Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onwards

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BDV
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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#16

Post by BDV » 07 Jul 2014, 04:28

David1819 wrote:Once overstretched and in open space the Germans lying in wait launch counter attacks on the soviet advance cutting off and surrounding the spearheads of the Red Army's advance.
That was done, tactically, and was not possible strategically because the WAllies and the Soviets kept up the pressure on the Wehrmacht, continuously.

The interpretation of historical events by poster Alixanther seems to me most illumminating, and sheds some light on the strategic choices made by Schicklgruber. Understanding these choices, good or bad, was beyond the paygrade of the low level surviving putzes who wrote the Nazi side of WWII history.
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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#17

Post by David1819 » 10 Jul 2014, 15:39

Don71 wrote:And you will tell us, that without the Battle of Kursk, this would be the same?

You are aware that the Battle of Kursk costs all of the Wehrmachts built mobile reserves?
Your statement is clearly wrong, with a bachhand strategy and without the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht would have all opportunities to counter attack, where, when and at which timeline the Wehrmacht choose.
This is what I am talking about it, It would have made life extremely difficult for the red army

Von Manstein said after the war, the German eastern front campaign could have been won if Hitler had relinquished control and allowed the professionals to conduct the war as they saw fit. Manstien realised that Germany could not defeat Russia in a static defence like Hitler "temporary fortress" idea which is just hold your ground last man to the last bullet, A kamikaze style stupidity.

The battle of Kursk involved 2,900 German tanks
Production of tanks in 1943 was 3,800 panzer IV 1,800 panzer V and 650 Tigers and they managed to produce even more in 1944
They had all the capacity to conduct a mobile elastic defence on the eastern front.

However if the Germans did use Manseins strategy it would most defiantly mean that Hitler has more given control to the generals which would make a take over by the Whermarcht and an assassination more likely against Hitler.


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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#18

Post by ljadw » 10 Jul 2014, 16:22

Why should we believe ONE word of what Manstein said after the war ? After the war,Manstein followed the ancient military law : if you belong to the winning camp,claim the victories, if you lost: search a scape-goat .

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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#19

Post by BDV » 10 Jul 2014, 17:22

David1819 wrote:Manstein said after the war, the German eastern front campaign could have been won if Hitler had relinquished control and allowed the professionals to conduct the war as they saw fit. Manstein realised that Germany could not defeat Russia in a static defence like Hitler "temporary fortress" idea which is just hold your ground last man to the last bullet, A kamikaze style stupidity.
Who would those be? Even with the Ostfront fractured into three pieces, aside from Runstedt (maybe) no commander demonstrated ability to command effectively at Army Group level. Among the Panzer army commanders the sole bright spot is Kleist, the other three demonstrating significant deficiencies during 1941, Hoeppner being IMO the worst.

It was the "Professionals" that told Hitler that AGN could take Leningrad, it was the "Professionals" that stated (and fully expected!) at start of Taifun that Moscow will be taken by November 7th, etc. etc. etc. It was the "Professionals" that drafted the Barbarossa plan. It was the "Professionals" who planned that panzer armies would operate independent of infantry and with disregard to their logistical needs (thus allowing Soviets to defeat both panzers and infantry). It was the "Professionals" that planned the logistics which failed so spectacularly during Barbarossa and Taifun. It was the "Professionals" that promised Adolf Leningrad in 6 weeks and European Russia in 6 months, etc etc etc.

Manstein, OTOH, was the chief OstFront on-field blunderer, (although Hoepner and Bock played probably a bigger role in AGN's July 1941 debacle).
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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#20

Post by David1819 » 10 Jul 2014, 21:03

BDV wrote:[
It was the "Professionals" that told Hitler that AGN could take Leningrad, it was the "Professionals" that stated (and fully expected!) at start of Taifun that Moscow will be taken by November 7th, etc. etc. etc. It was the "Professionals" that drafted the Barbarossa plan. It was the "Professionals" who planned that panzer armies would operate independent of infantry and with disregard to their logistical needs (thus allowing Soviets to defeat both panzers and infantry). It was the "Professionals" that planned the logistics which failed so spectacularly during Barbarossa and Taifun. It was the "Professionals" that promised Adolf Leningrad in 6 weeks and European Russia in 6 months, etc etc etc.

Manstein, OTOH, was the chief OstFront on-field blunderer, (although Hoepner and Bock played probably a bigger role in AGN's July 1941 debacle).

Your going off topic now, It was the "Professionals" that that did not think it was a good idea to split up AGC before Moscow. It was the "Professionals" that objected to splitting AGS in half and taking caucus oil fields and Stalingrad at the same time.
What ever the "Professionals" said directly to Hitler is irrelevant because at the end of the day they had to comply with his wishes and demands.

