BDV,
Thank you for your post. I understand your point. Although I agree with you in certain respects, I see a couple of different views.
I personally believe there are a number of situations where the commanders performed well. For example, in the Battle of Raseiniai the Germans encountered KV-1 and KV-2 tanks for the first time. The LW and superior leadership led to a decisive Russian defeat. Also, Manstein was ordered to continue to the Daugava River and capture Daugavpils which occurred in amazing time instead of assisting XLI corps.
According to the egotistical Manstein book, Lost Victories, he was not informed of AGN’s objective of Leningrad until early July. During the meeting at Daugavpils (after its capture), he should have been informed.
AGN was the smallest of the 3 groups with 29 divisions versus 50 and 57. They also had less armor than the other 2 groups.
The essay by Stolfi,
http://militera.lib.ru/h/stolfi/04.html, I believe was a potential winning strategy. Holding Manstein at Daugavpils for one crucial week was a blunder I will attribute to Von Leeb and OKW. Also, Manstein to fumble east of the road to Pskov for another week was another blunder. Of course the obvious direction was this road, but it appeared open. Manstein wrote Pskov was minimally protected.
The one point I waver with you is the fact of the terrain. The “road” to Leningrad was filled with marshes and forests. This is definitely not tank or maneuverable country. The Luga area provided excellent defensive positions.
You are correct about Estonia. But didn’t the Forest Brothers have a major impact against the Russians? AND you must remember the terrain.
We all know the impact of Crete. Combined with hindsight, a division or less of paratroopers should have taken Narva in early July immediately after the capture of Pskov.
BDV, please discuss your position on Solzy. What were the mistakes? What would you have done differently? How would you proceed after Daugavpils? How would you proceed to occupy Leningrad? I appreciate your posts.