an alternate 1942 offensive
an alternate 1942 offensive
hi to all members,
I'm new to the forum but have many ideas and questions.
Firstly my alternate 1942 offensive.
On several threads you have discussed the failings of Barbarossa and why it ultimately failed. A divergence of targets, lack of military focus, economic political goals etc. etc.
What if with the failing of typhoon German planners opt for an offensive that providing its success will maintain military flexibility.
This new offensive will be launched in AGN region and involve 2 panzer groups, 16th and 18th armies with the intent to completely isolate Leningrad, link up with the Finns and potentially seize archangel.
The advantages are as follows;
1. the occupation of murmansk, the kola penisular. freeing up the 4(?) german divisions fighting in that region.
2. leningrad would ultimately be occupied. freeing up all 18th army forces maintaining the perimetre and those around the Oranienbaum Bridgehead.
3. with its completion artic convoys would be stopped, freeing up LW and kriegsmarine units.
4. by 1943 a panzer group will be in piosition directly to the north of moscow whether used or not the russians would be required to place extensive forces to guard against it.
5. this panzer group could be resupplied primarily via leningrad but also murmansk, through areas guarded by finnish troops, thus reducing the supply burden through belorussia regions.
what are your thoughts on this gentlemen, go easy its my first post
I'm new to the forum but have many ideas and questions.
Firstly my alternate 1942 offensive.
On several threads you have discussed the failings of Barbarossa and why it ultimately failed. A divergence of targets, lack of military focus, economic political goals etc. etc.
What if with the failing of typhoon German planners opt for an offensive that providing its success will maintain military flexibility.
This new offensive will be launched in AGN region and involve 2 panzer groups, 16th and 18th armies with the intent to completely isolate Leningrad, link up with the Finns and potentially seize archangel.
The advantages are as follows;
1. the occupation of murmansk, the kola penisular. freeing up the 4(?) german divisions fighting in that region.
2. leningrad would ultimately be occupied. freeing up all 18th army forces maintaining the perimetre and those around the Oranienbaum Bridgehead.
3. with its completion artic convoys would be stopped, freeing up LW and kriegsmarine units.
4. by 1943 a panzer group will be in piosition directly to the north of moscow whether used or not the russians would be required to place extensive forces to guard against it.
5. this panzer group could be resupplied primarily via leningrad but also murmansk, through areas guarded by finnish troops, thus reducing the supply burden through belorussia regions.
what are your thoughts on this gentlemen, go easy its my first post
Re: an alternate 1942 offensive
Hello Paul,
I believe the main concern of Operation Blau was OIL. I understand your position, but the intention was to conclude the war. Archangel is a long distance from St. Petersburg. IMHO the occupation of the entire Kola peninsula would not stop Arctic convoys. Archangel would still receive supplies during summer and free ice months. According to a number of posts, a majority of lend-lease supplies came through Siberia via Vladivostok (sp?). German supplies via Murmansk, NO....minimal shipping, British intervention with shipping, long distance. Better to ship to Leningrad or Helsinki and then railroad.
LW would still be needed for lend-lease to Archangel.
The other concern is the likely Russian counterattack towards the North. This could cut off the extended Germans. Also the winter in 1942-43 in all likelihood would be similar to the previous year.....40 degrees below zero. Most German casualties in '41-42 winter suffered from frostbite. I am sure they would be better prepared, but it still affected them in Stalingrad.
I believe the main concern of Operation Blau was OIL. I understand your position, but the intention was to conclude the war. Archangel is a long distance from St. Petersburg. IMHO the occupation of the entire Kola peninsula would not stop Arctic convoys. Archangel would still receive supplies during summer and free ice months. According to a number of posts, a majority of lend-lease supplies came through Siberia via Vladivostok (sp?). German supplies via Murmansk, NO....minimal shipping, British intervention with shipping, long distance. Better to ship to Leningrad or Helsinki and then railroad.
LW would still be needed for lend-lease to Archangel.
The other concern is the likely Russian counterattack towards the North. This could cut off the extended Germans. Also the winter in 1942-43 in all likelihood would be similar to the previous year.....40 degrees below zero. Most German casualties in '41-42 winter suffered from frostbite. I am sure they would be better prepared, but it still affected them in Stalingrad.
Re: an alternate 1942 offensive
This would have been very unfruitful, as the marshy/tundra was very difficult terrain for mobile operations, where Germans still held some advantage over the Soviets. I take the contrarian view. Except for a unexpected Soviet collapse German units should have NEVER went East of Peipus Lake - Narva River and/or north of the soviet/Russian M9 highway, given lack of Finn interest in keeping pressure on RKKA after reaching the 1939 border.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: an alternate 1942 offensive
thanks for your input
I agree that the ground would of been a hindrance pushing further east but not insurmountable as they tried attacking towards tikhvin. I think with the additional resources given to fall blau I think it could of worked. the thinking behind the what if is could Germany of launched an offensive in 1942 that with its completion would of left them in better position than before its start
my proposed offensive may well of done this, enabling the redeployment of the 18th army maintaining the Leningrad region, the divisions fighting in Finland and all the air assets supporting them.
if not In the northern regions where could the offensive been maintained with out the obvious failings of the historical truth.
