#17
Post
by BDV » 11 Sep 2014, 17:09
Well, what else changes in German planning?
Leningrad?
Is there a plan of what to do with the civilians/captured troops? Can these 1.5 million be put to some productive use? The best solution is a set piece battle with West Front artillery and troops during rasputitsa, deployed using the railsystem in the Baltic Countries and their ports (leaving only minimal Atlantic Wall protectors during Atlantic Wall storms).
Otherwise, wreck the key plants with some focused bombing and then "allow" the Soviets to relieve the siege. Simultaneously, pull the trrops protecting finninsh teritorry, especially given the Phoney War the Finns are engaged in. Use these forces in other places.
South
Taganrog-Baku 1400 km some through difficult mountainouis ranges. Taganrog-Astrakhan 850 km of flat terrain. So Astrakhan may be a better bet than Baku, also if Donets rather than Don is taken as defense line, also limits the overextension of the flank/rear protectors. Or, at a minimum if the Axis defensive line follows the Rossosh Milerovo line (with the railline right behind them), not trying to follow the Don bend. Stalingrad, if forces available, could be taken from the South, rather than East. If the Caucasus is to fall, then the Sevastopol needs not need to be stormed. Rather, a significant italo-german torpedoboat presence (up to triple digits), and 20+ small Uboats (not the historical 6), starting in Spring 1942, not Fall, should make supplying and/or evacuating Sevastopol an expensive proposition until the day (fall of Tuapse) it becomes an impossible proposition. The forces that took Sevastopol should help with Rostov-on-Don instead, because that's the key to Caucasus, thus hastening the fall of Sevastopol from the rear*.
I don't think that the North-South option was necessarily a bad one, just that in light of 1941 developments the Axis needed to change significantly their approach to OstFront, and not only the Wehrmacht. But 1942 was unfortunately simply more of the bloody but losing same approach...
*In toto, the invasion of Crimea was one of the bigger boondoggles of 1941 and early 1942, courtesy of Adolf's favourite self-aggrandizing bootlicking Junker, Erich "Munchhausen" Lewinski-Manstein.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion