

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Re: Turksih Railway Capacity supply to caucasus

#34

Post by BDV » 03 May 2014, 23:25

And should the rubble of some key railway bridge following a "lucky" British airstrike be dusted, one would obviously find 808 residue. But Nazis would not even get to see the rubble, much less test it. And a certain amount of money would be quietly be transferred (maybe from British, maybe from US accounts) in certain Turkish (governmental?, private?) books at Basel.

P.S. I am still agaped at the proposed vision of TURKISH bureaucrats applying themselves (their svengalied selves?) with utmost energy to furthering of NAZI GERMAN designs in Caucasus and/or Levant.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: Turksih Railway Capacity supply to caucasus

#35

Post by phylo_roadking » 04 May 2014, 00:29

JAG13, stop with the cheek right now. It is NOT approved of on this forum. I don't know what sort of forums you're used to, but it's banned here. Get used to that.
Lol, as expected...

But ok, lets see if you are not making stuff up, just quote the passage where it says in the book that the Turkish railroad is primitive, simple right? Page as well while we are at it.
What you have CONSISTENTLY done with posters' comments from the start of this thread is to move the goal posts. What I said WAS...
Try MRD Foot's History of the SOE and how they planned sabotage against industrial and transport targets
There doesn't NEED to be a mention of Turkey's railway system - ALL period railway systems are exactly the same when it comes to exploiting in-built weakness to disrupt them. Turkey's huge percentage of single-track lines throughout the entire network simply makes the task simpler.

Yeah, I guess it was very hard to figure out after 2 years of war and actually carrying out black out exercises that blaking out was a very effective and easy way to deny assistance to the enemy... and just to point out the sheer stupidity of such an argument, even if they dont black-out right away... they would after the first bombing, wouldnt they?

So, whats your argument?
Would they, effectively, at ALL locations and towns across Turkey? Do you really think the Turkish civil administration in the 1940s was that effective??? Do you have any idea what level of investment and constant development of a civil defence organisation it took even advanced Western european nations to achieve that in the 1920s and 1930s as war approached?

Turkey had little or no experience at all of suffering strategic aerial bombardment of any form during WWI; Germany and Britain did. Not only did it influence ALL their interwar preparations for a repeat of events, they also learned from all the interwar developments in theory and practice.
And no, you didnt use the word precision, you just claimed the 1941 RAF able to target junctions at night...
You don't really get it, do you...

How many major junctions in the Turkish railway system were outside towns or cities???
Such a laughable statement has been desperately covered by then indicating city bombardment as a means to get at what was at first indicated as a pretty specific target, junctions, without mentioning cities and we all now junctions and cities do not mean the same thing. That when is well known the RAF could barely target cities and in the end just dropped the bombs in the hope of hiting something within it, that is when they were lucky enough to actually find the city.
I suggest you do some REAL research on events; what happened was the British discovered that percentages of their raids were not finding targets, that percentages of ordnance was not hitting their intended industrial targets within built-up areas etc., that percentages of their ordnance was missing targets by various distances. There were major and frequent successes - just not enough to justify the HUGE number of sorties Bomber Command was flying.

The point is however that from Aril/May 1940 the RAF set out to exactly what I said they needed to do here - attack specific targets within urban areas. As of the beginning of BARBAROSSA and for some months after wards they CONTINUED to do exactly that, having ramped their effort up considerably from the early days of the "Oil Campaign". They hadn't realised as yet that the results were not what they wanted or as they thought they were - when used against a Germany and German targets in Western Europe that were effectively protected by various countermeasures...

BECAUSE they didn't realise it yet, the same tactics would be employed here - raids from Syria/Lebanon against Turkish towns that contained rail junctions...except here they would be being employed against targets that would not be effectively blacked out, where there was no decoy system, no nightfighter capability, little or no anti-aircraft capability of any sort...

No matter what countermeasures were eventually put in place, the RAF in the Eastern Med would have some weeks or months to damage the Turkish rail network - and that's just flying by night...