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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#21

Post by BDV » 11 Jul 2014, 16:41

David1819 wrote:Your going off topic now,
No, in that it establishes that the Professionals' track record on the OstFront is not that good.

It was the "Professionals" that did not think it was a good idea to split up AGC before Moscow.
The two panzer grouppes that had trouble securing the Smolensk pocket was going to make it to Moscow (much less take it) without infantry help?!? How'd that work during Taifun?!?

What ever the "Professionals" said directly to Hitler is irrelevant because at the end of the day they had to comply with his wishes and demands.
The "Professionals" had their shot in 1941 and blew it. They almost blew it in 1940, too, only to be saved by Runstedt's and Adolf's supervision.
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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#22

Post by alltoes » 13 Jul 2014, 02:51

BDV,
Over the last few years, you've made negative statements towards the leadership of AGN during the initial stages of Barbarossa. I am always learning. Please give your reasons with detailed information. The Solzy incident was a tough fight. The essay by.....can't remember his name. Well his position was for a straight attack IN LINE towards Leningrad after the battle of Rez... (sp?) I felt was a good option and possible war winning strategy.
Also I have not read much about Hoth and 2nd Panzer Army after the battle of Smolensk.

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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#23

Post by David Thompson » 13 Jul 2014, 03:58

A post from Don71, containing personal insults and low forms of speech, was removed pursuant to our forum rules.

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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#24

Post by BDV » 14 Jul 2014, 04:36

alltoes wrote:Over the last few years, you've made negative statements towards the leadership of AGN during the initial stages of Barbarossa. I am always learning. Please give your reasons with detailed information. The Solzy incident was a tough fight. The essay by.....can't remember his name. Well his position was for a straight attack IN LINE towards Leningrad after the battle of Rez... (sp?) I felt was a good option and possible war winning strategy.
AGN failures are like a mosaic. One has to fit many parts to arrive at the conclusion, although none of this is some breaking news, just the standard historical data. Of course, the Soltsy debacle stands out most glaringly. But compared to what the attacker had in mind at the time, also the Soviet stopping the 41st panzer on the Luga has to qualify as failure. Speaking of which, sticking the mobile kampfgruppe Raus in a bridgehead to get its brains bashed in by relentless soviet attacks, at that particular moment does not strike me as some great military accomplishment or even reasonable use of scarce resources. And even then clearing Estonia took till the end of August..

While 41st and 56th panzer korps were getting abused in varied ways between Peipus and Ilmen, west of Peipus the 18th army had a very tough time advancing against soviet defenses that had found their footing (either 41st or 56th could have done wonders). Instead the Army Group had to throw in the last reserve (infantry Korps 50 I think).

Overall July 10 - August 1st a discombobulated affair, that reflects poorly on vLeeb and Hoepner, even without considering Soltsy. After August 1st, even with the 39th Panzer added to the roster, additional poor, unimaginative attacks, as a result failing to take the objective (Leningrad) despite the additional resources.
Last edited by BDV on 14 Jul 2014, 12:51, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#25

Post by ljadw » 14 Jul 2014, 07:23

BDV wrote:
After August 1st, even with the 39th Panzer added to the roster, additional poor, unimaginative showing, as a result failing to take the objective (Leningrad) despite the additional resources.
1)This is falling in the usual trap :i.e. :the failure of AGN was caused by German shortcomings ,and not by the Soviet resistance .

2)I also like to see the proof that Leningrad was the objective:Hitler's Weisungen 33,33A,34,34 A and 35 are not mentioning the capture of Leningrad,but the encirclment of the city,something AGN finally did .

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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#26

Post by BDV » 14 Jul 2014, 15:57

ljadw wrote:the failure of AGN was caused ... by the Soviet resistance .
Well, obviously. But then, there are two main options for how Soviet resistance came to defeat the German attack:

A) Forces for the attack were insufficient.

B) The attack was performed poorly.

Historically, IMO, a combination of A+B occurred. German officer excuses that their arms were completely tied by GROFAZ for both are nonsense.

2)I also like to see the proof that Leningrad was the objective:Hitler's Weisungen 33,33A,34,34 A and 35 are not mentioning the capture of Leningrad,but the encirclment of the city,something AGN finally did .
Well, it was, at least in Directive 21 (until grapes soured, that is ;) )
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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#27

Post by ljadw » 14 Jul 2014, 16:29

BDV wrote:
ljadw wrote:the failure of AGN was caused ... by the Soviet resistance .
Well, obviously. But then, there are two main options for how Soviet resistance came to defeat the German attack:

A) Forces for the attack were insufficient.

B) The attack was performed poorly.

)

You are forgetting C) The fact that the SU was able to mobilize continously fresh forces,and longer than the Germans could defeat them .

Besides:A and B are questionable :although more forces would have been better and the Germans made some mistakes,this was not relevant for the German failure :more forces and less mistakes would still have resulted in a German failure :failure or success of Barbarossa depended on the possibility that the Soviet state would collaps in the first few weeks,making it impossible for the Kremlin to start the general mobilisation .This collaps did not happen,the result was that the Kremlin was able to send (on the average) weekly 250000 men to the front and this meant the failure of Barbarossa .


BTW: Weisung 21 had already been abandoned after less than 1 month of fighting :weisung 33 was talking about an advance in direction of Leningrad,not about the capture of Leningrad .

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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#28

Post by LWD » 14 Jul 2014, 17:10

ljadw wrote:
BDV wrote:
ljadw wrote:the failure of AGN was caused ... by the Soviet resistance .
Well, obviously. But then, there are two main options for how Soviet resistance came to defeat the German attack:

A) Forces for the attack were insufficient.

B) The attack was performed poorly.
You are forgetting C) The fact that the SU was able to mobilize continously fresh forces,and longer than the Germans could defeat them .
Your C is the equivalant of A.
Besides:A and B are questionable
Not really although other options are possible.
:although more forces would have been better
As a blanket statement this is questionable. If your log system is already over stretched adding more forces may not help the situation.
and the Germans made some mistakes,this was not relevant for the German failure
Of course it was.
:more forces and less mistakes would still have resulted in a German failure :failure or success of Barbarossa depended on the possibility that the Soviet state would collaps in the first few weeks,
That very much depends on how narrowly you define "Barbarossa. Certainly the Germans had options that might have lead to the defeat of the Soviets. Historically after the British and French declared war I'm not sure that they had any that wouldn't lead to a German defeat though.

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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#29

Post by alltoes » 14 Jul 2014, 17:22

BDV,
Thank you for your post. I understand your point. Although I agree with you in certain respects, I see a couple of different views.
I personally believe there are a number of situations where the commanders performed well. For example, in the Battle of Raseiniai the Germans encountered KV-1 and KV-2 tanks for the first time. The LW and superior leadership led to a decisive Russian defeat. Also, Manstein was ordered to continue to the Daugava River and capture Daugavpils which occurred in amazing time instead of assisting XLI corps.
According to the egotistical Manstein book, Lost Victories, he was not informed of AGN’s objective of Leningrad until early July. During the meeting at Daugavpils (after its capture), he should have been informed.
AGN was the smallest of the 3 groups with 29 divisions versus 50 and 57. They also had less armor than the other 2 groups.
The essay by Stolfi, http://militera.lib.ru/h/stolfi/04.html, I believe was a potential winning strategy. Holding Manstein at Daugavpils for one crucial week was a blunder I will attribute to Von Leeb and OKW. Also, Manstein to fumble east of the road to Pskov for another week was another blunder. Of course the obvious direction was this road, but it appeared open. Manstein wrote Pskov was minimally protected.
The one point I waver with you is the fact of the terrain. The “road” to Leningrad was filled with marshes and forests. This is definitely not tank or maneuverable country. The Luga area provided excellent defensive positions.
You are correct about Estonia. But didn’t the Forest Brothers have a major impact against the Russians? AND you must remember the terrain.
We all know the impact of Crete. Combined with hindsight, a division or less of paratroopers should have taken Narva in early July immediately after the capture of Pskov.
BDV, please discuss your position on Solzy. What were the mistakes? What would you have done differently? How would you proceed after Daugavpils? How would you proceed to occupy Leningrad? I appreciate your posts.

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Re: Manstein's backhand strategy is used from March 1943 onw

#30

Post by BDV » 14 Jul 2014, 18:43

ljadw wrote:C) The fact that the SU was able to mobilize continously fresh forces,and longer than the Germans could defeat them .
After the initial June-July callup, that would be hampered until the end of harvest. The additional men would also need weapons. Meaning that IF the forces are destroyed, Soviets would have very tough time to replace them, until about mid-November (end of October + 2 weeks for call-up). Which should have been obvious to the "professionals", but somehow was not.

BTW: Weisung 21 had already been abandoned after less than 1 month of fighting :weisung 33 was talking about an advance in direction of Leningrad,not about the capture of Leningrad .
That depends on the scope of Weisung 33. If its scope was limited, why talk about capturing Leningrad? But continuing advance on Leningrad means that German designs on Leningrad had not been abandoned.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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