German War Economy 1940

[ljadw]

Tooze mentions that France's pre-war oil imports were 5.4 million tons per year, dropping to only 8% of that level after the German occupation. Not sure about the Benelux countries, but probably broadly similar on a per capita basis.

French oil imports were higher

1938 : Crude :6,968 million ton/refined :1.177 million ton

[ljadw]

the importance of oil was almost meaningless,and French transportation did not depend on diesel fuel

European energy consumption (in %)

1938 :

Coal and lignite : 90

Hydro-electric power : 3

liquid petroleum fuels : 7


1947:

coal and lignite : 85

hydro-electric power : 4.5

liquid petroleum fuels : 10.5

[glenn239]

the importance of oil was almost meaningless,and French transportation did not depend on diesel fuel

Tooze says the effect was severe,

Before the war, the French economy had consumed at least 5.4 million tons of oil per annum, at a per capita rate 60% higher than Germany's. The effect of the German occupation was to throw France back into an area before motorization. From the summer of 1940, Frace was reduced to a mere 8% of its prewar supply of petrol. In an economy adjusted to a high level of oil consumption the effects were dramatic...."

pg 411

[pugsville]

"the importance of oil was almost meaningless,and French transportation did not depend on diesel fuel"

The Germans too away most of the French rolling stock for the railways, coupled with the massive reduction in available oil, the railways were much reduced under the German occupation and their was no petrol to drive trucks. So the French economy nose dived under the occupation. France also imported most of it;s coal pre war.

[ljadw]

French transportation depended on railways who used coal,not trucks .

[ljadw]

the importance of oil was almost meaningless,and French transportation did not depend on diesel fuel

Tooze says the effect was severe,

Before the war, the French economy had consumed at least 5.4 million tons of oil per annum, at a per capita rate 60% higher than Germany's. The effect of the German occupation was to throw France back into an area before motorization. From the summer of 1940, Frace was reduced to a mere 8% of its prewar supply of petrol. In an economy adjusted to a high level of oil consumption the effects were dramatic...."

pg 411

The figures are not supporting Tooze( not for the first time)

There were in France before the war 450000 trucks (big and mostly small),in september 1939,250000 were required by the military .

In january 1944,the number of trucks that had the autorisation to drive was some 261000

small ones (<than 2 ton) :140850 ,45524 (12 %) used timber /charcoal (what the French called gazogène)

big ones (> than 2 ton) :120567,of which 70214 used timber/charcoal (58 %)

There were also 71690 personal cars(8507= 12 %,used timber/charcoal)

Thus, in january 1944,France had still almost 70 % of its prewar number of trucks .

Source :Transports dans la France en guerre P 205 Table 3

[RichTO90]

It's not only a question of blockade efficiency, but also of control.

Yep...something that seems to be escaping those staunch believers in the power of the free market and smuggling... :roll:

By 1942-43, almost all tankers not directly under control of the Axis were routed through the allied convoy system (including neutrals who actually prefered to run the risk of being torpedoed in an allied convoy to the risk of sailing as neutrals and being torpedoed anyway).
Which means that the naval authorities of UK & USA actually knew what every tanker was doing.
(note that the ships not sailing in an actual convoy were still managed by the same authorities)

Except...except...except, what about all those major oil trading nations that aren't subject to Allied naval power :roll: and all those smuggling conglomerates with all those tankers or one's they can build themselves cause they's gonna make SOOO much MONEY they's just gonna spring into existence MAGICALLY and...OOO - UNICORNS!!! :roll: :roll: :roll:

I don't know whether you're speaking in monetary terms, but the fun part is to "price" it in tons of coal (actually needed in the process) - and then check it against actual coal availability.

You spoil all the fun by bringing reality into the topic!

Man, I just couldn't wait to get back to see what the Heil Raisers had come up with this time. Seems like holding your breath and wishing for things really hard is their agenda... :roll:

[glenn239]

French transportation depended on railways who used coal,not trucks .

Tooze says on 385 that 1/3rd of all Axis war booty in France came from the French railway industry;

"All in all, the French, Dutch and Belgian railways provided Germany with 4260 locomotives and 140,000 wagons, figures that dwarfed the Reich's own investment in rolling stock in the 1930's.

[Gorque]

Unless I read the entry wrong when I noted it, DRZW states the exact same figures but differs by stating that only half of the above amounts came from the aforementioned nations.

[RichTO90]

And your concept of price fluctuations as not working as a tool for reallocating resources and increasing production and/or availability of scarce goods is also "interesting."

You might find the reality interesting. I suggest Stokes' The Oil Industry in Nazi Germany, 1936-1945 as a good starting point, following up with some of the analysis by the CIOS, BBSU, and the USSBS. The Fischer-Tropsch system required 7.1 to 8.9 metric tons of bituminous coal equivalent for hydrogenation and power to produce 1 metric ton of synthetic fuel. The Bergius process required 6.7 to 7.7 metric tons per ton produced. The production cost in monetary terms was 260 to 320 RM per metric ton. Note that prewar, the excise on imported fuel was around 1 RM per gallon, which was about the same as the cost...so about 714 RM per metric ton imported. In theory, the synthetic fuel was cheaper than the monetary cost of imports.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I wonder what the energy measurement was for the 6.7 metric tons of coal vs the ton of liquid fuel?

[Guaporense]

The energy density of oil is ca. 50-60% greater than bituminous coal. To make a ton of synthetic fuel, they had to destroy a huge amount of energy in the process: Germany was consuming ca. 40 million tons of coal a year to make synthetic fuel by 1943-44. The cost of oil in 1939 was 4 RM per barrel or 32 RM per metric ton, synthetic fuel was ca. 8-10 times more expensive.

[Carl Schwamberger]

With a cost ratio in btu suggested by the 50% to 60% per ton advantage, and the cost of approx eight metric tons of coal per ton of oil it suggests the liquid fuel was very important, or the coal was of small value. I'm guessing the former.

One item I cant recall seeing here is the effect on the non mechanizied side of agriculture. ie: what portion of horses & high value feed were removed from use of the farms? I'd think this would connect to the importance of automotive fuel were it either used a s a substitute for animal power, or it shortage made draught animals more important.

[ljadw]

From what I know,automative fuel was not important at all for the German agricuture,given the structure of this agriculture .

[Carl Schwamberger]

So, then what portion of horses were removed from the agriculture economy, and feed, and how did it affect agriculture production? We can see from the record that extensive rationing was in place in Germany in 1939, and the German occupied territories from latter 1940. what did any shortage of horsepower contribute to the necessity of that rationing?

My question here extends to the agriculture of France & the low countries post June 1940. IIRC France & Belgium were much further along in mechanizing agriculture than Germany.