What if they choose to raid by day too? :wink: An effective defence in daylight relies on early warning and raid tracking I.E. a well-trained ground observer system, a command-and-control system for fighters, having the fighters positioned in the right places...and RADAR - how was the Turkish radar network in 1941? :lol: :lol: :lol:
In other words there was a VERY disaffected minority...
...that knows what is at stake.
Has that actually ever stopped the Kurds? 8O
Yeah, the mighty SOE the one the British ambassador in Ankara did not think very highly of
NOONE in Great Britain thought highly of the SOE - except themselves...and the War Cabinet, and the various governments-in-exile and armed forces-in-exile. And yet - look at the results that the SOE achieved...
...so after rounding up the known ones already identified you just put up posters:

"Have you seen suspicious white people about your village?

Call 1800 WE-WILL-BURN-YOUR-VILLAGE-AND-MASSACRE-EVERYONE-IF-YOU-DONT-REWARD-OFFERED-MAYBE"

There may be some willing, but after the first couple massacres things would settle and SOE agents turned in, if any scaped the Turks that is. You see, one thing is killing random people as retaliation, a good directed Turkish-style genocide is a whole different thing specially when the guys offering "help" are the ones on the run themselves and putting your people at risk...
In all seriousness, do you know ANYTHING about the history of Resistance in the Occupied nations during WWII? 8O ALL over Europe and the Mediterranean theatres, and the Far East - people in their thousands took that risk.

And yes, there WERE hundreds of hostages killed, and villages destroyed - did it stop the Resisters? Did it stop SOE? Did it stop the Resisters cooperating with SOE? You know what the answer to that is...
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Re: Turksih Railway Capacity supply to caucasus

#36

Post by phylo_roadking » 04 May 2014, 00:32

P.S. I am still agaped at the proposed vision of TURKISH bureaucrats applying with utmost energy to furthering of NAZI GERMAN designs in Caucasus and/or Levant.
...let alone being able to organise a mandatory, nationwide, blackout system! :lol: :lol: :lol:
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

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Re: Turksih Railway Capacity supply to caucasus

#37

Post by alltoes » 04 May 2014, 01:21

Let's expand this thread a bit. Let's say Germany and Turkey in early 1941 agree on german transit rights. What would be the Russian response? Would Russia deploy troops in Georgia and Armenia? And how would the Germans deploy their troops prior to opening of Barbarossa? I would think Germany would present a feint towards Iraq and Syria. I realize this is a huge expansion; political, military, multi-country consideration, etc. IMHO for Germany to acquire such an agreement, a lot of diplomatic pressure would be levied against Turkey. Germany probably would allow Turkish occupation of Cyprus. An invasion into Iraq would probably be invited by Iraq. But the bigger prize would definitely be Baku.

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Re: Turksih Railway Capacity supply to caucasus

#38

Post by JAG13 » 04 May 2014, 01:52

phylo_roadking wrote:JAG13, stop with the cheek right now. It is NOT approved of on this forum. I don't know what sort of forums you're used to, but it's banned here. Get used to that.
Coming from you the one that uses smilies liberaly? Thats rich!
Lol, as expected...

But ok, lets see if you are not making stuff up, just quote the passage where it says in the book that the Turkish railroad is primitive, simple right? Page as well while we are at it.
What you have CONSISTENTLY done with posters' comments from the start of this thread is to move the goal posts. What I said WAS...
Try MRD Foot's History of the SOE and how they planned sabotage against industrial and transport targets
There doesn't NEED to be a mention of Turkey's railway system - ALL period railway systems are exactly the same when it comes to exploiting in-built weakness to disrupt them. Turkey's huge percentage of single-track lines throughout the entire network simply makes the task simpler.
Oh, so no page quote then? And now YOU accuse ME of moving the goalposts? Trip down memory lane:

This is what you said at first:
Might it be worth considering that by mid 1941, the really rather primitive....and filled with multiple points of failure...
You are clearly separating the two, which is why when challenged this was your response:
Remind us again WHAT percentage of the Turkish network you said was single track? And HOW many different gauges?
See? You immediately went into questioning the composition of the railroad out of sheer ignorance... then we evolved into this "primitive doesnt mean primitive, means vulnerable" gymnastics of yours, that altough it is quite entertaining it is just a means to obscure your earlier display of ignorance. :thumbsup:

So yeah, you went wild with the qualifications without having any idea about the turkish railroads, you were just trying to be dismissive, and then it came back to bit you in the rear.

And here we are, we could have stopped this long time ago, you made a dumb mistake and could have take it back, but you clearly you rather try to square the circle than to aknowledge a mistake, fine by me, it is fun to see you contort like that.
Yeah, I guess it was very hard to figure out after 2 years of war and actually carrying out black out exercises that blaking out was a very effective and easy way to deny assistance to the enemy... and just to point out the sheer stupidity of such an argument, even if they dont black-out right away... they would after the first bombing, wouldnt they?

So, whats your argument?
Would they, effectively, at ALL locations and towns across Turkey? Do you really think the Turkish civil administration in the 1940s was that effective??? Do you have any idea what level of investment and constant development of a civil defence organisation it took even advanced Western european nations to achieve that in the 1920s and 1930s as war approached?

Turkey had little or no experience at all of suffering strategic aerial bombardment of any form during WWI; Germany and Britain did. Not only did it influence ALL their interwar preparations for a repeat of events, they also learned from all the interwar developments in theory and practice.
Cut off the power? That is rather easy and the Turks had actually been preparing, it is no coincidence that their army had been mobilized since 1940, that would mean to usual pre-radar precautions, spotters, black-outs, etc. and they can always draw on German experience.
And no, you didnt use the word precision, you just claimed the 1941 RAF able to target junctions at night...
You don't really get it, do you...

How many major junctions in the Turkish railway system were outside towns or cities???
How many did inside?
Such a laughable statement has been desperately covered by then indicating city bombardment as a means to get at what was at first indicated as a pretty specific target, junctions, without mentioning cities and we all now junctions and cities do not mean the same thing. That when is well known the RAF could barely target cities and in the end just dropped the bombs in the hope of hiting something within it, that is when they were lucky enough to actually find the city.
I suggest you do some REAL research on events; what happened was the British discovered that percentages of their raids were not finding targets, that percentages of ordnance was not hitting their intended industrial targets within built-up areas etc., that percentages of their ordnance was missing targets by various distances. There were major and frequent successes - just not enough to justify the HUGE number of sorties Bomber Command was flying.
Against railroads? Thats what we are talking about here, and with a few Wellingtons...

And remember, they were missing a LOT, so even if they do bomb, they will miss, a LOT, and giving the railroads resilience...
The point is however that from Aril/May 1940 the RAF set out to exactly what I said they needed to do here - attack specific targets within urban areas. As of the beginning of BARBAROSSA and for some months after wards they CONTINUED to do exactly that, having ramped their effort up considerably from the early days of the "Oil Campaign". They hadn't realised as yet that the results were not what they wanted or as they thought they were - when used against a Germany and German targets in Western Europe that were effectively protected by various countermeasures...

BECAUSE they didn't realise it yet, the same tactics would be employed here - raids from Syria/Lebanon against Turkish towns that contained rail junctions...except here they would be being employed against targets that would not be effectively blacked out, where there was no decoy system, no nightfighter capability, little or no anti-aircraft capability of any sort...
They would be blacked out and rather quickly since those are truly obvious precautions and would count on German advice for that.

Remember that you are not attacking Turkey, you are attacking the German logistical chain, so they would make sure there is flak were is needed, and if radars and nightfighters are needed they would be deployed there as well, but I doubt it would come to that because of a handfull of Wellingtons...

And remember, they would miss, a LOT, so even if they bomb they wont affect the railroads.
No matter what countermeasures were eventually put in place, the RAF in the Eastern Med would have some weeks or months to damage the Turkish rail network - and that's just flying by night...

What if they choose to raid by day too? :wink: An effective defence in daylight relies on early warning and raid tracking I.E. a well-trained ground observer system, a command-and-control system for fighters, having the fighters positioned in the right places...and RADAR - how was the Turkish radar network in 1941? :lol: :lol: :lol:
Lol, not at all, those are obvious targets and the RAF couldnt hit crap at night so no. The Turks were in war footing since 1940, the whole structure, including raid spotters, an obvious and easy one since they were advised by the RAF... :lol:

But the Germans would deploy there as well, its not like they would leave the safety of their supply chain to the Turks, so if the RAF ever becomes more than a handful of Wellingtons then an appropriate response would be implemented, yes, including radar like in most occupied countries that faced RAF raids.

And remember, they would miss, a LOT, so even if they bomb they wont affect the railroads.

Please do recall that all this began becuase you claimed that the RAF 1941 would be able to hit railroad junctions... now just assimilate that you just said that they missed a lot... now add the natural resilience of rairoad track to that... can we finally agree that whatever the RAF does in 1941, it wont mean crap to the Turkish railroads?
In other words there was a VERY disaffected minority...
...that knows what is at stake.
Has that actually ever stopped the Kurds? 8O
After 1937, when was the next armed Kurd uprising?
Yeah, the mighty SOE the one the British ambassador in Ankara did not think very highly of
NOONE in Great Britain thought highly of the SOE - except themselves...and the War Cabinet, and the various governments-in-exile and armed forces-in-exile. And yet - look at the results that the SOE achieved...
Yeah... what results... that can be atributable to the SOE... in consitions similat to Turkey's, were they were already under surveillance and based on British legations of all places, meaning that they would lose their support net on day 1 of the war...
...so after rounding up the known ones already identified you just put up posters:

"Have you seen suspicious white people about your village?

Call 1800 WE-WILL-BURN-YOUR-VILLAGE-AND-MASSACRE-EVERYONE-IF-YOU-DONT-REWARD-OFFERED-MAYBE"

There may be some willing, but after the first couple massacres things would settle and SOE agents turned in, if any scaped the Turks that is. You see, one thing is killing random people as retaliation, a good directed Turkish-style genocide is a whole different thing specially when the guys offering "help" are the ones on the run themselves and putting your people at risk...
In all seriousness, do you know ANYTHING about the history of Resistance in the Occupied nations during WWII? 8O ALL over Europe and the Mediterranean theatres, and the Far East - people in their thousands took that risk.

And yes, there WERE hundreds of hostages killed, and villages destroyed - did it stop the Resisters? Did it stop SOE? Did it stop the Resisters cooperating with SOE? You know what the answer to that is...
And yet none of those ever reached the level the Turks were willing and did reach, all of those involved invaded countries where logically people really took an issue with the German presence, in this case the country itself would gleefully carry out the punishment if a tribe or some people betray its country.

And yes, I know about the resistance and their sacrifices, but this is a whole different environment, this is not killing a few to disuade people, this is killing thousands to make the problem people dissapear and that is what you are missing or seem unable to understand, perhaps because it is too horrific to grasp.

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Re: Turksih Railway Capacity supply to caucasus

#39

Post by phylo_roadking » 04 May 2014, 03:01

JAG13, stop with the cheek right now. It is NOT approved of on this forum. I don't know what sort of forums you're used to, but it's banned here. Get used to that.
Coming from you the one that uses smilies liberaly? Thats rich!
Smilies are permitted, "low forms of speech" are not. Period.
Cut off the power? That is rather easy and the Turks had actually been preparing,
I'm sure YOU can provide evidence of that. Reference please.
it is no coincidence that their army had been mobilized since 1940, that would mean to usual pre-radar precautions, spotters, black-outs, etc. and they can always draw on German experience.
If you knew anything about civil defence, then you'd be aware that it's VERY rarely carried out by the armed services of any nation but by "parallel" civil organisations. Mobilised armies and military formations tend to be posted at potential targets for enemy action on the ground - not stationed a man on every street shouting at people to put their lights out or pull their curtains. THAT is the level of blackout that is required; for the Turkish Army to be on every street in Turkey doing THAT....the British could just walk into Turkey unopposed and wrap the place up! :roll:

By the way - exactly HOW much of Anatolia did the Turkish national power grid cover in 1941? :P I wonder just how few towns would simply pulling the plug REALLY black out? And of course....how many people IN those towns could and would be using electric lighting? :roll:
How many major junctions in the Turkish railway system were outside towns or cities???
How many did inside?
YOU style yourself the supposed expert on the Turkish railway network - you tell US how many towns or villages the railway network passed through...
Against railroads? Thats what we are talking about here, and with a few Wellingtons...
Few??? Perhaps YOU should check the number of RAF bombers in the Eastern Med by mid and late 1941...
And remember, they were missing a LOT, so even if they do bomb, they will miss, a LOT, and giving the railroads resilience...
If they miss the rail tracks or even the junctions, marshalling yards, switch and signalling gear etc...then they hit the towns around them ;) How long do you think there will be good relations between the Germans and the Turks, once the Turks' agreemwnt to let the Germans use their rail network brings British bombs down on Turkish civilians? Remember - the Turkish Army may have been "pro-German" as you call it...although interesting elements of the Turkish armed forces were not ;) ...but the Turkish head of state was VERY aware of what Turkey's allying themselves with the Central European Powers had cost them in WWI...

Because, you see...
Remember that you are not attacking Turkey, you are attacking the German logistical chain, so they would make sure there is flak were is needed, and if radars and nightfighters are needed they would be deployed there as well, but I doubt it would come to that because of a handfull of Wellingtons...
But the Germans would deploy there as well, its not like they would leave the safety of their supply chain to the Turks, so if the RAF ever becomes more than a handful of Wellingtons then an appropriate response would be implemented, yes, including radar like in most occupied countries that faced RAF raids.

And remember, they would miss, a LOT, so even if they bomb they wont affect the railroads.
No; once the Turks allow the Germans to station ANY form of defence INSIDE Turkey to protect that logistical chain, as opposed to leaving it to the Turks within Turkey....in the eyes of the world Turkey is no longer Neutral it will have become if not an outright German ally then a "co-belligerent". That's how it worked, I'm afraid.

There might be German advice...but if the Turks permit any active GERMAN defence of the Turkish rail network, any deployment of German forces under arms inside Turkey for whatever reason - Turkey has joined the war.
The Turks were in war footing since 1940, the whole structure, including raid spotters, an obvious and easy one since they were advised by the RAF...
You DO realise what the RAF "advice" consisted of until 1943, don't you??? :lol:
Has that actually ever stopped the Kurds?
After 1937, when was the next armed Kurd uprising?
You see, there you go again :roll: It doesn't need an Kurd uprising at all....just a disaffected Kurdish population to shelter and support the SOE. To begin with...
Yeah... what results... that can be atributable to the SOE...
Really? That's a real, honest-to-god question? 8O 8O 8O
in consitions similat to Turkey's, were they were already under surveillance and based on British legations of all places, meaning that they would lose their support net on day 1 of the war...
Want a for-instance???

Well, in 1941, the Greek government in temporary exile on Crete were VERY aware of the existence and opreparations of the SOE for a german invasion....and they demanded it all be halted. And it was...

And yet - despite the opposition of the Greek government...and that opposition to SOE operations on Greek territory continued in the Delta - and despite the "opposition" of the Germans on Crete - in 1944 the SOE-supplied, trained and networked Cretan Resistance forces, both Communist and non-Communist, the SOE networking /training/supporting BOTH groups even though they occasionally "went to war" with each other...forced the withdrawal of the German garrison from ALL over the island into one town, forced its SURRENDER, with the British havng to guarantee their safety from the Cretans.

Do you actually understand that? After the Greek government demanded the SOE end its anti-invasion preparations, and John Pendlebury was himself killed...the SOE went back to Crete after the invasion and from a standing start with its trained/supported local resisters entirely liberated Crete.

Perhaps you should take a look at the number of locations and areas where SOE operations failed entirely, or all hands were lost...and the SOE kept inserting agents and networking resisters and carrying out their own covert actions over and over again DESPITE earlier failures. Do you REALLY think that deporting the KNOWN SOE agents in the British Embassy would STOP SOE operations in Turkey for the rest of the war??? :lol: :lol: :lol:
And yet none of those ever reached the level the Turks were willing and did reach, all of those involved invaded countries where logically people really took an issue with the German presence
Seriously? Is that the real level of your knowledge on all this? You really don't know how "thin" opposition was in so many Occupied European nations for several years??? 8O :roll:
in this case the country itself would gleefully carry out the punishment if a tribe or some people betray its country.
:roll: Ahem....one word - Milice
And yes, I know about the resistance and their sacrifices, but this is a whole different environment, this is not killing a few to disuade people, this is killing thousands to make the problem people dissapear and that is what you are missing or seem unable to understand, perhaps because it is too horrific to grasp.
And you think this is going to be so easy once the British start arming the Kurds or any other opposition to Ankara?