I agree that the ground would of been a hindrance pushing further east but not insurmountable as they tried attacking towards tikhvin. I think with the additional resources given to fall blau I think it could of worked. the thinking behind the what if is could Germany of launched an offensive in 1942 that with its completion would of left them in better position than before its start
my proposed offensive may well of done this, enabling the redeployment of the 18th army maintaining the Leningrad region, the divisions fighting in Finland and all the air assets supporting them.
if not In the northern regions where could the offensive been maintained with out the obvious failings of the historical truth.
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Re: an alternate 1942 offensive
Leningrad was a port, Soviet Baltic fleet was "bottled up" there from first stages of Operation Barbarossa but it did aid in defense of city using naval guns against the Germans.
my viewpoint is every effort should have been made to eliminate the Soviet fleet, consider how many planes LW lost turning large piles of rubble into small piles of rubble in Stalingrad 1942 (2,000 - 2,500??)
or consider the loss of Bismarck on first sortie into Atlantic, just months before invasion of USSR.
what if some of those assets had been expended seizing Leningrad? close out one of the three fronts, a huge political victory, increases German influence in Scandinavia.
my viewpoint is every effort should have been made to eliminate the Soviet fleet, consider how many planes LW lost turning large piles of rubble into small piles of rubble in Stalingrad 1942 (2,000 - 2,500??)
or consider the loss of Bismarck on first sortie into Atlantic, just months before invasion of USSR.
what if some of those assets had been expended seizing Leningrad? close out one of the three fronts, a huge political victory, increases German influence in Scandinavia.
Re: an alternate 1942 offensive
thaddeus_c wrote:or consider the loss of Bismarck on first sortie into Atlantic, just months before invasion of USSR.
what if some of those assets had been expended seizing Leningrad? close out one of the three fronts, a huge political victory, increases German influence in Scandinavia.
Der Schwerpunkt des Einsatzes der Kriegsmarine bleibt auch während eines Ostfeldzuges eindeutig gegen England gerichtet.
Grofaz and his bloody henchmen
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: an alternate 1942 offensive
I'd like to modify Paul's interesting idea, because I agree with the earlier post that a 1942 offensive in the North, would not have the same strategic significance as Operation Blue had (seizing the Oil of the Caucasus).
What if:
After the opening phase of Operation Typhoon, the Germans realise that their supply difficulties and underestimation of Soviet reserves (perhaps a couple of armies escape encirclement during Typhoon), mean that they are unlikely to capture Moscow before Christmas.
Army Group center then digs in for the winter along a Livny-Tula-Kaluga-Volokolamsk-Kalinin line. They are in far better shape to withstand the Red Army's winter counteroffensive.
In Feb, with starvation in Leningrad at its peak, a sufficiently reinforced Panzer group 4, is transferred back to AG-North for a renewed offensive to capture Leningrad. This offensive also has all all available heavy artillery and Luftwaffe units that can be spared. (2 Panzer groups may be overkill because of the terrain around Leningrad). Leningrad falls (though I expect street fighting would extract a high German toll), the Germans link up with the Finns (who are now able to cross the pre-war frontier), AG North can be supplied by sea.
This marginally eases German logistics and reduces Red army strength and production capacity. I don't think it would result in the transfer of any significant no of divisions to AG Centre and South, because the Red Army would also not undertake their costly winter offensives to relieve Leningrad (incl. the loss of Vlasov's 2nd Shock army) and the Volkhov and Kalinin fronts would remain a threat. I also don't think it was logistically possible for the German's to capture Archangelsk.
What if:
After the opening phase of Operation Typhoon, the Germans realise that their supply difficulties and underestimation of Soviet reserves (perhaps a couple of armies escape encirclement during Typhoon), mean that they are unlikely to capture Moscow before Christmas.
Army Group center then digs in for the winter along a Livny-Tula-Kaluga-Volokolamsk-Kalinin line. They are in far better shape to withstand the Red Army's winter counteroffensive.
In Feb, with starvation in Leningrad at its peak, a sufficiently reinforced Panzer group 4, is transferred back to AG-North for a renewed offensive to capture Leningrad. This offensive also has all all available heavy artillery and Luftwaffe units that can be spared. (2 Panzer groups may be overkill because of the terrain around Leningrad). Leningrad falls (though I expect street fighting would extract a high German toll), the Germans link up with the Finns (who are now able to cross the pre-war frontier), AG North can be supplied by sea.
This marginally eases German logistics and reduces Red army strength and production capacity. I don't think it would result in the transfer of any significant no of divisions to AG Centre and South, because the Red Army would also not undertake their costly winter offensives to relieve Leningrad (incl. the loss of Vlasov's 2nd Shock army) and the Volkhov and Kalinin fronts would remain a threat. I also don't think it was logistically possible for the German's to capture Archangelsk.
Re: an alternate 1942 offensive
Barbarossa was a strategic offensive as was fall blau. my suggestion is that the 1942 offensive is more of a tactical venture. almost a staightening of the line but a bigger scale. at its end would be the realise of 18th army assests around leningrad, those involved in finland and all supporting luftwaffe assets ready for 1943.
during this "tactical offensive" the remainder of the forces on the eastern front could be brought up to strength with men and material, additionally this would enable the training and equiping of the rumanian, hungarian and italian forces making them more reliable for the 1943 strategic offensive.
The intent is to take a breath before the next major offensive.
during this "tactical offensive" the remainder of the forces on the eastern front could be brought up to strength with men and material, additionally this would enable the training and equiping of the rumanian, hungarian and italian forces making them more reliable for the 1943 strategic offensive.
The intent is to take a breath before the next major offensive.
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Re: an alternate 1942 offensive
I would equate the situation on the Eastern front thusly:
You are confronted by three grizzly bears.
You only have two rounds left in your rifle.
No matter which two you shoot you are pretty well screwed.
It is human nature to assume having made a mistake, any other options must be a better solution. In life there is not always a correct answer.
Germany was doomed after the failure of Barbarossa. They just didn't know it.
You are confronted by three grizzly bears.
You only have two rounds left in your rifle.
No matter which two you shoot you are pretty well screwed.
It is human nature to assume having made a mistake, any other options must be a better solution. In life there is not always a correct answer.
Germany was doomed after the failure of Barbarossa. They just didn't know it.
Re: an alternate 1942 offensive
I would suggest the best 1942 offensive would be a 2nd attempt at Moscow
1. AGS is divided into two groups one would be stationary and on standby to hold territory and protect supply lines.
2. The other group of AGS would be more mobile and armoured and be sent north to attack Moscow from the south east of the city
3. AGC attacks from the north or the centre of Moscow forming a pincer movement with AGS
That would be my alternate offensive, Who knows it might work
1. AGS is divided into two groups one would be stationary and on standby to hold territory and protect supply lines.
2. The other group of AGS would be more mobile and armoured and be sent north to attack Moscow from the south east of the city
3. AGC attacks from the north or the centre of Moscow forming a pincer movement with AGS
That would be my alternate offensive, Who knows it might work
Re: an alternate 1942 offensive
All though a attack on Moscow Pt 2 was what Stalin excepted I think it would have had a better chance to gain objectives that would at least bring about a armistices on German terms. The logistics are better here then the dash to to the caucus . There is the opportunity to destroy more Soviet forces without overextending your forces. The Wehrmacht is still superior to the Soviets in mobile warfare, and the Soviets must defend Moscow leaving them open to encirclement. While even if the Germans fail to capture Moscow if done right they can cause huge losses to the Soviets without undue risk to their forces, unlike Stalingrad. Plus I feel that the whole Case Blue OTL was a waste as there was no way in the time line of the war that the oil resources in the caucus could be used. Unless Hitler chose to close the oil fields through bomber raids ( which attacking from Crimea would suffice) the OTL attack was not the best choice.
Re: an alternate 1942 offensive
What's the chance of Leningrad turning into another Stalingrad (grave of the German army etc), or was Stalingrad less confined (with a completely open rear) so a Leningrad battle wouldn't last as long? I think it was essential to take Leningrad ASAP it was a large port and close to important rail links - it would have eased the German supply situation in the northern half of the front considerably. Also, the mountain troops could be moved out to where there are actually some mountains instead of being wasted as ordinary infantry. Maybe it wouldn't be necessary to move troops from the Crimea to Leningrad (!), which is what happened after the fall of Sevastopol. Taking Leningrad is a top priority for Hearts of Iron players, if that means anything (usually via a surprise seaborne assault somewhere near Riga to cut off the Russian armies in the area).
Re: an alternate 1942 offensive
David1819 wrote:I would suggest the best 1942 offensive would be a 2nd attempt at Moscow
1. AGS is divided into two groups one would be stationary and on standby to hold territory and protect supply lines.
2. The other group of AGS would be more mobile and armoured and be sent north to attack Moscow from the south east of the city
3. AGC attacks from the north or the centre of Moscow forming a pincer movement with AGS
That would be my alternate offensive, Who knows it might work
It wuld not work,and if it worked,the results would be meaningless
Re: an alternate 1942 offensive
Perhaps not if the mobile forces of AGS then wheeled south and captured Astrakhan after the fall of Moscow and cut the Caucasus off from the rest of Russia.ljadw wrote:It wuld not work,and if it worked,the results would be meaningless
Then the Germans would be in a good position for a third strategic offensive in 1943.
Re: an alternate 1942 offensive
By which time the AngloAmericans would/did come'a'knocking. Ergo, Adolf's predicament. A late victory in the East had been achieved previously, with zero effect to Germany's war fortunes. It would have been, again, a hollow victory.ChrisDR68 wrote:Perhaps not if the mobile forces of AGS then wheeled south and captured Astrakhan after the fall of Moscow and cut the Caucasus off from the rest of Russia.ljadw wrote:It wuld not work,and if it worked,the results would be meaningless
Then the Germans would be in a good position for a third strategic offensive in 1943.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion