Synthetic Fuel in WWII Britain

[BDV]

Hello,

In light of the deteriorating relations between Germany and Great Britain and the uptick in German naval warfare preparations, I was wondering whether there would have been feasible for Great Britain to start a synthetic fuel effort in the aftermath of the German takeover of Czechoslovakia (Summer 1939).

This would reduce Britain's dependence on importations with easy to see strategic and economic benefits.

[ljadw]

It would not be feasible:Britain did not have the know-how/experience: the Germans started already during Weimar with synthetic oil.

And,if it was feasible,there was no need for it ,because the imports of oil never were in danger during the war .

BTW; Afaics,Britain produced small amounts of synthetic oil during the war .

[BDV]

Britain did not have the know-how/experience:

LOL

Not a good explanation. Billingham Manufacturing Plant

And,if it was feasible,there was no need for it, because the imports of oil never were in danger during the war.

Acquiring the Norwegian tanker fleet is not a given. The success of ASDIC/SONAR is not a given. The success of ULTRA is not a given. Not in July 1939.

[RichTO90]

Acquiring the Norwegian tanker fleet is not a given.

By it not being a "given" then you must be able to imagine a reasonable scenario where a significant proportion of 18% of the world's tanker tonnage would be in Axis controlled ports and unable to flee to the control of Nortraship in April 1940? Seriously?

The success of ASDIC/SONAR is not a given.

Given that ASDIC was fully developed by 1923 it again remains for you to imagine a scenario that would make it a "not given" by "July 1939". I suppose you could postulate a world where all Brits are mewling idiots incapable of the doctrinal development based on experience that made ASDIC an effective part of the ASW weapon system, but otherwise your claim that it "is not a given" is unreasonable.

The success of ULTRA is not a given. Not in July 1939.

In theory without the Polish and French foundational work there would have been a delay, but ULTRA was not that significant except as part of the overall system employed to defeat the U-Boat anyway. In a converse, I could reasonably posit a world where the Brits were not idiotic enough (I suppose in reality they were somewhere between idiotic and mewling idiotic) to continue to use a compromised convoy code for years after it should have been obvious it was compromised.

The ASW system that eventually included HF/DF, AMC's, land-based aircraft, and CVE's, which you apparently forgot about. I suppose in your worldview those also are "not a given"? :roll:

[ljadw]

Britain did not have the know-how/experience:

LOL

Not a good explanation. Billingham Manufacturing Plant

And,if it was feasible,there was no need for it, because the imports of oil never were in danger during the war.

Acquiring the Norwegian tanker fleet is not a given. The success of ASDIC/SONAR is not a given. The success of ULTRA is not a given. Not in July 1939.

I stick to my point that Britain had not the know-how,experience,neither the time and money,and coal to produce enough synthetic oil as a substitute for oil imports,something which was your OP .

[BDV]

By it not being a "given" then you must be able to imagine a reasonable scenario where a significant proportion of 18% of the world's tanker tonnage would be in Axis controlled ports and unable to flee to the control of Nortraship in April 1940?

No Weserubung, Norway holding tight on its neutrality status plus asking a price Brits cannot afford for the use of the Fleet.

Given that ASDIC was fully developed by 1923 it again remains for you to imagine a scenario that would make it a "not given" by "July 1939". I suppose you could postulate a world where all Brits are mewling idiots incapable of the doctrinal development based on experience that made ASDIC an effective part of the ASW weapon system, but otherwise your claim that it "is not a given" is unreasonable.
...
In theory without the Polish and French foundational work there would have been a delay, but ULTRA was not that significant except as part of the overall system employed to defeat the U-Boat anyway. In a converse, I could reasonably posit a world where the Brits were not idiotic enough (I suppose in reality they were somewhere between idiotic and mewling idiotic) to continue to use a compromised convoy code for years after it should have been obvious it was compromised.
...
The ASW system that eventually included HF/DF, AMC's, land-based aircraft, and CVE's, which you apparently forgot about. I suppose in your worldview those also are "not a given"?

Strawmen, all.


The SUCCESS of this combination of measures is not a given. Indeed, RN comissioned and implemented significant technical and tactical develoments in convoy protection and ASW throughout the Battle of Atlantic.

Given that ASDIC was fully developed by 1923

FULLY DEVELOPED? "Seriously"?

[RichTO90]

I stick to my point that Britain had not the know-how,experience,neither the time and money,and coal to produce enough synthetic oil as a substitute for oil imports,something which was your OP .