By the way - I really think you SHOULD read a decent history of the events on Crete - you'll find that there the Germans DID at times carry out almost-systemic attempts to wipe out opposition and local civilian populations...and all it did was create FURTHER oppostion to their occupation - with the eventual results I noted above :wink:

There's nothing remarkable or unique about circumstances in Turkey, you know; government over-reaction ALWAYS, EVERYWHERE, causes growing resentment and a spiral of resistance and counter-resistance violence...in this case with the British waiting to take advantage of it. Which they usually did :wink:
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Re: Turksih Railway Capacity supply to caucasus

#40

Post by David Thompson » 04 May 2014, 05:18

JAG13 -- You wrote:
You cheeky bugger! :wink:

Feel free to civilly criticize a poster's arguments, but our rules prohibit personal insults and low forms of speech. Please avoid this mistake in future posts.

phylo -- Taunting posts add nothing to the discussion. If you have sourced corrections to make, please post them, and leave it at that.

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Re: Turksih Railway Capacity supply to caucasus

#41

Post by phylo_roadking » 04 May 2014, 23:58

phylo -- Taunting posts add nothing to the discussion. If you have sourced corrections to make, please post them, and leave it at that
No problem....

Let's begin by poutting the SOE nonsense being talked here to rest.
The Turks were well aware of SOE activities which were dumbly based out of the British embassy and consulates, the first thing to go in a state of war.
Moreover, they based in British legations, so in day 1 of the war they lose their support net...
They were aware of SOME of the activities of the SOE...and turned a blind eye to them. For several years the SOE efforts in the Balkans were organised and run out of Istanbul and Izmir because of the fall of Greece ;) Turkey was the centre of SOE's operations in the Balkans because of its proximity...

WHY were SOE operatives based in embassies and Consulates? Why are intelligence officers in ANY nation given diplomatic over? The SOE....and British Naval Intelligence,... and Section D(sabotage), MI6...ALL had operatives with diplomatic covers, and ALL of them had large operations in Turkey...but the SOE , for each of its officers with diplomatic cover, had a simuilar number of agents living and working in the community in Istanbul, Izmir, Therapsis etc. that the Turks did NOT know about. Izmir for example became the home to a large and semi-independent SOE "command", HQ'd in the consulate there but with a wireless station in Buga and a base in Egrilar.

As for numbers - the SOE "diplomatic community" in Istanbul was always large - never less than 25, and sometimes as large as 32, all with diplomatic cover as members of the "Shipping Department, Ministry of War Transport".
And the SOE had already been caught red handed by smuggling explosives into Turkey, one of their rings uncovered and some of their agents already under surveillance... very good indeed... .
It was quite late in the war this happened - specifically, after the Turks signed their treaty and non-agression with the Germans in 1941...because the SOE were doing EXACTLY what I said they'd do, they were stockpiling explosives INSIDE Turkey for "stay behind" demolition actions. Only one stockpile was ever known about by the Turks - there were ALSO stockpiles in Embassy properties in Izmir and the stable in the consulate gardens at Therapsis!

I wonder why else the SOE and all those other British intelligence services were active in Turkey APART from projection into the Balkans??? Simple....HISTORICALLY, Naval Intelligence, Section D of MI6, and the SOE were ALL also carrying out lowlevel sabotage against Axis rolling stock in Turkey, and in the case of Naval Intelligence against Axis shipping transporting chrome etc..

Relations between the Embassy staff and the SOE wavered up and down in a sine curve....but the SOE were always welcome in the embassy to one extent or another, although their activities "embarassed" the Ambassador occasionally - like smuggling the leader of the Bulgarian Agraraian Party, in exile, into the Embassy in Istanbul and giving him diplomatic clearance as am embassy translator! :P The Ambassador for instance managed to get their preparations for attacking the Turkish chrome industry and transport network toned down in 1943, just as chrome exports to Germany were going up again...and at this point Churchill agreed with him...because with the disastrous end of the Aegean Campaign, the British in the Eastern Med weren't in a position to intervene in Turkey at THAT point if the Germans ' chrome supply was made SO problematic as to cause them to consider invading Turkey to secure it!

But after April 1944 and the total suspension of chrome shipments to Germany by Turkey, there was discussion about pulling out those SOE operatives engaged in activities INSIDE Turkey as being no longer necessary, and leaving those staff responsible for SOE operations In the Balkans, but the C-in-Cs Middle East requested (and got!) the SOE presence in Turkey ramped back up again to its maximum over the summer of 1944...this time with their "domestic" in-Turkey activites redirected at monitoring and sabotaging Axis shipping moving from the Black sea to the Aegean.

So as we can see - the SOE maintained a VERY large (for SOE) presence in Turkey from its creation right through to the end of the war. Throughout most of that time, as well as controlling SOE operations in the Balkans out of Turkey, they were making preparations for and carrying out operations INSIDE Turkey - preparations for a German invasion, preparations for and sabotage against the chrome trade Axis-owned railway rolling stock, sabotage against Axis shipping etc.

The above from Ch.8, British Diplomacy in Turkey: 1583 to the Present by G.R. Berridge.
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Re: Turksih Railway Capacity supply to caucasus

#42

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 05 May 2014, 00:59

Would not hurt this thread to have had few less posts that were barely related to the topic. Here is the OP.
pugsville wrote:It's cropped up a few times in the What if section about the Germans pursuing a "southern" strategy that involves attacking Russia through Turkey. So I thought I'd start a thread solely for evaluating the logistical problem in suppling a German army on the Turkish-Russian border.

I have some appreciation of logistics, but I don't claim any knowledge of Turkish railways. So I'm throwing a few questions out there and see what other posters could contribute (I'll do some research and see what I can come up with)
Questions.

Whats the capacity in tons per day of the existing Turkish railway?
- Was it only a single track to the Russian border? What sort of quality? what sort of axel loadings?

How much rolling stock would be required to do this?
- trains running from Germany would require a lot of rolling stock, to maintain the 'pipe' providing supply. The German economy was already drastically sort of rolling stock, so an estimate of how much (% of total rolling stock) would this impact of the Germany economy,
- (maybe barges down the daube across the black sea could be used)

How many divisions would this supply?
I am hoping post # 3 & my post # 4 helped Pugsville with his question.
JAG13 wrote:This is their 1941 net:

Image

The net to be used had 3 different origins as this map explains (2011):

Image

The red net allows for a 20t axle load, the pink one 19-20t, and the blue one 17t, so it was pretty decent on that respect.

The khaki one are the old Russian railroads, those were narrow and of varying gauge, any plan to use them would require an upgrade to standard gauge first.

The biggest use would be sidings since it was pretty much all single track, and I have no idea about their density.

This is the best source you are likely to find:

http://www.trainsofturkey.com/w/pmwiki. ... ry/History

Just go to the section for each railroad, at the end you will find the open date for each branch and its axle load. If you check the section for TCDD you will see that the Turks had been investing heavily on their railroads in the decade prior to WW2, in that context I would expect the line to be well maintained.

There were no train ferries in Turkey back then but a "terminal" could be improvised in Istanbul fairly quickly if Italian ferries from the Messina service can be made available. Samsun and Zonguldak would be available for shipping.

The RB expected a single track line to be able to support 10 trains a day, with weights going from 450t to 800t (usually closer to the former). Number of divisions would vary, an artillery-heavy division would consume a lot more in combat than a mountain or even PzDiv, a static PzDiv consumes very little compared to a division with many horses that need to eat regardless...

Some additional statistical info, but this is from 2008, so...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rail_trans ... nformation

And info on their trains:

http://www.trainsofturkey.com/w/pmwiki. ... Steam#toc4

They had quite a few, but you never have enough.
Carl Schwamberger wrote:Ten per day at that load = 8000 tons maximum daily. Numbers for army requirements are all over the range, but here are sime rough estimates. A German 'bare' infantry division without attachments could consume up to 400 tons per day in heavy sustained combat. That would be mostly artillery ammunition. Things like high energy grain for horses, human food, clothing, small arms ammo, medical supplies, vehicle parts.... for a division in operations would be 150 tons per day rough average. If battle is not sustained or intense then a average division requirement might be 250-300 tons per day.

Consumption for mechanized or motorized divisions is higher what with fuel and more spare parts. 400 to 500 tons per day for 'average' combat.

This does not cover corps & army overhead, a air wing, or the Golden Phesants, naval base units, railway service units, ect... that are over & above the the division logistics load. Just considering the legit corps/army/airwing overhead dividing the total number of battalions & airgroups by division HQ for a 'division' logistics draw suggests around 700 to 800 tons per day. For operation Overlord the BRit/US logistics planners allowed a overall army draw of 900 tons per day per Div HQ. A larger corps/army artillery, engineer, automotor transport, tactical air. support group in the Allied army accounts for most of that difference be tween their 1944 army & a 1941 German army.

So the high number from above, 8,000 tons, would at a minimum allow a army of ten divisions to be supplied properly by rail. Fifteen might be a upper limit. This of course assumes the 8,000 tons per day is a sustainable number, or is not too low, and has no allowance for a high draw by railway service units including extra FLAK.
Last edited by Carl Schwamberger on 05 May 2014, 06:34, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Turksih Railway Capacity supply to caucasus

#43

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 05 May 2014, 01:00

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Re: Turksih Railway Capacity supply to caucasus

#44

Post by phylo_roadking » 05 May 2014, 02:39

The 2011 map...

Image

The 1914 network...

Image

...and so things pretty much sat until 1927 and the creation of TCDD, The State Railways of the Turkish Republic. All the rail network IN RED on the 2011 map above was built by TCDD after that date...see my last paragraph below ;)

Looking around the trainsofturkey site, and several others, it would appear that 1930 was the high point of railway building, with the longest mileage of rail laid by TCDD being laid in that year. From there, TCDD kept on building, but it tapered down. As of 1930 the TCDD rail construction product was the largest civil expenditure of the Turkish state...
If you check the section for TCDD you will see that the Turks had been investing heavily on their railroads in the decade prior to WW2, in that context I would expect the line to be well maintained.
...which of course while it means that the lines in red that were created NEW before the war would be in decent shape, the funding split between maintenance for the old elements of the network and building the new might bear some checking if possible ;)
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Re: Turksih Railway Capacity supply to caucasus

#45

Post by phylo_roadking » 05 May 2014, 02:52

Samsun and Zonguldak would be available for shipping.
...although the successful RN submarine campaigns in the Sea of Marmaris and Black Sea in WWI bear considering ;) Remember - the French had already proposed in early 1940 that the RN commence submarine operations in the Black Sea as a way of disrupting Soviet consignemtns of strategic raw materials to Germany via the Black Sea-Danube route...so such a campaign was already on the table for discussion. It was one of THE great successes of RN submarine warfare, WWII submariners were always harking back to Nasmith and the E-11.

It's also noticable that each of these Black Sea ports is only served by a single branch line - should anything block or disrupt traffic on that branch, the ports are cut off from the rest of the rail network entirely...
And info on their trains:

http://www.trainsofturkey.com/w/pmwiki. ... Steam#toc4

They had quite a few, but you never have enough.
One interesting feature of the Turkish rail network in this period was their use of "Decapods" - 2-10-0 or 0-10-0 locos for heavy hauling. Both after and during the war period (in fact they majority of the Turkish network relied on steam right up to the very late 1980s!) There are problems using Decapods on a lot of the Turkish network - with its steep gradients and twisting mountain routes - problems that restricted most national operators of decapods to a maximum of 50mph...which is of course going to impact on the number of trains that can be run daily on the long haul stretches using Turkish locomotives.

Another interesting feature of the 1914-era map is that half of Turkey's pre-WWI rail network was built and owned by UK or French interests! Nationalised on the outbreak of Turkey's war, they were handed back to their original owners after WWI and before they were eventually forced into the hands of TCDD. Means there's plenty of useful detail available on all the elements of the Turkish rail system NOT built after 1927 by TCDD...
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