Really? The British had the patent for the Bergius process and used it from 1929, so they certainly had the "know-how, experience" and "time" part of it. Britain was also wealthier than Germany, so they emphatically had the "money" part of it, while arguing they did not have the "coal" is about as odd a statement to make as "shipping coal to Newcastle".

What they DID NOT have, which the Germans absolutely DID have, was a crying need to invest heavily in such a technology when they had easy and reasonably secure access to natural sources of petroleum products, especially when they had access to AVGAS from the U.S., which was the chief reason for the Bergius-process plant in the first place.

[RichTO90]

No Weserubung, Norway holding tight on its neutrality status plus asking a price Brits cannot afford for the use of the Fleet.

I see, so in fact you're piling POD on top of POD to get to your POD? Fascinating. :roll:

Strawmen, all.

Er, no, you raised the strawmen of them being insuperable obstacles. the burden is rather on you to show how.

The SUCCESS of this combination of measures is not a given. Indeed, RN comissioned and implemented significant technical and tactical develoments in convoy protection and ASW throughout the Battle of Atlantic.

Sigh...so your POD's now include no ASDIC development from 1916 on, no ASDIC prototype in 1918, no ASDIC testing beginning in 1920, no ASDIC deployment with the fleet from 1923 on, no ASDIC schools in the Fleet from 1924, and no jint US/USN development form 1931? Or, I suppose, HF/DF development, RADAR development, and cryptanalysis development? The SUCCESS was the CULMINATION of those developments, and others, along with prewar and wartime doctrinal development and tactical experience - it was not the product of the COMBINATION of those developments except in that to ensure lack of success you would have to POD ALL of them.

FULLY DEVELOPED? "Seriously"?

ASDIC as a device? Yes. As an element in an ASW system? No.

[BDV]

I see, so in fact you're piling POD on top of POD to get to your POD?

I responded to a concern/question of yours.

ASDIC as a device? Yes. As an element in an ASW system? No.

Glad we agree.

[ljadw]

1939 was to late to build the plants who would produce millions of tons of synthetic oil .

About the coal :to produce 4 million tons of synthetic oil,20 million ton of coal would be needed .Where would Britain get these extra 20 millions ?

About the experience and know-how ,Germany had these,because,before the war,it was already producing considerable amounts of synthetic oil,something Britain did not .

Before the war,Germany produced the following amounts of synthetic oil :

1933:170000 ton

1934:150000

1935:240000

1936:500000

1937:650000

1938:1.2 million

1939: 2.2 million

If Germany did not produce synthetic oil in 1933, it could not produce synthetic oil in 1939 .
How much synthetic oil was Britain producing in 1933?

[RichTO90]

1939 was to late to build the plants who would produce millions of tons of synthetic oil .

Why start in 1939 when the British actually began industrial-scale construction of their first plant in 1933? It was designed for a capacity of 150,000 tons per year. In 1935 it produced about 69,000 tons...because the demand would not support more. In 1939 and then again in 1940 the plant achieved its peak output of nearly 148,000 tons - in 1940 entirely from coal-tar creosote; coal was only utilized from 1935-1939.

About the coal :to produce 4 million tons of synthetic oil,20 million ton of coal would be needed .Where would Britain get these extra 20 millions ?

British coal production 1937-1939 averaged 233 million tons per year...down from 276 million in 1923 and 267 million in 1924. In 1947 it was 197 million.

About the experience and know-how ,Germany had these,because,before the war,it was already producing considerable amounts of synthetic oil,something Britain did not .

Nonsense. Britain had no economic reason to do so, but its investment in the single plant built and operational in 1935 was sufficient to match early German production if the economics had been feasible. It wasn't.

Before the war,Germany produced the following amounts of synthetic oil :

Yes, increased because of additional plant investment, which made no economic sense for Britain and only barely made sense for Germany. BTW, the bulk of German production was Fischer-Tropsch using mainly coal synthesis. The British production was entirely Bergius process using coal-shale/creosote hydrogenation. Different processes, different goals - the British were principally interested in an alternative to importing high-octane spirits - the Germans had no real alternatives to any form of foreign POL dependence other than the F-T process.

If Germany did not produce synthetic oil in 1933, it could not produce synthetic oil in 1939 .
How much synthetic oil was Britain producing in 1933?

The prototype plant built in 1929 was capable of 10 metric tons per day. And, just like the Germans, they could have elected to expand an economically unfeasible petroleum industry that easily could have matched the German...except they didn't need to and there was no incentive to do so after the conclusion of trade agreements for 100-octane supplies from the U.S. and Venezuela.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Hello,

In light of the deteriorating relations between Germany and Great Britain and the uptick in German naval warfare preparations, I was wondering whether there would have been feasible for Great Britain to start a synthetic fuel effort in the aftermath of the German takeover of Czechoslovakia (Summer 1939).

This would reduce Britain's dependence on importations with easy to see strategic and economic benefits.

I think the correct end state of this proposition is: Germany still loses.

[ljadw]

1939 was to late to build the plants who would produce millions of tons of synthetic oil .

Why start in 1939 when the British actually began industrial-scale construction of their first plant in 1933? It was designed for a capacity of 150,000 tons per year. In 1935 it produced about 69,000 tons...because the demand would not support more. In 1939 and then again in 1940 the plant achieved its peak output of nearly 148,000 tons - in 1940 entirely from coal-tar creosote; coal was only utilized from 1935-1939.

About the coal :to produce 4 million tons of synthetic oil,20 million ton of coal would be needed .Where would Britain get these extra 20 millions ?

British coal production 1937-1939 averaged 233 million tons per year...down from 276 million in 1923 and 267 million in 1924. In 1947 it was 197 million.

About the experience and know-how ,Germany had these,because,before the war,it was already producing considerable amounts of synthetic oil,something Britain did not .

Nonsense. Britain had no economic reason to do so, but its investment in the single plant built and operational in 1935 was sufficient to match early German production if the economics had been feasible. It wasn't.

Before the war,Germany produced the following amounts of synthetic oil :

Yes, increased because of additional plant investment, which made no economic sense for Britain and only barely made sense for Germany. BTW, the bulk of German production was Fischer-Tropsch using mainly coal synthesis. The British production was entirely Bergius process using coal-shale/creosote hydrogenation. Different processes, different goals - the British were principally interested in an alternative to importing high-octane spirits - the Germans had no real alternatives to any form of foreign POL dependence other than the F-T process.

If Germany did not produce synthetic oil in 1933, it could not produce synthetic oil in 1939 .
How much synthetic oil was Britain producing in 1933?

The prototype plant built in 1929 was capable of 10 metric tons per day. And, just like the Germans, they could have elected to expand an economically unfeasible petroleum industry that easily could have matched the German...except they didn't need to and there was no incentive to do so after the conclusion of trade agreements for 100-octane supplies from the U.S. and Venezuela.

I remain unconvinced

[RichTO90]

I remain unconvinced

And you had to quote the entire passage to make sure everyone knew what you were unconvinced about? :roll: Instead, if you remain unconvinced, why not supply some pertinent information that supports your lack of conviction?

[ljadw]

Call it lazyness,but,it is easier for my to quote the whole post than to select specified passages;not every one is a computer genius .

Why am I not convinced ?


The OP by BDV was : was it possible for Britain to start in the summer of 1939 a synthetic fuel effort that would reduce her dependence on oil imports during the war .

My answer is still : no

It would be possible for Brittain to start in the summer of 1939 a synthetic fuel effort,but ,it would not reduce her dependence on oil imports during the war. This was the reason why such efort was not undertaken :what would be the use of spending billionsof £ ,if the result would be noticeable only after the war ?

The OP implies also that the capacity of the existing infrastructure was insufficient to reduce the dependence on oil imports :with the existing infrastructure,it would not be possible to produce 4 million ton of synthetic oil ;this implies that new plants had to be built ,and,this would take years .

If the OP had been : was it possible for Britain to start in the summer of 1935 a synthetic fuel effort that would reduce her dependence on oil imports during the war, I would answer ; YES. But,1939 was to late .


About the coal : I know that the coal production was going down during the war,and that conscripts had to be used (the Bevin boys),but the big question is not the possible production,but,what was needed : if for a production of 4 million ton of oil,20 million ton of coal was needed,there were only 2 possibilities :to increase the production by 20 million tons, or to take away 20 million tons from the existing consumers . And,I do not think that these 2 were possible .

Other points are : to build new plants, a lot of workers and a lot of steel would be needed .Where should one get these ? Between 1938-1943 (included) ,Germany spent some 4 million tons of steel for the oil program.
And, if 20 million (additional) tons of coal were available, would British Rail be able to transport them to the new plants ? 20 million tons of coal is a lot of trains .